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INTRODUCTION 
 
Often the choice is not between the Community 
method and the intergovernmental method, but 
between a coordinated European position and 
nothing at all.1 
[H. Van Rompuy] 
 
I believe we must put old rivalries behind us, we 
must set common goals and adopt common 
strategies. Perhaps we can agree on the following 
description of this approach: coordinated action 
in a spirit of solidarity – each of us in the area for 
which we are responsible but all working 
towards the same goal. That for me is the new 
“Union method”.2 
[A. Merkel] 
 
The European External Action Service (EEAS or Service) is one of the most 
significant innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It is also one of the most 
debated, given the symbolic importance attached to this unprecedented non-
national diplomatic service. The EEAS may not seem the most obvious subject for a 
legal inquiry. Given the administrative nature of this entity, an investigation of its 
organisation and functions might appear less useful than an analysis of the practical 
activities of its officers.3 However, it is apparent that the novel structure of the 
EEAS may have lasting consequences for the EU, not least because it alters the 
distribution of power in the Union. The Service is expected to increase the 
effectiveness of European foreign policy;4 the very European Parliament found the 
EEAS' form to be "extremely important if the Union's external relations are to be 
rendered more coherent and efficient".5 At the same time, the Service has been 
accused of denaturing the international identity of the Union, transforming a 'soft' 
or 'normative' power6 into a practitioner of the raison d'état. 7   
                                                 
1 Van Rompuy, Not Renationalisation of European Politics, but Europeanisation Of National 
Politics, Address given at the invitation of "Notre Europe", Paris, 20 September 2010, PCE 191/10. 
2 Merkel, Speech at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe in 
Bruges, 2 November 2010. 
3 It is indeed commonplace to affirm that "les fonctionnaires diplomatiques valent plutôt par leurs 
capacités que par  la manière dont ils sont groupés", as noted by G. Tornielli, Italian ambassador to 
France (1895-1908); quoted in Piccioni, Les Premiers Commis des Affaires Etrangères aux XVII° et 
XVIII° Siècles (De Boccard, 1928), p. 23.  
4 Less than three years after its establishment, several studies have already attempted to ascertain the 
Service's efficacy, see inter alia Vaïsse et al., European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013 (European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), pp. 21-22; Blockmans, The European External Action Service 
One Year On: First Signs of Strengths and Weaknesses (CLEER, 2012); De Jong and Schuntz, 
"Coherence in European Union External Policy Before and After the Lisbon Treaty: the Cases of 
Energy Security and Climate Change", 17 European Foreign Affairs Review (2012): 165-187. 
5 European Parliament legislative resolution of 8 July 2010 on the proposal for a Council decision 
establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, O.J. 2011 C 
351. 
6 See Nye, "Soft Power", 80 Foreign Policy (1990): 153-171; Manners, "Normative power Europe: a 
contradiction in terms?", 40 Journal of Common Market Studies (2002): 235-258.  
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It may be tempting to address these issues through the traditional schemes of 
European integration. It is well known that the EU is based on the tension between 
two different visions, one of which is favourable to an "ever closer Union" and the 
other seeks to maintain the 'Europe of States'. Union bodies are generally 
understood in light of this dialectic. While the European Parliament and, above all, 
the Commission stand for further integration, or 'communitarisation', the 
institutions where the Member States are represented are often depicted as the 
bastions of intergovernmentalism.  
If the EEAS were an instance of 'communitarisation' in foreign policy, it should be 
expected to increase effectiveness and maintain the exceptional nature of the EU on 
the international scene. The Service may thus behave as a sort of 'new Commission', 
providing impetus for the harmonisation of the Member States' foreign policies into 
a single EU external action. However, it is patent that this sort of Service may exist 
only to implement a single European foreign policy, which does not exist at 
present.8 Such an understanding of the EEAS would thus justify the view of a Euro-
sceptic Member of the European Parliament: "the whole EEAS is based on a 
gigantic myth [since] there is no common European foreign policy."9  
If, on the contrary, the EEAS were an instance of 're-nationalisation' of the external 
action, it should be expected to reduce the EU's capabilities and radically alter the 
international identity of the Union. Also this characterisation of the Service is 
misleading, simply because EU Members can hardly be expected to be as short-
sighted as to ignore that, as the J. Solana recently affirmed, "today, three European 
countries are among the world’s seven largest economies. Ten years from now, only 
two will remain. By 2030, only Germany will still be on the list, and by 2050, none 
will remain. […] What this means is that the European states are too small to 
compete separately in the world of the twenty-first century. It’s as simple as that."10 
As noted by Kissinger, it is transparent that EU Members "are attempting to 
compensate for this relative weakness by creating a unified Europe, an effort which 
absorbs much of their energies."11 Is it logical to argue that the Masters of the 
Treaties purposefully sought to invert this process via the EEAS?  
This analysis intends to demonstrate that the EEAS is not a champion of the 
traditional approaches to European integration. The Service is functional neither to 
set up, nor to dismantle, a monolithic foreign policy of the Union, but it should 
rather seek to promote harmony between the different external actions that already 
exist. Moreover, the EEAS should not redefine the identity of the Union as an 
international actor, but it should rather respect the different identities of the Union 
and its Members, and strive to pragmatically square their different views. In other 
                                                                                                                                               
7 These concerns seem to be at the basis of the scepticism of part of the civil society for the EEAS' 
role, namely in the field of development cooperation, see Van Reisen, Note on the Legality of 
Inclusion of Aspects of EU Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance in the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) (Europe External Policy Advisors, 2010); Mekonnen, The 
Draft Council Decision on the Establishment of the European External Action Service and its 
Compliance with the Lisbon Treaty, Legal Opinion Drafted for European Solidarity Towards Equal 
Participation of People (Eurostep), 2010. 
8 Bale, "Field-level CFSP: EU Diplomatic Cooperation in Third Countries", 10 Current Politics and 
Economics of Europe (2000): 187 - 212. It is worth specifying that, for the purpose of this work, 
'foreign policy' is intended as the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor 
(the EU or its Members) in international relations.8 EU Foreign policy is consequently used as a 
synonym for 'EU external action' and 'EU external relations'. 
9 William Dartmouth MEP, meeting of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee, 21 March 2012.  
10 Solana, "The European-American dream", www.project-syndicate.org, 26 February 2013. 
11 Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 24. 
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words, the Service is the expression of a novel approach to European integration, 
which does not postulate the renounce to the Member States' sovereignty, but 
rather seeks the coordination of the different European external actions. 
The delimitation of the object of this analysis is simple. We intend to investigate the 
status, structure, organization and functions of the EEAS. Consequently, we will not 
deal directly with EU policies, or entities such as agencies or EU Special 
Representatives.12  Given the close relationship between the Service and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High 
Representative or HR), several references are made to the latter, but only when this 
is necessary for the purpose of our research on the EEAS. 
Since the objective is to analyse the nature and functions of the EEAS, and these are 
mainly determined by the lex lata, it is necessary to determine the content of the 
law, by taking into account its sources and its application in practice.13  This work 
consequently adopts a classical 'legal dogmatics' approach (also known as 'legal 
doctrine' or technique juridique).14 We do not seek to conduct an inquiry in the 
fields of sociology, philosophy, or political science.  
A legal analysis of the EEAS encounters several obstacles, especially when the 
analysis seeks to reconstruct the law in action: the practice related to the EEAS is 
limited, difficult to identify and often contradictory. Nonetheless, a legal analysis of 
the Service does not appear to be premature. It is possible to reconstruct a large 
part of the law concerning the EEAS, as it is currently applied, by taking into 
consideration, beside primary and secondary law, subsidiary sources. These include 
firstly the unpublished documents of EU bodies, which may not have legal content, 
but influence the way EU law is applied. The documents that are not published in 
open sources were delivered to the author by the 'access to documents' services of 
EU bodies. The opinions of EU officers provide for another source.15 Such opinions 
were ascertained through 28 'in-depth' interviews conducted by the author between 
July 2010 and September 2012.16 These interviews are not relied on in a systematic 
                                                 
12 Although the Special Representatives assist the HR, like the EEAS, they are not part of the Service. 
This is rendered evident by the difference in these organs' legal bases (see Articles 28, 31(2) and 33 
TEU), but also by the fact that the EUSRs' mandate is limited to the CSFP. Such conclusion is further 
confirmed by the practice: if the EUSRs were part of the EEAS, it would be illogical for the Council to 
require them to "work in close coordination with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and 
its relevant departments", see e.g. Council Decision 2012/390/CFSP, O.J. 2012 L 187/44, Article 
4(3). 
13 In other words, we tend to adopt a 'realist' or 'pragmatic' approach to the legal inquiry, which, as 
noticed by Summers, “Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought – a 
Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General theory About Law and Its Use”, 66 Cornell Law 
Review (1980): 861, is more a body of general directions of thought than a fully developed set of 
views completely worked out in all major respects. There is no need, therefore, to discuss the 
theoretical implications of our approach at this stage: the consequences of our 'pragmatic' viewpoint 
will become clear in the course of the analysis. 
14 Cf. Corten, Méthodologie du droit international public (Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 
2009), p. 105. See also Peczenik, Scientia Juris - Legal Doctrine as Knowledge and a Source of Law 
(Springer, 2005), pp. 1-2. 
15 For the sake of protecting the anonymity of the interviewees, they will be referred to as officers 
belong to a certain body, without any further specification as to their identity. 
16 In-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive 
individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a 
particular idea, program, or situation. See Boyce and Neale, Conducting in-depth interviews: a guide 
for designing and conducting in-depth interviews for evaluation input (Pathfinder international, 
2006); see also Legal, Keegan and Ward, "In-depth Interviews", in Ritchie and Lewis, Qualitative 
Research Practice: a Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, pp. 138-169. 
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manner, but only for the purpose of clarifying the content of the law or its 
application in practice.17 
Another reason why a legal analysis of the EEAS appears to be feasible today is that 
the Service is not an idiosyncratic evolution of EU law, but is rather a development 
grounded on previous experiments. In other words, the EEAS is not entirely 'new'. 
This work seeks to demonstrate that it is possible to explain the features of the 
Service by analysing them in light of the evolution of external action law. Our 
hypothesis is based on a commonplace and an assumption. The commonplace is 
that the EEAS should provide the "coordination necessary to ensure the coherence 
of the European Union's external action as a whole", as the European Council, 
among many others, held when the EEAS was about to be set up.18 The assumption 
is that 'form follows function' and that the function of the EEAS should 
consequently determine its form.19 We hypothesise, in other words, that the Service 
should be structured in a manner that is conducive to coherence in EU and Member 
States' foreign policy.  
An analysis of the EEAS in the perspective of external action coherence is 
complicated by the uncertainties related to the definition of coherence. The first 
chapter seeks therefore to demonstrate that coherence is a legal principle that 
requests EU bodies and Members to promote synergy in the implementation of 
European external actions and unity in international representation. It is submitted 
that this principle can be enforced only via the coordination of European decision-
makers, through the 'Union method' put forward by Chancellor A. Merkel in 2010. 
The Masters of the Treaties foresaw an organ tasked with bringing about 
coordination and coherence, i.e. the High Representative. The HR's tasks are 
performed in practice by his/her administration, the EEAS, which should 
consequently implement the 'Union method'. The second chapter seeks to verify 
whether the EEAS is an expression of the Union method, or is rather a traditional 
'Communitarian' or 'intergovernmental' body. It is argued that the EEAS truly 
embodies the Union method, since it has multiple links to European policy makers, 
but is entirely accountable only to the HR. Nonetheless, the proteiform and 
sometimes contradictory inter-institutional relations of the Service render its 
coordinating capabilities difficult to ascertain a priori. Therefore, chapters 3 and 4 
focus on the Service's ability to promote coherence in practice. Chapter 3 intends to 
clarify the EEAS' potential to foster synergy in EU policy management. The Service 
generally performs this function mainly by promoting coordination between 
European policy makers. In some cases, the EEAS can also enforce coordination via 
specific powers explicitly entrusted by the legislator on the basis of an extensive 
reading of the principle of external action coherence. The fourth, and last, chapter 
investigates the EEAS' capability to enhance unity in EU external representation. In 
                                                 
17 In fact, the primary task of this work is not to reconstruct the EU officers' view of the EEAS. For a 
study of the self-perception of EU 'diplomats' (before the Lisbon reform), see Carta, The European 
Union Diplomatic Service (Routledge, 2011). 
18 EUCO 21/1/10 REV 1, Annex I para f, (emphasis added). 
19 Possibly this principle was expressed in this form for the first time by an architect, see Sullivan, 
"The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered", 57 Lippincott's Magazine (1896): 403-409:  "it is 
the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things physical and metaphysical, of all 
things human and all things super-human, of all true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the 
soul, that the life is recognizable in its expression, that form ever follows function. This is the law." 
Given the propensity of EU lawyers to favour architectural metaphors (such as the 'Greek temple' 
structure of the pre-Lisbon EU), it does not seem inappropriate to derive our working hypothesis 
from an established, albeit contested, architectural doctrine. 
 10 
most cases, the EEAS facilitates such unity, but does not ensure it. In the field of 
diplomacy, however, the Service makes sure that the Union 'speaks with one voice' 
and reinforces unity between EU and Member States' ambassadors. 
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CHAPTER 1  
THE 'UNION METHOD': 
ENFORCING THE PRINCIPLE OF 
EXTERNAL ACTION COHERENCE  
The process of European integration has led to the creation of numerous external 
initiatives at EU level, which coexist with the policies of the Member States. The 
challenge is now to bring together these different instruments and capabilities, in 
order to reinforce the European identity and its independence in order to promote 
peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.20  
EU law soon acknowledged the importance of this issue, which was firstly 
addressed in primary law by the Single European Act, whose preamble stressed 
Europe's responsibility "to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and to 
act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to protect its common 
interests and independence."21 The Maastricht reform, at Article C TEU (then 
Article 3 TEU) reinforced this requirement of consistency, by asserting that "the 
Union shall […] ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the 
context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies."  The 
Constitutional Treaty and, later, the Lisbon reform multiplied the references to 
"consistency". Article 21(3) TEU partially echoes previous Article 3 TEU, by 
affirming that "the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its 
external action", but also "between these and its other policies." Other primary law 
provisions call for "consistency" in specific external action areas or within the EU 
institutions that manage them.22 The concept of "consistency" between EU policies 
also spilled over to other areas, and is now listed among the "provisions having 
general applications" of the TFEU, whose Article 7 reads "the Union shall ensure 
consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into 
account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers." There is little 
doubt, therefore, that external action "consistency" should be considered as a 
general principle of EU law. 
Despite the significant attention practitioners and academics devoted to external 
action consistency,23 the content of this principle and its consequence for external 
                                                 
20 See European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better world: European Security Strategy, 12 
December 2003, not published in the OJ, pp. 3-4, p. 13 and the preamble to the TEU. 
21 Single European Act, preamble: see also Article 30(5). 
22 Articles 18(4), 26(2) TEU and 196(1)(c), 212(1), 214(7), 329(2) TFEU 
23 On external action coherence, see inter alia, Mignolli, L'Azione Esterna dell'UE e Il Principio della 
Coerenza (Jovene, 2009); Bosse-Platière, L'article 3 du Traité UE: Recherche sur une Exigence de 
Cohérence de l'Action Extérieure de l'Union Européenne (Bruylant, 2009); Michel (ed.), Le Droit, les 
Institutions et les Politiques de l'Union Européenne Face à l'Imperatif de la Cohérence (Presses 
Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2009); Dony and Rossi (eds), Démocratie, Cohérence et Transparence: 
Vers une Constitutionnalisation de l'Union Européenne (Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 
2008); Gauttier, “Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the European Union”, 10 
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relations law remain unclear. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the principle 
the Treaties refer to as external action "consistency" cannot be construed as to 
require the mere prevention of legal contradictions in EU external relations, 
through the delimitation of EU competences. It should rather be interpreted as a 
duty for both EU bodies and Member States to ensure the political synergy of their 
external actions.  
The first section shows that a restrictive interpretation of external action 
"consistency" is not to be accepted, since it is theoretically flawed and practically 
inefficient. The second section intends to demonstrate that EU institutions and 
Member States tend to overcome some of the issues raised by the delimitation of 
Union competences through pragmatic solutions, since they consider themselves 
under a political requirement to foster coherence in European foreign policies. The 
third section shows that such requirement of coherence has often been interpreted 
as a legal principle, since it generates legal outcomes and it underlies the 
architecture of the external action set by the Lisbon Treaty. The fourth, and last, 
section seeks to demonstrate that external action coherence can be enforced mainly 
at political level, by bridging the gap between the Community and the 
intergovernmental methods through the so-called 'Union method", whose 
implementation is ensured mainly by the European External Action Service 
(EEAS).  
SECTION 1. EXTERNAL ACTION "CONSISTENCY": INSUFFICIENCY OF A 
LEGAL REQUIREMENT OF NON-CONTRADICTION BETWEEN EUROPEAN 
FOREIGN POLICIES 
A literal interpretation of external action "consistency" may seem to suggest that 
this principle merely calls for the prevention of antinomies between European 
foreign policies. In the common speech, “consistency” is defined as the “ability to be 
asserted together without contradiction”.24 Such reference to non-contradiction 
seems to be supported by the most widely accepted legal definition of “consistency”, 
that is to say the absence of logical contradiction between two statements of law.25 
In this sense, consistency is a property of legal systems, which allows for their 
                                                                                                                                               
European Law Journal (2004): 23-41; Wessel, "The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and 
Delimitation in EU External Relations”, 37 Common Market Law Review (2000): 1135-1171; Hillion, 
Cohérence et Action Extérieure de l’Union Européenne (EUI Working Paper, 2012). 
24 For instance, see “Consistency” in the Merriam-Webster dictionary (Merriam Webster Mass 
Market, 2004). 
25 In this understanding, "consistency" would thus amount to what Dworkin refers to as "bare 
consistency", see Guest, Ronald Dworkin, (Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 80. As noted by 
Maulin, "Cohérence et Ordre Juridique", in Michel (ed.), Le Droit, Les Institutions et Les Politiques 
de l'Union Européenne Face a l'Imperatif de La Cohérence (Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 
2009)¸ pp. 9-24, at p. 11, the reason for this requirement of consistency descends from the fact that 
"la valeur de l'ordre juridique ne procède pas seulement de l'autorité qui le crée […] mais […] elle 
procède encore de la raison".  This characterisation of consistency can be found in the Treaties, 
outside the field of external relations, in Article 256(3) TFEU, dealing with the jurisdiction of the 
General Court. This provision reads “where the General Court considers that the case requires a 
decision of principle likely to affect the unity or consistency of Union law, it may refer the case to the 
Court of Justice for a ruling.” It is evident that the use of consistency in this case clearly refers to the 
non-contradiction we referred to above. 
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existence, and which is protected by preventing the emergence of antinomies.26 
Such prevention can be performed through the interpretation of legal acts, in order 
to construe norms that are not mutually contradictory. If this proves impossible, 
antinomies should be prevented through interpretation and, if necessary, solved by 
relying on the chronological, hierarchical, specialty and competence criteria.27 
It may therefore be hypothesised that ‘external action consistency’ should be seen 
as a specification of the general principle, or meta-principle, of consistency typical 
of the EU legal system. In this perspective, external action consistency may amount 
to the absence of antinomies between acts that relate to EU external relations. This 
section seeks to demonstrate that such interpretation cannot be accepted. 
Paragraph 1 shows that the contradictions in the external action are caused mainly 
by the delimitation of EU competences, determined by the attribution of limited to 
the Union. The rest of the section demonstrates that the principle of conferral 
actually serves to prevent the antinomies between EU and Member States foreign 
policies (paragraph 2) and between EU external actions (paragraphs 3 and 4). 
1. The Principle of Conferral and its use as the (Alleged) Main Causes of Legal 
Contradictions between European External Actions 
As in the other sectors of the EU legal system, the antinomies of the external action 
can be generated by a number of factors. For instance, a shift in the EU’s political 
priorities may generate intertemporal inconsistencies; moreover, an erroneous 
interpretation of a Treaty provision may lead to an inconsistency with primary law. 
An accurate reading of the Treaties clarifies that external action inconsistencies are 
expected to be caused mainly by the overlapping of different EU policies. Article 
21(3) TEU indeed asserts that the Union shall ensure consistency between the 
different "areas of its external action" and between these and its other "policies". 
This is further confirmed by Article 7 TFEU, according to which the Union shall 
ensure consistency between its "policies and activities". An even closer inspection 
reveals that external action consistency is an issue affecting also the relation 
between EU and Member States’ policies.28 In one case, Article 196(1)(c) TFEU 
(civil protection), primary law explicitly call for “consistency” between a policy of 
the Union and the one of its Members. In other instances, the Treaties require the 
EU’s and Member States’ action to promote “complementarity” among their 
                                                 
26 It is not necessary to investigate into the detail the philosophical implications of the 'consistency' of 
legal systems, since there seems to be no unanimity in the doctrine in this respect, and an analysis of 
this issue would depart from the subject of our studies. In particular, we do not intend to discuss the 
'coherence' of legal systems as such, which may be defined as the ability to express a single and 
comprehensive vision of justice, see Guest, op. cit., p. 80 and Schiavello, “on Coherence and Law: An 
Analysis of Different Models”, 14 Ratio Juris (2001), 233-243, pp. 236 ff. As discussed later, we will 
content with a differentiation between the consistency of the external action, as an expression of the 
consistency of legal systems, and its coherence. The latter cannot be seen as an expression of a vision 
of justice, but it is rather an aspect typical of policy management, and particularly of foreign policy. 
27 See Falcòn y Tella, Equity and Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 106.  
28 This form of 'consistency' is often referred to as 'vertical consistency', in opposition to the 
'consistency' of EU external action, which is termed 'horizontal'. This terminology implies a 
characterisation of the EU system as hierarchically organised, with the EU at the top and the Member 
States at the bottom of the legal order. Such 'federal' understanding of EU law does not seem to be 
appropriate for the EU legal order, therefore we will not use the adjectives 'vertical' and 'horizontal'.  
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policies,29 and request EU countries to “refrain from any action which is contrary to 
the interests of the Union”.30 Provided that the Treaties clearly refer to 
"consistency" as a requirement relating to the conduct of European foreign policies, 
we do not seek to investigate other possible dimensions of "consistency", such as 
the consistency between EU actions and values, or 'institutional' consistency.31  
What does generate this multiplicity of European external policies? The coexistence 
of EU and Member States' external action is determined by the principle of 
conferral. As it is known, the EU does not have general competences, but acts only 
"within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein” (Article 5 TEU). Since the 
“competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States”, the actions of the Union coexist with those of its Members. In 
theory, conferral may not entail external action fragmentation, as long as the 
competences relating to foreign policy may be concentrated at one level or another. 
This may suggest that it is actually the use of conferral, rather than this principle 
per se, that generates fragmentation. In practice, however, even 'internal' policies 
often have 'external' dimensions, and may consequently become part of a subject's 
foreign policy, extensively intended.32  
Conferral allows also for the fragmentation of the external actions at EU level. An 
international organisation may theoretically be attributed one single competence. 
The masters of the Treaties, on the contrary, decided to confer on the Union 
numerous competences, which are consequently delimited both ratione materiae 
and teleologically, as testified by the Treaty provisions upon which each policy is 
grounded, that is to say the 'legal bases'. Therefore, conferral sets the basic 
architecture of the external action and determines the "institutional balance" of the 
Union, that is to say the division of powers between EU bodies established by 
                                                 
29 See Article 210 TFEU: "in order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the 
Union and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall 
consult each other on their aid programmes". 
30 Article 24(3) TEU. 
31 For an analysis of the coherence between values and practices, see Bosse-Platière, op. cit., pp. 425 
ff; on institutional coherence, see Cremona, “Coherence Through Law: What Difference Will the 
Treaty of Lisbon Make?”, 3 Hamburg Review of Social Sciences (2008): 11-36, p. 25. It seems that 
the different dimensions of consistency/coherence identified in the literature, for the most part, are 
just different facets of the consistency/coherence of foreign policies. In any case, considering that the 
Treaties are rather straightforward in respect of the requirement of consistency/coherence between 
EU policies, there is no need, for the purpose of our analysis, to further break down this principle in 
different dimensions the Treaty never refers to.  
32 This may be demonstrated through an analogy, mutatis mutandis, with the experience of the 
United States. In this country, foreign affairs questions are generally considered to fall within the 
exclusive orbit of the federal government (see, e.g. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 423-
24 (2003)), to the extent that the federates states do not 'exist' at international level, see United 
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937). The latter nonetheless act at international level, for 
instance by entering into nonbinding instruments or by determining, through their conduct, the 
violation of international law on the part of the U.S. as an international subject. See inter alia Bilder, 
“The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Affairs”, 83 American Journal of International Law (1989): 
821; Resnick, “Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs 
Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism”, 57 Emory Law Journal (2007): 31-92; Ahdieh, 
"Foreign Affairs, International Law and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination", 73 
Missouri Law Review (2008): 1129-1245, p. 1185; Schaefer, “Constraints on State-Level Foreign 
Policy: (Re) Justifying, Refining and Distinguishing the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine”, 41 Seton 
Hall Law Review (2011): 201; Vogel and Swinnen (eds), Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: the 
Shifting Roles of the EU, The US and California, Cheltenham (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
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primary law.33 The limits of the powers of EU bodies, indeed, are not to be inferred 
from a general principle, but rather from an interpretation of the legal bases,34 as 
testified by the letter of Article 13(2), which asserts that "each institution shall act 
within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties". 
The centrality of conferral to the division of European foreign policies is likely to 
generate inconsistencies in practice. The attribution of competences is dependent 
on a legal fiction, that is to say the distinction between different policy areas, which 
is increasingly at odds with reality.35 In contemporary international relations, the 
boundaries between different foreign policies are blurred: it is probable that actions 
sharing a single functional purpose may be pursued by policies with different legal 
bases. Thus initiatives based on different material competences and having 
different objectives may coexist in the same area. This may well lead to the 
proliferation of legal contradictions in the external action of the Union. For 
instance, international agreements with developing countries may be based on 
different Treaty provisions, such as development cooperation and trade, and still 
have similar functions. If a development cooperation and a trade agreement 
coexisted in the same field, there would be a high risk of inconsistency among the 
two acts, not least because development cooperation pursues the reduction of 
poverty” (Article 208 TEU), whereas trade fosters a partially different objective, 
that is to say the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade (Article 
206 TFEU). 
The contradictions determined by the overlapping of different policies may 
theoretically be solved on the basis of the usual hierarchical, chronological, 
specialty and competence criteria. The hierarchical and specialty criteria, however, 
are of scarce usefulness in this context, since EU policies are not in a hierarchical or 
general-special relationship with each other. The chronological criterion may be of 
some use in certain circumstances, but not always: for instance, if the EU entered 
into two international undertakings with partially different groups of States, it 
would not be obliged to disregard the former, but it may select which commitment 
it should violate. More generally, the use of the chronological criterion in the case of 
overlapping policies may lead to a paradoxical result, that is to say the continuous 
redefinition of the EU position, via the use of different legal bases. Provided that 
the speciality, hierarchical and chronological criteria are not effective for our 
purpose, it remains to be seen whether the antinomies generated by the multiplicity 
                                                 
33 For the first application of the doctrine of 'institutional balance' see Case 9/56, Meroni, [1958] ECR 
11. See Constantinesco, "L'équilibre Institutionnel dans La Constitution de l'Union Européenne", 
Raux (Liber Amicorum), Le Droit de l'Union Européenne en Principes (Apogée, 2006), pp. 481-491, 
at p. 485: "issu du principe d'attribution des competences (à la Communauté) et des pouvoirs (aux 
institutions), [l'équilibre institutionnel] s'analyse d'abord comme conduisant au respect, par toutes 
les institutions, des prérogatives de chacune". See also Jacqué, "The Principle of Institutional 
Balance", 41 Common Market Law Review (2004): 383-391. For the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on 
institutional balance, see Daniele, "Le Istituzioni Politiche Dell'unione Europea dopo Il Trattato Di 
Lisbona: Verso Un Nuovo Equilibrio?", Studi Sulla Integrazione Europea(2009): 43-54, and 
Christiansen, "The European Union After the Lisbon Treaty: An Elusive 'Institutional Balance'?, in 
Biondi, Eeckhout and Ripley (eds.), EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 228-
247. 
34 Joined cases 188-190/80, [1982] ECR 2545, para 6.  
35 See, for instance, the Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European 
Council, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/76, according to which: "the 
traditional distinctions maintained by diplomatic chancelleries in this field make increasingly less 
sense in the modern world. Recent developments of international life show that economic, industrial, 
financial and commercial questions will all in the future be the subject of negotiations, the 
significance of which will be highly political". 
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of European foreign policies may be solved on the basis of the competence criterion, 
that is to say by relying on conferral. 
2. Conferral as a Solution to the Antinomies between EU and Member States' 
Policies 
In principle, conferral delimits the action of the Union, thus ensuring the non-
overlapping of its policies with those of the Member States. The absence of 
overlapping, in turn, makes sure that different policies do not have similar scope, 
and consequently prevents their contradiction. Thus conferral sets the basis for the 
solution of inconsistencies between the acts of the EU and its Members in the field 
of foreign policy.  
On the one hand, Union acts cannot impinge on the Member States’ competences. 
If a EU measure were not based on a conferred competence, it should be declared 
invalid, or even non-existent, because of the incompetence of the Union. On the 
other hand, and as a corollary of conferral, the Member States’ cannot hinder the 
exercise of the competences they conferred on the Union. This principle  is 
generally referred to as ‘loyalty’ and it has been described as a akin to the bona fide 
typical of international law and the principle of ‘federal loyalty’ that characterises 
certain internal legal systems.36 At EU level, it is rendered explicit by Article 4(3) 
TEU, which affirms inter alia that the Member States “shall refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives” and 
should “facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks”.  
Article 4(3) TEU and its predecessors have been fundamental for preservation of 
the consistency of EU law, also in the field of external relations. This is clarified, in 
the first place, by the ECJ jurisprudence on primacy. As it is known, the Member 
States must grant primacy to EU law because, as the ECJ held in Costa v. Enel “the 
executive force of community law cannot vary from one state to another in 
deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the 
objectives of the treaty set out in article 5(2) [now article 4(3) TEU]”.37 The Court 
clarified also that the duty loyalty descends from conferral, since the Member States 
"have limited their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which 
binds both their nationals and themselves".38 Thus by enforcing a corollary of 
conferral, that is to say loyalty, the Court can prevent contradictions between EU 
and Member States’ acts on the basis of the criterion of competence. Such 
prevention concerns all the sectors of activity of the Union, therefore including also 
the external action. 
The ECJ has identified at least one expression of the Member States’ loyalty which 
is specific to the external action. In the ERTA case, the Court found that the duty of 
                                                 
36 Constantinesco, “L'article 5 CEE, de La Bonne Foi A La Loyauté Communautaire”, in Pescatore 
(Liber Amicorum), du Droit International Au Droit de L'intégration (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1987). See also Neframi, "The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking Its Scope through Its Application in the 
Field of EU External Relations”, 47 Common Market Law Review, 2010: 323-359. 
37 Case 6-64, Costa v. Enel, [1964] ECR 1129. 
38 Id.: "by creating a community of unlimited duration, having […] real powers stemming from a 
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the community, the Member 
States have limited their sovereign rights and have thus created a body of law which binds both their 
nationals and themselves. The integration into the laws of each member state of provisions which 
derive from the community and more generally the terms and the spirit of the treaty, make it 
impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure 
over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity." 
 17 
loyalty of the Member States also implies the ‘parallelism’ of internal and external 
competences. If the EU has exercised its internal competences in order to pursue 
the objectives conferred by the Treaties, the Member States no longer have the right 
"to undertake obligations with third countries which affect those rules",39 since this 
would question their loyalty. Therefore, not only does loyalty, and thus conferral, 
ensure the consistency of EU and Member States’ acts through the principle of 
primacy, but it contributes to their non-overlapping also in abstracto, by excluding 
the Member States’ ability to enter into international legal commitments in areas 
already covered by EU internal measures. 
The delimitation of EU competences, and thus the enforcement of conferral, may 
encounter some difficulties in practice. A classic example in this sense is provided 
for by Opinion 1/78, where the Court was requested to determine whether an 
international agreement relating to trade, but having repercussions on the 
economic policy competence of the Member States, fell within the competence of 
the EEC.40 The ECJ started from the assumption that the concept of trade policy 
has to be interpreted extensively, in order not to "risk causing disturbances in intra-
Community trade".41 On the basis of this finding, it concluded that the existence of 
repercussions on the Member States economic policy did not exclude the agreement 
from the scope of EU competences. This example demonstrates that the existence 
of links between EU and Member States' competences does not prevent the 
delimitation of the European and Member States' area of action. It also suggests, 
however, that a policy of the Union may lawfully have "repercussions" on, and thus 
interfere with, the policies of the Member States.   
It is clear, therefore, that the principle conferral is apt at delimiting EU and 
Member States' competences, thus preventing the existence of inconsistencies 
between the two, both in theory and in practice. However, conferral is not always 
easy to enforce and it does not completely exclude the existence of interferences 
between the policies adopted at one level and the actions conducted at another.  
3. Conferral as a Solution to the Antinomies between EU External Actions… 
Not only does conferral ensure the non-contradiction of EU and Member States' 
foreign policies, but it prevents contradictions also between the different external 
actions of the Union. Each of the EU competences, and the policies which are 
founded upon them, has a specific material and teleological delimitation. In order 
to enforce the non-contradiction of EU policies it is sufficient to make sure that the 
material and teleological scope of each EU act is referred only to the legal basis it is 
founded upon. This is precisely the function of the ‘centre of gravity’ doctrine 
elaborated by the EC, according to which the choice of the legal basis for a measure 
must be based on objective factors, which include in particular the aim and the 
content of the measure.42 On the basis of such objective factors, the interpreter can 
always reconstruct the content and purpose of an act and, thus, its legal basis.  
The centre of gravity doctrine allows for the identification of the correct legal basis 
even in the case of acts having a twofold purpose or component. According to an 
                                                 
39 Case 22-70, Commission v Council, [1971] ECR 263, para 17. 
40 Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, [1979] ECR 2871. 
41 Id., para 45. 
42 See inter alia Case 45/86, Commission v Council, [1987] ECR 1493, para 11, Case C-300/89, 
Commission v Council, [1991] ECR I-2867, para 10, and Case C-
269/97, Commission v Council [2000], ECR I-2257, para 43. 
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established jurisprudence of the Court, if one such purpose or component is 
incidental, the measure must be founded on the legal basis required by the 
predominant purpose or component.43 This signals that two policies may be 
separated, but they can nonetheless influence each other, as in the case of EU-
Member States relations.44 These influences may be prevented, in a formal 
perspective, simply by allowing for the cumulation of legal bases. In such a case, an 
act would be part of two policies at once, and would thus 'ontologically' embody 
their non-contradiction.  
The cumulation of legal bases is exceptionally admitted by the Court, but only if an 
act pursues a twofold purpose, or has a twofold component, none of which is 
incidental.45 The rationale for this restrictive approach is transparently linked to the 
protection of the institutional balance. Each legal basis may determine its decision-
making procedure. The cumulation of legal bases would thus question the link 
between legal bases and procedures that was foreseen by the Treaties.46 The Court’s 
intention to maintain institutional balance via the centre of gravity jurisprudence is 
also confirmed by the Titanium dioxide jurisprudence, according to which two legal 
bases foreseeing incompatible procedures can never be cumulated.47  
It is clear, therefore, that conferral creates a multiplicity of EU external policies, but 
it also contributes to their consistency, by allowing for their legal separation, 
according to the ‘centre of gravity’ doctrine. The enforcement of such separation 
may be troublesome, and it does not always prevent the influence of one policy on 
the others,48 especially because of the need to preserve the institutional balance set 
in the Treaties.   
4. …Including the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EU and its external action were 
divided in three 'pillars', i.e. the EC, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and Police and Justice Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM). The 
pillars were different in a 'formal' perspective, since the first was provided for in the 
TEC, while the others were contained in the TEU. Even more importantly, the 
pillars were different in a substantive viewpoint. The EC pillar was managed 
                                                 
43 C-42/97 Parliament v Council [1999] ECR I-869, para 39 and 40. 
44 This issue is particularly thorny in the case of acts having a component related to one competence 
and pursuing the objective of another competence. Such difficulties are elucidated by a comparison 
between the Energy Star case and Opinion 2/00 on the Cartagena Protocol. In both circumstances, 
the controversial measures had prevalently commercial content and environmental objectives. In the 
former case, the Court seems to have favoured the material perspective, concluding that the 
controversial agreement had to be founded on the trade legal basis. In the latter, the ECJ gave more 
importance to the teleological dimension of the agreement, concluding in favour of the environment 
legal basis. See Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, [2001] ECR I-9713, and Case C-281/01, 
Commission v Council, [2001] ECR I-12049. 
45 See inter alia, Case C-42/97, Parliament v Council [1999], ECR I-869, para 39 and 40, Case C-
336/00, Huber [2002], ECR I-7699, para 31, and Opinion 2/00, cited above, para 23. 
46 The legal basis is indeed "one of the manifestations of the institutional balance", according to 
Jacqué, op. cit., p. 386. 
47 Case C-300/89, Commission v Council, [1991] ECR I-2867, paras 18-21. 
48 The development cooperation and agriculture policy of the Union, for instance, are well known to 
be at odds, even when they do not unwarrantedly overlap, since the protectionism that underlies the 
Common Agricultural Policy hinders the exports of developing countries and, thus, their economic 
progress. See, inter alia, Koulaïmah-Gabriel and Oomen, Improving Coherence: Challenges For 
European Development Cooperation (ECDPM Policy Management Brief No. 9, 1997). 
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through procedures that generally reflected the archetypal 'Community method', 
which may be defined as the exercise of legislative power by the EC following the 
Commission’s exclusive right of initiative, leading to the adoption of legislation by 
the Council (by qualified majority) and Parliament, resulting in a binding uniform 
rule which is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 49 The EU pillars, on 
the contrary, were seen as 'intergovernmental', since their decision-making was 
performed almost exclusively by the Council, which decided mostly by unanimity, 
and the other EU institutions played an ancillary role.50  
The relation between the pillars was regulated not only by the centre of gravity 
doctrine, but also by primary law. Article 47 TEU asserted that "nothing in this 
Treaty shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities or the 
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them." When the Court 
was called to judge upon inter-pillar conflicts determined by acts with a clear 
purpose or content, it applied the doctrine of the centre of gravity. Thus acts 
pursuing mainly EC aims, or having a primarily Communitarian content, and 
having mere repercussions on EU issues, could be validly based on the TEC. Thus in 
the Dual Use case51, the Court relied on the findings of Opinion 1/78 to conclude 
that a measure whose effect is to prevent or restrict the export of certain products 
"cannot be treated as falling outside the scope of the common commercial policy on 
the ground that it has foreign policy and security objectives.”52 Similarly, acts 
pursuing mainly EU aims, and with ancillary EC components, had to be founded on 
the TEU. In the PNR case, indeed, the Court asserted that, even if the controversial 
EC act incidentally affected an "activity which falls within the scope of Community 
law" it could not be based on the TEC, since it was mainly related to "operations 
concerning public security and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law".53  
Article 47 TEU was not however without effect with respect to the delimitation of 
EC and EU competences. The Court held in Ecowas that acts having non-ancillary 
EC and EU purposes and components could not be based on both TEC and TEU 
basis, as the centre of gravity doctrine would have (extraordinarily) been allowed. 
In order to justify this finding, the Court argued that since "Article 47 EU precludes 
the Union from adopting, on the basis of the EU Treaty, a measure which could 
properly be adopted on the basis of the EC Treaty, the Union cannot have recourse 
to a legal basis falling within the CFSP in order to adopt provisions which also fall 
within a competence conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community."54 Such 
interpretation of Article 47 TEU is not entirely convincing, since it appears to be 
based on a circular line of reasoning: in order to determine whether an act could be 
adopted on a EC or EU legal basis, the Court started from the assumption that…“a 
                                                 
49 Craig, "Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance", in Craig and de Burca (eds), The Evolution 
of EU Law (Oxford University Press. 2011), pp. 41-84. 
50 As noted by Missiroli, A little discourse on method(s) (Egmont, 2011), p. 2.: "the so-called 
'communitarian' and the 'intergovernmental' approaches often constituted rather "ideal-types" à la 
Max Weber than concrete methods or models - and they rarely operated in a 'pure', unadulterated 
form". Nonetheless, this dichotomy effectively expresses the different decision-making patterns in 
the EC and EU frameworks (and now in the non-CFSP and CFSP areas). Therefore the traditional 
definitions "Community method" and "intergovernmental method" are retained for our purposes. 
51 Case C-70/94, Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen v Germany [1995] ECR I-3189. 
52 Id, para 10. 
53 Joined cases C-317/04, Parliament v Council, [2006] ECR I-4721, paras 55-57. See also 
Papakonstantinou and de Hert, "The PNR Agreement and Transatlantic Anti-Terrorism Cooperation: 
No Firm Human Rights Framework on Either Side of the Atlantic”, 46 Common Market Law Review 
(2009): 883–919, p. 891 
54 Case C-91/05, Commission v Council, [2008] ECR I-3651, para 77. 
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measure […] could properly be adopted on the basis of the EC Treaty”! The Ecowas 
judgement is important, however, because it confirms the Court's concern for 
institutional balance. Presumably, the ECJ excluded the accumulation of EC and 
EU legal bases because this would have led to the 'contamination' of 
Communitarian procedures, typical of the TEC, with intergovernmental elements, 
characteristic of the TEU. In other words, the Court considered that the protection 
of the Community method justified a significant interference of EC policies on EU 
activities.   
This problem may have been solved by the Lisbon Treaty. Not only did the recent 
reform abolish the 'pillars', but it substituted the subordination clause contained in 
Article 47 TEU with a 'symmetric' non-affection provision for CFSP and non-CFSP 
sectors, now contained in Article 40 TEU. The latter still affirms that the 
implementation of the CFSP shall not affect the application of non-CFSP policies, 
but it adds that the implementation of non-CFSP actions shall not affect the CFSP. 
This innovation can hardly modify the Dual Use and PNR jurisprudence, but it may 
theoretically have effects as far as the acts having non-ancillary CFSP and non-
CFSP components and purposes are concerned. An exact interpretation of this 
provision, however, requires an assessment of the structure of the Lisbon Treaty, 
therefore it will be provided in section 4. 
It may be concluded that the principle of conferral, via the centre of gravity 
doctrine, ensures the consistency between the CFSP and the rest of the external 
action. As demonstrated in Paragraphs 2 and 3, such application of conferral is 
problematic, and it does not exclude the existence of interferences between one 
sector of the external action and the others. 
 
* 
 
* * 
 
This section sought to demonstrate that, although the delimitation brought by 
conferral generates some concerns about the consistency of European foreign 
policies, the same principle of conferral is actually instrumental in solving them. In 
this perspective, external action "consistency" seems no to be problematic. The 
numerous references to external action "consistency" contained in the Treaties 
consequently appear redundant, and even superfluous. Why should have the 
drafters of the Treaties called for the non-contradiction of European foreign policies 
when the principle the Union is founded upon already ensures it?  
At the same time, conferral is not a panacea, since paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 suggest 
that this principle is not easy to apply in practice and it cannot prevent the 
existence of influences between the different European foreign policies, even when 
they are correctly separated. Such influences do not amount to interferences 
susceptible of questioning the delimitation of EU and Member States policies in 
theory, but they raise practical problems, since they may question the European 
cohesiveness on the international scene. They have consequently been tackled by 
political institutions and Member States through pragmatic means, as 
demonstrated in the next section. 
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SECTION 2. EXTERNAL ACTION COHERENCE AS A POLITICAL 
REQUIREMENT: EVIDENCES FROM THE PRACTICE 
According to the preamble of the TEU, the Union should seek to reinforce "the 
European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and 
progress in Europe and in the world". Although this statement is referred to the 
CFSP, it may be understood as a general requirement of effectiveness for the EU as 
a whole. For this purpose, the mere consistency of the EU legal order is not 
sufficient, since the different European foreign policies influence each other.55 
Union Institutions and Member States are cognizant of this issue, and have been 
tackling it through pragmatic solutions that seek to 'bridge' the different policies, in 
order to regulate their mutual influences and foster coherence in foreign policy.  
The first paragraph of section conceptualises the concept of "coherence" between 
European foreign policies. The remainder of the section analyses situations where 
EU institutions and Member States have been seeking coherence in their external 
relations, to the detriment of delimitation. It is submitted that European policy 
makers sought to coordinate their actions in order to increase coordination in their 
external actions (paragraphs 2 and 3) and to enhance unity in international 
representation (paragraph 4). 
1. Conceptualising the Requirement of Coherence in European Foreign Policy 
If the mere legal non-contradiction of foreign policies is insufficient, which 
objective should Union institutions and Member States seek? It is generally 
acknowledged by academics and the civil society that European foreign policies 
should not only be "consistent", that is to say delimited, but they should be also 
"coherent". The latter is a protean concept, whose meaning is usually accepted to 
refer to the existence of synergy between norms, actors and instruments in EU 
external relations.56  
Coherence differs from consistency, in our understanding, for three reasons. In the 
first place, the idea of coherence postulates that EU institutions and Member 
should not only seek to eliminate contradictions by delimiting EU policies, but they 
should rather try to bring EU and Member States' instruments together in order to 
reinforce the European identity at international level.57 In other words, they should 
coordinate their policies so as to give rise to a coherent EU foreign policy.58 
Secondly, coherence cannot be defined with precision in abstracto, differently from 
the non-contradiction of legal norms. A system can, or cannot, be "consistent", 
                                                 
55 Cf. Neframi, "Exigence de Cohérence et Action Extérieure de l'Union Européenne", in Michel (ed.), 
Le Droit, Les Institutions et Les Politiques de l'Union Européenne Face a l'Imperatif de La 
Cohérence (Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2009), pp. 49-80, p. 49, according to whom "pour 
avoir du poids politique il faut que l'Union soit un acteur global et cohérent". 
56 Cremona, "Coherence through law", cit. supra, at p. 16.  
57 Cf. Bosse-Platière, op. cit., p. 524, according to whom: "la  recherche de la cohérence ne signifie pas 
seulement l'élimination des contradictions entre les politiques, afin de les rendre compatibles. Elle 
requiert également la capacité pour l'Union d'utiliser les potentialité offertes par l'ensemble de ses 
instruments dans le cadre de toutes ses politiques, a fin de dégager une stratégie d'ensemble 
permettant la satisfaction de l'objectif d'affirmation de son identité sur la scène internationale." 
58 Portela, "(In-)Coherence in EU Foreign Policy: Exploring Sources and Remedies", Paper Presented 
At the European Studies Association Bi-Annual Convention, Los Angeles, 2009, p. 4. 
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while it can be more or less "coherent".59 Thirdly, and as a consequence of the first 
two differences, the degree of coherence of a system can difficultly be appraised 
solely through the legal methodology, whereas consistency can be ascertained, and 
ensured, through the interpretation of legal acts. The identification of the legal 
content of coherence is necessary, however, since EU institutions and Member 
States routinely bypass, or defy, conferral and delimitation precisely for the purpose 
of promoting coherence, by bridging the gap between EU and Member States' 
competences, as well as between the different competences of the Union. 
2. Coherence as Synergy in Policy Management: Bringing Together 
Communitarian Initiatives and Member States' Foreign Policies via the CFSP… 
The first, and possibly most significant, manifestation of coherence in European 
foreign policies is provided for by the arrangements set up in the last decades in 
order to foster coordination in policy management across the delimitations set by 
conferral.  
The first example in this sense is the very Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Shortly after the creation of the EEC, the Member States realised that the entirety of 
their foreign policies could be affected by the activity of the Communities. 
Therefore, in 1970 the Foreign Ministers of the Six adopted the Davignon Report, a 
document that sought to foster progress “in the area of political unification through 
cooperation in foreign policy matters”.60 This report indicated that the Member 
States should have stepped up their political cooperation and provided themselves 
“with ways and means of harmonizing their views in the field of international 
politics.” Such endeavour was motivated by the fact that the “implementation of the 
common policies being introduced or already in force require[d] corresponding 
developments in the specifically political sphere”. These “corresponding 
developments” were not necessary to foster non-contradiction in European foreign 
policies: as long as the EEC had no “political” competence in external relations 
inconsistencies were inconceivable. The new impetus for foreign policy 
coordination, on the contrary, was functional to enable Europe “to discharge the 
imperative world duties entailed by its greater cohesion and increasing role” and “to 
bring nearer the day when Europe can speak with one voice”.61 This renders 
apparent that the Davignon Report called for increased coherence, functionally to 
ensure the synergy of European foreign policies and lead to the affirmation of the 
European identity on the global scene.  
In order to foster such objective, the Report envisaged the creation of the 
“European Political Cooperation” (EPC), a loosely institutionalised form of 
cooperation among EEC Members in the field of foreign policy. 62 It is not 
necessary, for our purposes, to describe the EPC in detail. It suffices to highlight 
two of its crucial aspects. First, the EPC was a truly intergovernmental forum, since 
it consisted of a framework for consultations among governments. Consequently, 
Community institutions played only a minor role. The Commission, in particular, 
                                                 
59 Tietje, "The Concept of Coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy”, 2 European Foreign Affairs Review (1997): 211-233, at p. 212. 
60 Davignon Report (Luxembourg, 27 October 1970), Bulletin of the European Communities, 
November 1970, n° 11. 
61 Id., Part One, Para. 8-10. 
62 For a more detailed account of the creation of the EPC and its relation with external action 
coherence, see Mignolli, op.cit., pp. 229-239. 
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was only consulted when the activities of the Communities were affected by the 
political cooperation. Second, the EPC did not form the object of a conferral of 
competences. This had a relevant corollary: whereas the EEC could act only within 
the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaty 
to attain the objectives set out therein, the EPC had neither material nor 
teleological limits.63 The lack of limits and the intergovernmental character of the 
EPC were complementary: provided that each Member State was in control of the 
developments occurring under the EPC there was no need to delimit its field of 
application.  
The Maastricht Treaty institutionalised the EPC in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, which formed the second pillar of the European Union. 
Subsequently, the Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillars, thus inserting the CFSP in 
the general institutional framework of the EU. A formal appraisal may thus suggest 
that the CFSP should be treated as one among other policies. For the sake of 
simplicity, also the present analysis adopted this formalistic viewpoint so far. Such 
approach, however, may not enable an accurate comprehension of the substantive 
reality of the CFSP. The law and practice of the CFSP suggest the existence of 
remarkable analogies between this policy and the EPC. Like the latter, the former is 
a prevalently intergovernmental forum, which consists of a framework where the 
Member States act in common for the purpose of achieving the objectives laid down 
in the TEU.64 On the one hand, the CFSP is an embryonic policy, whose function 
remains primarily one of “cooperation” among the Member States, and whose 
development is precariously tied to the European balance of power. Indeed, CFSP 
decisions are normally adopted by unanimity in the Council, without any 
intervention of either the Parliament or the Commission. On the other hand, the 
CFSP is a sui generis EU competence, which lacks a material field of application 
and objectives of its own.65 Like pre-Lisbon Article 11 TEU, and in assonance with 
the Davignon report, current Article 24 TEU asserts that “the Union’s competence 
in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign 
policy”;66 the CFSP therefore lacks any material limit.67  The CFSP is not given any 
specific aim either, but it must pursue the list of external action objectives set by 
Article 21(2) TEU,68 which is very generic. Such objectives encompass, for instance, 
the safeguarding of EU “values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity”, the preservation of peace, the prevention of conflicts and the 
strengthening of international security, thus probably serving as a basis for any 
possible CFSP initiative. 
                                                 
63 Indeed, European governments committed themselves to “consult each other on all major 
questions of foreign policy”, with the broadest possible objectives: “to ensure greater mutual 
understanding” and “to increase their solidarity”, id. Part Two, points I and IV. 
64 Gosalbo Bono, “Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order”, 43 Common Market Law Review 
(2006): 337-394, at p. 347. Notice however that this consideration de facto does not question, in our 
opinion, the formal characterisation of the CFSP as a policy of the Union (even before the Lisbon 
Treaty), for the simple reason that the Masters of the Treaties explicitly construed it as such in 
primary law, see Case C-91/05, Commission v Council, [2008] ECR I-03651, para. 60-61. 
65 Rectior, the CFSP is a "competence" in formal terms, as asserted by Article 24(1) TEU, and a 
framework for coordination. 
66 Emphasis added. 
67 In this sense, see Brkan, “Exploring EU Competence in CFSP: Logic Or Contradiction?”, Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2006): 173-207, at p. 180. 
68 Article 23 TEU. 
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The dual characterisation of the CFSP as a competence of the Union and as a 
framework for intergovernmental cooperation69 explains the concern for the 
consistency/coherence of this sector with other non-CFSP policies, also in a 
political perspective. If the consistency of the CFSP with the rest of the external 
action can be ensured by relying on conferral, as seen above, its coherence is more 
evanescent. The next paragraph intends to demonstrate that EU institutions are 
well aware of the necessity of coherence between CFSP and non-CFSP actions and 
created innovative solutions to tackle it. 
3. …and Coordinating CFSP and non-CFSP Implementation 
As seen in the previous section, CFSP and non-CFSP actions should be kept 
distinct, in order not to jeopardise the institutional balance of the Union. The 
existence of mutual influences between these areas, however, suggests that some 
form of CFSP/non-CFSP coordination should be identified in practice.  
The need to coordinate the different strands of the external action has been taken 
into consideration by Union institutions, which have tried to 'mainstream' external 
action coherence in their law-making activity. In the first place, the Council used 
certain CFSP acts to influence non-CFSP activities. Such influence, in some 
occasions, has taken the form of a Council invitation to the Commission to orient its 
action towards the realisation of CFSP objectives through economic actions in the 
ambit of the implementation of Communitarian programmes.70 In other cases, the 
Council adopted CFSP acts that directly regulated issues that were probably related 
to the non-CFSP area. For instance, Joint Action 96/195/CFSP, concerning the 
participation of the European Union in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization, arguably encroached upon the exercise of Euratom competences: 
although this Joint Action was meant to address also a typical CFSP objective 
(“contribute to an overall solution to the issue of nuclear proliferation in the Korean 
peninsula”) it nonetheless had a primary Euratom finality (cooperation with third 
countries in the field of civil nuclear energy).71 Similarly, other CFSP acts probably 
encroached upon the exercise of EC competences, in fields such as nuclear safety, 
humanitarian aid, development cooperation, economic cooperation and 
                                                 
69 Cf. Constantinesco and Petculescu, "La Personnalité de l'Union", in Constantinesco, Gauttier and 
Michel (eds.), Le Traité Etablissant une Constitution Pour l'Europe (Presses Universitaires de 
Strasbourg, 2005), pp. 65-78, at p. 69: "la PESC s'analyse d'avantage comme une série de 
mécanismes destinés à favoriser la recherche d'une certaine unité des positions et des actions des 
diplomaties nationales au sein de l'Union, que comme l'attribution à celle-ci d'une véritable 
compétence propre et autonome en matière de politique étrangère". Similarly, the CFSP has been 
defined as a "policy process" by Edwards, "Common Foreign and Security Policy: Incrementalism in 
Action?", in Koskenniemi (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1998), pp. 3-18, at p. 3. 
70 See, e.g., Council Decision 94/367/CFSP, O.J. 1994 L 165/2, Article 3. 
71 Cf. case C-91/05, cit. supra. See Agreement on the establishment of the Korean peninsula energy 
development organization”, 9 March 1995, Article II(a): “The purposes of the Organization shall be 
to: [...] provide for the financing and supply of a light-water reactor [...] project in North Korea”; see 
also the Article 2 Euratom: “In order to perform its task, the Community shall, as provided in this 
Treaty: […] (h) establish with other countries and international organisations such relations as will 
foster progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” In this sense, see Gauttier, op. cit., 23-41, at p. 
28, and Wessel, op. cit., at p. 1154. 
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international trade.72 This extensive understanding of the scope of application of 
the CFSP raised some concerns. In order to ease the tension, the Council and the 
Commission adopted a soft law instrument, called mode d’emploi, regulating the 
superposition of Community and intergovernmental policies in external relations, 
according to which “[CFSP] Common positions […] shall preserve at all stages each 
institution’s competences, the procedures through which such competences are 
exercised, and the rules established for adopting decisions under different Treaty 
provisions.”73 The mode d’emploi had only partial effect, since some CFSP acts 
adopted at a latter stage seemed not to have been entirely respectful of EC 
competences.74  
While numerous CFSP acts probably interfered with Communitarian actions, some 
EC acts possibly encroached upon the CFSP field. This was the case of acts in the 
field of trade, such as Regulation 2036/2005/EC75, which was ultimately meant to 
restrict the commerce of tools which could be used to give the death penalty. 
Similarly, Regulation 2368/2002/EC,76 relating to the Kimberley process, was 
concerned with the import of goods (diamonds), but it was ultimately meant to 
improve security in Sierra Leone. In light of Opinion 1/78 and its extensive 
definition of the Community’s trade policy, it may be argued that these acts were 
probably rightly founded on the TEC, but they nonetheless interfered with the 
CFSP.  
Other Community actions had a stronger link to the CFSP. This is the case of the 
Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM),77 and its successor, the Instrument for Stability 
(IfS).78 These instruments are intended to underpin existing Community policies 
and programmes and enable the Community to take urgent action to help re-
establish or safeguard normal conditions for the execution of the policies 
undertaken, especially in the field of development cooperation, in order to preserve 
their effectiveness. Both instruments serve EC purposes, since they are functional 
inter alia to re-establish the conditions essential to the proper implementation of 
other EC/EU policies, but they have also a close link to the CFSP, since they foresaw 
(and foresee) the financing of operations not entirely referred to the framework of 
the EC and FEU Treaties, such as the support for international criminal tribunals 
and the destruction of landmines.79 It is not surprising, therefore, that the RRM 
sought to contribute to “the coherence of the external activities conducted by the 
European Union in the context of its external relations”80 and the IfS Regulation 
                                                 
72 See inter alia Common Position 94/779/CFSP, O.J. 1994 L 313/1; Decision 94/697/CFSP, O.J. 
1994 L 283/1; Decision 94/276/CFSP; Decision 94/942/CFSP. For a fuller critical appraisal of these 
acts, see Wessel, op. cit., pp. 1154 ss.; Mignolli op. cit., pp. 391 ss.; Gauttier, op. cit., pp. 28 ss. 
73 Council doc. 5194/95, not published in the O.J. 
74 See inter alia Common Position 95/413/CFSP, point C; Common Action 2001/759, Article 2(2). 
Nonetheless, the mode d'emploi may have favoured the transition towards a ‘softer’ CFSP influence 
on the rest of the external action. If in the early nineties CFSP acts sometimes contained a rather 
peremptory language, after the adoption of the mode d’emploi CFSP instruments tended to take note 
of Community actions and to make generic references to the requirement of external action 
consistency/coherence, also in the Communitarian area; see, e.g., Common Action 2000/298/CFSP, 
Article 2(2). See also Gauttier, op. cit., p. 29 and Wessel, op. cit., p. 1155 and .g., Common Action 
98/301/CFSP, preamble; Common Action 2008/112/CFSP, O.J. 2008 L 40/11, Article 11(1). 
75 O.J. 2005 L 200/1.  
76 O.J. 2002 L 358/28. 
77 Council Regulation 381/2001/EC, O.J. 2001 L 57/5. 
78 Regulation of the Parliament and the Council 1717/2006/EC, O.J. 2006 L 327/1. 
79 Id., Article 3(2). 
80 Regulation 381/2001/EC, cit. supra¸ preamble. 
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explicitly requires the instrument to be “consistent” with the CFSP.81 After the 
Ecowas judgement (2008), it would be difficult to argue that the RRM and IfS are 
incompatible with the centre of gravity doctrine. It is significant, however, that, at 
the time of their adoption (2001 and 2006), EC institutions already understood the 
scope of Communitarian competences in a broad manner, as partially covering also 
security-related fields close to the CFSP. 
Given the legal issues relating to the coordination of CFSP and non-CFSP through 
hard law, EU institutions have also used soft law instruments to foster coherence.82 
Thus EU institutions were able to adopt the European Security Strategy and the 
Internal Security Strategy83, but also other CFSP/non-CFSP instruments, such as 
the strategies for the external Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and 
the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ)84 or the European Consensus on 
Development.85 Although these documents were adopted by different institutions,86 
they respond to the same necessities and present a view that is widely shared by 
Union institutions and Member States. These soft law instruments do not seek to 
create new competences or to substitute the hard law acts already in place. On the 
contrary, they are functional to “integrating existing strategies and conceptual 
approaches”87 and “organising [existing instruments] around defined principles 
and guidelines”.88 This should lead to the coordination of the “broad range of 
instruments at the EU’s disposal”, also across the CFSP/non-CFSP divide, and to 
increase external action coherence.89 Notwithstanding their ‘soft’ character, these 
instruments can have some legal effect, since they may serve as an aid to 
interpretation. In the Ecowas case, in particular, the Court used the Consensus on 
Development in order to ascertain the relation between the Communitarian 
(development cooperation) and the intergovernmental (CFSP) strands of the 
external action. The Court noted that, according to the Consensus “without peace 
and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without 
                                                 
81 Regulation 1717/2006/EC, cit. supra, Article 1(3). 
82 If it seems that soft law is subject to the principle of attribution as hard law, the delimitation of the 
competence to adopt soft law acts is obviously quite 'flexible'. See Senden, Soft Law in European 
Community Law (Hart, 2004), pp. 291 ff. In addition, it would appear from the Ecowas judgement 
that soft law CFSP acts cannot impinge on non-CFSP competences. See Case C-91/05, cit. supra, para 
33: "It is therefore the task of the Court to ensure that acts which, according to the Council, fall within 
the scope of Title V of the Treaty on European Union and which, by their nature, are capable of 
having legal effects, do not encroach upon the powers conferred by the EC Treaty on the 
Community" (emphasis added). For a comment of this issue, see Hillion and Wessel, “Competence 
Distribution in EU External Relations After Ecowas: Clarification Or Continued Fuzziness?”, 46 
Common Market Law Review (2009): 551-586. 
83 European Council, A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy, 12 December 
2003, not published in the O.J., pp. 3-4. Council of the European Union, Internal Security Strategy 
for the European Union: « Towards a European Security Model », doc. 5842/2/10 REV 2, p. 2.  
84 Council of the European Union, A strategy for the external dimension of JHA, doc. 14366/3/05, 30 
November 2005; Communication from the Commission - A strategy on the external dimension of the 
area of freedom, security and justice, COM(2005) 491 final, 12 October 2005. 
85 European consensus on Development, Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of 
the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission on European Union Development Policy, O.J. 2006 C 46/1. 
86 The security strategies were approved by the European Council, the strategies on JHA and the 
AFSJ were adopted by the Commission, while the Consensus was contained in a joint statement of 
European institutions and Member States 
87 Internal Security Strategy, cit. supra, Introduction. 
88 A strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice, cit. supra, point 
III. 
89 A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA, cit. supra, para. 9. 
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development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur.”90 This 
allowed the Court to conclude that the objectives of “development cooperation 
policy should […] not be limited to measures directly related to the campaign 
against poverty”,91 but should encompass also issues such as the fight against arms 
proliferation.  
4. Coherence as Unity in the International Representation of the Union and its 
Members: the Case of Mixed Agreements 
The cohesiveness of the foreign policies of the EU and its Members is not fostered 
only by their capability to conduct coordinated policies, but also by their ability to 
"speak with one voice".92 The multitude of European voices at international level is 
known to puzzle EU's interlocutors, as testified by the famous question "who do I 
call if I want to call Europe?", attributed to H. Kissinger.93 This issue is generally 
referred to as the 'external representation' of the European Union.  
There is some terminological confusion about this issue in the literature and the 
practice. External representation stricto sensu refers to the competence of an entity 
to speak on behalf of its organisation, and as such it is referred to in the EU 
Treaties. More generally, the concept of external representation' is used to indicate 
the process through which the Union and its Members express their position 
externally, thereby including the identification of the speaker, but also the 
formulation of the message it delivers and the legal-political framework in which 
the message is expressed. This paragraph refers to 'external representation' in its 
wider sense, as it is most commonly used in practice.  
Conferral fragments the external representation of the EU and its Members, since 
the former is able to adopt and express internationally a position only within the 
ambit of its competences and the latter are prevented from doing so in the same 
area. This problem was partially solved through the introduction of the so-called 
'mixed agreements', which may be defined as agreements that are signed and 
concluded by the EU and (some of) its Member States, on the one hand, and by one 
or more third parties, on the other hand.94  
This sort of agreement is very frequent in EU external relations, for legal and 
political reasons. When an agreement contains matters falling within EU's exclusive 
competences, or already exercised shared competences, and aspects falling within 
Member States' sole competences, it can neither by concluded by the Union, nor by 
the Member States acting alone. In order to solve this problem, the Member States 
and the Union can conclude the agreement as a single party, through the recourse 
to the ‘mixed form’.95 In these circumstances, the mixed form limits some of the 
                                                 
90 European Consensus on Development, cit. supra, para. 40. 
91 Case C-91/05, cit. supra, para. 66-67. 
92 See the Davignon report, cit. supra. 
93 Notice that H. Kissinger affirmed that "I am not sure I actually said it […] But it's a good statement 
so why not take credit for it?", according to Gera, "Kissinger says calling Europe quote not likely his", 
Bloomberg Businessweek News, 27 June 2012. 
94 Cf. Maresceau, “A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements”, in Hillion and Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed 
Agreeements Revisited: the EU and Its Member States in the World (Hart, 2010), pp. 11-29, p. 12. 
Notice that, according to some authors, the expression “mixed agreement” should describe, in 
principle, agreements where the European Union and the Member States share competences; in this 
sense, McGoldrick, International Relations Law of the European Union (Longman, 1997), p. 78 
95 Daniele, "Il Diritto Internazionale Generale e Gli Accordi Internazionali Nel Sistema Delle Fonti 
Dell'unione Europea", in Pace (ed.), Nuove Tendenze del Diritto Dell'unione Europea Dopo Il 
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shortcomings entailed by conferral: in the absence of mixity, the EU and its 
Members would not be able to conclude certain agreements, because of their 
relative lack of competence, or may do so only separately. Thus mixity appears as 
an instrument for the promotion of unity in international representation.96 
The interest of EU institutions and Member States for unity in international 
representation may seem to be questioned by the fact that in many, and perhaps 
most, circumstances mixed agreements are used for political, rather than legal, 
reasons.97 This is the case of the agreements containing matters falling within EU's 
exclusive competences and aspects falling within shared competences not yet 
exercised. In this situation the Council may decide to exercise the shared 
competence and conclude the instrument in the EU-only form, that is to say 
without the participation of the Member States. The Member States, however, are 
often unwilling to authorize the Union alone to conclude agreements containing 
concurrent competences.98 Even in such context, mixity may contribute to the unity 
of European external representation, at least in the perspective of the Member 
States. According to Article 5 TEU, the Member States can exercise shared 
competences as long as the EU has not done so; several authors, and certainly also 
the Council, consider that this principle applies also to the conclusion of mixed 
agreements.99 Therefore, by concluding an agreement containing non-exercised 
                                                                                                                                               
Trattato Di Lisbona (Giuffrè, 2012), pp. 207-221, at p. 214, notes also that "lo strumento dell'accordo 
misto si è rivelato utile di fronte all'ipotesi di accordi riguardanti anche materie che non rientravano 
affatto nella competenza dell'Unione". 
96 As noted by De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford, 2008),  p. 265, 
mixity "also has the advantage of combining the knowledge and expertise, as well as the diplomatic 
and intelligence resources, of all the member states with those of the Community".  
97 Among these political reasons, it is possible to mention also the uncertainty of the distribution of 
competences, especially in the eyes of third states. Cf. Roucounas, Engagements Parallèles et 
Contradictoires (Hague Academy of International Law, 1987), p. 269: "il n'est donc pas surprenant 
que l'échelle mobile des competences communautaires crée des incertitudes pour les Etats tiers quant 
à la bonne partie avec laquelle il faut contracter pour éviter les contestations subséquentes. Dans ce 
contexte, on peut comprendre l'épanouissement des accords dits mixtes, accords dans lesquels la 
Communauté participe conjointement avec ses Etats membres intéressés." 
98 Rosas, “Mixed Union – Mixed Agreements”, in Koskenniemi (Ed.), International Law Aspects of 
the European Union (Nijihoff, 1998) 125-148, at p. 144. This is testified by the recent practice, cf. the 
decisions authorising the negotiation of new framework agreements, e.g., Council decision 
authorising the negotiation of a Cooperation agreement with Afghanistan, Council, of 10 November 
2010, Council doc. 16146/11, Article 1(1): “the Commission shall negotiate the provisions of the 
Agreement […] which, in accordance with the Treaties, fall within the competences of the Union, 
either as matters falling within the Union's exclusive competence or as matters in respect of areas of 
supporting or shared competence to the extent that the Union has exercised its competence” 
(emphasis added).   
99 This appears to be a rather settled view. Cf. Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements As A Technique For 
Organising the International Relations of the European Community and Its Member States (Kluwer 
Law International, 2001), pp. 42-43; Leal Arcas, "The European Community and Mixed 
Agreements”, 6 European Foreign Affairs Review (2001): 483-513, at p. 494; Rosas, “Mixed Union – 
Mixed Agreements”, in Koskenniemi (ed.), International Law Aspects of the European Union 
(Nijihoff, 1998), pp. 125-148, at p. 132. Nonetheless, two different solutions may be available. On the 
one hand, Advocate General La Pergola, in Portugal v. Council, Case C-268/94, [1996] ECR I-06177, 
par. 4, held that “the provisions laid down by the Agreement […] affect sectors that are within the 
purview of the Member States and therefore required the adoption of a mixed agreement” (emphasis 
added). On the other hand, it may be argued that mixity is not possible when an agreement contains 
elements falling within exclusive competences and matters  falling within non-exercised shared 
competences, since the latter have been conferred on the Union, and its Members should allow it to 
exercise them, consistently with their duty of loyalty (ex Article 4(3) TEU). This second reading 
probably should be preferred in case the choice of the mixed form were detrimental to the 
effectiveness of the EU’s participation in the agreement (see infra), at least in so far as coherence is 
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shared competences in the mixed form, the Member States may actually increase, 
rather than decrease, European unity (at least in their view), since they do not enter 
into the agreement separately from the Union. This consideration seems to be 
confirmed by the fact that even the Commission, as 'guardian of the Treaties', often 
does not oppose this form of mixity, and even proposes it.100 
The ‘political’ character of mixity may be more problematic in a second situation, 
relating to agreements whose content is entirely covered by Union exclusive 
competences (either originally exclusive or exercised shared competences), which 
are concluded in the mixed form solely for reasons of political expediency.101 The 
rationale for this choice is transparent: the Member States desire to participate in 
the negotiation of the agreement, or, more frequently, simply intend to maintain 
and reinforce their international status. Such mixity is problematic, since it 
evidently decreases, rather than increasing, the external unity of the EU. The perils 
of this form of mixity, however, should not be overemphasised. Since the Member 
States are not competent to conclude the agreement, they lack the capability to 
determine the negotiating line and give implementation to the agreement. In other 
words, this sort of 'political' mixity does not seem to be exceedingly problematic for 
the EU's external unity, even if it is in violation of EU Treaties (and it should 
consequently be abandoned).  
The element of mixed agreements that clarifies their objective of 'unity' in 
international representation is perhaps contained in the negotiation phase. 
Independently from the distribution of competences, the ‘mixed’ negotiation often 
functions as a de facto ‘EU-only’ negotiation, since the Member States normally 
entrust their representation on the EU negotiator (generally, the Commission). This 
may not prevent the Member States from interfering with the negotiation, namely 
by issuing instructions to the EU representative for the negotiation of elements 
falling within their area of competence. Nonetheless, it would seem that the 
Member States leave ample margin of manoeuvre to the Commission, in order to 
                                                                                                                                               
interpreted as a legal principle in light of which Treaty provisions (like Article 4(3) TEU) must be 
interpreted, as we seek to demonstrate below. 
100 See, e.g. Commission proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement, COM(2011)380, 24 June 2011, exploratory memorandum, par. 6: “where a matter 
falls under shared competence, either the European Union or Member States may legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts. Regarding the signature and conclusion of ACTA, the Commission has opted not 
to propose that the European Union exercise its potential competence in the area of criminal 
enforcement pursuant to Article 83(2) TFEU. [...] For this reason, the Commission proposes that 
ACTA be signed and concluded both by the EU and by all the Member States.” 
101 According to Schermers, “a Typology of Mixed Agreements”, in O'Keeffe and Schermers (eds.), 
Mixed Agreements (Kluwer, 1983), pp. 23-33, at p. 27, such agreements are formally mixed, but 
substantively “they are agreements made by the Community alone”. On political mixity see also 
Maresceau, op. cit., p. 16 and Rosas, op. cit., note 27, p. 130. To be precise, the ultimate exam of the 
legal basis of the agreement can be performed only when the negotiation is terminated and the final 
text is ready, that is to say with respect to the authorisation to sign the agreement. Indeed, it is the 
conclusion, and not the authorisation to negotiate an agreement, that engenders the pre-emption 
effect. In this sense, see ECJ Opinion 1/76, [1977] ECR 741, par. 4. Cf. also Smyth, “Mixity in Practice: 
a Member State's Practitioner Perspective”, in Hillion and Koutrakos (eds.), Mixed Agreeements 
Revisited: the EU and Its Member States in the World (Hart, 2010), pp. 304-319, at p. 313. 
Nonetheless, the mixed or Union-only character of an agreement is generally determined before the 
beginning of the negotiation, although it remains potentially subject to change. Cf. also Groux, 
“Mixed Negotiations”, in O'Keeffe and Schermers (eds.), Mixed Agreements (Kluwer, 1983), pp. 87-
96, at p. 87, and Macloed et al., op. cit. supra note 23, p. 152. 
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increase the efficiency of the process, thus demonstrating their commitment for the 
external unity of the EU. 102 
 
* 
 
* * 
 
This section sought to demonstrate that Union institutions and Member States 
strive to ensure coordination among European foreign policies and unity in their 
external representation, by developing pragmatic solutions that bypass the 
obstacles posed by conferral. This suggests that European policy makers consider 
coherence as a political requirement guiding their foreign policies. Such 
requirement seems so crucial that it may be wondered whether it may have also 
some legal content. 
SECTION 3. EXTERNAL ACTION COHERENCE AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE: FROM 
SEVERAL 'FOREIGN POLICIES' TO A EUROPEAN 'FOREIGN POLICY'? 
The political relevance of coherence as a requirement guiding the external action is 
certainly important, but it is perhaps of limited relevance for a legal analysis. This 
section therefore investigates the capability of coherence to function also as a legal 
principle, that is to say as a fundamental proposition of law which underlies the EU 
legal system and from which concrete rules or outcomes derive.103 This section 
seeks to demonstrate that the concern for external action coherence has led to 
concrete legal outcomes in the practice, namely as far as the interpretation of 
primary law was concerned.104  
Such analysis may seem futile, since the English version of the Treaties refers to 
"consistency" and not to "coherence". However, consistency and coherence are 
closely interrelated concepts, and they are sometimes considered as synonymous in 
the English language.105 What is more, the linguistic distinction between 
consistency and coherence does not exist in several European languages and, 
consequently, it is not reflected in other versions of EU Treaties.106 The distinction 
between consistency and coherence that is presented here, therefore, should be 
understood as purely analytical in nature, and it should not prevent from 
                                                 
102 See Gatti and Manzini, “External Representation of the European Union in the Conclusion of 
International Agreements”, 49 Common Market Law Review (2012), 1703-1733, pp. 1719-1720. 
103 Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 1. In this sense, see 
also Blumann, "Objectifs et Principes en Droit Communautaire", in Raux (Liber Amicorum), Le Droit 
de l'Union Européenne en Principes (Apogée, 2006), p. 39-67. 
104 General principles do not necessarily take priority over (other) Treaty provisions, but they may 
decisively the latter's interpretation, as noted by Tridimas, op. cit., p. 53.  
105 See Franklin, "The Burgeoning Principle of Consistency in EU Law", 30 Yearbook of European 
Law (2011): 42-85, at p. 47, according to whom "consistency may also be understood in a broad sense 
as meaning that something is organized so that each part of it agrees with all other parts—a condition 
in which a given subject-matter coheres so as to stand together. Taken in this sense, consistency 
would appear somewhat synonymous with a broader notion of coherence as this term is usually 
understood in the English language." 
106 For instance, "consistency" is referred to as coherence (French), coerenza (Italian) coerenza 
(Spanish) and coerência (Portuguese). 
 31 
interpreting the references the Treaties make to "consistency" as calls for 
"coherence". 
The first and second paragraphs of this section seek to demonstrate that coherence 
has had legal effects in the recent practice, since political institutions and the very 
Court of justice relied on it in order to interpret the Treaties, thus fostering synergy 
in the implementation of European foreign policies (paragraph 1) and unity in 
international representation (paragraph 2). The third and fourth paragraphs show 
that coherence is a fundamental proposition of law underlying the post-Lisbon EU 
legal system, as demonstrated by the creation of a single framework for EU external 
relations (paragraph 3) and the general overlapping of EU and Member States' 
foreign policies (paragraph 4). 
1. Coherence as a Legal Principle Allowing for Synergy in Policy Management 
The previous section demonstrates that Union institutions have adopted a number 
of acts that bypass, or even challenge, the delimitation of EU policies, for the 
purpose of increasing coordination in the implementation of European foreign 
policies. This paragraph seeks to demonstrate that, in at least two instances, 
innovative solutions have been adopted for the same purpose, on the basis of a 
coherence-oriented interpretation of conferral. 
The first example that serves the purpose of our analysis is provided for by the 
external action ‘strategies’ adopted by the European Council. Before the Lisbon 
reform, according to Article 13(2) TEU, this body was responsible for the adoption 
of “common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member 
States have important interests in common”. Importantly, Article 13(2) TEU was 
part of the CFSP Title of the TEU, and “common strategies” consequently were 
CFSP acts. Even a cursory reading of the common strategies adopted in practice, 
however, suggests that these acts were used as a tool to orient the entire external 
action. Common strategies, in particular, explicitly set cross-pillar finalities and 
objectives, and foresaw the use of both EC and EU instruments.107  
Thus common strategies generated a problem: as acts adopted upon a CFSP legal 
basis, found in the TEU, they affected also Community areas, even if the already 
mentioned Article 47 TEU explicitly affirmed that “nothing in this Treaty shall 
affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities”. The use of Common 
Strategies thus suggests that Union institutions and Member States (which 
participate in the European Council) interpreted Article 47 TEU in a 'flexible' 
manner. A literal interpretation of this provision, indeed, would have led to the 
adoption of strategies concerning only the CFSP, which would have added little to 
the effectiveness of the external action. The European Council probably preferred a 
systemic appraisal of the Treaties.  Articles 13(2) and 47 TEU could be read along 
with Article 4 TEU, whereby the European Council was responsible for the 
identification of the “general political guidelines” of the Union. The “common 
strategies” foreseen in Article 13(2) TEU could therefore appear as a specific form of 
                                                 
107 As noted by Hillion, "Common Strategies and the Interface Between EC External Relations and 
CFSP", in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds.), The General Law of EC External Relations (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), pp. 287-301, at p. 29: "by adopting a [Common Strategy (CS)], the 
European Council mobilises all existing and future EU instruments – in a very wide sense – and 
institutions to achieve the objectives set out in the strategy. The CS becomes a vehicle for consistency 
of the E.U.'s external policy [...] by being established as hierarchically superior to any other 
instruments adopted in the framework of the E.U., EC external relations included". 
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“guideline” for the external action, which could only be “general” if it concerned 
also EC areas. Why was this approach preferred to the literal interpretation of 
Article 47 TEU? Arguably, this choice was performed in light of external action 
coherence: the acceptance of a restrictive interpretation of Article 47 TEU would 
have led to fragmentation in the strategic governance of EU external relations. The 
solution that was retained in practice, on the contrary, enabled for the coordination 
of EU activities “as a whole”, as required by then Article 3 TEU.  
This approach was so convincing that the Constitutional Convention characterised 
common strategies as instruments “aimed at covering Community policy, JHA and 
CFSP”, functionally to “ensure an integrated approach in the external action of the 
EU”.108 As a result, the Constitutional Treaty and, later, the Lisbon Treaty, codified 
the pre-Lisbon practice in what is now Article 22 TEU, whereby “decisions of the 
European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate 
to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action 
of the Union.”  
The adoption of common strategies thus shows that institutions and Member States 
read primary law in light of external action coherence. Such reading of the Treaties 
appears so cogent that is capable of leading to the modification of provisions whose 
letter was previously not entirely compatible with the pursuit of a synergetic 
external action. In this sense, external action coherence seems to have legal 
outcomes, and thus function as a legal principle of the EU legal order, allowing for a 
'flexibile' interpretation of conferral and the non-affectation clause contained in 
Article 47 TEU. Such conclusion, however, may be overly optimistic, since the 
practice relating to common strategies is quite scarce: only three such acts were 
adopted in practice, probably because of the lengthy internal negotiations linked to 
their adoption.  
Economic sanctions, or, as they are referred to in the Treaties, “restrictive 
measures”, provide for a perhaps more significant example for our purposes. On the 
one hand, they are politically important, since they are very numerous and 
represent one of the most developed parts of the EU external action. On the other 
hand, they are theoretically relevant, since they embody the clearest interaction 
between the different strands of the EU’s external relations.  
In the sixties, Community institutions and Member States were faced with a 
conundrum: could Member States adopt economic sanctions against third countries 
individually, or should they do so in the EEC framework? In a teleological 
perspective, economic sanctions could be characterised as part of the Member 
States’ foreign policies, since they pursued a political objective, that is to say 
changing the behaviour a third country. In an instrumental viewpoint, however, 
sanctions could be seen as commercial measures (falling within EEC competences), 
since they were economic in nature.109 Sanctions therefore embodied a very clear 
link between politics and economics in European external relations.  
This conundrum was solved through a compromise: the decision to adopt sanctions 
was adopted by the Member States, in the EPC framework, and it was implemented 
by the EEC. Such compromise is relevant for our analysis, since it shows that EU 
institutions and Member States did not delimit EEC (and Member States’) 
competences in order to ensure the non-overlapping of external policies, for the 
sake of external action consistency. They rather gave a ‘flexible’ interpretation of 
                                                 
108 The European Convention, Working Group VII - "External Action", CONV 459/02, p. 25. 
109 See De Wilde d'Estmael, "L'Elaboration du Droit Des Sanctions Economiques Communautaires: 
Enjeux et Normativité Politiques du Processus", 49 Droit et Société (2001): 729-769, at pp. 731-732. 
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EEC and Member States’ competences in order to promote the coordination of 
European foreign policies, thus allowing for their coexistence in the same field. 
Such reading of the Treaty was so accepted that it led to the modification of primary 
law. The Maastricht reform codified this practice in Article 228A TEC, lately Article 
301 TEC. According to this provision, when a Union (CFSP) act provided “for an 
action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic 
relations with one or more third countries”, the Council was required to take the 
necessary “restrictive measures” by qualified majority. This procedure was 
substantially maintained also by the Lisbon Treaty, in Article 215 TFEU.110 
The integration of CFSP and non-CFSP measures in the adoption of economic 
sanctions is all the more important since it was upheld by EU Courts in several 
occasions. In the Kadi case, both the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the ECJ 
termed such integration “a bridge […] between the actions of the Community 
involving economic measures […] and the objectives of the EU Treaty in the sphere 
of external relations, including the CFSP”.111 In its judgement, the CFI went a step 
further, by explicitly linking the procedure leading to the adoption of economic 
sanctions to external action coherence. The CFI considered, in particular, that the 
use of the 'flexibility clause', then Article 308 TEC, to pursue CFSP objectives 
should have been allowed "for the sake of the requirement of consistency laid down 
in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union”.112 This reference was particularly 
relevant, since the Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce Article 3 TEU directly, 
provided that it was part of the common provisions of the TEU and, as such, it was 
excluded from the Court's jurisdiction by Article 46 TEU. The ECJ apparently did 
not share the view of the CFI. Although it did not question the existence of a ‘bridge’ 
between Article 301 TEC and the CFSP, the ECJ considered that “neither the 
                                                 
110 It is understood that, given the elimination of the pillar structure, restrictive measures are no 
longer adopted through a EU/EC procedure, but through a CFSP/non-CFSP one. There are however 
four main differences between Article 215 TFEU and previous Article 301 TEC. First, restrictive 
measures in the non-CFSP area are no longer proposed by the Commission individually, but are put 
forward by the Commission and the High Representative. Second, the EP must now be informed 
about the adoption of these measures. Third, Article 215 TFEU explicitly allows for the adoption of 
restrictive measures against natural or legal persons (other than States), which was only implicitly 
allowed for by the TEC (see infra). Fourth, restrictive measures are now required to “include 
necessary provisions on legal safeguards”. 
111 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission, [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 197. See also case T-306/01, 
Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, [2005] ECR 
II-3533, paras. 159-160. In this sense, see also Case C-130/10, Parliament v Council, cit. supra. 
112 The Court was inter alia requested to determine whether a sanction against a person other than a 
State could be adopted on the basis of Article 301 TEC, which only referred to “third countries”, 
complemented by the ‘flexibility clause’, then Article 308 TEC. The latter allowed for the adoption of 
measures, which the EC was not otherwise competent to adopt, if action by the Community proved 
“necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community”. The CFI considered that economic sanctions did not pursue Community objectives, but 
they rather sought EU (CSFP) ones. This, however, did not prevent Article 308 TEC from functioning 
as a legal basis for economic sanctions. In order to demonstrate this, the Court preliminary noted 
that an action adopted on the basis of Article 301 TEC was an “action by the Union”, since it pursued 
a EU (CFSP) objective, as discussed above. The Court also noted that, according to Article 3 TEU, the 
Union was “to ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external 
relations, security, economic and development policies”. Therefore, considering that the powers to 
impose economic sanctions provided for by Articles 301 TEC could be “proved insufficient to allow 
the institutions to attain the objective of the CFSP”, recourse to the additional legal basis of Article 
308 EC was justified “for the sake of the requirement of consistency laid down in Article 3 of the 
Treaty on European Union”. See case T-306/01, cit. supra, para 161-164. 
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wording of the provisions of the EC Treaty nor the structure of the latter provides 
any foundation for the view that that bridge extends to other provisions of the EC 
Treaty, in particular to Article 308 EC”. In other words, the ECJ found that the 
Treaties enabled Article 301 TEC to pursue CFSP objectives, but they did not allow 
Article 308 TEC to do so, as the CFI had affirmed. Nonetheless, the ECJ accepted 
that Article 308 TEC could function as a legal basis for economic sanctions, since 
Article 301 TEC was “the expression of an implicit underlying objective, namely, 
that of making it possible to adopt [restrictive] measures through the efficient use 
of a Community instrument”113 and such objective could consequently “be regarded 
as constituting an objective of the Community for the purpose of Article 308 EC.”114  
A cursory reading of these judgements may suggest that they provide for 
incompatible readings of coherence and delimitation in European foreign policies. 
Whereas the CFI argued that Article 301 TEC could be used “to attain the objective 
of the CFSP […] in view of which [it] was specifically introduced”, the ECJ held that 
Article 301 TEC was meant “to implement actions decided on under the CFSP [… 
] through the efficient use of a Community instrument”. A closer look, however, 
reveals that the approaches of the CFI and the ECJ are not entirely incompatible. 
Not only did both judgements lead to the same result, that is to say allowing for the 
adoption of restrictive measures on the basis of Article 308 TEC, but they were also 
characterised by a similar construction of the linkage between external action 
pillars. Neither Court considered the 'bridge' provided for in Article 301 TEC as an 
exception, to be interpreted restrictively.115 On the contrary, both Courts 
acknowledged that this provision served to foster coherence, transversally to the 
external action. If the CFI explicitly affirmed that Article 301 TEC served this 
purpose, the ECJ did so in an implicit manner by arguing that the adoption of 
restrictive (CFSP) measures through the efficient use of a Community instrument 
was itself an objective of the Community (and not of Article 301 TEC in particular), 
which could thus be pursued also through Article 308 TEC.116  
The example of restrictive measures confirms that EU institutions and Member 
States challenge the delimitation entailed by conferral, not only occasionally, as 
seen in the previous paragraphs, but on a constant basis. As a result, the very 
Treaties have been reformulated, in order to codify the solutions previously 
suggested only by the concern for external action coherence. Even the Court of 
Justice has acknowledged the crucial role of coherence in the interpretation of 
                                                 
113 Id., para 226. 
114 Id., para 227. 
115 Cf. Ecke, “Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures—the Yusuf and Kadi Judgments 
of the Court of First Instance”, 14 European Law Journal (2008): 74-92, p. 79, who asserted that “it 
is true that Article 301 EC has the specific purpose to enable the Community to adopt sanctions 
following a CFSP decision and that this direct linkage between the first and second pillar is of an 
exceptional character. However, particularly because this linkage is an exception to the general 
division of the EU into three separate and autonomous pillars, it must be construed narrowly”. 
116 In fact, both Courts acknowledged that the controversial EC acts could find its footing on the 
Community pillar, i.e. Article 301 TEC only after the Council had adopted a common position or a 
joint action under the CFSP. In such circumstance, was it really different to allows for the use of 
Article 308 TEC for the pursuit of CFSP objectives, as the CFI did, rather than for making it possible 
to implement CFSP actions in the EC framework, as done by the ECJ?. In this respect, we partially 
disagree with Hillion, Cohérence et action extérieure, op. cit., according to whom “la Cour étayait 
ainsi la thèse selon laquelle les compétences communautaires ne sauraient être exercées dans le but 
de réaliser des objectifs PESC qui relevaient alors des compétences de l’Union, quand bien même 
cette opération inter-pilier eût pu se justifier par des considérations de cohérence. La Cour fait ainsi 
prévaloir les règles relatives à l’ordonnancement des compétences, sur l’exigence de cohérence” (p. 
4). 
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primary law, albeit implicitly. Therefore, the evidence presented in this paragraph 
supports the argument whereby coherence has some legal content in so far as it 
entails legal outcomes.  
2. Coherence as a Legal Principle Requesting Unity in International 
Representation 
As noticed in the previous section, the fragmentation of international 
representation threatens the coherence of European foreign policies. EU 
institutions and Member States tackle this issue also by entering into mixed 
agreement and nominating a single negotiator for both the EU and its Members. In 
some circumstances, however, the identification of a single negotiator may not be 
possible or desirable for the Member States.117  The problems for unity of 
international representation that the fragmentation in the negotiation entails have 
been addressed by the ECJ through the use of coherence as an interpretative tool, in 
order to infer obligations for the Member States. 
As the Court affirmed in Ruling 1/78 (International Atomic Energy Agency), when 
mixed agreements are negotiated by both EU and Member States' representatives, 
there should be "a close association between the institutions of the community and 
the member states.”118 The ECJ later specified, in Opinion 1/94, that the duty of 
"close cooperation" between the negotiators of mixed agreements descends from 
"the requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community.”119 
At that time, however, the “unity in the international representation” remained a 
rather broad formula, whose implementation did not find any specific guideline in 
the jurisprudence of the Court, and was consequently difficult, or even impossible, 
to implement.120  
Three relatively recent cases clarify which conduct is required from the Member 
States in order to foster unity in international representation, and what is the 
source of such requirement. In the two Inland Waterways cases, the Court found 
that the Member States are under a procedural obligation to promote unity, since 
they must 'consult' the European representative (i.e. the Commission) before 
entering, in their own capacity, into international agreements whose conclusion 
may negatively affect “a concerted Community action at international level”.121 In 
the subsequent PFOS judgement the ECJ went a step further, by arguing that the 
requirement of unity in international representation entails also a substantive 
                                                 
117 The potential coexistence of two or more representatives is an unavoidable consequence of the 
simultaneous participation of the Union and Member States in an international agreement. In this 
sense, see Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR I-5267, paras. 106–107. 
118 Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, paras. 34 to 36. 
119 Opinion 1/94, cit. supra, para 108; see also Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR I-1061, para 36, and Case C-
25/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I-1469, para 48. 
120 Heliskoski, “Should there Be A New Article on External Relations? Opinion 1/94 ‘Duty of 
Cooperation’ in the Light of the Constitutive Treaties”, in Koskenniemi (ed.), International Law 
Aspects of the European Union (Nijhoff, 1998), p. 274. See also Cremona, “Defending the 
Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance”, in Cremona and de Witte (eds.), 
EU Foreign Relations Law – Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart, 2008), p. 127, p. 168. 
121 Case C-266/03, Commission v. Luxembourg, [2005] ECR I-4805, para 60. See also Case C-
433/03, Commission v. Germany, [2005] ECR I-6985, para 66. By analogy, see Case C-459/03, 
MOX plant, [2006] ECR I-04635, para 176, where the Court held that, during the implementation of 
mixed agreements, the Member States must “inform and consult” the competent EU institutions 
prior to undertaking initiatives that may lead “a judicial forum other than the Court will rule on the 
scope of obligations imposed on the Member States pursuant to Community law.” 
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obligation, that is to say not to make use of a State competence in order to 
dissociate oneself “from a concerted common strategy within the Council”, 
especially when such dissociation has negative consequences for the Union.122  
It is evident that in neither case the obligation of cooperation of the Member States 
was derived directly from conferral or was interpreted in its light,123 since the 
Member States were acting in the ambit of non-exercised shared competences and 
there could consequently be no interference with EU competences in abstracto. In 
Inland Waterways, the EU had not exercised its competences since the Council had 
merely authorised the Commission to negotiate an international agreement. In 
PFOS the exercise of EU competences was even more remote, in so far as the 
Council had not adopted any legal act explicitly embodying a Union position. 
According to the Court, however, the existence of obligations for the Member States 
does not stop at the limits of EU competences, but it extends beyond them, thus 
protecting the coherence of European foreign policies. In the Inland Waterways 
cases, the Court expressed this idea by affirming that the adoption of a decision 
authorising the Commission to negotiate a multilateral agreement "marks the start 
of a concerted Community action at international level" and requires a duty of close 
cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions,124 in 
order to ensure "the coherence and consistency of the action and its international 
representation.” This same interpretation of the duty of cooperation was 
maintained in PFOS, and it was even expanded, since the Court held that such 
"concerted Community action at international level" could also be embodied in a 
"common strategy" that is not explicitly contained in a typical act, but that may be 
identified by interpreting Council conclusions in light of the works of its 
preparatory bodies.125   
These cases signal that the Court did not intend to protect EU competences, but it 
rather sought to preserve the Union political position, which may be disrupted even 
when conferral is formally respected, because of the 'repercussions' of the Member 
                                                 
122 Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden, [2010] ECR I-3317, paras. 87–102. Although this case did 
not concern the negotiation of an international agreement, but the adoption of a position the Union 
should have taken within a body established through an international agreement, it would seem 
logical to apply this jurisprudence by analogy. 
123 It may be recalled that the obligation of cooperation is of general application (and it embodied "in 
particular") in Article 4(3)TEU, as the Court noted in case 230/81, Luxembourg v Parliament, [1983] 
ECR 255, par. 37. Therefore, it is not necessary for our purposes to determine whether the duty of 
cooperation Member States were under in the aforementioned cases stemmed directly from an 
alleged principle of unity in international representation, or from then Article 10 TEC (now Article 
4(3) TEU). On the issue, see Casolari, "The Principle of Loyal Cooperation: A 'Master Key' For EU 
External Representation?", in Blockmans and Wessel, Principles and Practices of EU External 
Representation, (CLEER, 2012), pp. 11-36, at p. 13. See also Hillion, Mixity and Coherence in EU 
External Relations: the Significance of the 'Duty of Cooperation' (CLEER, 2009). 
124 Case C-266/03, cit. supra, para 60. Notice that the Court makes an analogy with its earlier 
jurisprudence (Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR I-1045, paragraph 28), 
where it held that the then Article 5 TEC, now Article 4(3) TEU, “imposes on member states special 
duties of action and abstention in a situation in which the commission, in order to meet urgent needs 
of conservation, has submitted to the council proposals which , although they have not been adopted 
by the council , represent the point of departure for concerted community action” (emphasis added). 
Although the Court does not mention this 'detail', the analogy is incomplete, because in the Inland 
Waterways case there was no 'urgent need of conservation'. 
125 Case C-246/07, cit. supra, para 89. The Court may have been influenced in this sense by a 
consideration rendered explicit by it Advocate General, according to whom the absence of a decision 
was in fact determined by the defendant Member State, which “did not let [the] decision-making 
process take its natural course”, see Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-246/07, 
cit. supra, para 58. 
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States' actions. What is more, the Court interpreted the duty of cooperation of the 
Member States in an extensive manner, which is explicitly motivated by the concern 
for coherence.126 The latter, therefore, indubitably has legal outcomes, in so far as it 
affects the interpretation of a core EU principle and, in particular, it enables the 
sidelining of conferral.127 
3. Coherence as the Principle Underlying the 'Softening' of Delimitation in the 
Lisbon Reform: the Creation of a Single External Action Framework… 
Our necessarily brief presentation of the EU’s practice relating to coherence, as a 
political requirement and a legal principle, is not meant to deny the existence of an 
equally significant practice supporting the opposite conclusion, that is to say the 
denial of coherence for the sake of delimitation.128 The pre-Lisbon practice, 
therefore, suggests that coherence may have legal effects, but it does not necessarily 
demonstrate that it underlies the EU legal system. In our perspective, however, the 
practice relating to coherence is particularly important because it expresses the line 
of tendency that inspires the entire architecture of the external action set by the 
Lisbon Treaty. The remainder of this section seeks to demonstrate that the recent 
reform renders coherence one of the central regulatory standards of the EU external 
action, to the detriment of the delimitation of competences. This paragraph shows 
that the Lisbon Treaty 'bridged' the different policies of the Union, by creating a 
single framework for the external action. The next paragraph completes the picture, 
by clarifying that several, apparently unrelated, novelties entailed by the Lisbon 
reform allow for an ample overlapping of EU and Member States' competences.  
The drafters of the Lisbon Treaty clearly sought to enhance coherence in the 
external action of the Union. This is testified by the mandate for the 2007 
Intergovernmental Conference, which was asked to draw up a reform "with a view 
to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the enlarged Union, as 
well as the coherence of its external action."129 As a consequence, the Lisbon Treaty 
reinforced the principle of coherence by making numerous references to it, as noted 
above, and by structuring the architecture of the external action in order to 
augment the unity of EU representation and the coordination in the conduct of its 
actions.   
Unity in international representation is reinforced primarily by the merging of the 
EC and the EU into one single legal person (Article 47 TEU), thus entailing the 
abolition of the three 'pillars'. Such reform promotes coherence in external 
representation lato sensu, since the Union now presents itself to third parties as a 
single entity, and not as a scarcely intelligible triadic structure. In practice, this 
means that the Union can now indubitably enter into international agreements in 
                                                 
126 Cf. Bosse-Platière, op. cit., p. 692, according to whom "l'obligation de coopération étroite 
découlant de l'exigence d'unité de la représentation internationale de la Communauté peut trouver 
dans les disposition combinées des articles 10 CE et 3 UE un fondement juridique approprié". 
127 This would explain why "the legal picture emerging from the case-law does not consider the 
possible interplay between the loyalty principle and other EU principles – namely the principle of 
conferred competences and the principle of proportionality – which could lead to a more cautious 
affirmation of ‘fidelity duties’ binding Member States", as affirmed by Casolari, op. cit., 20. 
128 As a matter of fact, examples in this sense are not absent from our analysis either: for instance, in 
the Ecowas case the Court did not hesitate to re-affirm the delimitation of Union pillars, to the 
detriment of coherence 
129 IGC 2007 Mandate, Council doc. 11218/07, 26 June 2007, p. 2.  
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its own name, something that was contested before the entering into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. The EU can also adopt legal acts concerning its entire external action 
and, possibly, all its sectors at once. In particular, it may be argued that the EU 
could theoretically enter into international commitments covering both CFSP and 
non-CFSP issues, something Union institutions had considered before the reform 
but never put into practice because of the legal difficulties entailed by Article 47 
TEU. Finally, the new architecture of the external action enhances the unity of 
external representation stricto sensu, since it simplifies the rules governing the 
identification of the Union speaker. Before the reform, as a general rule, the 
Rotating Presidency spoke on behalf of the EU, whereas the Commission 
represented the EC. The Lisbon Treaty eliminated the representation power of the 
Rotating Presidency, and provided for a general rule on EU representation, 
contained in Article 17(1), whereby, with the exception of the cases provided for in 
the Treaties, the Commission ensures the Union’s external representation.  
Coordination in policy management is promoted through more elaborate structural 
arrangements. The Lisbon Treaty created a single framework for the external 
action, which provides for principles and objectives common to all strands of 
European external relations, including the CFSP (Articles 21 and 22 TEU). At the 
same time, the reform preserved the peculiarities of the single external action 
policies. Non-CFSP actions still pursue specific objectives, contained in their legal 
bases, but must foster them within the framework of the principles and objectives 
of the Union’s external action. CFSP actions pursue only the generic objectives of 
the external action, but remain procedurally 'anomalous'. This policy is indeed the 
only one that finds its legal bases in the TEU, whereas the others are contained in 
the TFEU. In addition, and most importantly, the CFSP remains largely 
intergovernmental in nature, whereas the other policies are generally managed 
through the Community method, or similar decision-making procedures. This 
motivates the persistence of a clause separating the CFSP and the rest of Union 
policies, contained in Article 40 TEU (previously Article 47 TEU). As noted above, 
however, this provision no longer foresees a straightforward subordination of the 
CFSP to non-CFSP initiatives, but it is 'symmetric' in nature.  
Therefore, the new architecture of the external action transparently suggests that 
the drafters of the Treaties sought to 'soften' the boundaries between Union 
policies, in order to increase unity in EU international representation and 
coordination in the implementation of its actions.  
4. …and the Overlapping of EU and Member States' Foreign Policies 
The recent reform did not abolish the separation between EU and Member States' 
foreign policies. The drafters of the Lisbon Treaty, however, set a legal architecture 
that allows the Union and its Members to identify the level of action in a pragmatic 
manner, as to foster unity in international representation and coordination in the 
implementation of external policies. This can be demonstrated through a systemic 
reading of the Treaties, which shows that the external competences of the Union 
and its Members overlap in most instances, rather than excluding each other.  
Such argument may seem to be contradicted by the existence of EU exclusive 
competences, in fields such as trade and monetary policy. Even in these fields, 
however, an intervention of the Member States is possible, since they the EU may 
authorise them to act. Similar considerations may be extended to the areas falling 
within the shared competences of the Union which the latter has already exercised. 
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The contemporary action of the EU and its Members is, by definition, always 
possible in the ambit of EU shared competences not yet exercised by the Union and 
in the fields covered by EU shared competences whose exercise does not result in 
Member States being prevented from exercising theirs (sometimes labelled as 
'parallel competences').130 This last category of shared competences includes de 
facto, if not de jure, also the CFSP: the Union is capable of adopting acts relating to 
"all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security" and the 
Member States are bound by its decisions. In respect of issues not covered by CFSP 
actions, however, the Member States maintain their competence intact. 
Both the EU and its Members can act also in the areas where the Union has 
competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of 
the Member States. The freedom of the Union is restrained, since Article 2(5) TFEU 
asserts that the use of "support" competences cannot lead to the harmonisation of 
Member States’ laws. This restriction to the EU's power should not be 
overemphasised, since the Treaties do not exclude the possibility to adopt 
harmonising measures having an impact on the areas covered by "support" 
competences on the basis of other (shared or exclusive) competences.131 
What of the areas not covered by Union competences? In principle, the 
competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member 
States. In the areas where the Union intervention is not explicitly excluded by the 
Treaties, however, the Union can rely on its implied powers to conduct 
international actions.132 The implied powers of the Union relate, firstly, to the 
conclusion of international instruments. As the Court held in Opinion 2/91, the EU 
is empowered to enter into the international commitments necessary for 
attainment of its objectives even in the absence of express provisions to that 
effect.133 More generally, the Union can adopt unilateral and international acts for 
which the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, on the basis of the so-
called ‘flexibility clause’, i.e. former Article 308 TEC and current Article 352 
TFEU.134 The scope of this provision is debated. The ECJ held in Opinion 2/94, that 
this provision “is designed to fill the gap where no specific provisions of the Treaty 
confer on the Community institutions express or implied powers to act",135 but it 
cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of Community powers beyond the 
"general framework" created by the provisions of the Treaty.136 This apparent 
contradiction may be explained by the fact that the 'flexibility clause' could be relied 
on only "in the course of the operation of the common market”, which could be 
                                                 
130 i.e. research, technological development, and, above all, development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid (Article 2(2) TFEU). 
131 Case C-376/98, Germany v Parliament and Council, [2000] ECR I-8419, p. 77-78.  
132 As noted by the International Court of Justice in Reparation for Injuries, “the necessities of 
international life may point to the need for [international] organizations, in order to achieve their 
objectives, to possess subsidiary powers […] known as ‘implied’ powers”, ICJ, Legality of the Use by a 
State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 8 July 1996, International Court of Justice, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 25. Cf. also Engstrom, “How to Tame the Elusive: Lessons from the 
Revision of the EU Flexibility Clause”, International Organizations Law Review 7 (2010); 343–373. 
133 Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR I-1061, para 7. 
134 Article 352(1) TFEU reads “if action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of 
the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the 
Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the 
appropriate measures.” 
135 Opinion 2/94, [1996] ECR I-1759, para 29. 
136 Opinion 2/94, cit. supra, para 30. 
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roughly be considered as the "general framework" of the EC Treaty. However, the 
common market clause, was interpreted very broadly in the practice, to the extent 
that some commentators argued that it did not serve any practical purpose.137 The 
Lisbon reform acknowledged this extensive reading of the 'flexibility clause', by 
modifying the wording of the 'common market clause' into "within the framework 
of the policies defined in the Treaties". This suggests that the use of Article 352 
TFEU is likely to be excluded only in most exceptional cases.138  
Therefore, it would seem that the EU is capable of intervening in any CFSP and 
non-CFSP sector. The EU's action may however encounter three obstacles. The first 
obstacle to the exercise of (non-exclusive) EU competences is provided for by the 
principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU, according to which "the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States", but can rather be better achieved at 
Union level. It is easy to note that this principle hardly hinders the EU's external 
action. Despite the indubitably legal nature of this principle,139 its enforcement 
depends mainly on a political evaluation, since the interpreter must determine 
whether the objectives of the proposed action can be "sufficiently" achieved by the 
Member States or can be "better" achieved at Union level. 140 The observance of 
subsidiarity, therefore, is more formal than substantial.141 This is all the more true 
for the external relations, where EU institutions may easily demonstrate that any 
external action is best performed at EU level, simply by arguing that "we are 
stronger when we act together".142 In other words, the concern for coherence may 
justify the conduct of an action at EU level. 
A second obstacle may be found in the objectives of the EU's external action: if 
Union competences can be used only to attain the objectives set in the Treaties, the 
                                                 
137 The very Court of Justice implicitly acknowledge this: even in its Opinion 2/94, where it sought to 
limit the breadth of the flexibility clause, it never mentioned “the common market” requirement; see 
Dashwood, ‘the Limits of European Community Powers", 21 European Law Review (1996): 113-128. 
138 Even in Opinion 2/94, the Court seems to have provided a narrow interpretation on the scope of 
former Article 308 EC, not because of the need to protect conferral as such, but rather in order to 
avoid the undesired effect of submitting itself to the scrutiny of a distinct organization with its own 
legal principles, judicial structure, and case-law, see Konstantinides, "Drawing the Line Between 
Circumvention and Gap-Filling: An Exploration of the Conceptual Limits of the Treaty's Flexibility 
Clause", Yearbook of European Law (2012): 1-36, p. 10. Notice however that the use of the flexibility 
clause seems to be declining, also because of the Lissabon Urteil judgement of the German 
Constitutional Court, see Konstantinides, op. cit., and Rossi, "Does the Lisbon Treaty Provide a 
Clearer Separation of Competences Between EU and Member States?", in Biondi, Eeckhout and 
Ripley, EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 85-106, at p. 105. 
139 On the political, rather than legal characterisation of subsidiarity, see inter alia Kapteyn, 
"Community Law and the Principle of Subsidiarity", 35 Revue Des Affaires Européennes  (1991): 35-
43; Lenaerts and Ypersele, "Le Principe de Subsidiarité et Son Contexte : Etude de L'article 3 B du 
Traité C.e.", 13 Cahiers de Droit Européen (1994): 13-33; Estella, The EU Principle of 
Proportionality (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
140 This is not to say that subsidiarity can never be enforced by the ECJ. Cf. cases C-233/94, Germany 
v Parliament and Council, [1997] ECR I-2405 and C 491/01, British American Tobacco and Imperial 
Tobacco, [2002] ECR I-11453. See also C-58/08, Vodaphone et. al., not published yet in the ECR. See 
also Biondi, "Subsidiarity in the Courtroom", in Biondi, Eeckhout and Ripley (eds.), EU Law After 
Lisbon (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 213-227. The Lisbon reform also introduced a specific 
procedure, involving national parliaments, to enforce subsidiarity, which may however lead only to a 
'review' of the proposed EU acts, and consequently does not restrain the EU's capability to act at 
international level, See Protocol 2 to the Lisbon Treaty, on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, O.J. 2010 C 83/206. 
141 Rossi, Does the Lisbon Treaty Provide a Clearer Separation of Competences Between EU and 
Member States?, cit. supra, p. 95 
142 European Security Strategy, cit. supra, p. 13. 
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international actions that do not pursue such objectives (and do not fall within the 
EU's exclusive competences), in principle, should be performed at State level. Such 
consideration is accurate in a formal perspective, since external action objectives 
are binding and may even be enforced jurisdictionally, at least in theory.143 The 
practice, however, is likely to go in the opposite direction. In the first place, the 
common objectives of the external action are numerous, partially contradictory144 
and extremely generic: the very first objective mentioned by Article 21 TEU may be 
used to justify almost every action on the international level, since it asserts that the 
EU should “safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity.”145 Since the flexibility clause and the CFSP can be used to pursue any of 
these objectives,146 it may be argued that they are scarcely limited in a teleological 
perspective. Secondly, even the objectives of sector (non-CFSP) policies provide for 
scarce restraints to the EU's action. The objective of the Common Commercial 
Policy, for instance, seems rather straightforward: contributing to the harmonious 
development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs 
and other barriers. It can hardly be denied that this provision is binding upon 
Union institutions, given its peremptory wording.147 Nonetheless, such objective 
seems hardly capable of restraining the margin of manoeuvre of EU institutions. It 
cannot be ignored that an international actor needs to play according to the rules of 
its own legal order, as well as of those of international relations. These include the 
legal requirements of the international system, the rules and political willingness of 
                                                 
143 Case C-268/96 Portugal v. Council [1996] ECR I-6177, para. 23. See also Larik, Shaping the 
International Order as a Union Objective and the Dynamic Internationalisation of Constitutional 
Law (CLEER, 2011). 
144 For instance, the eradication of poverty (Article 21(2)(d) TEU) might not be compatible with the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade (Article 21(2)(e) TEU). 
145 In order to affirm that this objective is of any interest in our perspective, one should assume that 
the EU may actually intend not to pursue its interests, security and independence in the future, which 
is obviously illogical. In this respect, see Parliament resolution of 8 June 2011 on Regulation (EC) 
1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation: lessons learned and 
perspectives for the future (2009/2149(INI), par. 16, according to which “development cooperation is 
the only external action policy (besides humanitarian aid) which has not been designed to serve EU 
interests but rather to defend the interests of the most marginalised and vulnerable populations on 
this planet” (emphases added). 
146 According to Article 23 TEU, “The Union’s action on the international scene, pursuant to [the 
CFSP] Chapter, […] shall pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general 
provisions laid down in Chapter 1”, i.e. Article 21 TEU. More generally, Article 352 TFEU can be used 
when the action by the Union proves necessary “to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties”.  
147 Before the Lisbon reform, the TEC affirmed, differently from current Article 206 TFEU, that “By 
establishing a customs union between themselves Member States aim to contribute, in the common 
interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade and the lowering of customs barriers” (Article 131). The ECJ stated the non-
binding character of the liberalization objective in Case C-150/94 United Kingdom v. Council 
(Chinese Toys) [1998] ECR I-7235, para. 67; Case C-112/80 Dürbeck v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt 
[1982] ECR 1251, para. 10 ff.; see also Case C-51/75 EMI v. CBS United Kingdom LtD [1976] ECR-
811. It may be argued, however, that the re-formulation of this provision in the Lisbon Treaty 
suggests that it has now acquired binding character, also in light of the ECJ jurisprudence on the 
objectives of other EU policies (see infra). For a fuller discussion of the issue, see Bonavita, "The EU 
Strategy Towards WTO Commercial Disputes After the Lisbon Reform”, in Larik and Moraru (eds.), 
Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action After the Lisbon Treaty 
(European University Institute, 2011), pp. 41-60, at pp. 44-46. See also Dimopoulos, "The Effects of 
the Lisbon Treaty On the Principles and Objectives of the Common Commercial Policy”, 15 European 
Foreign Affairs Review (2010): 153. 
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other states, as well as the allocation of resources outside one’s own borders.148 
Thus there is a need to preserve an ample degree of discretion for political 
institutions. The ECJ jurisprudence on the application of WTO law in the EU legal 
order confirms that primary law should be interpreted as to maintain the scope for 
manoeuvre enjoyed by Union institutions, especially in the context of relations 
based on reciprocity. In Portugal v. Council (1999), for instance, the Court held that 
“to accept that the role of ensuring that Community law complies with 
[international] rules devolves directly on the Community judicature would deprive 
the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre 
enjoyed by their counterparts in the Community's trading partners”. 149 The Court 
probably takes into consideration the effectiveness of the EU’s external action also 
when it does not explicitly mention it. For instance, it has recently been asserted 
that, by holding that the application of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to the 
aviation sector is compatible with EU and international law, the ECJ actually 
sought to foster the “environmental leadership” of the Union at multilateral level.150 
The third limit to the EU's capability to act on the international scene may be 
provided for by the explicit exclusion of certain areas from its competences. 
Primary law asserts that the exercise of certain EU competences “shall not affect” 
the competences of Member States in specific areas. For instance, the Union 
competence on border checks, asylum and immigration “shall not affect the 
competence of the Member States concerning the geographical demarcation of their 
borders” (Article 77(4) TFEU).151 These limitations of EU competences, however, do 
not seem able to exclude any EU intervention, but only those based on specific legal 
bases (in our examples: border checks). The ‘flexibility clause’ may therefore be 
used in this ambit to fill the gap in the EU powers. In a few circumstances, however, 
this course of action seems to be precluded, in so far as certain provisions do not 
only exclude the use of certain competences, but they rather forbid the EU’s 
interference with Member States’ activities. Thus, for instance, Article 17(1) TFEU 
asserts that “the Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national 
law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States”.152 
For the purpose of the external action, this means that the Union cannot enter into 
international agreements with the Holy See, as several EU Members did, for the 
purpose of regulating the status of the Roman Church throughout the EU.153  
                                                 
148 Larik, op. cit., p. 20. 
149 Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, par. 46, (emphasis added).  
150 Bogojevic, “Legalising Environmental Leadership: A Comment On the CJEU’S Ruling in C-366/10 
On the Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme”, 24 Journal of Environmental 
Law (2012): 345-356. 
151 Similarly, the EU’s competence on energy “shall not affect a Member State’s right to determine the 
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply” (Article 194(2) TFEU). In this sense, see also Articles 72, 79(5), 
154(4), 168(7) TFEU. 
152 Similarly, Article 165(1) TFEU affirms that the Union should fully respect “the responsibility of the 
Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems.” This implies 
that, in particular, the Union can never enter into international instruments containing commitments 
relating to the content of school programmes, independently from the legal basis that is chosen for 
this purpose. 
153 This is not to say to say the EU should have no relation with religious organisations or that the EU 
should have no stance whatsoever towards religious groups. Article 17(3) TFEU, in fact, affirms that 
the Union must maintain an “open, transparent and regular dialogue” with religious organisations, 
and Union institutions have actually a certain leeway in the conduct of this dialogue. See Rynkowski, 
“Remarks on Article I-52 of the Constitutional Treaty: New Aspects of the European Ecclesiastical 
Law?”, 6 German Law Journal (2005): 1719–1730, at p. 1726. See also Gatti, “Autonomy of Religious 
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In summary, the Lisbon reform enables both the EU and its Members to 
contemporarily intervene in almost every circumstance, thanks to the EU's 
cumulation of CFSP and non-CFSP competences in the Union framework, the 
reformulation of the 'flexibility clause' and the identification of wide objectives for 
the external action. This suggests that the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty did not 
intend to delimit EU and Member States' area of intervention with precision. They 
rather sought to allow for an allocation of the level of intervention on the basis of 
pragmatic considerations. Consequently, Union institutions and Members can 
conduct contemporary and synergetic actions.  In other words, the reform appears 
to be inspired by the concern for external action coherence, rather than by a 
formalistic approach to conferral. 
 
* 
 
* * 
 
This section sought to demonstrate that coherence is not only a political 
requirement perceived by EU institutions and Member States, but also a legal 
principle. Before the Lisbon reform, EU institutions used this principle in order to 
'soften' the delimitation of EU competences, in order to foster unity in international 
representation and synergy in the implementation of Union competences. 
Coherence, therefore, seems to have had legal effects insofar as it allowed for a 
'flexible' interpretation of conferral and it was even considered to request 
international unity. The pre-Lisbon practice favourable to external action coherence 
was confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty, which unified the architecture of the external 
action in order to allow for the overlapping of EU's external actions and Member 
States' foreign policies, transversally to the division of competences determined by 
conferral.  
This means that the spirit of the Lisbon reform does not reflect the traditional 
project of law – to draw lines between different areas of action – but is actually 
functional to sustain the interdependence of European foreign policies, in order to 
promote their coherence.154 The very idea of a plurality of European foreign policies 
may be reconsidered: if it is true that the EU and its Members conduct different 
external actions, it is also evident that they are closely integrated, to the extent that 
they largely overlap. Given the blurred distinction between the competences of the 
EU and those of its Members, it is possible to describe their external actions as a 
multiform European foreign policy. 
Since coherence has legal effects and it underlies the entire architecture of the 
entire external action, it should be considered as a legal principle, in light of which 
EU law should be interpreted. It may be wondered, however, how such 
interpretation may be enforced in practice. 
                                                                                                                                               
Organizations in the European Convention on Human Rights and in European Union Law, in Rossi 
(Ed.), Fundamental Rights in Europe and China: Between Identities and Universalism, in course of 
publication.  
154 Similar considerations have been expressed, with respect to the US legal order, by Ahdieh, op. cit. 
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SECTION 4. THE 'UNION METHOD': POLITICAL COORDINATION AS A MEANS 
TO ENFORCE EXTERNAL ACTION COHERENCE 
If coherence is the legal principle that underlies the recent reform, its practical 
implementation may be complicated. This section intends to demonstrate that the 
most significant contribution to external action coherence is likely be provided for 
by the High Representative and his/her Service. Paragraph 1 shows that, even after 
the Lisbon reform, external action coherence is still hindered by procedural issues, 
and its promotion can take place only by bridging the Community and 
intergovernmental approaches, through the so-called 'Union method'. Paragraph 2 
shows that the Union method can be implemented through the legal instruments 
foreseen in the Treaties, but only to a certain extent. Paragraph 3 clarifies that the 
Union method can be applied in practice mainly through the activity of the High 
Representative, who is tasked by the Lisbon Treaty with the coordination of 
European foreign policies; it is also argued, however, that the effective performance 
of the HR's tasks is dependent on the administration that supports him/her, that is 
to say the European External Action Service. Paragraph 4 concludes the analysis by 
presenting the main challenges for the effectiveness of the EEAS, as they appeared 
during the process that led to its establishment. 
1. Political Coordination as a Response to Policy Incoherence: Introducing the 
'Union Method' 
Although the architecture of the external action is inspired by the principle of 
external action coherence, it is apparent that synergy is far from being achieved in 
practice. This persisting incoherence may be explained mainly in a procedural 
perspective. To be sure, the EU may intervene in almost all external relations fields, 
by mobilising coherently all its tools. Such outcome, however, is primarily 
dependent on the priorities of the Member States. In the absence of unanimity in 
the Council, neither the CFSP nor the flexibility clause can be activated. Reaching 
unanimity is obviously challenging, since by using these frameworks the Member 
States substantially restrain their scope for manoeuvre in respect of sensitive issues, 
such as security policy. Even reaching the qualified majority that is generally 
requested for non-CFSP decision-making sometimes proves quite difficult.155  
Even when the Member States agree upon a EU policy the obstacles to coherence 
are not eliminated. Since every policy has specific legal bases, and may be 
conducted according to autonomous procedures, the outcome of the different 
decision-making processes may not support each other. This is especially true in 
respect of the CFSP, since the different decision-making procedures of this sector 
might lead to the formulation of priorities incompatible with those of the non-CFSP 
areas. This may prevent, at political level, the linking of the former external action 
pillars.  
Despite these procedural obstacles, coherence is not unattainable. It is well know 
that coordination in the management of policies can be reached also in polycentric 
frameworks. Abundant evidence suggests that repeated negotiation among actors 
                                                 
155 This is especially true in the case of non-exercised shared competences, whose use entails also the 
pre-emption effect (and, thus, a restriction of the Member States’ discretion in the future). 
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often leads to cooperation and some form of mutually supportive actions.156 
Coherence may therefore be the product of cooperation between decision-makers, 
transversally to the traditional approaches to European integration. This idea finds 
ample support in European circles. For instance, in its Communication on external 
action coherence of 2006, the Commission held that the Community and 
intergovernmental methods need to be combined on the basis of what best achieves 
the desired outcome, rather than institutional theory or dogma.157 Indeed, 
according to H. Van Rompuy, "often the choice is not between the Community 
method and the intergovernmental method, but between a coordinated European 
position and nothing at all".158 The objective of the Union, therefore, should not be 
about giving up the Member States' role, "it is about leveraging our strength by 
aligning our positions, pooling resources, acting in the world as a club – and 
increasingly as a team",159 or, to put it more vividly, as "a convoy of 27 ships, 
negotiating the waves of the geopolitical ocean".160 
The most known definition of this approach was provided for by A. Merkel in a 
speech in 2010: "I believe we must put old rivalries behind us, we must set common 
goals and adopt common strategies. Perhaps we can agree on the following 
description of this approach: coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity - each of us 
in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same goal. 
That for me is the new Union method”.161 To be sure, A. Merkel did not refer to the 
external action in particular, but to EU law-making as a whole. We retain however 
this definition since it effectively depicts the need to bridge Community and 
intergovernmental approaches to European foreign policy. 
The Union method has been debated, since it has been characterised as an attempt 
at hindering the activity of EU institutions and even the integration process. 
However, it is not a new idea: a close analysis of the functioning of the EU shows 
that the Community and the intergovernmental principles have always coexisted 
and have actually been merged in several instances.162 In the internal fields, the EU 
has sometimes managed policies in "partnership" with the Member States, by 
relying on its coordination competences.163 In external relations, the clearest 
                                                 
156 For evidence in the international relations literature, see Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 
(Basic Books, 1985); comparable conclusions have been reached also in other sectors, such as 
organisational behaviour, see inter alia Powell, "Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of 
Organization", 12 Research in Organisational Behaviour (1990): 303. For a discussion of the 
implications of these findings for legal systems, see Ahdieh, op. cit., p. 1216. 
157 Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006, Europe in the 
World — Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, 8 June 2006, 
COM(2006) 278 final, para. 4. See also COM(2002) 247, A project for the European Union, p. 12.. 
158 Van Rompuy, Not Renationalisation of European Politics, cit. supra. 
159 "Europe on the World Stage" , speech by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, 
at Chatham House 31 May 2012. 
160 Van Rompuy, Not Renationalisation of European Politics, cit. supra. 
161 Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of 
the College of Europe in Bruges on 2 November 2010. 
162 See Missiroli, a Little Discourse on Method(s) (Egmont, 2011), p. 8, according to whom "this is 
why the current European public "discourse on methods" and the resulting polarisation between 
[Community method] and [Intergovernmental method] - with Merkel's [Union method] as a dark 
horse - appear superficial and, above all, not to the point". 
163 See the description of the "dual partnership coordination" in Smismans, "from Harmonization to 
Coordination? EU Law in the Lisbon Governance Architecture", 18 European Journal of Public 
Policy (2011): 504-524, at p. 508. See also Commission Communication, ‘Common action for growth 
and employment: the Community Lisbon Programme’, COM(2005) 330 final. See also Council 
Presidency, Conclusions, 14 March 2008, para 14 and 18. Cf. also Quermonne, La Question du 
Gouvernement Européen (Notre Europe, 2002), p. 2: "l’institution des "piliers" a généré un 
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example of an ante litteram application of the Union Method probably is provided 
for by the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As seen above, the EPC and, later, 
the CFSP were originally conceived as instruments to coordinate the Member 
States' foreign policies with the activities of EEC institutions, through negotiation 
and dialogue. The pre-Lisbon attempts at fostering coherence through 
coordination, however, proved insufficient in practice. Does the recent reform bring 
added value in this respect? 
2. On the Insufficiency of Secondary Law for the Attainment of Coordination 
The pre-Lisbon practice suggests that EU institutions and Member States have 
often sought to bridge the gap between the Community and intergovernmental 
methods through secondary law. Does the Lisbon reform render this approach 
more effective? 
The Treaties directly foresee an act that should orient the entire external action, 
that is to say the 'strategic' decisions of the European Council. Article 22 TEU, 
significantly located among the common provisions of the external actions, codifies 
the pre-Lisbon practice on Common Strategies. This provision affirms that the 
European Council may identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union 
through its decisions. These acts may play a crucial role in the implementation of 
the Union method, since they relate to the entire EU external action, and define the 
means to be made available by both the Union and the Member States. The 
practical significance of Article 22 TEU, however, may be scarce, since the 
European Council adopts 'strategic decisions' by unanimity and the pre-Lisbon 
practice suggests that the reaching of unanimity within the Institution entails 
lengthy negotiations, which are rarely conducive to the adoption of decisions. This 
is confirmed by the fact that no such decision has been adopted after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The bridging of the Community and intergovernmental methods may be ensured 
also through the acts of other institutions. The creation of a single framework for 
the external action, characterised by common principles and objectives, may lead to 
a 'relaxation' of the centre of gravity doctrine. The vagueness and multiplicity of 
external action objectives makes sure that the EU external actions share some 
objectives with internal and external policies. This was demonstrated in the recent 
Parliament v Council case, where the ECJ held that although "the combating of 
terrorism and its financing may well be among the objectives of the area of 
freedom, security and justice […] the objective of combating international terrorism 
and its financing in order to preserve international peace and security corresponds, 
nevertheless, to the objectives of the Treaty provisions on external action by the 
Union" and, in particular, of the CFSP.164 The identity of objectives of EU policies 
implies that the Union can pursue its external aims by selecting the instruments 
that are most appropriate in each specific circumstance, according to the content of 
the action to be undertaken. In other words, the legislator is no longer obliged to 
                                                                                                                                               
cloisonnement, voire des doubles emplois entre les organes de l’Union, comme en témoigne la 
coexistence d’un Haut Représentant pour la PESC et d’un Commissaire aux relations extérieures. […] 
Dans d’autres domaines, d’ordre économique et social, l’intelligente invention de la "méthode ouverte 
de coordination", par le Conseil européen de Lisbonne, a tenté de remédier à cette entrave, mais sans 
que ses résultats soient, jusqu’à présent, tout à fait convaincants". 
164 Para. 61. 
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use the legal basis that is linked to the pursuit of a specific objective. This renders 
the EU strategy more flexible and potentially more coherent.  
This line of reasoning may seem to be partially contradicted by the fact that most 
external action objectives listed in Article 21 TEU are also objectives of specific 
internal or external action policies set in the TFEU. It may be hypothesised that this 
should lead to the prevalence of TFEU objectives over common external action aims 
by way of lex specialis. For instance, it may argued that, since fostering the 
sustainable development of developing countries is a 'special' objective of 
development cooperation (Article 208 TFEU), the CFSP should not be allowed to 
contribute to it. Such reading of the Treaties, however, takes into consideration 
neither the principle of external action coherence nor the explicit request for 
coordination between non-CFSP actions and external relations as a whole 
contained in TFEU legal bases. It is more logical to argue that, although 'sector-
specific' objectives should be primarily promoted through sector-specific legal 
bases, they may be pursued also through other bases. This is not to say that the 
centre of gravity doctrine should cease to have any function: an act that seeks only 
to foster sustainable development should certainly be based on the development 
cooperation basis. The Court may however apply its doctrine with a certain 
flexibility, by accepting that the connection between an act and external action 
objectives different from those of its legal basis, or even typical of other legal bases, 
might be more than 'incidental'. For instance, the connection between CFSP actions 
and development cooperation objectives may be stronger than the link the Court 
habitually accepts between the means and objectives of internal policies. The 
acceptable degree of such connection will evidently have to be determined through 
the jurisdictional practice.  
What of the actions whose contents and objectives are so closely tied to two (or 
more) policies that it is impossible to ascertain which one should prevail? Before 
the Lisbon reform, this issue was particularly contentious in the case of cross-pillar 
issues, since the Ecowas jurisprudence excluded the cumulation of EU and EC legal 
bases, and initiatives relating to both pillars had to be adopted on Communitarian 
bases only. The situation may different today, since the subordination clause of 
Article 47 TEU was substituted by a 'symmetric' non-interference clause for CFSP 
and non-CFSP actions. Since Article 40 TEU no longer expresses any favor 
communitatis, it may be argued that the accumulation of CFSP and non-CFSP legal 
bases should be possible. Acts having CFSP and non-CFSP legal bases may be 
labelled ‘cross-Treaty’, since the CFSP provisions are located within the TEU, while 
non-CFSP legal bases are to be found in the TFEU.165  
The letter of the Lisbon Treaty is clearly in favour of at least one category of cross-
Treaty acts, i.e. international agreements. Before the Lisbon reform, this kind of act 
was considered impossible because of the separation of EC and EU legal 
personalities, the restrictive interpretation of Article 47 TEU seen above, and the 
discrepancy between Community and CFSP procedures (i.e. the Titanium Dioxide 
jurisprudence).166 The first problem was solved by the Lisbon reform, through the 
                                                 
165 See, in this sense, Gatti and Manzini, “External representation of the European Union in the 
conclusion of international agreements”, 49 Common Market Law Review (2012), 1703-1733, p. 
1707. 
166 For the sake of precision, it must be stressed that the EU actually concluded similar agreements 
before the Lisbon reform, but only in an 'indirect' manner (i.e. by relying on an extensive 
interpretation of EC competences), or, in a few cases, by using two internal (EU and EC) acts for the 
conclusion of one single EU/EC agreement. See Wessel, "Cross-Pillar Mixity: Combining 
Competences in the Conclusion of EU International Agreements", in Koutrakos and Hillion (eds.), 
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introduction of the new legal personality of the EU, which encompasses both CFSP 
and non-CFSP policies. The second is probably solved by new Article 40 TEU. The 
third, that is to say the discrepancy of treaty-making procedures, was addressed by 
the merging of treaty-making procedures: the pre-Lisbon provisions regulating the 
conclusion of international agreements of the EU (Article 24 TEU) and the EC 
(Article 300 TEC) were substituted by a single provision, that is to say Article 218 
TFEU.167 The existence of a single legal basis for all international agreements (to the 
partial exception of trade and monetary agreements) suggests that the drafters of 
the Treaties did not intend to exclude cross-Treaty agreements a priori. Against 
this finding it cannot be held that Article 218 TFEU foresees de facto two different 
procedures for CFSP and non-CFSP agreements, roughly corresponding to the 
Community and the intergovernmental methods.168 An accurate reading of this 
provision suggests indeed that 'mixed' Community/intergovernmental procedures 
for the conclusion of international agreements are explicitly allowed by primary 
law. Whereas, according to paragraph 8, the Council shall act unanimously in 
respect of agreements relating primarily or exclusively to the CFSP,169 paragraph 6 
stipulates that the Parliament shall not approve only the agreements that relate 
"exclusively" to the CFSP. This implies that agreements relating also, but not 
exclusively, to the CFSP may be adopted by unanimity in the Council and after 
approval of the EP,170 that is to say through a de facto CFSP/non-CFSP procedure. 
The practice confirms this reading of the Treaties, since the Council has already 
adopted seven decisions authorising the negotiation of cross-Treaty agreements.171 
                                                                                                                                               
Mixed Agreements Revisited (Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. 30-54; see also De Baere, op. cit., pp. 294 
ff. 
167 With the partial exception of trade (Article 207 TFEU) and monetary policy (Article 219 TFEU). 
168 First, while the opening of negotiations, the signing and the conclusion of non-CFSP agreements is 
approved by the Council by qualified majority, CFSP agreements are authorized, adopted and 
concluded by unanimity. Second, the conclusion of non-CFSP agreements is subject to the previous 
consultation of the European Parliament, whose opinion is often binding. In the case of CFSP 
agreements, the Parliament is not even consulted. Third, the opening of negotiations for non-CFSP 
agreements is recommended by the Commission, while CFSP agreements are proposed by the High 
Representative (HR). Fourth, the ECJ maintains its jurisdiction in respect of the compatibility of 
non-CFSP agreements with the Treaties, but it can control CFSP agreements only with respect to 
their influence on non-CFSP provisions. 
169 Article 218(8) TFEU asserts that the Council "shall act unanimously when the agreement covers a 
field for which unanimity is required for the adoption of a Union". In light of centre of gravity 
doctrine, this can but mean that the Council shall act unanimously in respect of acts having 
preponderant CFSP content and/or objectives. 
170 In these cases, the intervention of the Parliament would however be limited to association 
agreements, agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation 
procedures and agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union, see Article 218 
TFEU. 
171 An example of the decisions authorizing the opening of negotiations with Georgia, adopted on 10 
May 2010, can be found in the letter to the European Parliament attached to Council doc. 7462/2010, 
27 May 2010 (annex II); for the framework agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia, whose 
negotiations were authorized on the same date, see Council doc. 7461/10 annex II and doc. 7460/10 
annex II, respectively. Note that the authorizations to negotiate these agreements were proposed by 
the Commission before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and that they were not published, 
unlike similar decisions adopted afterwards. Nonetheless, it may be assumed that their content is 
similar, if not identical, to the decisions authorizing the negotiation of the following framework 
agreements: the Cooperation Agreement with Afghanistan, whose negotiation was authorized 
through a Council decision (doc. 16146/11) and a Member States’ representatives decision (doc. 
16147/11), both adopted on 10 Nov. 2010; the Partnership and Cooperation agreement with 
Kazakhstan (Council doc. 8282/11 and 8283/11, 13 Apr. 2011); the framework agreement with 
Australia (doc. 14657/11 and 14658/11, 4 Oct. 2011); the framework agreement with Canada (Council 
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Such agreements are being negotiated in the ‘mixed’ form, that is to say with the 
participation of the Member States; consequently, the Member States have 
unanimously approved the opening of the negotiations. It is true that, theoretically, 
a mere practice cannot derogate from the rules laid down in the Treaties,172 but, 
given the plausibility of the legal basis chosen for these agreements, and the general 
approval they meet with in the institutions and the Member States, this practice is 
likely not to remain isolated. 
The adoption of cross-Treaty unilateral acts may seem to be more troublesome 
because of the Titanium Dioxide jurisprudence. CFSP and non-CFSP unilateral acts 
maintain separate legal bases, which foresee different and potentially incompatible 
procedures. Whereas the adoption of CFSP acts calls for unanimous voting in the 
Council acting alone, most TFEU legal bases provide for application of the ordinary 
legislative procedure, which entails qualified majority voting in the Council and the 
Parliament’s full participation in the procedure. The ECJ recently affirmed, in a 
rather succinct way, that “differences of that kind are such as to render those 
procedures incompatible”.173 This jurisprudence may seem to suggest that 
unilateral cross-Treaty acts should be impossible. Such conclusion, however, should 
be nuanced in light of a broader assessment of the Court’s jurisprudence. Two 
aspects of the CFSP and non-CFSP procedures seem to be problematic for the 
Court: the voting method in the Council and the role of the EP. The first issue was 
found to be unproblematic in the International Fund for Ireland case,174 dealing 
with the accumulation of two non-CFSP procedures entailing qualified majority 
voting, on the one hand, and unanimity, on the other. In this judgement, the Court 
affirmed that “the ‘co-decision’ procedure referred to in Article 251 EC and the 
requirement that the Council should act unanimously” are compatible.175 Because of 
this judgement, the Parliament and the Council subsequently adopted Regulation 
1232/2010 “acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and the 
requirement for unanimity in the Council provided for in the first sentence of 
Article 352(1) [TFEU]”. 176 Mutatis mutandis, the EP and Council may therefore 
seem able to adopt a cross-Treaty act in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure and the requirement for unanimity in the Council provided for in the 
CFSP Chapter of the TEU (Article 24). The second obstacle to the adoption of a 
cross-Treaty, i.e. the role of the Parliament, is not more problematic. Such an act 
may theoretically be adopted by the Council acting alone, but this would nullify the 
                                                                                                                                               
doc. 16964/11 and 17037/11, not published, 30 Nov. 2011). Note that the wording of the decisions 
authorizing the negotiation of these agreements is almost identical. Remarkably, the negotiation of 
these agreements was authorized through two separate Decisions, adopted by the Council, on behalf 
of the Union, and by the representatives of Member States, meeting within the Council, on the States’ 
behalf. 
172 Case 68/86, United Kingdom v Council, [1988] ECR 855, para. 24. 
173 Cf. Case C-130/10, Parliament v Council, [2012] not published in the ECR yet, par. 47. 
174 Case C-166/07, Parliament v Council, [2009] ECR I-7135. 
175 Theoretically, it may be argued that this jurisprudence became obsolete with the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, since nowhere in this Treaty is the co-decision procedure with unanimity retained. 
However, this does not seem to be the case, since when the Court laid down its International Fund 
for Ireland judgement it could not ignore that it would have led to the adoption of an act (Regulation 
1232/2010, see infra) under the accumulation of Lisbon procedures. For a wider discussion of this 
issue and its implications, see Corthaut, Case C-166/07, European Parliament V Council of the 
European Union, Judgement of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 3 September 2009 [2009] 
ECR I-7135, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011): 1271-1296. 
176 Regulation of the Parliament and the Council (EU) No 1232/2010 of 15 December 2010, O.J. 2010 
L 346/1, preamble. 
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effect of the non-CFSP legal basis, thus jeopardising the democratic principle the 
European Union is founded upon.177 Alternatively, the EP may be fully involved in 
the procedure, as prescribed by the TFEU legal basis, but this would seem to 
question the “choice made by the framers of the Treaty of Lisbon conferring a more 
limited role on the Parliament with regard to the Union’s action under the CFSP.”178  
This second solution should nonetheless be preferred, since an involvement of the 
EP in the adoption of a CSFP/non-CFSP act does not run counter to the spirit of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which allows for the intervention of the Parliament in at least one 
CFSP procedure, that is to say the conclusion of international agreements that 
relate “principally”, but not “exclusively” to the CFSP.  Even more convincingly, the 
previous jurisprudence of the Court suggests that the use of different legal bases, 
foreseeing a variable degree of involvement of the EP, should simply lead to the 
integration of the Parliament in the decision-making process, as required by the 
most ‘democratic’ procedure. Thus in Commission v Parliament and Council 
(2006) the Court affirmed that Articles 133 and 175(1) TEC could be combined 
“although the first-mentioned article does not formally provide for the participation 
of [the Parliament] in the adoption of a measure of the kind at issue in this case, 
[whereas] the second article, on the other hand, expressly refers to the procedure 
provided for in Article 251 EC.”179  
Therefore, it would seem possible for institutions to adopt cross-Treaty acts in the 
future, by relying on ad hoc procedures, generally involving the use of unanimity in 
the Council and the full intervention of the EP. The shortcoming of this solution is 
that it may question the institutional balance set in the Treaties, and which the 
Court sought to defend through its centre of gravity doctrine. Not only would the 
EP obtain a certain influence on CFSP decision-making but unanimity in the 
Council would be applied also to sectors covered by the ordinary legislative 
procedure. The latter issue may render the adoption of external action acts 
exceedingly difficult, ultimately reducing, rather than improving, the effectiveness 
and coherence of the external action. Such problem, however, should not be 
overestimated, since the CFSP/non-CFSP international agreements presently being 
negotiated actually demonstrate that the mixing of 'methods' is not necessarily 
unworkable in practice. In addition, it cannot be ignored that the Member States 
may be less than willing to adopt non-CFSP acts having non-secondary CFSP 
components, as an inflexible protection for institutional balance (and the Ecowas 
jurisprudence) would require. Therefore, the choice may not be between the 
Community method and the intergovernmental method, but between a 'sub-
optimal' CFSP/non-CFSP procedure and nothing at all. If political institutions seek 
cross-Treaty acts because they consider them to be effective, the Court may grant 
them this opportunity, by interpreting primary law in light of external action 
coherence, even at the cost of partially sacrificing institutional balance. 
The adoption of cross-Treaty instruments, however, may not be entirely effective. 
On the one hand, institutions may not be comfortable with the 'reshuffling' of 
institutional balance that would be determined by the cumulation of legal bases, as 
                                                 
177 Indeed, “participation by the Parliament in the legislative process is the reflection, at Union level, 
of the fundamental democratic principle that the people should participate in the exercise of power 
through the intermediary of a representative assembly”, Case C-130/10, cit. supra, para. 81. See also 
the Titanium dioxide judgement, Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867, para. 20; 
see also Case 138/79 Roquette Frères v Council [1980] ECR 3333, para. 33.  
178 Case C-130/10, cit. supra, para. 82. 
179 Case C-178/03 Commission v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-107, para. 59. In this sense, 
see also Case C-155/07 Parliament v Council [2008] ECR I-8103, para. 79. 
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testified by the absence of cross-Treaty unilateral acts at present. On the other 
hand, and this is the most important issue, the absence of unanimity between the 
Member States prevents any coordination with, and within, the CFSP framework. It 
is necessary to assuage the concerns of EU institutions and promote the consensus 
among the Member States. These functions are performed by the new 'coordinators' 
of EU external relations.  
3. The High Representative as an External Action Coordinator: the "Impossible 
Job" 
The drafters of the Treaties did not ignore the concerns created by the 
fragmentation of European foreign policies, but responded to them through 
institutional engineering, by creating an organ that should organise the activities of 
other bodies in order to foster coherence,180 that is to say a 'coordinator' of the 
external action. 
The idea of coordinating decision-makers at political level is not unknown to the 
EU. Intergovernmental coordination, in particular, has been fostered by several 
entities since the inception of integration process. This is the function of the 
Presidencies of intergovernmental bodies, which facilitate cohesion and consensus 
among the representatives of the Member States.181 Similarly, the COREPER 
contributes to the efficiency of the Council's decision-making by preparing its 
works.182 Even the Commission contributes to consensus building, since it mediates 
between the Member States by proposing measures on which their views may 
converge.183 What the EU lacked, before the Lisbon reform, was an entity 
performing a coordinating role across the intergovernmental and Communitarian 
frameworks. The Lisbon Treaty sought to fill this gap by providing for the creation 
of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.184 
The High Representative is a Union office, whose creation and main powers are 
provided for in Article 18 TEU, and who is appointed by the European Council by 
qualified majority with the agreement of the President of the European 
                                                 
180 On the activity of coordination see inter alia Mazzaroli et al., Diritto Amministrativo (Monduzzi, 
2005), p. 397 and Giannini, Diritto Amministrativo (Giuffrè, 1993), p. 314. 
181 Article 15(6)(c) TEU explicitly refers to this function with respect to the President of the European 
Council. 
182 Article 16(7) TEU. See also Article 19(2) of the Rules of procedure of the Council, 2009/937/EU, 
O.J. 2009 L/35, which asserts that "Coreper shall endeavour to reach agreement at its level to be 
submitted to the Council for adoption." On the coordinating role of COREPER, see Sauron, "Rapport 
Introductif", in Constantinesco and Simon (eds.), Le COREPER dans Tous Ses Etat (Presses 
Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2000), pp. 15-21, at pp. 18-19. See also Constantinesco, Compétences et 
Pouvoirs Dans Les Communautées Européennes: Contribution A l'Etude de La Nature Juridique 
Des Communautés (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1974), pp. 341-347. 
183 Constantinesco, Compétences et Pouvoirs, cit. supra, pp. 405-407. 
184 The coordinating role of the HR, as a corollary of the abolition of EU pillars, was originally 
supported by the Rapport du groupe présidé par Jean-Louis Quermonne, Commissariat Général du 
Plan, see Quermonne, L'Union Européenne en Quête D'institutions Légitimes et Efficaces (La 
Documentation Française, 1999)., pp. 99-110. Cf. also Mestre, "La Commission Européenne", in 
Constantinesco, Gauttier and Michel (eds.), Le Traité Etablissant une Constitution Pour l'Europe 
(Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2005), pp. 161-178, at pp. 168-169: "les constitutionnels ont 
decidé de fondre les deux fonctions [de Commissaire pour les affaires étrangères et de Haut 
Représentant] entre les mains d'un seul responsable […] l'objectif d'une telle fusion réside dans la 
volonté de rapprocher les positions des Etats membres et de permettre enfin l'émergence d'une 
politique extérieure européenne propre à l'Union".  
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Commission. The coordinating function of the HR is testified, firstly, by his/her 
multiple responsibilities. It is in fact commonly affirmed that the HR has three 
'hats'. He/she has two intergovernmental roles: he/she presides over the Foreign 
Affairs Council and he/she "conducts" the CFSP, since he/she has been conferred 
initiative, implementation and external representation competences in this field.185 
The HR has also responsibilities in the formerly Communitarian area, since he/she 
is one of the Vice-Presidents (VP) of the Commission. For the sake of a good 
understanding of the analysis, it is worth specifying that we refer to the HR as 
"HR/VP" only when discussing his/her activities in his/her capacity as a Vice-
President of the Commission.  
The coordinating function of the HR is demonstrated also by the letter of the 
Treaties, and more precisely by Article 21(3) TEU, according to which "the Council 
and the Commission, "assisted by the High Representative" shall ensure external 
action "consistency". A cursory reading of this provision may suggest that the 
Council and the Commission share the same responsibility to maintain coherence 
as the HR. A more accurate reading of Article 21(3) TEU, however, clarifies that the 
roles of these entities are necessarily different. Whereas the Council embodies the 
intergovernmental approach, and the Commission is closely associated with the 
Community method, the HR is located somewhere 'in between' the two institutions, 
as testified by his/her multiple 'hats' and the procedure for his/her appointment. 
This implies that his/her cooperation with the Council and the Commission is 
necessarily meant to bridge the gap between the activities of the Institutions.186  
Such reading is further supported by Article 18(4) TEU, which asserts that the HR 
is "responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in 
external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external 
action". In other terms, the HR, in his/her capacity as a Commission VP, should 
also coordinate the activities of the Commission with the aspects of external 
relations that are not "incumbent" on the latter (including the CFSP). The 
coordinating function of the HR is further confirmed by his/her role in 
intergovernmental frameworks. The coordinating duties of the HR are implicit in 
the role of President of a Council formation, who must facilitate cohesion and 
consensus among the representatives of the Member States, as noted above. 
Explicit references to the HR's coordinating function in the intergovernmental field 
are also found in provisions dealing with specific issues. According to Article 32 
TEU, the HR and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States should 
coordinate their activities in the CFSP. Article 34 TEU, furthermore, asserts that the 
HR must "organise th[e] coordination" of the Member States in international 
organisations. Article 43(2), finally, affirms that the HR ensures "coordination" of 
the civilian and military aspects of crisis management. 
                                                 
185 As it is well known, the Council has a double nature, since "c'est d'une part le lieu de rencontre des 
interets étatiques et, d'autre part, un organe intégré dans le système institutionnel des 
Communautés", Constantinesco, Compétences et Pouvoirs, cit. supra, p. 308. 
186 The Commission supported this view as early as in 2003, when it affirmed that the HR/VP's 
functions is to improve "the consistency of the Union’s external action in all fields, regardless of the 
decision-making procedure provided for in the Constitution", COM(2003) 548 final, A constitution 
for the Union, para. 18. A similar opinion was expressed by Barnier and Vitorino in their contribution 
to the European Convention on the "Joint External Action Service", p. 3: "the point of abandoning the 
pillared structure of the existing Treaties, and creating a post of Foreign Minister, is to allow the 
European Union to pursue a genuinely coherent foreign policy". In this sense, see also Franklin, op. 
cit., p. 76. 
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The protean role of the HR may seem an absolute innovation of the recent reform, 
especially in light of the HR's office as it previously existed. Before the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the HR merely assisted the Council in the CFSP area, 
and acted externally only on its behalf and at the request of the Rotating 
Presidency.187 A closer investigation of the new HR's duties, however, reveals that 
this office is not entirely new, in so far as it constitutes an attempt at 'importing' the 
figure of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Union framework. It is well known 
that the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of sovereign States are primarily tasked with 
the coordination of the external activities of their Countries.188 They perform this 
function through their responsibilities in foreign affairs stricto sensu, as well as 
through the oversight of the external activities of the government as a whole. The 
Constitutional Treaty sought to insert this figure in EU law by introducing, in 
Article I-28, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Lisbon Treaty modified the 
nomen of the Minister, for reasons of political opportunity, but maintained its 
powers intact.  
The figure of the High Representative, therefore, is not innovative per se, but rather 
because of the legal constraints it is subject to. Since external action competences 
are divided among the Member States and the Union, and between CFSP and non-
CFSP sectors, there is no 'government' in which the HR may coordinate the entirety 
of European foreign policies. The activity of the HR must therefore span across the 
activities of the Member States and those of the Union, in both CFSP and non-CFSP 
areas.  
The peculiarities of the EU render the activity of the HR, as a sui generis Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, difficult to perform in practice. In the first place, the HR may be 
contemporarily subject to political pressures in opposing directions. The Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs of States are part of a government, where priorities can be set in 
a centralised manner, ultimately by the Head of Government or Head of State. The 
HR is in a more delicate position: whenever the interests of the Member States 
collide with those of European integration, the HR must strike a balance between 
the 'Communitarian' approach that predominates in the Commission and the 
intergovernmental priorities he/she is sensitive to because of his/her 
intergovernmental 'hats' (in the CFSP area and within the FAC). To make matters 
worse, the recent creation of the post of High Representative renders the 
boundaries of his/her attributions blurred, thus potentially engendering numerous 
controversies with both the Member States and Union institutions (and namely the 
Commission), especially because of the unstable HR's balance across the 
intergovernmental and 'Communitarian' fields. 
Secondly, the HR does not have the resources to perform all his/her tasks at once. 
The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of sovereign States operate within legal and 
political frameworks that have been evolving and adjusting for centuries, thus 
ensuring the feasibility of the Ministers' tasks. The HR's role, on the contrary, has 
not been tested yet, and the multitude of his/her functions does not militate in 
favour of its sustainability. Not only does the HR have to coordinate the activities of 
its own organisation (the Union), but he/she must promote synergy at another level 
(between the Member States). The multitude of the HR's activities is rendered more 
                                                 
187 See Article 18, 26, 27d,  
188 On the role of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and its ministry, see Decaux, "La Réforme du 
Ministère Français Des Affaires Etrangères", 25 Annuaire Français du Droit International (1979): 
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problematic by the difficulty the HR encounters in delegating his/her powers. 
While the Treaties do not explicitly provide for any such delegation, an established 
jurisprudence of the Court explicitly excludes the possibility for Union bodies to 
delegate the exercise of discretionary powers.189 
It is no wonder, therefore, that the HR's job has been termed "impossible".190 Like 
national Ministers for Foreign Affairs, however, the HR is assisted by a 
bureaucracy, the European External Action Service, which may render his/her 
coordination objective more attainable in practice.  
4. The Setting up of the European External Action Service: Implementing the 
'Union Method'? 
The creation of a 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs', or 'diplomatic service', of the 
European Union was one of the major novelties discussed in the European 
Convention. If the general purpose of the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
was rather clear, i.e. assisting the triple-hatted HR/VP, its nature was subject to 
debate. Some participants argued in favour of its integration within the structure of 
the Commission,191 but this view did not prevail. The Constitution provided for the 
creation of the Service in Article III-197(3), which belonged to the CFSP Chapter, 
thus suggesting a close link between the Service and this policy. This provision was 
quite obscure, since it merely stated that "in fulfilling his or her mandate, the Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be assisted by a European External Action 
Service." (Article III-197(3)).192 Such vagueness was probably intended, since, as the 
Commission later affirmed, the way the Service would have been set up was 
"essentially of an administrative nature and should therefore not be regulated in the 
Constitution."193 The Joint Paper presented by the Commission and the High 
Representative/Secretary of the Council General Secretariat in 2005 did not enter 
into the details of the issue either.194 The Member States, at the time, were only able 
                                                 
189 Case 9-56, Meroni v High Authority, [1958] ECR English special edition 133. 
190 See Schmid, The Deputisation of the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission: 
Making the Impossible Job Work (College of Europe, 2012); Avery, "Europe's Future Foreign 
Service", 43 The International Spectator (2008): 29-41., at p. 32; Wouters, Coppens and Meester, 
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191 See, e.g., the suggestion for Amendment of Article I-19, by Brok et al., according to which the 
Foreign Minister should have been "supported by a single administration within the Commission 
including officials from the relevant units from the General Secretariat of the Council and foreign 
ministries of the Member States". See also the suggestion for Amendment of Article I-19 by Barnier, 
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international organisations and which forms part of the services of the Commission." 
192 Even the Declaration on the creation of a European External Action Service did not clarify the 
Service's position, although it suggested its 'inter-institutional' characterisation, since it affirmed that 
the Service should have been "composed of officials from relevant departments of the General 
Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and of the Commission and staff seconded from national 
diplomatic services." 
193 COM(2003) 548 final, cit. supra, para 19. 
194 Commission and High Representative, Issue paper on the European External Action Service, 
Annex II to Council doc. 9956/05, para 10: "the question arises as to whether this should be an 
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to agree on the fact that the EEAS would have had a "sui generis" nature: it would 
not have been a new "institution", but a service under the authority of the Foreign 
Minister, "with close links to both the Council and the Commission". The nature of 
those links was left unaddressed.195  
The Lisbon Treaty did not innovate significantly with respect to the Constitution. 
Article 27(3) TEU, which substitutes Article III-197(3), is similarly worded and 
located in the CFSP Chapter of the TEU. Article 27(3) differs from its predecessor 
only in two respects. Firstly, it affirms that the Service "shall comprise officials from 
relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the 
Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the 
Member States." This provision, which is modelled on a declaration annexed to the 
Constitution, vaguely suggests that the EEAS should have inter-institutional nature 
and should be tied, to a certain extent, to the Member States, but it does not 
provide for any decisive evidence in respect of the EEAS' nature. Secondly, and 
most importantly, Article 27(3) TEU provides for the procedure for setting up the 
Service: "the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal 
from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after 
obtaining the consent of the Commission."  
It is on the basis of this provision that the High Representative presented the 
Council with a proposal on the establishment of the EEAS in March 2010.196 This 
proposal partially clarified the position of the EEAS, as "a functionally autonomous 
body of the European Union, separate from the Commission and the General 
Secretariat of the Council".197 The Parliament did not agree with this aspect of the 
Proposal, since it considered that the EEAS should have been incorporated into the 
Commission's administrative structure,198 but it did not try to obtain its 
modification.199 The Commission and the Council eventually endorsed the proposal 
of the HR, which was finally inserted in Article 1(2) of Decision 2010/427/EU 
establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS Decision).200 As a consequence, at the beginning of 2011 numerous 
departments of the Council (DG E, crisis management, policy unit, staff in 
secondment to Special Representatives) and the Commission (DG RELEX, external 
service and part of DG DEV) were merged into the new EEAS,201 together with a 
number of national diplomats seconded to the Service.  
The relation between the EEAS and the other entities that manage European 
foreign policies, however, remains far from clear. Is the EEAS a mere service of the 
HR? How does it relate to Union institutions, and particularly to the Commission 
and the Council, and their services? And how does it interact with the Member 
                                                                                                                                               
autonomous service, neither in the Commission nor in the CGS, or whether it should be partly 
attached to either or both." 
195 Council doc. 9956/05, para 6. 
196 High Representative, Draft Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service, Council doc. 8029/10, 25 March 2010. 
197 Id., Article 1(2). 
198 For the position of the Parliament, see the EP Resolution on the institutional aspects of setting up 
the European External Action Service, 2009/2133(INI), 22 October 2009, para 7. 
199 See European Parliament legislative resolution of 8 July 2010 on the proposal for a Council 
decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, O.J. 
2011 C 351. 
200 O.J. 2010 L 201/30. 
201 Id., Annex. 
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States? In other words, does the EEAS represent "a logical extension of the acquis 
communautaire in the sphere of the Union's external relations"202, is it the longa 
manus of the intergovernmental method in the external action, or does it truly 
embody the 'Union method' in foreign affairs? The next Chapter explores these 
questions, and it hopefully identifoes the EEAS' position vis à vis EU Institutions 
and Member States. It may be anticipated, however, that the analysis will not be 
sufficient to determine the nature of the Service. Indeed, the relation between the 
EEAS and other European actors is primarily functional, in so far as, being a 
service, the EEAS performs services for them. The nature of the EEAS cannot 
therefore be satisfactorily understood without investigating its tasks in detail.  
The functions of the European External Action Service have never been entirely 
clear. To be sure, its role as an assistant to the High Representative was never 
questioned. It was generally believed, moreover, that the EEAS should coordinate 
the external action, in order to enhance its coherence.203 The most authoritative 
assertion in this sense probably emanated from the European Council, which 
affirmed that "the European External Action Service will be a crucial tool in support 
of the efforts towards enhancing the European Union's external policy. At service 
level, it will, under the authority of the High Representative, provide support to the 
European Council, the Council and the Commission concerning the strategic 
overview and coordination necessary to ensure the coherence of the European 
Union's external action as a whole."204 Apart from these generic considerations, 
however, there was little consensus on the EEAS' role in policy management. At one 
extreme, some Member States considered that the EEAS' activities should have 
encompassed also some non-CFSP policies, like enlargement, neighbourhood and 
development (but not trade).205 At the other extreme, the EP argued that the 
integrity of Community policies with an external dimension should have been 
preserved,206 and the Commission should have been responsible for their initiative 
and implementation, in accordance with Article 17 TEU. Also the issue of external 
representation raised some doubts. In particular, it was soon clear that Union 
Delegations should have been placed under the authority of the High 
Representative207, and would have consequently become part of the EEAS.208 
                                                 
202 European Parliament legislative resolution of 8 July 2010 on the proposal for a Council decision 
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Nonetheless, it was not clear whether this implied that all staff working in the 
Delegations would have needed to be members of the EEAS,209 or they could also be 
"specialist advisers from Commission Directorates-General".210  
Both these issues were addressed in the HR's proposal for a EEAS Decision. 
According to this document, the EEAS should have had the function of supporting 
the HR in all his/her functions, that is to say as CFSP office, president of the FAC 
and Commission VP. In addition, the Service would have led and partially staffed 
Union Delegations, which would have however maintained also Commission staff. 
Finally, the Service was granted a primary role in the management of certain 
development cooperation and neighbourhood programmes. This was probably the 
most important cause of disagreement between the Parliament and the other 
political institutions. Although the procedure set in Article 27(3) TEU did not 
require the Parliament's assent, the EP sought to obtain this power de facto, by 
threatening to withdraw its approval of the amendments to the staff and budget 
implementation regulations that would have been necessary for the EEAS to initiate 
its operations. After a 'quadrilogue' between the HR, the Council, the Commission 
and the EP, a final compromise on the EEAS Decision was reached in June 2010, 
which led to the adoption of the Decision on the following month. The reach of the 
EEAS' policy management powers, however, remained largely untouched, and the 
Service maintains a primary role in the management of development and 
neighbourhood programmes, as well as authority on EU Delegations.211  
The precise division of labour between the EEAS and other bodies in the 
implementation of EU policies and the external representation of the Union 
remains fuzzy. To what extent does the EEAS interfere with the Commission's 
prerogatives in the field of policy implementation? Does the EEAS play a major role 
in the decision-making within the Council? Which rationale lies behind the division 
of labour between the EEAS and the services of other institutions? Which powers 
does the EEAS' authority on Union Delegations entail? In other words, does the 
EEAS have the capability to ensure synergy between European external actions and 
unity in international representation? These issues are investigated in Chapters 3 
and 4, in order to verify whether the Service can truly enforce the Union method 
and promote coherence in European foreign policy. 
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 1 
The purpose of this chapter was to determine the legal content of the principle of 
external action consistency/coherence, and the instruments available to implement 
it. A survey of the pre-Lisbon practice, as well as of the structure of the Lisbon 
Treaty, demonstrated that this principle should be interpreted extensively, as a 
legal requirement of coordination in the implementation of European foreign 
                                                                                                                                               
208 See Commission and High Representative, Issue paper on the European External Action Service, 
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policies and unity in the EU's international representation. The implementation of 
this principle can be performed only through the so-called 'Union method', that is 
to say political coordination between European decision-makers, a task which the 
Treaties entrust upon the High Representative. Given the limits of the HR's office, 
however, his/her coordinating tasks are performed in practice mainly by the 
European External Action Service. The remainder of this work seeks to shed light 
on the peculiar aspects of the EEAS by relying on the findings of this chapter. In an 
analytical perspective, it is hypothesised that the 'anomalous' features of the EEAS 
can be explained by considering that the legislator interpreted the Treaties in light 
of external action coherence. In a normative viewpoint, it is anticipated that the 
provisions concerning the EEAS should be interpreted by bearing this principle in 
mind, also when the legislator failed to do so. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EMBODYING THE UNION 
METHOD: RELATIONS BETWEEN 
THE EEAS AND OTHER  
POLICY-MAKERS 
The first chapter suggested that the EEAS is functional to implement the Union 
method for the purpose of enforcing external action coherence. It may be 
hypothesised, therefore, that the legal nature of the EEAS should be functional to 
bridge the Community and intergovernmental approaches to European foreign 
policy. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the EEAS embodies the 'Union 
method', since it serves the coordinator of the external action (i.e. the HR), but it is 
partially accountable also to the entities that express the intergovernmental and 
Communitarian approaches. Section 1 elucidates the relation between the EEAS 
and the HR, by defining the former as a service capable of acting autonomously in 
'administrative' fields, but dependent on the HR for operative purposes. Section 2 
seeks to demonstrate that such apparently bizarre characterisation of the Service is 
functional to promote the development of close ties between the EEAS and the 
exponents of both the Community and intergovernmental methods. 
SECTION 1 – THE EEAS AS AN ADMINISTRATIVELY AUTONOMOUS SERVICE 
OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE 
The Treaties only mention the European External Action Service in Article 27(3) 
TEU, which affirms that in fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative “is 
assisted by a European External Action Service”. The content of this provision is 
reflected in Article 2 of the EEAS Decision, which asserts that the EEAS supports 
the High Representative in fulfilling his/her mandates and is placed under the 
latter’s authority.212 These provisions cannot be interpreted easily, since the 
traditional categories of national or EU administrative law are transparently 
inadequate to grasp the novelties of the EEAS. The Service is indeed a one-of-a-
kind entity, which has a 'dual' identity, since it is autonomous from the HR in 
administrative matters, but depends on him/her for operative purposes.  
This section is divided into ten paragraphs. Paragraph 1 shows that that the EEAS is 
an entity administratively autonomous from the HR. The second paragraph intends 
to demonstrate that the EEAS, given its administrative autonomy, functions as an 
institution and a service at once. We subsequently turn, in the third paragraph, to 
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define the formal manifestations of the EEAS' autonomy, that is to say legal 
personality and legal capacity. The remainder of the section delimits the boundaries 
of the EEAS’ legal capacity. In the fourth paragraph we turn to the EEAS’ capacity 
to adopt legal acts. In the fifth one we address the EEAS’ capacity to cooperate with 
other EU bodies and in the sixth paragraph we investigate the implementation of 
cooperation, through an analysis of the EEAS’ capacity to enter into legally binding 
instruments with other EU bodies. The last paragraphs address the EEAS standing 
before the ECJ, both as a defendant and as a plaintiff 
1. The EEAS as an Entity Administratively Autonomous from the High 
Representative 
This paragraph intends to show that the EEAS is a service of the HR. Consequently, 
it is not completely independent and it does not participate in its name and on its 
own behalf in the political life of the Union. The EEAS nonetheless enjoys 
autonomy from its master with respect to its internal management, and is 
consequently conceivable as a separate body, albeit exclusively in relation to 
administrative issues. This can be demonstrated by comparing the autonomy of the 
EEAS to the autonomy of other Union offices and bodies.  
Union offices and bodies generally enjoy ample autonomy, in six perspectives. In 
the first place, they are endowed with autonomous competences; therefore, they 
participate in the division of powers set by the Treaties. Secondly, and as a corollary 
of their competences, most Union offices and bodies autonomously determine their 
political line. To be sure, some offices and bodies are accountable to others and all 
bodies follow the general political directions set by the European Council.213 
However, Union offices and bodies usually have margin of manoeuvre in the 
performance of their tasks. Thirdly, most Union bodies can autonomously adopt the 
rules that govern their functioning.214 Such form of autonomy is most evident in the 
case of the Council, since Article 240(2) TFEU explicitly affirms that the Council 
decides on the organisation of its General Secretariat. The Treaties also protect the 
autonomy of the Commission, since Article 249(1) TFEU states that the 
Commission adopts its Rules of Procedure so as to ensure that its departments 
operate. Similarly, the other EU institutions, as well as the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR), adopt their 
rules of procedure.215 Fourthly, Union bodies, and, in particular institutions, 
determine the provisions that govern access to the documents they possess, 
consistently with Article 15 TFEU and secondary law; they also decide whether to 
grant access to specific documents. Fifthly, most EU bodies and offices 
autonomously manage their internal budget. Although the Commission generally 
implements the EU budget ex Article 317 TFEU, Regulation 1605/2002 (Financial 
Regulation) affirms that the Commission confers on other bodies (including 
institutions, the EESC, the CoR, the European Ombudsman and the European Data 
Protection Supervisor) the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections 
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of the budget relating to them.216 In practice, these offices and bodies authorise, 
through agents called “authorising officers by delegation”,217 the disbursement of 
the funds related to their internal functioning. Sixthly, according to the Staff 
Regulations218 most Union bodies, including institutions, the EESC, the CoR, the 
European Ombudsman, and the European Data Protection Supervisor, are capable 
of entrusting an agent of theirs (the “appointing authority”) with the power to 
appoint, promote or transfer officials within the ranks of their respective 
administrations.219 In addition, these bodies hold the exclusive power to issue 
instructions for their agents.220   
The EEAS may appear not to have any autonomy from the HR. Provided that the 
Service's mandate consists of assisting the HR, the EEAS does not have 
competences of its own, but it exercises those of its master. This implies that the 
HR has authority on the Service and can consequently exercise the powers typical of 
entities heading public administrations. The authority of the HR extends firstly to 
'operative' issues, since he/she can set the political line the Service must follow and, 
for this purpose, issue instructions to the EEAS staff. The HR has also powers 
relating to administrative issues: he/she can determine the structure of the EEAS221 
as well as the rules that concern its administrative budget and staff;222 moreover, 
he/she authorises the expenses of the Service, as its ‘authorising officer’, and she 
manages its staff, in his/her capacity as ‘appointing authority’ of the Service.223  
A more careful analysis of the EEAS’ prerogatives, nonetheless, shows that the 
Service has some autonomy from its master in respect of 'administrative' issues, 
that is to say access to documents, staff management and budget implementation. 
The EEAS enjoys relevant autonomy with respect to access to its documents, since 
the EEAS Decision enabled the Service to grant, or refuse, access to its own 
documents.224 More interestingly, the EEAS is autonomous also with respect to 
administrative budget implementation and staff management. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that, in a substantive perspective, budget implementation and staff 
management decisions are often taken by EEAS, and not by the HR: provided that 
the latter can hardly find the time and resources to perform political tasks, he/she 
is most unlikely to interfere with ‘bureaucratic’ issues.225 The EEAS' autonomy in 
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respect of staff management and budget implementation becomes more evident in 
a formal perspective, since, for the purpose of the financial regulation and staff 
regulations, the EEAS is considered as an institution. Therefore it has its own 
budget and its entertains direct relations with its officers. The HR simply acts as the 
authorising officer and appointing authority of the EEAS: he/she does not operate 
in his/her capacity as High Representative, but rather in his/her capacity as EEAS 
top officer (i.e. as an organ of the EEAS). 
Therefore, the EEAS has decisional autonomy with respect to access to documents, 
administrative budget and staff management. This form of autonomy may be 
labelled as ‘administrative’.226 Consequently, we provisionally term the EEAS as an 
‘administratively autonomous entity’. The next paragraph clarifies the EEAS' status, 
and its consequences, by comparing it to other EU bodies.  
2. A truly Sui Generis Service? 
The administrative autonomy of the EEAS suggests that the Service is a sui generis 
entity, as several practitioners and commentators have held in the last years. Such 
labelling, however, is of scarce usefulness for the legal analysis, since it does not 
clarify the role the EEAS plays in the architecture of the external action. A closer 
inspection of the analogies and differences between the EEAS and other EU bodies 
may clarify the status and purpose of the Service. Since the EEAS is neither a 
legislative nor a jurisdictional body, such comparison should concern entities 
performing executive tasks.227  
It may be excluded that the EEAS should be characterised as an institution. In a 
formal perspective, it is easy to notice that institutions are set up by the Treaties 
and they are enumerated by Article 13(1) TEU; since this provision does not 
mention the EEAS, the Service cannot be an institution. The EEAS is not similar to 
institutions in a substantive viewpoint either, since it does not have competences of 
its own. This implies that the EEAS is also different from those EU offices and 
bodies that are not referred to as “institutions” in the Treaties, but which are 
conferred competences similar to those of institutions, such as the High 
Representative. 
Moreover, and for partially similar reasons, the EEAS cannot be considered as a 
body acting upon delegated powers, such as the executive agencies of the 
Commission.228 On the one hand, according to the Meroni doctrine, such bodies 
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cannot be entrusted with discretionary powers in translating political choices into 
action; consequently, executive agencies generally manage ‘technical’ aspects, such 
as the implementation of projects.229 Differently, the Service may, and indeed 
should, support the HR also in the exertion of the powers that involve the 
discretionary determination of a political line.230 On the other hand, the bodies that 
exert delegated powers enjoy autonomy in their specific field of intervention: in 
certain circumstances the Commission may not participate in the adoption of 
decisions by agencies.231 Although the EEAS enjoys administrative autonomy, it is 
not autonomous in ‘operative’ areas, unlike executive agencies. 
Finally, the EEAS may be compared to an entity that is functionally attached to an 
institution, agency, office or body and which is dependent on it, that is to say a 
“service”. The creation of EU services is explicitly foreseen by the Treaties, 
according to which in carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and 
independent European administration (Article 298(1) TFEU). Given its lack of 
operational autonomy, and its dependence on the HR, EEAS may be seen as the 
administration, or service, that supports the HR.232 The analogy between the EEAS 
and other services, however, is incomplete, in so far as the former has 
administrative autonomy, while the latter do not. 
Hence, we may characterise the EEAS in two different ways. For operative 
purposes, it functions as a service. In ad administrative viewpoint, it works as an 
institution. The next paragraphs formalises such duality by investigating the 
existence, and limits, of the legal personality and capacity of the Service.  
3. A formal Appraisal of the EEAS’ Autonomy: Legal Personality and Capacity 
In a formal perspective, the autonomy of an organ is expressed by its legal 
personality and capacity.233 Legal personality is commonly defined as the quality 
through which an entity can be subject to rights and obligations. Legal capacity 
then denotes the scope of its power to be subject to rights and obligations.234  
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established by a regulation […] In the present case, it is the EAR which took the decision to cancel the 
tender procedure, by virtue of the powers delegated by the Commission in accordance with 
Regulation No 2667/2000. The Commission played no part in the decision-making process. 
Accordingly, it is clear that the EAR is the body which enacted the contested measure.” 
232 Such interpretation of the EEAS’ nature appears to be confirmed by a systemic reading of Article 
27(3) TEU and 240(2) TFEU: these provisions are formulated in a similar manner, since the former 
affirms that the HR is assisted by the EEAS, while the latter states that the Council is “assisted by a 
General Secretariat”, that is to say the service of the Council. 
233 In this sense, see Gautier, "The Reparation For Injuries Case Revisited: the Personality of the 
European Union", in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2000), pp. 331-361, p. 333.  
234 The definitions are taken from Van Vooren, "a Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European 
External Action Service", 48 Common Market Law Review (2011): 475-502, p. 485; see also, inter 
alia, Smith, “Legal Personality”, 37 Yale Law Journal (1928): 283-299; Yasseen, “Création et 
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It may be excluded that the EEAS should be able to act on the international level in 
its own capacity, insofar as it is merely an organ of the Union; hence, the EEAS can 
have neither international legal personality nor international legal capacity. For 
similar reasons, it may be excluded that the EEAS should have legal personality and 
capacity in the legal order of the Member States.235 It may be wondered, however, 
whether the Service has been granted internal legal personality and capacity by the 
EU legislator and it consequently exercises it in the legal order of the EU.236  
The existence of the EEAS' legal personality is demonstrated by its autonomy: being 
separate from the HR in administrative areas, the Service must be subject of rights 
and obligations in its own name.237 The EEAS, for instance, is the entity with which 
the Service's officers have a contractual relation for the purpose of their 
professional activity. Similarly, it is the EEAS that is under an obligation to disclose 
its documents to European citizens and that enters into financial commitments for 
the purpose of implementing its budget.  
The existence of the EEAS' legal personality can be demonstrated also through a 
parallelism with the international legal personality of international organisations. 
As affirmed by the International organisation Court Justice (ICJ), in the 
Reparation for Injuries case, the legal personality of an international organisation 
is demonstrated by the fact that it occupies “a position in certain respects in 
detachment from its Members.”238 By analogy, the legal personality of a body of an 
international organisation may be demonstrated by its position in detachment from 
other organs of that organisation. Since the EEAS is autonomous from the HR, at 
least for administrative purposes, it should have legal personality. The fact that the 
EEAS is not entirely autonomous, on the other hand, is not significant. 
International organisations are not completely autonomous either, since, as the ICJ 
held in 1996, they "are governed by the "principle of speciality", that is to say, they 
are invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a 
function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to 
them".239 Since the speciality of international organisations does not question their 
international personality, the speciality of their organs should not lead to the 
exclusion of the latter's legal personality either.  
                                                                                                                                               
Personnalité Juridique Des Organisations Internationales”, in Dupuy (ed.), Manuel sur Les 
Organisations Internationales (Hague Academy of International Law, 1988), pp. 33-56, at p. 43. 
235 According to Article 335 TFEU “In each of the Member States, the Union shall enjoy the most 
extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under their laws […] To this end, the Union shall be 
represented by the Commission. However, the Union shall be represented by each of the institutions, 
by virtue of their administrative autonomy, in matters relating to their respective operation” 
(emphases added); in other words, the Union has personality in the legal order of Member States, 
and its bodies function as its organic representative in Member States’ legal orders. 
236 Indeed, “la creation des personnes de droit public n’est jamais le résultat de l’initiative privée; c’est 
l’autorité publique seule qui y procède, Waline, Droit administratif (Dalloz, 2010), p. 50. 
237 In this sense, mutatis mutandis, see Mazzaroli et al, op. cit., p. 151-152. 
238 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. 
Reports, 1949, p. 174, at p. 179. Cf. also Yasseen, op. cit., p. 43: “Ce qui caractérise une organisation 
internationale c'est qu'elle est une association d'Etats qui fait naitre une entité distincte, 
indépendante des Etats qui la composent.” On the autonomy and legal personality of the EU (before 
the Lisbon reform), see also Dehousse and Andoura, “La Personnalité Juridique de l’Union 
Européenne: Le Débat Qui N’existe Pas”, in Franck and Duchenne (eds.), L’action Extérieure de 
l’Union Européenne : Role Global, Dimensions Matérielles, Aspects Juridiques, Valeurs, pp. 229-
254, and especially pp. 239-241.  
239 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. 
Reports, 1966, p. 66, at para 25. 
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The characterisation of the EEAS as a body endowed with legal personality 
encounters a main logical difficulty. Is it possible to conceive an entity having a 
'large' legal personality (the EU) that contains other entities having a 'small' legal 
personality (the EEAS)? The earlier case law of the ECJ clearly excludes this, since 
“only the Community has legal personality, and its institutions do not”.240 This 
assertion, however, should not be interpreted literally. If legal personality is the 
quality through which an entity can be subject to rights and obligations, then each 
and any entity capable of being subject to rights and obligations should be a legal 
person. There is little doubt that EU institutions fall in this category and this is 
rendered most evident by the case of sincere cooperation: as the Court held in 
several instances, Union institutions are “subject to the same mutual duties of 
sincere cooperation which […] govern relations between the Member States and the 
Community institutions.”241 How could institutions be subject to duties, if they 
lacked legal personality? And even more convincingly, towards whom these duties 
should be directed? Denying the legal personality of EU institutions would be 
tantamount to affirming that an entity representing the Union has a mutual duty of 
cooperation with another entity representing the Union…thus the Union should be 
under a duty to cooperate with itself! Provided that the EU's legal order foresees 
rights and obligations for Union institutions, it must be concluded that the 'large' 
personality of the EU contains the 'small' personalities of its bodies. 
A closer investigation of the ECJ case law shows, in fact, that EU judicial bodies 
often implied the legal personality of Union institutions. The General Court, for 
instance, argued that a service cannot be sued because it is attached to an 
institutions and “it is without legal personality”.242 More generally, the ECJ and the 
General Court repeatedly held that provisions that do not concern individuals 
directly and individually may not be challenged in a direct action “by natural or 
legal persons other than Community institutions and Member States”.243 
Strikingly, the Court held this very opinion in one of the judgements where it 
allegedly denied the existence of the personality of EU institutions.244  
If the above considerations suggest that EU institutions should have legal 
personality, they are not sufficient to demonstrate that a service, such as the EEAS, 
should be in the same position. As a matter of fact, the services of EU institutions 
do not have legal personality.245 A cursory reading of Article 1(2) of the EEAS 
Decision appears to confirm this, since it asserts that the EEAS is only endowed 
                                                 
240 Case 7/56, 3 to 7/57, Algera and others v Common Assembly of the ECSC, [1957] ECR English 
special edition p. 39, at p. 57; see also Joined cases T-177/94 and T-377/94, Henk Altmann and 
Margaret Casson v Commission, [1996] ECR II-2041, par. 150. 
241 Case 230/81, Luxembourg v European Parliament, [1983] ECR 255, par. 37; Case 
204/86 Greece v Council [1988] ECR 5323, par. 16; Case C-65/93 Parliament v Council [1995] 
ECR I-643, par.23. 
242 Case T-309/03 Camós Grau v Commission [2006] ECR II-1173, par. 66; in this sense, see also 
T-264/09 Technoprocess v Commission and Delegation of the European Union to Morocco, not 
published in the ECR, par. 70;  case T-395/11, Elti d.o.o v Commission, not published in the ECR, 
par. 36. 
243 Case 92/78, SpA Simmenthal v Commission, [1979] ECR 777, par. 40 (emphases added); 
Altmann, cit. supra, par. 127; case C-171/00, Alain Libéros v Commission, [2002] ECR I-451, par. 32. 
244 Altmann, cit. supra, par. 127. This apparent inconsistency may be explained by arguing that, 
rather than excluding the legal personality of Union institutions, the ECJ excluded their capacity to 
enter into obligations towards thirds in their own name; this is logical, considering that the Treaties 
clearly affirm that only the Union is contractually and non-contractually liable towards third subjects. 
245 The situation is not entirely different in the law of the Member States. In France, the ministries 
lack personality, whereas in Italy their personality is debated, see inter alia Mazzaroli et al., op. cit., 
p. 408.  
 66 
“with the legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives”. 
Legal personality, on the contrary, is never mentioned by the Decision establishing 
the Service.246 In theory, such literal interpretation of Article 1(2) may only be 
accepted under two alternative conditions. In the first place, the EEAS should be 
able to act in its own name on the legal level, in the areas where it is autonomous, 
without being able to be subject to rights and obligations. However, this is 
obviously impossible: once a person’s capacity to enter into legal relations is 
established, such capacity presupposes the ability of that person of being subject to 
rights and obligations.247 Alternatively, the EEAS' should be able to participate in 
legal relations without yet having become a party to them,248 but only as a 
representative of the HR. This argument cannot be accepted, either, given the 
EEAS’ administrative autonomy and its consequent capacity to act on its own. It 
must be concluded, therefore, that the EEAS, like EU institutions, has legal 
personality because it enjoys a certain autonomy from the HR. 
Our view, which derives the legal personality of the EEAS from its autonomy, is 
reinforced by the recent case law of the General Court. In the Elti case (2012), a 
company governed by Slovenian law tried to challenge an act allegedly adopted by 
the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro. Union Delegations, after the creation of 
the EEAS, have an apparently double nature: on the one hand, they represent the 
EU abroad (Article 221(2) TFEU), while, on the other hand, they are departments of 
the EEAS.249 This twofold nature of Delegations was found to be problematic in the 
Elti case. Both the applicant and the defendant accepted that EU's bodies locus 
standi derives from their legal personality and that the latter is a consequence of 
their 'autonomy' or 'independence'. While the applicant asserted that Delegations 
are "independent players having legal personality"250, the Delegation held that it 
did not enjoy "the status of independent body" and did not act as such in the 
circumstances of the case. Although the EEAS formally did not participate in the 
proceedings, it inevitably shared the Delegation's view, for the simple reason that 
the latter is part of the former. The Court supported the view of the Delegation, by 
holding that it "is merely a division of [the EEAS], whereas the latter is clearly 
designated as an independent body of the European Union".251 This led the Court to 
conclude that Delegations are attached to the EEAS and are dependent on it, and 
therefore they have no legal personality (and no locus standi). It is only logical to 
suppose, a contrario, that since the EEAS is "independent" is should have legal 
personality. 
Why, then, did the EEAS Decision fail to mention the EEAS’ personality? Arguably, 
the Council formulated Article 1(2) of the EEAS Decision in a manner that was 
politically acceptable for the Parliament and the Commission. The former was 
                                                 
246 Such reading of Article 1(2) of the EEAS Decision may appear to be further reinforced by the fact 
that, when the legislator establishes a body endowed with legal personality it generally confers this 
quality in an explicit manner. On the legal personality of the typical entities set up through secondary 
legislation, that is to say EU agencies, see Chiti, “An Important Part of the EU’s Institutional 
Machinery: Features, Problems and Perspectives of European Agencies”, 46 Common Market Law 
Review (2009): 1395-1442. 
247 De Quadros, Droit de l’Union Européenne: droit constitutionnel et administratif de l’Union 
Européenne (Bruylant, 2008), p. 51. 
248 Cf., mutatis mutandis, Smith, op. cit, p. 283. 
249 EEAS Decision, Article 1(4): "The EEAS shall be made up of a central administration and of the 
Union Delegations". The implications of this duality in respect of institutional balance are 
investigated in chapter 4. 
250 Elti, cit. supra, para 33. 
251 Id., para 35 (emphasis added). 
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particularly vocal in calling for the EEAS to be “incorporated, in organisational and 
budgetary terms, in the Commission's staff structure”.252 The lack of an explicit 
recognition of the EEAS’ legal personality may have been functional to reduce the 
apparent ‘distinctiveness’ of the EEAS, in order to appease the Parliament.253  
The acknowledgement of the legal personality of the EEAS has symbolic 
importance, but it ultimately holds scarce relevance for the determination of the 
Service's position in the architecture of the external action. Legal personality, 
indeed, does not imply full legal capacity. All legal persons, including Union bodies, 
have limited legal capacity, instrumentally to the performance of their functions, 
according to the already cited principle of specialty.254 The EEAS makes no 
exception to the rule, as testified by the latter of Article 1(2) of the EEAS Decision, 
which, somewhat tautologically, states that the Service has the legal capacity 
necessary to perform its tasks. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter seeks to 
elucidate the limits of the legal capacity of the EEAS. 
4. EEAS' Capacity to Adopt Unilateral Acts 
The partial autonomy of the EEAS and its legal personality are first reflected in its 
capacity to adopt legal acts. To be sure, the Service cannot adopt acts with respect 
to the operative areas. Although the Service participates in the preparation of legal 
acts, under the authority of the High Representative (and other entities) and it 
influences the content of such acts, the final decision as to their adoption remains 
with the HR (or any other institution, body or office that is conferred the relevant 
power by the Treaties). The recent practice supports this conclusion: acts having 
their bases in the HR or Commission’s powers are constantly adopted by the HR 
and the Commission, respectively, even if they are prepared by the EEAS, or by the 
latter and other services. By way of analogy with COREPER, therefore, the EEAS 
may be considered as an auxiliary body of the HR, for whom it carries out 
preparation and implementation work.255  
Nonetheless, the EEAS’ administrative autonomy suggests that the Service may 
adopt at least a few acts. In order the evaluate EEAS’ capacity to adopt legal acts it 
is not sufficient to consider whether the Service actually adopts acts in its own 
name: in light of the ECJ jurisprudence, an act can only be attributed to a EU body 
if, having regard to its content and all the circumstances in which it was adopted, 
the act in question is not in reality a decision of another office or body.256 Therefore, 
we address both the formal and substantive authorship of the acts the Service may 
adopt. 
In the first place, the EEAS adopts acts whereby it grants, or denies, access to 
documents in its possession. As noticed above, Article 11(1) of the EEAS Decision 
asserts that the EEAS shall apply the rules laid down in Regulation 1049/2001/EC 
                                                 
252 European Parliament resolution on the institutional aspects of the European External Action 
Service, of 26 May 2005, O.J. 2006 C 117 E/232-233, par. 1. Notice that the ‘non-paper’ by MEPs 
Brok and Elmar on the EEAS, of 18 March 2010, held that “the EEAS should be an autonomous 
service that: is in administrative, organisational and budgetary terms linked to the Commission”. 
253 Cf. Van Vooren, op. cit., p. 485. 
254 Cf. Douence, “La Spécialité Des Personnes Publiques”, Revue de Droit Publique (1972) : 762; De 
Quadros, op. cit., p. 160. 
255 See C-25/94, Commission v. Council, [1996] ECR I-1469, par. 26. 
256 Cf., mutatis mutandis, joined cases C-181/91 and C-248/91, Parliament v Council, [1993] ECR I-
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regarding public access to documents.257 Article 11(1) of the EEAS Decision was 
implemented through the HR Decision governing access to documents in 
possession of the EEAS.258 This act demonstrates the EEAS’ capacity to adopt acts 
relating to access to documents: according to its Article 3(1) “the EEAS shall answer 
initial and confirmatory applications”; in addition, Article 4(2) specifies that even 
‘difficult’ cases are ultimately decided upon by EEAS Officers. The HR, on the 
contrary, appears not to play any role in the procedure.259 
The recent practice confirms this interpretation. The EEAS generally grants or 
denies access to documents through a communication of its own department 
responsible for this activity, in the form of an email or letter. A practical example 
vividly elucidates such practice: the EEAS recently denied access to two internal 
documents through an e-mail signed by the Head of a EEAS department, under the 
heading “European External Action Service”.260 The letter specifies that the 
adoption of the decision not to grant access to the documents was preceded by “in-
depth consultations concerning the releasability of such documents”; nothing in the 
letter suggests that those consultations involved entities other than EEAS 
departments. Hence, this act was both formally and substantively adopted by the 
EEAS. 
Secondly, the EEAS adopts acts concerning the implementation of its 
administrative budget. As demonstrated above, the EEAS is treated as an 
institution with respect to this issue. Even if the High Representative holds ultimate 
authority in respect of the implementation of the EEAS’ budget, he/she should 
exercise this authority qua EEAS organ. This is testified by an analogy with the 
authorising officers of other Union bodies: the latter do not adopt act in their own 
capacity, but in the name of their body; similarly, the acts that concern the 
implementation of the EEAS' budget should be adopted by the EEAS, under the 
(political) authority of the HR. These acts are likely to be EEAS acts also in 
substantive terms, in so far as the High Representative can hardly screen the 
disbursement of all EEAS funds.261 
Thirdly, the EEAS adopts acts linked to the management of its staff. As 
demonstrated above, the HR acts as the appointing authority of the EEAS and 
he/she delegates this power to EEAS officers. However, as in the case of financial 
                                                 
257 Regulation 1049/2001/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, O.J. 2001 L 
145/43–48. 
258 Decision of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 July 
2011 on the rules regarding access to documents, O.J. 2011 C 243/16-18. 
259 Indeed, even the “answers to confirmatory applications shall be decided upon by the Chief 
Operating Officer, on the advice of the Access to Documents Coordinator”, see Decision of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 July 2011 on the rules 
regarding access to documents, cit. supra, Article 4(2). 
260 Letter by Cesare Onestini, EEAS Corporate Board Secretariat, to the author, of 13 August 2012, 
EEAS CBS D(2012), Ares document 1139689. 
261 The relevance of this aspect is currently limited to the cuisine interne of the EEAS, since its 
administrative budget truly concerns internal issues. However, the recent history shows that the 
administrative budget of Union institutions and bodies can be used as a means to finance operative 
initiatives: during the nineties, the Council used its own administrative budget to finance CFSP 
operations, in order to bypass the control of the Commission on the operative lines of the EU budget 
and fully preserve the intergovernmental character of CFSP. It cannot be excluded that the EEAS may 
try to use its administrative budget in a similar manner: the use of the EEAS’ funds for the financing 
of certain operations, such as public diplomacy, would streamline the implementation of EU funds 
relating to activities already managed by the Service. This would render the autonomy of the EEAS in 
this area particularly significant also in a political perspective. 
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implementation, the HR performs this role as a representative of the EEAS, and not 
in his/her own capacity. Thus, it is the EEAS, and not the HR, that should adopt 
decisions concerning the appointment or the transferral of EEAS officers.  
At first sight, the practice may seem not to be consistent with the above line of 
reasoning, since the HR adopts, in his/her capacity as HR, acts relating to the 
administrative governance of the EEAS.262 This apparent anomaly can be explained 
in two complementary perspectives. On the one hand, the direct intervention of the 
HR may be advisable for merely political reasons, since it stresses the salience of 
the act to be adopted. On the other hand, the adoption by the HR in his/her 
capacity, rather than by the HR qua EEAS appointing authority has limited 
practical consequences: any act concerning the administration of the EEAS, 
independently from its form, is likely to be prepared and implemented by EEAS 
officer, under the authority of the HR; in addition, staff management acts are to be 
implemented by EEAS officers delegated by the HR. It may be concluded that the 
HR’s acts on EEAS staff management and budget implementation are acts of the 
Service, which take the form of instruments of the High Representative for merely 
political reasons. 
5. EEAS' Capacity to Cooperate with other Union Bodies 
The second corollary of the EEAS’ legal capacity consists of its ability to cooperate 
with other Union bodies. As it is known, the close relation between the EU external 
actions and Member States’ foreign policies implies that the entities that manage 
the different strands of European external relations should closely cooperate. It 
may be wondered whether the EEAS should be directly addressed by an obligation 
of cooperation, which source this obligation stems from, and which instruments are 
used to implement it in practice. This paragraph addresses the first and second 
issues, whereas the third is investigated in the next paragraph. 
The very legal basis of the EEAS Decision, Article 27(3) TEU, affirms that the EEAS 
“shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States”; the 
cooperation between the EEAS and other Union bodies is not explicitly mentioned 
in the Treaties. The entire Article 3 of the EEAS Decision is devoted to cooperation 
between the Service and other entities. The first paragraph of this provision 
provides for a general obligation of cooperation, and it reads: “the EEAS shall 
support, and work in cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the Member 
States, as well as with the General Secretariat of the Council and the services of the 
Commission, in order to ensure consistency between the different areas of the 
Union’s external action and between those areas and its other policies.” The fourth 
                                                 
262 The adoption of some of these acts by the HR is explicitly provided for in the EEAS Decision, 
therefore they are rather unproblematic. See Article 6(3), (8), (10) and 8(1). Other acts, however, 
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paragraph extends the duty of cooperation to “the other institutions and bodies of 
the Union, in particular to the European Parliament.” 
In light of the above, it is evident that the EEAS must work with the other bodies 
that manage European foreign policies. Is it the addressee of the duty of 
cooperation? Arguably, the answer to this question depends on the EEAS’ capacity 
to be subject to legal obligations. As demonstrated above, the EEAS has legal 
personality, because it has autonomous responsibilities concerning its own 
administration. This leads us to believe that the EEAS is directly addressed by an 
obligation of sincere cooperation in areas concerning access to documents, the 
implementation of its budget and the management of its staff. For instance, the 
EEAS is responsible for the conduct of cooperation with the Commission in 
financial areas, as to ensure the regular disbursement of the funds relating to the 
EEAS administrative budget.263 
If the EEAS is addressed by an obligation of sincere cooperation in administrative 
areas, this obligation does not extend to the operative field. As demonstrated above, 
the Service does not hold autonomous powers related to policy management and 
external representation, since it is attached to, and depends on, the High 
Representative for the performance of its activities.264 Therefore, in operative areas 
the EEAS should cooperate with other bodies because of an obligation binding its 
master, i.e. the HR. 
It remains to be seen where this duty of cooperation comes form. Arguably, the 
obligation of sincere cooperation that binds the High Representative and the EEAS 
does not originate in the EEAS Decision, but it is rooted in the Treaties. As it is 
known, Article 13(2) TEU affirms that Union institutions “shall practice mutual 
sincere cooperation.” Although the Treaties do not explicitly affirm that other 
Union organs, including the HR and the EEAS, are bound by this obligation, such 
conclusion appears to be necessary. This is testified by the fact that, according to 
the ECJ, this obligation “is of general application”265 and, even more convincingly, 
by its rationale, that is to say ensuring the effective performance of the tasks 
entrusted upon Union institutions.266 Considering that the HR is entrusted with 
specific competences by the Treaties, and that the EEAS should assist him/her in 
the performance of his/her tasks, we are inclined to think that these entities should 
cooperate with other Union institutions, bodies and offices, as well as with Member 
States, in force of an obligation enshrined in the Treaties. This means that the 
provisions of the EEAS Decision implementing the duty of cooperation must be 
interpreted consistently with the duty itself.  
A literal interpretation of Article 13(2) TEU suggests that the EEAS shall practice 
mutual sincere cooperation with all other Union offices and bodies, in all areas 
related to its activity. A teleological interpretation of this provision points in the 
same direction, since the effective discharging of EU bodies’ duties would be 
                                                 
263 Notice, however, that, since the HR acts as the authorising officer of the EEAS, he/she must 
oversee the cooperation between the EEAS in this aspect, but always as a representative of the EEAS. 
264 In these respects, the obligation of sincere cooperation must be addressed to the High 
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265 Case C-266/03, Commission v Luxembourg, [2005] ECR I-4805, par. 58. 
266 Such is indeed the rational of institutional balance according part of the doctrine, see Curtin, 
Executive power of the European Union, cit. supra, p. 153.  
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hindered by a ‘segmented’ form of cooperation. This argument is further reinforced 
by the aforementioned jurisprudence of the ECJ, according to which the duty of 
cooperation is of general application. A cursory reading of the EEAS Decision may 
seem at odds with this argument, since its Article 3(2) explicitly affirms that, 
although the EEAS and the services of the Commission “shall consult each other on 
all matters relating to the external action”, such duty of consultation does not 
extent to "matters covered by the [Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)].” 
Hence, the EEAS may seem not to be bound to cooperate with the Commission with 
respect to administrative issues related to CSDP, such as, for instance, access to 
CSDP documents or instructions for staff employed in crisis management missions. 
The contradiction between the letter of the EEAS Decision and our interpretation of 
sincere cooperation appears to be more apparent than real: Article 3(2) of the EEAS 
Decision explicitly affirms that “this paragraph shall be implemented in accordance 
with Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU, and with Article 205 TFEU”, that is to say in 
accordance with the provisions that govern the entire external action, transversally 
to the divide between CFSP and the other policies. The teleological interpretation of 
this provision suggests that cooperation between the EEAS and other Union bodies 
(and their services) should promote the coordination of European foreign policies 
and, thus, it should concern the entire external action. In other words, the EEAS 
should always cooperate with Commission services, including CFSP and CSDP 
areas. This is not to say that this cooperation should always take identical forms. 
Article 3(2) of the EEAS Decision regulates this aspect, by asserting that 
cooperation between the EEAS and Commission services should generally take the 
form of a consultation on all matters relating to the external action. In areas related 
to CSDP, such cooperation may take other forms, but it should not cease to exist.  
6. EEAS' Capacity to Enter into Binding Arrangements with other Union Bodies  
The EEAS Decision directly provides for instruments implementing the duty of 
sincere cooperation: the arrangements with the services of other Union offices and 
bodies. According to Article 3(3), the EEAS “may enter into service-level 
arrangements with relevant services of the General Secretariat of the Council, the 
Commission, or other offices or interinstitutional bodies of the Union.” The 
rationale of this provision is clear: fostering and supporting cooperation between 
the EEAS, on one side, and the services of other Union institutions and bodies, on 
the other. This is hardly surprising, considering that Article 3 of the EEAS Decision 
is devoted to the “cooperation” between the EEAS, Union bodies and Member 
States.  
Some doubts, however, concern the real content of this provision and, 
consequently, the nature of the instruments entered into by the EEAS with other 
entities. At first sight, the arrangements entered into by the EEAS may seem to lack 
legal nature, because of three factors: the limited legal personality of the EEAS, the 
lack of legal personality of its counterparts and the intrinsic features of the 
arrangements themselves. This argument may seem to be supported by a superficial 
analysis of the principal category of arrangements entered into by the EEAS, that is 
to say the ‘service-level arrangements’ (SLA) between the EEAS and Commission 
services.267 Most SLAs are entered into by the EEAS and a Commission service. 
                                                 
267 SLAs are not published. The author is aware of the existence of the following: 
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Their characterisation as legal acts may seem to be impossible, for a simple reason: 
the EEAS enters into arrangements with a service, that is to say an administrative 
entity that is attached to the Commission and is dependent on it, and which 
consequently lacks legal personality and cannot be subject to rights and obligations. 
Similar considerations may seem to extend to a particular arrangement the EEAS 
entered into with Commission services in December 2010, that is to say the 
Framework Administrative Arrangement (FAA), which provides for the procedural 
and administrative framework that disciplines subsequent SLAs.268 According to its 
preamble, this arrangement was concluded by the EEAS, on the one side, and the 
“services et offices de la Commission européenne […] représentés par le Secrétariat 
Général de la Commission européenne […]”, on the other side. At first sight, the 
FAA may consequently be qualified as a multilateral SLA, which, like bilateral SLAs, 
should lack binding force. Such reading of the arrangements entered into by the 
EEAS may seem to be logical also in light of the HR's role as a Commission Vice-
President: since the EEAS assists the HR in the exercise of his/her Commission 
functions, the EEAS may reasonably be characterised as a Commission service. 
Thus, the arrangements entered into by the EEAS and Commission services might 
be considered as internal documents of the Institution. 
This conclusion is not entirely convincing, because it appears to be at odds with the 
role of the EEAS as an administratively autonomous entity. The remainder of this 
paragraph demonstrates that the interservice arrangements the EEAS enters into 
may be binding upon the Service and its counterparts. 
It is submitted that the FAA and SLAs may be qualified as legal acts, since they are 
capable of altering the legal position of Union bodies and offices.269 In order to 
demonstrate this, it is opportune to make an analogy between these instruments 
and interinstitutional agreements, as they existed before the Lisbon reform. As it is 
known, Union bodies have been entering into interinstitutional instruments for 
decades. Even before the Lisbon reform rendered (some) insterinstitutional 
agreements binding (Article 295 TFEU), the doctrine and the jurisprudence 
recognised their legal nature, at least when they were prescribed, or authorised, by 
the Treaties, or they represented a fulfilment of the duty of sincere cooperation or 
                                                                                                                                               
− Service Level Agreement between Commission services with staff in EU Delegations and the 
European External Action Service, 20 December 2010. 
− Service Level Agreement between the Directorate General For Interpretation (DG 
Interpretation) of the European Commission and The European External Action Service 
(EEAS), 21 December 2010. 
− Arrangement Administratif Spécifique portent sur la fourniture de services ICT entre le Service 
Européen pour l’Action Extérieure et la Direction Générale pour l’informatique de la 
Commission Européenne (DG DIGIT), 21 December 2010. 
− Accord de service entre la Direction Générale de la Traduction de la Commission Européenne et 
le Service Européen pour l’Action Extérieure, 22 December 2010. 
− Service Level Agreement concerning the collaboration between the European External Action 
Service and the Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security of the European 
Commission (DG HR), 22 December 2010. 
− Service Level Agreement (SLA) spécifique entre l’Office pour les infrastructures et la logistique 
et le Service Européen pour l’Action Extérieure, 22-23 December 2010. 
− Service Level Agreement between the European Commission’s Traineeship Office and the 
European External Action Service, 28 January 2011. 
268 Arrangement administratif entre les services de la Commission Européenne et le Service Européen 
pour l’Action Extérieure, 13 December 2010, not published in the O.J. 
269 Cf. case C-151/88, Italy v Commission, [1989] ECR 1255 and Hartley, The Foundations of 
European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 354. 
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unity of international representation.270 The arrangements entered into by the 
EEAS are similar to the second category of insterinstitutional agreements, since 
they represent a fulfilment of the duty of sincere cooperation. As demonstrated in 
the previous paragraph, the EEAS has the legal capacity to enter into legal 
relationships, and it is bound by the duty of sincere cooperation, in the areas 
relating to administrative issues. The Framework Arrangement and the SLAs serve 
the purpose of facilitating cooperation between the Service and the Commission (or 
its services) precisely in respect of administrative issues. Hence, these instruments 
can be seen as a fulfilment of the duty of sincere cooperation that is requested by 
the Treaties, and they should consequently have legal character, if the parties so 
intended.  
In this last respect, it may be noted that, although both the Commission and the 
EEAS were reluctant to acknowledge the legal nature of the arrangements, the 
latter are formulated in rather unequivocal terms. Their form, with the exception of 
the title, is similar to the one of legal acts, and includes a preamble, articles and a 
signature. Moreover, the engagements undertaken by the parties are precise and 
unconditional and they are consequently likely to create expectations of conduct.271 
Finally, the FAA foresees a dispute settlement mechanism,272 also applicable to 
SLAs, whereby the parties may nominate a mediator or designate an arbiter “dont 
la décision s’imposera aux parties”. It would indeed be difficult to imagine how the 
interpretation of a non-binding instrument may be binding upon the parties! 
Hence, we tend to consider the FAA, and consequently SLAs, as binding 
instruments, embodying the duty of sincere cooperation. 
The fact that the SLAs are formally characterised as inter-service arrangements 
does not seem to question this finding. On the one hand, it would seem that the 
EEAS entered into SLAs with the Commission in its own capacity, which is 
reminiscent of that of Union bodies, at least as far as administrative issues are 
concerned. The aforementioned Framework Arrangement and SLAs concern 
precisely administrative areas. The very first Article of the Framework Arrangement 
asserts that “le présent arrangement vise à faciliter l'établissement et le 
fonctionnement du SEAE, en sa qualité d'institution au sens de l'article 1er du 
règlement financier et de l'article 1er ter du statut." On the other hand, we are 
inclined to believe that the FAA and SLAs were entered into by the EEAS and the 
Commission, rather than by its services. This can be demonstrated by stressing that 
the FAA is an anomalous interservice arrangement, since it concerns all 
Commission services and, thus, the entire Commission structure. In substantive 
terms, this means that the FAA is not different from an interinstitutional 
agreement. In procedural terms, it implies that the College of the Commissioners 
probably approved the FAA, albeit implicitly: a document of such relevance for the 
                                                 
270 Case C-25/94, Commission v Council, [1996] ECR I-1469, par. 49. See also the opinion of the 
advocate general in case 204/86, Greece v Council, [1988] ECR 5323 at 5349. Notice also that in case 
34/86, Council v Parliament, [1986] ECR 2155, para 50, the Court implicitly acknowledged that 
insterinstitutional agreements can establish rules for the settlement of insterinstitutional conflicts. 
Cf. Monar, "Interinstitutional Agreements: the Phenomenon and Its New Dynamics After 
Maastricht", 31 Common Market Law Review (1994): 693-719, at 703 and Snyder, “Interinstitutional 
Agreements: Forms and Constitutional Limitations”, in Winter (ed.), Sources and Categories of 
European Union Law: a Comparative and Reform Perspective (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996), 
pp. 453-466, at 462. On the potentially binding nature of insterinstitutional agreements, see also 
Tournepiche, Les Accords Interinstitutionnels dans l'Union Européenne (Bruylant, 2011), pp. 443 ff. 
271 Cf. Wellens and Borchardt, “Soft Law in European Community Law”, 14 European Law Review 
(1989): 267, at 312. 
272 Article 6. 
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activity of the Commission could hardly be entered into without at least an informal 
approval of the Institution. The letter of the FAA confirms the fact that the 
instrument was entered into by the Commission. Although its title mentions the 
EEAS and Commission services, the instrument was signed “pour la Commission 
européenne”.  
The status of the FAA is probably shared by most SLAs. The first Article of the FAA 
affirms that: "le présent arrangement comprend […] en annexe les conditions 
particulières relatives aux services à rendre, sous la forme d'arrangements 
administratifs spécifiques. Celles-ci sont conclues entre le service de la Commission 
ou l'office intéressé et le SEAE. Une fois conclues et signées par les parties, ces 
annexes font partie intégrante du présent arrangement." This paragraph implies 
that, although SLAs are approved by Commission services, they have the same legal 
status of the FAA they are annexed to. Therefore, Commission services may enter 
into binding SLAs on behalf of the Institution. This argument in favour of the legal 
nature of SLAs may meet a further obstacle, since it may seem to contradict the ECJ 
jurisprudence. At the onset of the integration process, the Court held that 
Commission acts should always be approved by the College of the Commissioners. 
It is clear that the FAA and the SLAs have been signed by Commission 
departments.273 This obstacle, however, does not appear to be insurmountable: 
more recently, the ECJ accepted that acts adopted by the Union officers may be 
binding for their institutions if they are taken on the basis of a delegation of power 
and they concern less important decisions, having mainly bureaucratic nature.274 
SLAs belong to this category of acts, since they are entered into on the basis of an 
explicit delegation (contained in the FAA) and they are related to administrative 
issues. This suggests that the FAA and SLAs were entered into by Commission 
services on behalf of the Institution. 
The above conclusions may raise a question: if the EEAS and the Commission 
intended to conclude binding inter-institutional instruments, why did they choose 
to draft these documents as apparently non-binding inter-service arrangements? 
This may be due to an exceedingly restrictive interpretation of the EEAS Decision, 
whose letter only authorises the EEAS to enter into “service-level arrangements”.  
There is also another, political, reason that may explain the form of the FAA and 
SLAs: as recalled above, Union bodies are reticent to explicitly recognise the EEAS 
as an “independent kingdom” in EU external relations.275 Hence, the Commission 
refrained from treating the EEAS as a peer, but it formally interacted with it as if it 
were a ‘normal’ service, even when it de facto recognised its semi-institutional 
character through the conclusion of binding arrangements. 
                                                 
273 See joined cases 53-54/63, Lemmerz-Werke GmbH and others v High Authority, [1963] ECR 
English special edition p. 239: “a decision must appear as a measure taken by the high authority, 
acting as a body, intended to produce legal effects and constituting the culmination of procedure 
within the high authority, whereby the high authority gives its final ruling in a form from which its 
nature can be identified.” 
274 The ECJ accepted that letters signed by Commission officials can be considered Commission acts, 
cf. Joined cases 8 to 11/66, Société anonyme Cimenteries C.B.R. Cementsbedrijven N.V. and others v 
Commission, [1967] ECR English special edition p. 75. Even oral statements may be legal acts, as the 
ECJ affirmed in case Joined cases 316/82 and 40/83, Nelly Kohler v Court of Auditors of the 
European Communities, [1984]  ECR 641. Hartley, op. cit., p. 366, note 61, convingly asserts that in 
Lemmerz-Werke, cit. supra, the Court may have intended the principle whereby Collegiate bodies 
should adopt legal acts as a College only with respect to acts “having serious legal consequences”, as it 
was the case in Lemmerz-Werke. 
275 Elmar Brok (MEP), quoted in Euractiv, “The EU’s new diplomatic service”, 9 March 2010, 
www.euractiv.com. 
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Evidently, these arguments cannot apply to the arrangements concluded outside 
the framework of the FAA. Such arrangements must be understood as mere 
expressions of purely voluntary coordination and are therefore not intended in 
themselves to have legal effects, unless such entities act as representatives of Union 
bodies. In addition, arrangements relating to political issues cannot be binding 
upon the EEAS, since the Service does not have any autonomy in this respect.276 
7. EEAS’ Capacity to be Sued in Annulment Proceedings 
The last corollary of the EEAS’ autonomy and personality consists of its capacity to 
stand before the Court of Justice. This and the next two paragraphs concern the 
EEAS’ capacity to be sued. The last paragraph addresses the EEAS' capacity to sue 
other bodies.277  
The position of the EEAS as a defendant may relate, in the first place, to the 
annulment of its acts. It is worth clarifying the rationale for this analysis. A 
superficial reading of the Treaties may suggest that an inquiry into the EEAS' 
position before the ECJ is totally unnecessary, because of the combination of Article 
275 TFEU and Article 27(3) TEU. Article 275 TFEU affirms that “the Court of 
Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the 
provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to 
acts adopted on the basis of those provisions.” Article 27(3) TEU, that is to say the 
legal basis of the EEAS Decision, is part of the CFSP chapter of the TEU. Hence, the 
ECJ may seem not to not have jurisdiction with respect to any act adopted by the 
EEAS. This interpretation could only be accepted if the EEAS were solely concerned 
with CFSP, which is not the case. As demonstrated above, the Service only acts in its 
own capacity in areas related to its own administration. Such activity is not solely 
CFSP-related, since the EEAS performs tasks in non-CFSP areas, under the 
responsibility of the High Representative in his/her capacity as president of the 
Foreign Affairs Council and Vice-President of the Commission. The administration 
of the EEAS, therefore, is not a purely CFSP affair, and is not covered by Article 275 
TFEU. Therefore, it cannot be asserted a priori that the EEAS cannot stand before 
the ECJ as a defendant. 
In order to analyse the EEAS’ capacity to be sued in annulment proceedings, we 
have to consider, in particular, the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU:278 "the 
Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of 
acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other 
than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and 
of the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It 
shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties." 
                                                 
276 Such instruments, if entered into by the HR, may however be binding upon him/her. 
277 It is worth stressing that we only intend to elucidate the peculiarities of the EEAS’ position, and we 
consequently do not provide for a comprehensive account of jurisdictional procedures involving the 
Service. 
278 Notice that According to the last paragraph of this provision “acts setting up bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union may lay down specific conditions and arrangements concerning actions 
brought by natural or legal persons against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to 
produce legal effects in relation to them.” This provision, however, is of scarce interest at present, 
since the EEAS Decision never mentions such specific conditions and arrangements. 
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This provision, as interpreted by the ECJ, implies that the EEAS should pass a four 
stages test in order to be capable of being sued in annulment proceedings. In the 
first place, the Service should be characterised as an institution, agency, office or 
body of the Union, consistently with the last sentence of the first paragraph of 
Article 263 TFEU. This does not prove exceedingly challenging, since we have 
already demonstrated that the EEAS is an administratively autonomous entity, 
which possesses legal personality. Consequently, it is a ‘body’ within the meaning of 
Article 263 TFEU. 
Secondly, the EEAS must be able to adopt reviewable “acts”, within the meaning of 
Article 263 TFEU. This aspect proves rather unproblematic too, especially because 
the Court specified that reviewable acts are not identified on the basis of formal 
criteria, such as their nomen juris, but only with regard to their capability to have 
legal effects.279 The ECJ also specified that reviewable acts do not necessarily need 
to be adopted pursuant to a Treaty provision. Hence, even sui generis acts may be 
reviewed by the Court. This makes sure that EEAS acts, however defined, may be 
reviewed, provided they meet the substantive requirements that form the object of 
the two last stages of our test. 
Thirdly, the EEAS should be capable of adopting acts “intended to produce legal 
effects”. To be sure, the EEAS cannot adopt legal acts concerning operative areas, 
but it merely prepares the acts to be adopted by the HR, in his/her own capacity. 
This implies that it should be the HR, and not the EEAS, to defend acts relating to 
operative areas. If an EEAS act ever concerned an operative issue, it should be 
declared non-existent, given the manifest lack of competence of the Service.280 As 
demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, the EEAS can however adopt legal acts 
and enter into legally binding arrangements with other Union bodies in the areas 
concerning its own administration, that is to say staff management, administrative 
budget implementation and access to documents. Such legal acts should 
consequently be subject to review.281 
Fourthly, the EEAS should be capable of adopting acts producing legal effects “vis-
à-vis third parties”.282 The Court originally elaborated this concept in cases 
concerning the European Parliament, by affirming that it is not possible to 
challenge acts of this Institution which only relate to the internal organisation of its 
work.283 The Court further developed this concept in the case France v. 
                                                 
279 See case C-22/70, Commission v Council (Agreement on Road Transport), [1971] ECR 263, and 
case C-151/88, Italy v Commission, [1989] ECR 1255. 
280 On the non-existence of EU acts, see joined cases T-79, 84, 85, 86, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 98, 102 and 
104/89, BASF AG and others v Commission, [1992] ECR II-315; joined Cases 1 and 14/57 Société des 
Usines à Tubes de la Sarre v High Authority [1957] ECR 105; joined Cases 15 to 33, 52, 53, 57 to 109, 
116, 117, 123, 132 and 135 to 137/73 Kortner and Others v Council, Commission and Parliament, 
[1974] ECR 177; case 15/85, Consorzio Cooperative d' Abruzzo v Commission, [1987] ECR 1005; case 
226/87, Commission v Hellenic Republic, [1988] ECR 3611; case 156/89 Valverde Mordt v Court of 
Justice [1991] ECR II-412. 
281 This should apply also to statements concerning the action that the EEAS may take in the future, 
provided that they are definite and unequivocal. See case C-15/63, Lassalle v Parliament, [1964] ECR 
English special edition p. 31; case C-79/74, Kuster v Parliament, [1975] ECR 725; case C-25/77, De 
Roubaix v Commission, [1978] ECR 1081, par. 6-9. 
282 See case C-294/83, Parti Ecologiste ' Les Verts ' v European Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339. 
283 See case T-345/05, Ashley Neil Mote v Parliament, [2008] ECR II-2849, par. 22-24; see also 
order in case 78/85, Group of the European Right v Parliament, [1986] ECR 1753, par. 11; order in 
case C-68/90, Blot and Front national v Parliament, [1990] ECR I-2101, case C-
314/91, Weber v Parliament, [1993] ECR I-1093; joined Cases T-222/99, T-327/99 and 
T-329/99, Martinez and Others v Parliament, [2001] ECR II-2823. 
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Commission (1990),284 where it asserted that the capability of an act to affect the 
legal position of thirds is not simply determined by its form, but it must be verified 
on the basis of its content:285 a binding act, disguised as an internal document, is 
subject to review.286 At first sight, it may seem that all EEAS acts should be 
‘internal’ since they relate to administrative issues. However, 'administrative' does 
not equal “internal”.287 For instance, the decisions whereby EEAS officers authorise 
the disbursement of Union funds necessarily affect the legal position of thirds; 
similarly, the EEAS acts that concern the management of its staff affect the position 
of physical persons (i.e. EEAS officers).  
In sum, since some EEAS acts may meet this quadruple test, they may be 
challenged before the ECJ.   
8. Standing to Challenge EEAS Acts 
After having demonstrated that the EEAS can theoretically defend its acts before 
the ECJ, it is necessary to verify the likelihood of such defence by investigating the 
standing to challenge EEAS acts of privileged applicants, semi-privileged applicants 
and non-privileged applicants.   
In the first place, EEAS acts may be sued by privileged applicants, that is to say 
Council, Commission, EP and Member States: since these entities can always 
institute proceedings against other offices and bodies’ acts they should be able to 
sue the EEAS. In practice, privileged applicants may use their standing to sue the 
EEAS mainly for two reasons. On the one hand, in order to make sure EEAS acts do 
not ‘spill-over’ to non-administrative areas; for instance, they may initiate 
proceedings against any act whereby the EEAS authorises the disbursement of its 
administrative funds for operative purposes. On the other hand, privileged 
applicants may challenge EEAS acts to ensure the respect for the distribution of 
power provided for in the Treaties and the EEAS Decision;288 for example, Member 
States, the Council or the Parliament might institute proceedings against binding 
arrangements entered into by the EEAS and the Commission, in order to challenge 
their potential inconsistency with primary and secondary law.  
Secondly, EEAS acts may be challenged by ‘semi-privileged applicants’, that is to 
say the Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank and the Committee of the 
                                                 
284 Case C-366/88, French Republic v Commission, [1990] ECR I-3571. 
285 Cf. Della Cananea, "L'impugnabilità degli Atti "Interni" dell'amministrazione nel Diritto 
Comunitario: un Nuovo Orientamento della Corte di Giustizia. (Osservazioni in Margine a Corte di 
Giustizia delle Comunità Europee, Sentenza 9 Ottobre 1990, in Causa 366/88)", Rivista Italiana di 
Diritto Pubblico Comunitario (1992): 891-900, at p. 896. 
286 Cf. Della Cananea, op. cit., p. 899. See case C-366/88 France v Commission, cit. supra, par. 11; see 
also case T-258/06, Germany v Commission, [2010] ECR II-2027, par. 28; case 
C-303/90, France v Commission, [1991] ECR I-5315, par. 10; and case 
C-57/95, France v Commission, [1997] ECR I-1627, par. 9.  
287 The EEAS certainly adopts also internal acts, but they are subject to the regime applicable to other 
Union bodies, therefore this aspect is not further addressed here. It may be anticipated that 
Commission internal acts that concern the EEAS may concern the position of thirds (and namely the 
very EEAS); this aspect will be addressed in the next chapter. 
288 As a matter of fact, the violation of the acts establishing the EEAS amounts to an infringement of 
the Treaties and an infringement of procedural requirements, in so far as the acts establishing the 
Service are founded upon the legal bases contained in the Treaties, and such legal bases provide for 
specific procedures to be followed for their adoption. As it is evident, the EEAS cannot circumvent 
these procedures, neither by adopting unilateral acts, nor by entering into arrangements with other 
bodies. 
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Regions. Since Article 263 TFEU enables them to have standing for the purpose of 
protecting their prerogatives, and these bodies are functionally different from the 
EEAS, they are unlikely to have direct relations with the Service and, thus, to 
challenge its acts in practice. The practical consequences of the semi-privileged 
status of these applicants consequently does not require particular attention. 
Thirdly, the EEAS may be sued by natural and legal persons other than privileged 
and semi-privileged applicants. Natural and legal persons have access to the Court 
through under two different sets of conditions, concerning the impugnation of 
regulatory and non-regulatory acts, respectively. This distinction was introduced by 
the Lisbon reform, in order to simplify access to Court in relation to ‘regulatory 
acts’. These acts consist of acts of 'general application', that is to say acts which are 
applicable not to a limited number of persons, defined or identifiable, but to 
categories of persons viewed abstractly and in their entirety. 289  
The EEAS can adopt regulatory acts; in practice, it would seem to do so especially in 
order to organise its internal functioning. An example is provided for by the recent 
Decision on the “Junior Professionals in Delegation” programme,290 which provides 
for detailed rules governing a staffing programme and is not addressed to any 
person in particular. According to Article 263 TFEU, as interpreted by the ECJ, 
regulatory acts may only be challenged by natural and legal persons under two 
cumulative conditions.  On the one hand, they must not imply the necessity for 
implementing measures, that is to say measures to put the original acts into 
operation, which the applicant may challenge before the ECJ or national courts.291 
On the other hand, a regulatory act should concern directly the applicant; in other 
words, there should be a causal link between the controversial act and the 
affectation of the applicant’s legal sphere and the effects of that act must not 
depend on the discretion of another entity.292 Therefore, the access to Court of 
natural and legal persons is not exceedingly problematic in the case of regulatory 
acts of the EEAS, since the Service only adopts acts related to its own 
administration and it is unlikely to enable other bodies to exert discretion in its 
internal matters. As a matter of fact, the reverse situation is more probable: the 
                                                 
289 Order of the General Court in case T-381/11, Europäischer Wirtschaftsverband der Eisen- und 
Stahlindustrie (Eurofer) ASBL v Commission, [2012] not published yet, par. 42. See also  joined 
cases 16/62 and 17/62, Confédération nationale des producteurs de fruits et légumes and others v 
Council, [1962] ECR English special edition p. 471, par. 2. It may be noted that legislative acts of 
general application are subject to the same rules as non-regulatory acts, but this aspect can be 
ignored in the present inquiry, since the EEAS does not adopt legislative acts. 
290 Decision of the Chief Operating Officer of the EEAS, in agreement with the directors-general of 
DG DEVCO and DG HR of the European Commission, of 6 July 2012, on the implementing rules of 
the high level traineeship programme in the Delegations of the European Union in partnership with 
the Member States of the European Union, EEAS DEC(2012) 009/2, not published in the OJ; 
available at http://eeas.europa.eu, last visited on 5 September 2012. Notice that this decision has two 
peculiar aspects. In the first place, it was adopted on delegation from the HR and the Commission, cf. 
Joint Decision of  the Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, of 12 June 2012, establishing a High Level Traineeship Programme in the 
Delegations of the European Union and the Rules Governing this Programme in Partnership with the 
Member States of the European Union, JOIN(2012) 17 final, not published in the OJ; available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu. Secondly, it is a joint programme of the EEAS and the Commission, therefore 
it was launched by both the HR and the Commission and it is implemented by the EEAS officer that 
was delegated appointing authority powers form the HR, that is to say the Chief Operating Officer, in 
consultation with appointing authority delegated by the Commission, that is to say directors-general 
of Commission services. 
291 Hartley, op. cit., p. 388. 
292 See case 69-69, SA Alcan Aluminium Raeren and others v Commission, [1970] ECR 385, par. 8. 
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EEAS may be delegated the adoption of measures implementing framework 
decisions of other bodies, such as the HR and the Commission.293 In such 
circumstances, natural and legal persons should challenge the implementing 
decisions of the EEAS. 
The EEAS can also adopt non-regulatory acts, since the Service needs to take 
measures addressed to defined or identifiable persons in order to perform its 
administrative tasks, such as authorising the disbursement of funds or appointing 
its own officers.294 Non-regulatory acts can obviously be challenged by their 
addressees; they may also be challenged by natural and legal persons not formally 
addressed, but only under severe conditions: direct concern (as in the case of 
regulatory measures) and individual concern. The latter requirement implies that 
natural and legal persons can only institute proceedings against an act that affects 
them “by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of 
circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons,” and if by 
virtue of these factors the act distinguishes them individually just as in the case of 
the person addressed.295 In the case of unilateral EEAS acts these requirements are 
not necessarily problematic, since such measures probably affect only their 
addressees or a ‘closed group’ of persons, which have automatic standing.296 For 
instance, EEAS decisions appointing or promoting officers can be challenged by 
their addressees and unsuccessful applicants; similarly, EEAS decisions awarding a 
contract to a person may be challenged by other persons that sought the same 
contract. The impugnation of instruments entered into by the EEAS and other 
bodies, however, may raise some concerns. Although these instruments might 
contain provisions indirectly affecting the position of natural and legal persons, 
they are unlikely to distinguish such persons individually.  
9. EEAS’ Capacity to be Sued in Proceedings other than Annulment 
After having considered the EEAS’ capacity to be sued in annulment proceedings it 
is necessary to verify its standing in other circumstances. We turn firstly to failure 
to act and subsequently address reparation for damages.  
The EEAS’ capacity to be sued for failure to act appears to be unquestionable, albeit 
limited ratione materiae. Article 265 TFEU explicitly affirms that whenever EU 
bodies, in infringement of the Treaties, fail to act, they may be sued by privileged 
and non-privileged applicants, under different conditions. In order to test the 
EEAS’ capacity to be sued for failure to act, we need to conduct a three stages test. 
In the first place, the EEAS would be capable of being sued under Article 265 TFEU 
only if EU law required the Service, and not other Union offices or bodies, to act. In 
other words, the EEAS cannot be sued because of the omissions of other Union 
                                                 
293 If one embraced the view that the HR’s acts as EEAS appointing authority are truly HR acts (a 
vision we do not share), this would be the case of the JPD programme decision referred to above, that 
implements a joint decision of the HR and the Commission. 
294 For instance, decisions relating to access to documents grant, or deny, access to document to the 
person that requested it. Similarly, budgetary decisions identify the entity that receives the payment 
and staff management decisions refer to specific officers to be hired, promoted, demoted or 
transferred. 
295 Case C-25/62, Plaumann and Co. v Commission, [1963] ECR English special edition p. 95. 
296 In this sense, joined cases 106 and 107/63 Alfred Toepfer and Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v 
Commission, [1965] ECR English special edition p. 405; and case 62/70, Werner A. Bock v 
Commission, [1971] ECR 897. 
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entities, including the HR. Considering that the EEAS has legal capacity in 
administrative areas, it cannot be sued for operative omissions, but it can be sued 
for its failure to adopt administrative acts. 
Secondly, the EEAS should be required to act by primary or secondary law.297 In 
other word, the EEAS, like other Union bodies, cannot be sued for its failure to 
adopt discretional acts.298 In some cases, the EEAS does enjoy discretion; this is 
particularly evident with respect to the conclusion of binding instruments with 
other bodies: although, according to Article 3 of the EEAS Decision, the Service 
shall cooperate with other entities, the same provision specifies that it may enter 
into arrangements with them. However, the EEAS is also required to adopt certain 
legal acts. For instance, according to Article 7(1) of Regulation 1049/2001, read in 
combination with Article 11 of the EEAS Decision, the EEAS “shall within 15 
working days from registration of the application […] either grant access to the 
document requested and provide access […] within that period or, in a written 
reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal.” 
Thirdly, the EEAS should be able to “act” (and, thus, “fail to act”) within the 
meaning of Article 265 TFEU. This can be verified by answering a question: which 
‘actions’ does Article 265 TFEU refer to? A literal interpretation of this provision 
suggests that it concerns omissions to take any action, including the adoption of 
nonbinding acts.299 In light of this interpretation, acts that are not reviewable under 
Article 263 TFEU may form the subject of omissions for the purpose of Article 265 
TFEU. This may seem to be at odds with the ECJ jurisprudence whereby annulment 
and failure to act are two aspects of the same legal remedy.300 However, this 
apparent contradiction is not problematic, since the very ECJ affirmed that the 
conditions and limitations applicable to the procedures for annulment and failure 
to act should not necessarily be the same.301 Therefore, the EEAS may be sued for 
                                                 
297 Although Article 265 TFEU does not explicitly mention secondary law; however, failure to act in 
infringement of secondary law constitutes an infringement of the Treaties in itself, since, when 
primary law empowers Union bodies to enact binding legislation, the Treaties require other Union 
bodies to comply with it. According to this line of reasoning, legally binding instruments entered into 
by Union bodies, being part of the law based upon the Treaties, may give rise to obligations to act for 
the parties. Hence, the EEAS may be sued for its failure to act, in infringement of the instruments it 
enters into with other Union bodies. 
298 Cf. case C-247/87, Star Fruit co. v Commission, [1989] ECR 291. Notice that in a case relating to 
the application of Article 86 TEC (now Article 106 TFEU) the ECJ held that “the possibility cannot be 
ruled out that exceptional situations might exist where an individual or, possibly, an association 
constituted for the defence of the collective interests of a class of individuals has standing to bring 
proceedings against a refusal by the Commission to adopt a decision pursuant to its supervisory 
functions under Article 90(1) and (3),” case  C-107/95 P, Bundesverband der Bilanzbuchhalter v 
Commission, [1997] ECR I-2181, par. 25. This meaning of ‘exceptional circumstances’ was partially 
clarified in case T-17/96, Télévision Française 1 SA (TF1) v Commission, [1999] ECR II-1757, par. 52-
57. However, this jurisprudence probably should not be applied analogically to failure to act 
proceedings, because these jurisdictional procedures have different objectives and they are addressed 
to different persons. See Manzini, “La Proposizione di un Ricorso in Carenza in Assenza di un 
Obbligo di Agire dell’istituzione: Riflessioni sul Caso TF1”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico 
Comunitario (1999): 381-414,  p. 408. 
299 As a matter of fact, an exegetic interpretation points in the same direction: if the legislator had 
intended to exclude nonbinding acts from the scope of Article 265 TFEU, it would have done so 
explicitly, as it did in the case of Article 263 TFEU 
300 Case C-15/70, Amedeo Chevalley v Commission, [1970] ECR 975. 
301 Indeed, “there is no necessary link between the action for annulment and the action for failure to 
act; this follows from the fact that the action for failure to act enables [the applicant] to induce the 
adoption of measures which cannot in all cases be the subject of an action for annulment”, case C-
302/87, Parliament v Council, [1988] ECR 5615, par. 16. 
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its failure to adopt both binding and nonbinding acts. This is not to say, however, 
that any applicant may impugn any EEAS omission, since the second paragraph of 
Article 265 TFEU explicitly affirms that non-privileged applicants can only sue 
Union bodies for failure to adopt any act “other than a recommendation or an 
opinion”. In other words, only privileged applicants can sue the EEAS for its failure 
to adopt nonbinding acts.302  
The literal interpretation of Article 265 TFEU may have significant consequences 
for the EEAS, namely in respect of its relations with other EU bodies. Article 3(4) of 
the EEAS Decision affirms that “the EEAS shall extend appropriate support and 
cooperation to the other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular to the 
European Parliament.” It we accept that any conduct mandated by law may form 
the object of an omission reviewable on the basis of Article 265 TFEU, we should 
conclude that the EEAS may be sued for not extending “appropriate support” to 
other Union bodies, whatever content this support may be required to take.  
After having discussed the EEAS’ standing to be sued in case of failure to act we 
turn now to reparation for damages. It is worth specifying that these proceedings 
concern the Union as a whole, rather than the EEAS: like all Union bodies, the 
Service has no capacity to be sued in this context. However, it may have capacity to 
represent the Union before the Court. Therefore, we address this issue alongside 
situations where the EEAS is a defendant.  
In cases concerning contractual liability (Article 340 TFEU, first paragraph) the 
Union representative is easily identifiable. If the contract contains an arbitration 
clause in favour of the ECJ, as foreseen by Article 272 TFEU, the EU representation 
probably should be ensured by the body or office that entered into contract on 
behalf of the Union.303 If the contract provides for the jurisdiction of the tribunal of 
a Member State,304 the EU is represented in judgement according to Article 335 
TFEU, which affirms that the Union shall be represented by the Commission or by 
other EU bodies “by virtue of their administrative autonomy, in matters relating to 
their respective operation.” Since the EEAS’ legal capacity is limited to the 
administrative area, the Service may only enter into contracts relating to 
administrative issues (that is to say by virtue of its administrative autonomy); 
consequently, whenever the EU’s contractual responsibility is raised by a contract 
concluded the EEAS, the representation before the ECJ is likely to be ensured by 
the Service.  
                                                 
302 Our conclusion is not shared by part of the doctrine, according to which only binding acts should 
normally be subject to proceedings for failure to act, because of the analogy between this proceeding 
and annulment; partially differently, Hartley, (op. cit., pp. 399-400) accepts that preliminary acts, 
that is to say non-binding acts that constitute the first step in the adoption of other acts, should also 
form the subject of proceedings for failure to act. Even the acceptance of these restrictive 
interpretations of Article 265 TFEU would not imply that the EEAS may not be sued for failure to act, 
since it is actually required to adopt preliminary acts and, as demonstrated above, binding acts. An 
instance of preliminary act is provided for by the preparation of the draft budget: without EEAS’ 
preliminary acts, the budget cannot be proposed and, a fortiori, adopted. According to Article 31 of 
the Financial Regulation the EEAS shall send to the Commission an estimate of its revenue and 
expenditure before 1 July each year. Such estimate is an intermediate step in the adoption of the 
budget, which enables the Commission to prepare a draft budget and a comprehensive working 
document on the external action, as required by Article 32 and 33 of the Financial Regulation and 
Article 8(5) of the EEAS Decision. Hence, if the EEAS did not provide the Commission with its 
estimates, the Institution may sue the Service for failure to act. 
303 This appears to be logical and consistent with the ECJ jurisprudence on non-contractual liability, 
whereby the representation of the Union is ensured by the body whose conduct gave rise to the 
controversy (see infra). 
304 Cf. Article 272 TFEU. 
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In cases concerning non-contractual liability, representation arrangements are 
slightly more complicated. According to the Court, in proceedings for non-
contractual liability, the representation of the Union is not determined through an 
analogical application of Article 335 TFEU, but it is ensured by the body whose 
conduct gave rise to the controversy.305 Therefore, we have to assess the EEAS’ 
capacity to give rise to a controversy. This issue can be investigated by considering 
separately the non-contractual liability raised by the conduct of the EEAS staff and 
the one raised by the conduct of the EEAS as such.  
There is little doubt the conduct of EEAS staff may give rise to the non-contractual 
liability of the Union. Article 340 asserts that the EU shall make good any damage 
caused by “by its servants in the performance of their duties.” Since the EEAS is a 
Union body, its staff obviously belongs to the category of EU “servants”; this 
consideration extends also to the temporary officers of the EEAS, including the 
officials and diplomats seconded from the Member States.306 In light of the above, 
the EEAS should represent the Union in non-contractual liability proceedings 
raised by the conduct of its officers. 
A cursory reading of Article 340 TFEU may suggest that the EEAS’ conduct cannot 
give rise to controversies and, thus, that the Service cannot represent the Union in 
proceedings determined by its conduct. Indeed, this provision affirms that the 
Union shall make good any damage caused by its “institutions”. A restrictive 
interpretation would evidently exclude the EEAS from scope of this Article. The 
ECJ jurisprudence, however, clarified that this reference to “institutions” should be 
interpreted extensively, as to encompass any EU body,307 presumably including the 
EEAS. Hence, the Service should represent the Union in proceedings for non-
contractual liability raised by its own conduct. It must be stressed, however, that, 
due to its limited legal capacity, the Service may only raise the Union’s non-
contractual liability in respect of administrative issues. The non-contractual liability 
of the Union in operative areas is only entailed by the actions of other offices and 
bodies, such as the HR, even when the EEAS takes part in the preparation of those 
actions.   
10. EEAS' Capacity to sue Other Bodies 
The last corollary of the EEAS’ legal capacity consists of its capacity to sue other 
Union bodies for their actions and omissions. This paragraph addresses this issue 
by focussing on the EEAS’ standing in annulment proceedings and, subsequently, 
in proceedings for failure to act. 
It may be recalled that Article 263 TFEU provides for different conditions of access 
to Court for privileged, semi-privileged and non-privileged applicants. To be sure, 
                                                 
305 Joined cases C-63-9/72, Wilhelm Werhahn Hansamühle and others v Council, [1973] ECR 1229, 
par. 7. 
306 See EEAS Decision, Article 6(2), according to which "the EEAS shall comprise officials and other 
servants of the European Union, including personnel from the diplomatic services of the Member 
States appointed as temporary agents", and Article 6(4), whereby "the staff of the EEAS shall carry 
out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interests of the Union in mind. Without 
prejudice to the third indent of Article 2(1) and Articles 2(2) and 5(3), they shall neither seek nor take 
instructions from any government, authority, organisation or person outside the EEAS or from any 
body or person other than the High Representative." 
307 Case C-370/89, Société Générale d'Entreprises Electro-Mécaniques and Roland Etroy v 
European Investment Bank, [1993] ECR 2583, par. 15-16. 
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the Service is not listed as a privileged or a semi-privileged applicant. This does not 
prevent the Service from initiating proceedings in its capacity as a “legal person”, 
within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. It may be recalled, 
however, that the EEAS’ capacity is limited to the administrative area. Hence, the 
Service may sue other bodies with respect to administrative issues, but it is barred 
from suing other bodies’ acts that concern operative matters.308 
Being a “legal person” for the purpose of Article 263 TFEU, the EEAS can only 
challenge other bodies’ acts subordinately to two conditions: direct concern and 
lack of implementing measures, for regulatory acts, or direct and individual 
concern, for non-regulatory acts. In principle, this should not prevent the Service 
from being able to challenge most acts affecting its activities. However, the criteria 
set by Article 263 TFEU may prove problematic in the case of some non-regulatory 
acts, which are not addressed to the EEAS but impinge on its prerogatives. For 
instance, a Commission decision whereby the Institution grants access to a EEAS 
document in its possession may be characterised as a non-regulatory act, since it 
has a specific addressee, that is to say the person who requested access to the 
document. According to Regulation 1049/2001 the Commission may only grant 
access to such document after having consulted the EEAS.309 If it did not do so, 
however, the EEAS may hardly challenge the Commission’s decision, which is 
neither formally nor substantively addressed to the Service.  
This problem may appear to be solvable through an analogical application of the 
ECJ jurisprudence. The Court affirmed in Chernobyl that “observance of the 
institutional balance means that each of the institutions must exercise its powers 
with due regard for the powers of the other institutions. It also requires that it 
should be possible to penalize any breach of that rule which may occur.”310 This line 
of reasoning famously led the ECJ to conclude that, although at the time of the facts 
the Treaty did not enable the Parliament to bring action for annulment, such an 
action was admissible provided that it sought only to safeguard the EP’s 
prerogatives.311 This might lead to think that the EEAS should be enabled to bring 
action for annulment in order to safeguard its prerogatives. This jurisprudence, 
however, does not appear to be applicable to the EEAS: in Chernobyl, the Court 
started from the assumption that “the Treaties set up a system for distributing 
powers among the different Community institutions, assigning to each institution 
its own role in the institutional structure of the Community and the 
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community.”312 The EP’s access to 
Court was thus functional to preserve the distribution of power set in the Treaties. 
Institutional balance cannot be violated in a case concerning the EEAS, since this 
entity has legal capacity only in respect of administrative matters, and it does not 
directly participate in its own capacity in the political life of the Union. 
Consequently, the EEAS’ access to Court is not implied by the distribution of power 
                                                 
308 The Service may use two non-judicial ways to ensure the compatibility of such acts with the 
Treaties. Ex ante, it may influence the content of those acts through its responsibilities as a service 
working for the Commission and the Council. Ex post, the EEAS may suggest the HR to impugn other 
bodies’ acts before the Court. However, Article 263 TFEU does not list the HR among privileged 
applicants, therefore this second way may not be exceedingly easy to follow. 
309 Cf. Id., Article 4(4): “as regards third-party documents, the institution shall consult the third party 
with a view to assessing whether an exception in paragraph 1 or 2 is applicable, unless it is clear that 
the document shall or shall not be disclosed.” 
310 Case C-70/88, Parliament v Council, [1990] ECR I-2041, par. 22. 
311 Id., par. 27. 
312 Id., par. 21. 
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set in the Treaties and the Service may be incapable of bringing action against 
certain acts of other Union bodies. 
After having analysed the locus standi of the EEAS in respect of annulment, it is 
necessary to briefly evaluate the EEAS’ capacity to initiate proceedings for failure to 
act. As in the case of annulment, the EEAS is a non-privileged applicant for the 
purpose of Article 265 TFEU. This implies that the Service cannot challenge 
omissions of other bodies that are not concerned with the Service’s activities, 
namely the failure to adopt decisions relating to operative issues.  
In addition, the non-privileged status of the EEAS implies that the Service cannot 
challenge omissions to adopt non-binding acts. As a consequence, the EEAS is not 
able to sue other Union bodies for failure to cooperate, as required by Article 3 of 
the EEAS Decision, unless the Service demonstrates that this cooperation should be 
implemented through binding acts directed at the Service; on the contrary, as we 
demonstrated above, Union institutions may sue the EEAS because of its lack of 
support, independently from the instrument through which this support should be 
implemented. 
 
* 
 
* * 
 
This section sought to demonstrate that the EEAS is new kind of body of the 
European Union, since it has a 'dual' identity. It lacks competences of its own and 
autonomy of political direction and it consequently functions as a service of High 
Representative. At the same time, it has the legal capacity that is necessary to 
oversee its internal administration, in all its aspects, ranging from the adoption of 
acts, to cooperation with other entities and capacity to stand before the Court of 
Justice. The EEAS, therefore, seems to closely 'mimic' the functioning of a Union 
institution.   
It is apparent, therefore, that the legislator intended the couple HR/EEAS to 
function as a single quasi-institution, where the HR performs the 'operative' 
functions, dealing with the exertion of Treaty-based powers, while the EEAS 
manages the administrative governance. The original design of the EEAS has a clear 
rationale: enabling the setting up of an administration capable of assisting the HR 
in the performance of his/her duties without encumbering him/her with the 
performance of administrative tasks. Such choice is manifestly in line with the 
purpose of the EEAS that was outlined in chapter 1, that is to say contributing to the 
feasibility of the HR's "impossible job".  
This conclusion raises a further question: why did the legislator avoid creating a 
simple new institution made up of both the HR and the EEAS? The reason appears 
to be simple: by establishing the EEAS as a service, the legislator enabled it to 
participate in the activities of other entities. This allows the Service to work with 
(and within) the entities that spearhead the intergovernmental and Community 
method, that is to say the Councils and the Commission, as demonstrated in the 
next section.  
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SECTION 2 – 'SERVANT OF TWO MASTERS':  EEAS' POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY TO OTHER POLICY-MAKERS 
The characterisation of the EEAS as the administration that supports the High 
Representative has important consequences for its relation with the other entities 
that manage European foreign policies, and for its position in the division of power 
of the external action. Given the HR's responsibilities in the Commission and 
intergovernmental frameworks, it may be expected that his/her administration 
should, as noted by Catherine Ashton, "serve the President and Members of the 
Commission, especially the RELEX family, and the President of the European 
Council, and of course the Member-States and European Parliament.”313  This issue 
is of great relevance. If the EEAS served the Member States, the latter may use it to 
‘intergovernmentalise’ the entire external action. If the EEAS served the bodies that 
promote EU interests, i.e. the Commission and the European Parliament (EP), it 
may entail an unwarranted ‘communitarisation’ of national foreign policies. Finally, 
if the EEAS served both the Member States and EU bodies, it may encounter 
insurmountable obstacles. It is indeed common knowledge that “no man can serve 
two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold 
to the one, and despise the other.”314  
This section intends to verify whether the EEAS serves entities other than the HR, 
and is divided into 7 paragraphs. The first one investigates the EEAS' capability to 
assist the HR in the performance of all his/her functions, and consequently 
excludes that the EEAS' assistance to the HR may entail its hierarchical 
subordination to other entities. The second one hypothesises a ‘softer’ form of 
subordination, and argues that the EEAS may be 'accountable' to the entities that 
have legitimacy in the EU. The third paragraph assesses the 'democratic' 
accountability of the Service. In paragraphs 4-6 the analysis turns to the 
'international' accountability of the EEAS, by focusing on the relation with the 
Member States (paragraphs 4-5) and intergovernmental organs (paragraph 6). The 
section is concluded, in paragraph 7, through an analysis of the EEAS' 
accountability to the institution embodying the legitimacy brought by the process of 
European integration, that is to say the Commission. 
1. Assisting the HR in his/her Capacity as an Organ of other Institutions 
If the EEAS were a 'normal' service of the HR, it may be expected to assist him/her 
in the performance of all his/her functions, including those in the Commission and 
the Council. A literal interpretation of the Treaties seems to exclude such 
possibility, since the EEAS is only mentioned in the CFSP chapter of the TEU 
(Article 27(3)). Had the drafters of the Treaties intended to give the EEAS a role 
'transversal' to the external action, they would have provided for its legal basis in 
the common provisions on the external action (Articles 21-22 TEU) or directly in 
Article 18 TEU, which introduces the three 'hats' of the HR.315 The opposite 
                                                 
313 Speech to the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee, 23 March 2010, Brussels. 
314 King James Bible, Matthew 6:24. See also Pinsky and Laranjeira, “No one can serve two masters”, 
Addiction (2008): 855, according to whom “because of its universality, it is possible to find versions 
of these wise words in many cultures”.  
315 Blockmans and Hillion (Eds.), op. cit., p. 2, notice that "the rationale for locating the legal basis of 
the EEAS decision in the CFSP chapter of the TEU can thus be questioned". 
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conclusion can be reached through a teleological and systemic interpretation of 
Article 27(3) TEU. The EEAS' function is it to weave together the Community and 
intergovernmental approaches through the Union method. Moreover, the principle 
of coherence requires an interpretation of the Treaties favourable to the conduct of 
a synergetic external action. Hence, Article 27(3) TEU should receive an extensive 
interpretation.316 
The legislator retained this approach. The numbering of the EEAS Decision 
(2010/427/EU) suggests that it is not a merely CFSP act (since, in the latter case, it 
would appear as 2010/427/CFSP). Moreover, Article 2(1) of the EEAS Decision 
explicitly states that "the EEAS shall support the High Representative in fulfilling 
his/her mandates as outlined, notably, in Articles 18 and 27 TEU". This provision 
further clarifies that the EEAS supports the HR in the performance of all his/her 
tasks, including the conduct of the CFSP, the presidency of the Foreign Affairs 
Council and the promotion of external action coherence.317  
The concern for coherence of the legislator was such that it actually introduced new 
tasks of assistance for the EEAS. Whereas, according to Article 27(3) TEU, the 
EEAS assists the HR, Article 2(2) of the EEAS Decision asserts that it "shall assist 
the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the 
Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external 
relations." This provision is not entirely surprising, since the EEAS is linked to both 
the European Council and the Commission via its duty of assisting the HR, who 
takes part in the work of the former and is a Vice-President of the latter. It cannot 
be denied, however, that Article 2(2) suggests the existence of a new direct link 
between the Service and the two aforementioned institutions. Does this imply that 
the EEAS is hierarchically integrated in the administration of other institutions? 318 
This is not the case, since primary law clearly hints at the fact that the EEAS 
functions as the administration that serves the HR. A systemic reading of the 
Treaties confirms that the EEAS is not one of the departments of the Commission, 
since the organisation of the latter is regulated according to Article 249(1) TFEU, 
whereas the EEAS has its legal basis in Article 27(3) TEU. The EEAS is not an 
administration of intergovernmental institutions either, since their services find 
their mandate in Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU. The practice confirms this 
reading of the Treaties. Although the EEAS’ bureaucratic structure resembles that 
of the Commission (and of most national administrations), the Service has 
peculiarities of its own. This is rendered evident by the EEAS nomenclature: 
instead of having units, heads of unit, directorates and directors, like the 
Commission, the Service has “divisions”, “heads of division”, “managing-
directorates” and “managing-directors”. The EEAS’ structure is anomalous also in 
substantive terms. For instance, the Service has two heads: a Chief operating 
                                                 
316 A similar conclusion is reached when Article 27(3) TEU is interpreted in light of preparatory 
documents: as noted in chapter 1, the drafters of the Treaties transparently intended to enable the 
EEAS to support the HR in the performance of all his/her tasks.  
317 Perhaps incongruously, this reference to consistency is performed in the same paragraph that 
provides for the EEAS role in the CFSP, whereas, as shown in chapter 1, this issue is transversal to the 
different areas of the EU's external action. 
318 On the hierarchical relations between the organs of the public administration see, e,g., Garofoli 
and Ferrari, Manuale di Diritto Amministrativo (Nel Diritto, 2009), p. 101, Mazzaroli et al., op. cit., 
pp. 390 ff., and Waline, Droit Administratif (Dalloz, 2010), p. 67. It must be stressed, however, that 
the peculiarities of the EEAS render the traditional characterisation of hierarchy scarcely useful in 
our perspective, since the Service may receive input from different sources, which may be 
hierarchically superior (HR) but also linked in a non-hierarchical manner (Commission, Council), as 
this paragraph intends to clarify. 
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officer, dealing with administrative issues, and an Executive Secretary General, 
overseeing operative aspects (under the HR guidance). Together with their deputies 
and other high-ranking officers, these subjects compose the “corporate board”, that 
is to say the internal coordination management unit that steers the EEAS’ activities. 
The peculiar nomenclature of the EEAS is not found in any other EU institution, 
but it seem to have been borrowed (for reasons that remain obscure) from the 
terminology used in business management. 
It is clear, therefore, that the EEAS' support to the HR does not imply the 
hierarchical subordination of the former to other Union institutions. The EEAS' 
duty to assist the Commission and the European Council must consequently be 
construed as a generic political duty to 'serve' these institutions. How can such duty 
be enforced? 
2. Introducing the EEAS’ Political Accountability 
Although the EEAS is part neither of EU institutions nor of Member States’ 
administrations, it may theoretically serve European and national actors because it 
is accountable to them. In political terms, it seems quite established that 
accountability is one of several methods of constraining power319, and it 
characterises relationships in which a person is held to answer for performance that 
involves some entrustment of power from another entity.320 Thus the ‘accountable’ 
entity is under at least two political duties: providing information as to its actions 
and suffering punishment in the case of eventual misconduct.321 The reliance on a 
political concept such as ‘accountability’ admittedly raises methodological issues for 
the legal research. It is nonetheless opportune, since it enables us to position the 
EEAS in the institutional and constitutional framework of European foreign 
policies. Such analysis is also feasible in a legal perspective, since accountability is 
enforced mainly through legal instruments.  
Accountability descends from legitimacy. In democratic States, the exercise of 
power is believed to be delegated by the people to elected organs, which are 
consequently accountable to the demos.322 Non-elected organs may be directly 
accountable to people’s representatives, and indirectly accountable to the people 
themselves, such as in the case of governments in parliamentary democracies. Legal 
investigations of accountability, consequently, are usually related to ‘democratic’ 
accountability.323 The EU system is characterised also by other two elements of 
legitimacy. On the one hand, there is the ‘international’ legitimacy of the Union, 
which stems form the conferral of competences by the Member States, and which is 
                                                 
319 Lindberg, Accountability: the Core Concept and Its Subtypes (Overseas Development Institute 
Working Paper, 2009), p. 2. 
320 Romzek and Dubnick, “Accountability”, in Shafritz (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Public 
Policy and Administration (Westview, 1998), p. 6.  
321 Schedler, "Conceptualizing Accountability", in Schedler, Diamond and Plattner, The Self-
Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1999), pp. 14–28. 
322 For instance, see Philip, “Delimiting Democratic Accountability’, 57 Political Studies: 28-53. 
323 Cf. Verhey, Kiiver and Loeffen (ed.), Political Accountability and European Integration (Europa 
Law Publishing, 2009); see also, e.g., Bidégaray, La Responsabilité Politique (Dalloz, 1998); 
Rescigno, La Responsabilità Politica (Giuffrè, 1968); Azzariti (ed.), La Responsabilità Politica 
nell’era del Maggioritario e nella Crisi della Statualità (Giappichelli, 2005), Bressman, “Beyond 
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State”, 78 New York University 
Law Review (2003): 461-557. 
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expressed through intergovernmental organs.324 On the other hand, there is the 
legitimacy that is inherent to the integration process, and which is manifested by 
the subject acting in the "general interest of the Union", i.e. the Commission.325 
Given the democratic principle the EU is founded upon, it may be hypothesised that 
the EEAS should be accountable to the European Parliament, as investigated in 
next paragraph. The remainder of this section will evaluate the 'international' and 
'Communitarian' strands of the EEAS' accountability. 
3. The Scarce Democratic Accountability of the EEAS 
The EEAS Decision mentions the Service's support to, and cooperation with, the 
EP,326 and it specifies that the HR should submit a few reports on the EEAS to the 
Parliament. Neither this Decision nor the Treaties, however, clarify the democratic 
accountability regime applicable to the EEAS.  
The Service’s relation with the EP may be determined on the basis of the HR’s 
position. In this perspective, the democratic accountability of the EEAS seems 
rather limited. Whereas Article 230 TFEU affirms that the Commission must reply 
to questions put to it by the Parliament, no Treaty provision specifies that the HR 
should respond to the representatives of European citizens. In addition, whereas 
the Commission may be censured by the EP and the HR may be obliged to resign 
from duties that he or she carries out in the Commission, he/she cannot be 
compelled to renounce its prerogatives in the CFSP area and within the Council.  
Nonetheless, the HR is indirectly accountable to the EP through other means. 
He/she is subject to a vote of consent by the EP when the latter approves the 
Commission en bloc.327 Thus a very strong opposition to the HR on the part of the 
European Parliament may render impossible the appointment of the Commission. 
Such form of ‘indirect’ accountability is reinforced by the fact that the HR “shall 
resign, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 18(1) [TEU], if the 
[Commission] President so requests.” Thus if the Commission President (who is 
accountable to the EP) comes to oppose the HR, he may ask for the latter’s 
demotion.  
The EEAS’ democratic accountability is partially strengthened by its direct relation 
with the Parliament. The EEAS must take into consideration the Parliament's 
views, since the latter co-decides the adoption of the budget. The EP is unlikely to 
reduce the Service's administrative budget, but it may well choose not to grant the 
                                                 
324 On the democratic and international form of legitimacy of the EU, see Constantinesco, 
Compétences et pouvoirs, cit. supra, particularly at p. 418. The coexistence of democratic and 
international accountability in the EU explains why the Commission entertains an original relation 
with the EU legislator, which oscillates between a State-like government-parliament model and the 
typical formula of an international organisation’s administration; see also Constantinesco, "La 
Responsabilité de La Commission Européenne : La Crise de 1999", 92 Pouvoirs (2000): 117-131, at p. 
130. 
325 De Quadros, Droit de l’Union Européenne: Droit Constitutionnel et Administratif de l’Union 
Européenne (Bruylant, 2008), pp. 190-191. The inherent legitimacy of the Commission is testified by 
the letter of Article 17 TEU, according to which "In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission 
shall be completely independent. Without prejudice to Article 18(2), the members of the Commission 
shall neither seek nor take instructions from any Government or other institution, body, office or 
entity. They shall refrain from any action incompatible with their duties or the performance of their 
tasks." 
326 Article 3(4). 
327 Article 17(7) TEU. 
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discharge of the EU's budget.328 Since the EU budget is entirely implemented by the 
Commission, ex Article 317 TFEU, it is the latter institution that is directly 
accountable to the EP. However, considering that the EEAS cooperates with the 
Commission in the implementation of several policies, and it must interact with it 
for the purpose of financing CFSP endeavours (which are implemented by the 
HR/EEAS), it is evident that the Commission's accountability partially extends to 
the EEAS de facto if not de jure. 
In addition, the EP may oversee some of the EEAS’ implementation activities in the 
context of Comitology procedures. As it is known, Comitology relates to the 
procedures through which the Member States control the implementation of Union 
acts,329 before their adoption by the Commission.330 The EP has a “right of scrutiny” 
in Comitology procedures,331 whereby "it can indicate to the Commission that, in its 
view, a draft implementing act exceeds the implementing powers provided for in 
the basic act. In such a case, the Commission shall review the draft implementing 
act.” 332 Since the Service assists a Vice-President of the Commission, it may be 
administratively responsible for the implementation of certain policies; therefore, it 
may represent the Institution in some Committees. In this perspective, the EEAS is 
partially accountable to the EP as far as the implementation of Union policies is 
concerned. The EEAS’ democratic accountability in the implementation of Union 
policies, however, has relevant limits. The EP’s “right of scrutiny” does not concern 
the merit of a decision, but only its respect for institutional balance. Moreover, the 
exercise of this right obliges the Commission and thus the EEAS to revise, but not 
to modify, the proposed implementing decision. Finally, and most importantly, the 
right of scrutiny of the EP does not extend to the implementation of the CFSP, 
which is performed directly by the EEAS, under the authority of the HR, outside the 
Commission framework. 
In order to reinforce these weak forms of accountability, the EP requested the HR 
to adopt a Declaration on political accountability,333 as part of the negotiation for 
the approval of the EEAS Decision. Most provisions contained in this document 
probably are non-binding. The wording of the Declaration might seem to indicate 
that the HR intended to give the European Parliament a supervisory role in the field 
of CFSP decision-making334 and implementation,335 beyond the letter of the 
Treaties. Considering that primary law does not provide for such powers for the EP, 
and provided that EU offices and bodies cannot modify the distribution of 
competences set in the Treaties, it is evident that the HR could not intend to confer 
competences on the EP, but she simply wanted to undertake political 
                                                 
328 On the discharge procedure, see Petit, "Les Finances de l'Union Européenne dans Le Projet de 
Traité Etablissant une Constitution Pour l'Europe", in Constantinesco, Gauttier and Michel (eds.), Le 
Traité Etablissant une Constitution Pour l'Europe (Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2005), pp. 
191-202. 
329 See Article 291(3) TFEU and Regulation 182/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 February 2011 OJ 2011 L 55/13 –18. 
330 The existence of a function of ‘control’ does not exclude the possibility that Committees perform 
other functions too, including “technical assistance” to the Commission, see Baratta, “Introduzione 
Alle Nuove Regole Per L’adozione Degli Atti Esecutivi Dell’unione”, Diritto Dell’unione Europea 
(2011): 565-583, p. 568. 
331 Regulation 182/2011/EU, Article 11. 
332 The Commission may modify and integrate the non-essential elements of the base act, Case 23/75, 
Rey Soda, [1975] ECR 1301 and C-403/05, Parliament v. Commission, [2007] ECR I-9045.  
333 Declaration by the High Representative on political accountability, O.J. 2010 C 210/01. 
334 E.g. id., par. 1. 
335 E.g. id., par. 3. 
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commitments.336 Notwithstanding its ‘soft law’ character, the Declaration requires 
attention, since it may shape the expectations of both the EEAS and the EP, thus 
entailing the accountability of the former to the latter.  
The Declaration may be analytically divided in three parts. The first contains 
political commitments that the HR entered into in order to enhance the 
transparency of the EEAS vis à vis the EP and European citizens. These 
commitments concern mainly the ‘interviews’ of high ranking EEAS officer. 
According to the Declaration, Heads of Delegation are required to participate in 
“exchanges of views” with the EP, before taking service, if the latter so desires.337  
Similarly, Heads of Delegations, Heads of CSDP missions and senior EEAS officials 
may be required to participate “in relevant parliamentary committees and 
subcommittees in order to provide regular briefings”.338 It is not clear to what 
extent this first category of political commitments is enforceable. The EP is unlikely 
to transform such commitments into ‘hard powers’, as it did in the case of the 
appointment of prospective Commissioners. The views of the Parliament on single 
Commissioners cannot be disregarded, lest the EP does not approve the 
Commission.339 On the contrary, the EP has little means to sanction the non-
cooperative behaviour of the EEAS senior staff or their perceived inadequacy. 
The HR/EEAS’ accountability to the EP seems to be stronger in a second area, 
relating to mutually beneficial arrangements. In her Declaration, the HR affirmed 
that the EP will be consulted on the identification and planning of Election 
Observation Missions and their follow-up”.340 Given the obvious expertise of the 
European Parliament in respect of elections, it may be expected that the EEAS will 
live up to this commitment, at least because of its own interest in the matter. In this 
case, however, the relation between the EP and the EEAS resembles a dialogue 
between two functionally similar bodies, rather than the relation of a body 
accountable to another. 
The EEAS’ accountability is most evident in the fields where cooperation is fostered 
by the EP’s ability to sanction the Service. This is transparently the case of the 
Declaration’s provision whereby the EEAS shall provide briefings relating to CFSP 
missions “financed out of the EU budget”.341 Since the funding of these missions is 
dependent also on the will of the EP, in its capacity as budget authority, it is evident 
that the Service needs to take the latter’s view into consideration. A similar example 
consists of the requirement to provide information as to the negotiation of 
international agreements for the conclusion of which the consent of the Parliament 
is required,342 since any serious lack of cooperation on the part of the EEAS may 
lead to the non-approval of the agreement that is being negotiated. 
                                                 
336 Some provisions contained in the declaration might nonetheless be binding, insofar as they 
concern the internal governance of the EEAS or the deputising of the HR’s functions. Since these 
provisions merely echo the Treaties, or have an extremely vague content it is not necessary to 
investigate their legal character. 
337 Id., par. 5. 
338 Id., par. 7. 
339 As it is known, the EP obtained a de facto veto power on the nomination of new Commissioners, as 
testified by the case of the prospective Commissioner Buttiglione, see Zucca, "The Barroso Drama: All 
Roads Lead to Rome”, 1 European Constitutional Law Review (2005): 175-181. 
340 Par. 9. 
341 Id. par. 1. 
342 Id. par. 2. The provision is rather puzzling, in so far it relates to the agreements falling under the 
HR’s area of responsibility, “where the consent of the Parliament is required.” Since the HR only 
negotiates CFSP agreements, which are generally not subject to the approval of the EP, this provision 
is likely to be redundant.  
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In summary, the EEAS, unlike the European Commission, is scarcely accountable 
to the European Parliament. The elements of accountability binding the Service are 
mainly related to non-CFSP policy implementation, financial implementation and 
the negotiation of international agreements.  
4. ‘International’ Accountability: EEAS' Strong Links to the Member States 
After having considered the ‘democratic’ side of the EEAS’ accountability, we now 
turn to the ‘international’ one. The accountability of the EEAS to the Member States 
may be ensured in three manners: via a direct relation between the Service and the 
States, through the EEAS’ officers and through the relation between the EEAS and 
intergovernmental organs. This paragraph addresses the first issue, paragraph 5 
concerns the second one, and paragraph 6 approaches the third.  
The EEAS is most closely associated with the Member States when it acts as their 
organ. There is no international or EU rule that prevents States from entrusting the 
exercise of their competences to Union bodies, outside the field of Union 
competences. They have done so, in practice, in numerous occasions. This is 
typically the case of the European Development Fund (EDF), which was created 
through an ‘internal agreement’ of the Member States, entrusting EDF 
implementation on the Commission.343 A similar solution is often adopted in the 
negotiation of the so-called ‘mixed agreements’, where the Commission represents 
the Member States in their area of competence.344 In these situations, the Member 
States do not confer competences on the Union; the Commission, therefore, does 
not act in its capacity as a Union body. They do not attribute competence on the 
Commission either, since the latter is not an international subject and it cannot 
have competences of its own under international law. It may consequently be 
argued that the Member States adopt the Commission as their common organ;345 in 
other words, the Commission functions as a part of Member States’ executives, and 
is consequently accountable to them.  
The Member States may adopt also the EEAS as their common organ.346 They seem 
to do it in practice in the case of the “EU local statements”,347 which are issued by 
the Union Delegations accredited to third countries “in agreement with the EU 
Heads of Mission”, that is to say Member States’ embassies.348 Provided that the 
                                                 
343 The very ECJ accepted the legality of these arrangements, by holding that “no provision of the 
Treaty prevents Member States from using, outside its framework, procedural steps drawing on the 
rules applicable to Community expenditure and from associating the Community institutions with 
the procedure thus set up”.C-316/91 [1994] ECR I-625, par. 41. 
344 The legality of these arrangements was supported by Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion in 
Case C-316/91, Parliament v. Council, [1994] ECR I-625. 
345 On the notion of ‘common organ’ in international law, see Sereni, La Représentation en Droit 
International (Hague Academy of International Law, 1948), p. 86. 
346 The direct adoption of the EEAS is improbable, since the Service does not have operational 
autonomy from the HR. It is more probable the Member States adopt the High Representative as 
their organ; since the EEAS is a Service of the HR, the Member States would implicitly adopt the 
EEAS too. 
347 Cf. http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/local/index_en.htm 
348 Since the latter do not necessarily issue the statements autonomously, it may be assumed that 
their “agreement” functions as an ad hoc entrustment of competence to deliver a message. The 
picture may be complicated through a consideration of the distribution of competences. If the 
statement concerns both EU and Member States’ competences, the Delegation represents also the 
Member States. If the statement concerns only EU competences, the agreement expressed by 
Member States’ missions should be seen in analogy to the voting within the Council: the EU mission 
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Delegation is not autonomous from the EEAS, it would seem that the Member 
States adopt the EEAS as their organ for the issuing of “local statements”. Another 
interesting case concerns the negotiation of mixed agreements on behalf of the 
Member States: although the latter traditionally entrust their representation on the 
Commission, it may not be excluded that they will choose the HR and the EEAS as 
their representatives for future agreements containing ‘political’ elements, given 
their expertise in CFSP issues.  
The adoption of the EEAS as a common organ of the Member States appears to 
imply the complete accountability of the former to the letter: the power of the EEAS 
should be strongly constrained, since the Member States may issue detailed 
instructions, request information and sanction the EEAS’ incompliance through the 
withdrawal of its powers. Would the accountability of the EEAS be different in the 
case it acted in its capacity as a Union body? 
There is no Treaty provision that suggests a general accountability of the EEAS to 
the Member States. As it is known, the Union is conferred competences by the 
Member States and it exercises them through its organs, including the EEAS. 
Consequently, there should be no direct relation between the Member States and 
Union organs,349 unless the Treaties affirm otherwise. Since the Treaties do not 
foresee any direct relation between the Member States and the HR/EEAS, a 
formalistic approach would lead to exclude any accountability of the latter to 
former. However, such reading probably is neither realistic nor useful. Since the 
Member States are the Masters of the Treaties, their views can hardly be 
disregarded by Union bodies. The mechanisms enforcing their accountability are 
not only found in the Treaties, but are identified also in the practice. Informal 
mechanisms for the enforcement of accountability may be provided for by critical 
notes or reports. Such was the case of the non-paper on the EEAS prepared by 
several EU Member States in 2011.350 Although this document obviously had no 
binding character, it had at least the effect of placing some issues in the HR’s 
agenda.  
The Member States can use another mechanism to enforce the EEAS' 
accountability: comitology. As recalled above, comitology consists of a mechanism 
for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
powers.351. Comitology concerns the EEAS in so far as the latter participates in the 
                                                                                                                                               
would therefore act representing the EU position, decided upon by the Member States’ 
representatives. Independently from the distribution of competences, however, the decision-making 
method is always intergovernmental, since it is based on consensus. Therefore, the distinction 
between these two situations is theoretically relevant, but probably has no practical implication. 
349 The only exception to this principle is provided for by intergovernmental organs, which are 
formed by the States’ representatives: since the EEAS is not composed by such representatives, this 
issue can be ignored. 
350 Non-paper on the European External Action Service from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland 
and Sweden, 8 December 2011, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/, last visited 15 
December 2012. 
351 Regulation 182/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 OJ 
2011 L 55/13 –18. Although Comitology is now codified, it was created in the practice: the Member 
States subjected Commission implementing decisions to the scrutiny of a committee composed by 
their representatives, on the basis of the delegation of implementing powers by the Council to the 
Commission. The Court famously held that comitology did not run counter the EU institutional 
balance, because “without distorting the community structure and the institutional balance, the 
management committee machinery enables the council to delegate to the commission an 
implementing power of appreciable scope, subject to its power to take the decision itself if necessary”, 
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implementation of policies falling within the competence of the Commission, that is 
to say non-CFSP actions. The Service is invited by the Commission to participate in 
the Committees dealing with actions prepared also by the EEAS, such as in the field 
of development cooperation. Comitology is not directly applicable to the CFSP, 
whose implementation is regulated by Article 24 and 26 TEU, rather than Article 
291 TFEU. However, since the HR and the EEAS put into effect this policy under 
the scrutiny of the Council, it is evident and logical that the Member States should 
exert a strong control in this area too.352 The interaction between the Member 
States and the EEAS in the implementation of CFSP is particularly evident with 
respect to the CSDP. The Service indeed contains the organs that are responsible 
for the support to military operations (EU Military Staff), the conduct of civilian 
CSDP missions (Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability), and the civilian-
military strategic planning structure for CSDP operations and missions (Crisis 
Management and Planning Directorate). These organs are accountable to Council 
bodies, namely the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which inter alia 
exercises the political control and strategic direction of the crisis management 
operations (Article 38 TEU). Since the PSC is composed of representatives of the 
Member States, the EEAS is particularly accountable to the Member States in this 
ambit. 
5. EEAS Officers as a Source of Accountability to the Member States? 
At first sight, the EEAS’ accountability to the Member States may seem to be 
reinforced by the relation between its officers and European countries. Such 
relation may be problematic, in the first place, with respect to the EEAS’ top 
management. In March 2011, the HR Decision (2011) 005 established the 
‘Consultative Committee on Appointments’ to the EEAS.353 This Committee has, 
among its functions, those of acting as interview panel for senior appointments and 
monitoring EEAS selection procedures, in particular in relation to geographical 
balance issues.354 Two representatives of the Member States, on a rotational basis, 
sit in the Committee. This implies that European countries have a say in the 
management of the EEAS’ staff policy, in particular for apical positions. The 
relevance of the Member States influence, however, should not be overemphasised, 
since the Committee encompasses also a Commission member, who may 
counterbalance Member States’ representatives. Even if the Committee’s positions 
were biased in favour of the Member States’ positions, they remain nonbinding on 
the appointing authority (the HR), as provided for by Article 5 of the Decision. 
Finally, it cannot be ignored that the Member States are hardly alien from 
interferences with top level nominations in other EU bodies, and namely within the 
Commission, even if no hard or soft law document explicitly recognises this.355 The 
above considerations suggest that the EEAS should not be seen as particularly 
                                                                                                                                               
Case 25-70, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Köster and Berodt & Co., 
[1970] ECR 1161, par. 9. 
352 Although the Member States formally exert this form of control via Council preparatory bodies, 
and not purely intergovernmental organs, such as in the case of Comitology, it is appropriate to 
mention this issue in the present paragraph, rather than in Paragraph 7, because of its analogy with 
Comitology. 
353 PROC HR(2011) 005, 9 March 2011, not published in the OJ. 
354 Id., Article 2(c). 
355 Interviews with Commission officers, March-June 2011. 
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accountable to the Member States simply because of their intervention in the 
Service’s Consultative Committee on Appointments. 
The EEAS’ accountability to European countries seems to be suggested in a more 
credible way by the fact that the Service is staffed also by Member States’ officers. 
Like other Union bodies, the EEAS is partially composed of seconded national 
experts (SNE), that is to say officers from the administrations of the Member 
States, who work for the Union on a temporary basis. In practice, the SNEs staffing 
the EEAS are primarily those working in the field of crisis management, and they 
are militaries, policemen and judges. As it is evident, these officers are necessarily 
seconded by the Member States, since the EU cannot hire them on a permanent 
basis. The EP, however, insisted that only a “limited” presence of SNEs in the 
Service should be permitted, and only when “necessary” and “in specific cases” 
(Article 6(3) EEAS Decision). The Parliament’s concern for the presence of SNEs in 
the EEAS is explained by the Member States’ choice to flood the Service with a new 
sort of seconded officers: national diplomats.  
According to Article 27(3) TEU, the EEAS comprises officials from the General 
Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission “as well as staff seconded from 
national diplomatic services of the Member States”, who, according to Article 6(2) 
of the EEAS Decision, are “appointed as temporary agents.” Member States’ 
diplomats have significant weight within the Service, since they “should represent 
at least one third of all EEAS staff at AD level” (Article 6(9) EEAS Decision). What 
is more, national diplomats have meaningful responsibilities within the Service, 
since their presence is particularly evident at the management level.356 The 
relevance of the role entrusted upon national officers within the Service naturally 
raises an issue of accountability: do Member States use their fonctionnaires to 
constrain the EEAS’ power? In other words, are SNEs and national diplomats the 
'Trojan horse' of the Member States in the EU external action?  
The relevance of 'geographical balance' in the staffing of the EEAS seems to suggest 
that these questions should be answered affirmatively. The staff policy of the EEAS 
should be determined by three requirements contained in Article 6(8) of the EEAS 
Decision: gender balance, geographical balance and merit. The coexistence of 
meritocracy and geographical balance raises two theoretical problems. On the one 
hand, meritocracy and geographical balance may well counter each other, since the 
personal merit of an officer may require an appointment to a post different from 
the one his/her State have a 'right' to.357 On the other hand, if the content of 
meritocracy can be easily guessed, the one of geographical balance is less 
straightforward. These problems were solved in practice by systematically favouring 
geographical balance over meritocracy and by equating the former with balance of 
power. Thus the biggest Member States are well represented by the HR (UK), the 
EEAS Secretary General (France) and deputy secretary-general (Germany). Smaller 
Member States have been given (less) relevant positions, that is to say Chief 
Operating Officer (Ireland), another deputy secretary-general (Poland), and the 
                                                 
356 “In the second year of recruitment from the three Treaty sources, 30% of management posts will 
be occupied by national diplomats”, European Commission press release, 3 August 2011, IP/11/944, 
europa.eu, last visited on 23 August 2012. 
357 As it is evident, there may be a contradiction between geographical balance and meritocracy, as 
plastically rendered by an interview of the Commissioner for institutional relations in 2010, 
according to whom the Service should have had “no national quota”, but, at the same time, “the 
landscape of the European Union must be reflected in the External Action Service”. Euractiv 
interview with Commissioner Sefcovic, http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eeas-reach-balanced-
representation-2013-interview-493904. 
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officer responsible for crisis coordination (Italy). Since the top management of the 
EEAS was nominated in light of the preferences of the (biggest) Member States, and 
not necessarily in light only of meritocracy, it would seem that the former should be 
accountable to the latter. 
The above conclusion seems to be further reinforced by the fact that the Member 
States have foreseen the means necessary to enforce the accountability of EEAS 
officers. National officers seconded to the EEAS spend only part of their career in 
the Service; national diplomats, in particular, are supposed to spend between four 
and ten years in Brussels. In principle, each Member State should provide its 
officials who have become temporary agents in the EEAS “with a guarantee of 
immediate reinstatement at the end of their period of service to the EEAS” (Article 
6(11) EEAS Decision). In practice, however, EU institutions do not seem to have 
any realistic instrument to ensure the compliance of Member States in this respect. 
Therefore, it is evident that any national officer displaying an ‘unfriendly’ behaviour 
towards the administration he/she belongs to may be sanctioned, for instance, 
through the withdrawal of promotions or the transfer to an undesired location. 
The above reading of national officers’ role is not entirely misleading, but it appears 
exceedingly pessimistic. The assumption whereby the Member States second their 
officers to the Service solely in order to promote national interests seems 
unrealistic. In some cases, the Member States may simply want to foster 
coordination between national and European administrations, by providing the 
Union with the expertise that is solely found at national level.358 Such desire of the 
Member States is legitimate and conducive to external action coherence and 
effectiveness: there certainly are many aspects of foreign policy the EU is not well 
equipped to deal with, and the secondment of national officers appears as a cost-
effective means to solve this problem. The secondment of national diplomats may 
also benefit national services, by granting them insight into EU procedures and 
modus operandi, thus promoting mutual understanding and supporting the 
effectiveness of both national and EU services in Europe and in third countries. For 
instance, it was reported that the lack of experience within European institutions 
renders national diplomats unaware of the potentialities of European diplomatic 
cooperation. At the same time, officials having European experience tend to 
instinctively search for EU-wide collaboration (the so-called “Community 
reflex”).359 The Member States’ interest for European coordination, however, does 
not explain their competition for the positioning of national officers in the Service, 
which may be better understood in light of the quest for visibility and presence. The 
placing of a national officer to an apical position of the Service may be presented as 
a success by a national government, whereas the lack of visible representation may 
be perceived as a political failure. The press and academic coverage of the EEAS 
                                                 
358 Such intention on the part of the Member States was confirmed by three permanent Commission 
officers and four SNEs interviewed by the author (March 2011-September 2012), and it is supported 
by the findings of Suvarierol and Van Den Berg, “Bridge Builder Or Bridgeheads in Brussels? the 
World of Seconded National Experts”, in Geuijen et al. (eds.), The New Eurocrats: National Civil 
Servants in EU Policy-Making (Amsterdam University Press, 2009). In this sense, see also Trondal, 
“Governing At the Frontier of the European Commission: the Case of Seconded National officials”, 
29(1) West European Politics (2006): 147-160. 
359 Interview with an EEAS officer, September 2012. Notice however that previous research on SNEs 
working in the Commission suggests that there are limited long-lasting effect of socialization within 
European Union's executive machinery of government, Trondal, Van Den Berg and Suvarierol, "The 
Compound Machinery of Government: the Case of Seconded officials in the European Commission”, 
21 Governance (2008): 253-274. 
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staff reinforces this perception, since it often equates geographical balance with 
balance of power.360 In this light, the struggle for EEAS apical posts does not appear 
as an instrument for the promotion of national interests, but rather as end in itself. 
Therefore, even if it cannot be excluded that some national officers seconded to the 
EEAS may actually be accountable to their own countries, it cannot be assumed a 
priori that national diplomats are always likely to foster national interests. It is 
consequently necessary to take a closer look at the way national officers behave. In 
a formal perspective, national officers should be treated, and should behave like 
their colleagues, since they must “carry out their duties and conduct themselves 
solely with the interests of the Union in mind” and they should “neither seek nor 
take instructions from any government, authority, organisation or person outside 
the EEAS or from any body or person other than the High Representative” (Article 
6(4) EEAS Decision). The practice seems to confirm the respect for this provision. 
The literature on SNEs suggests that national officers seconded to the EU generally 
behave with the interests of the Union in mind. As effectively summarised by a 
Commission SNE quoted by Suvarieriol and Van der Berg: “expertise is the most 
important. We are not the Member States representatives here. They are in the 
Council”.361 What is more, it would seem that even national diplomats operating in 
Council structures develop a certain sensitivity to EU priorities.362 The interviews 
conducted by the author signal that national diplomats seconded to the EEAS do 
not behave very differently from permanent officers, either.363 
All in all, it seems inappropriate to characterise EEAS officers as a source of 
accountability to the Member States.  
6. ‘International Accountability’: the Relatively Weak Ties between the EEAS and 
the European Council  
The ‘international legitimacy’ that characterises the Member States pertains also to 
the intergovernmental organs, because of their composition.364 The letter of the 
Treaties seems to suggest that the EEAS is strongly accountable to the European 
Council, because the HR is closely linked to this institution. The HR is appointed by 
the European Council acting by qualified majority; the Institution can also end 
his/her term of office through the same procedure.365 This implies that the HR’s 
office is unlikely to be entrusted on a person disliked by a majority of Member 
States; in addition, the HR probably seeks not to displease his own appointers, or a 
                                                 
360 Cf. Ivan, A European External Action Service of the Whole Union? Geographical and Gender 
Balance Among the Heads of EU Delegations (EPIN, 2011). 
361 Suvarierol and van der Berg, op. cit., p. 118. In this sense, see also Trondal, op. cit. 
362 According to Juncos and Pomorska, national diplomats who participate in the CFSP bargaining in 
Brussels enter into a mutually influencing relationship with their sending institution, to the extent 
that “those that left the capitals and started working in Brussels felt the growing gap between 
themselves and their colleagues from the ministry. One of them observed that in Brussels ‘everything 
changes faster, when it comes to the mentality of the diplomats’ and that the people in the capital 
‘become frustrated, as they feel that we are getting further away and then the lack of understanding 
appears’, see Juncos and Pomorska, Playing the Brussels Game: Strategic Socialisation in the CFSP 
Council Working Groups (European Integration Online Papers, 2006). 
363 Some cases of direct national influence on EEAS decision-making via seconded national diplomats 
have been reported, but they only relate to a few high-ranking officers (managing director and 
above), and appear to be primarily linked to the personalities involved and the attitude of a few 
national governments. This confirms the finding by Suvarierol et and van der Berg, op. cit., p. 118. 
364 Constantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs, cit. supra, p. 418. 
365 Article 18(1) TEU. 
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majority thereof. Since the EEAS is, by definition, bound to promote the political 
line of the HR, it would seem that the Service should be accountable to the 
European Council.  
This formalistic reading of the Treaties, however, is not completely satisfactory. The 
High Representative is not likely to be appointed solely because of his/her political 
proximity to a majority of Member States. His/her nomination is not performed in 
the void, but in the context of repeated interactions among decision-makers. In 
addition, the HR’s nomination is influenced also by the preference of bodies other 
than the Member States: since the HR is also Vice-President of the Commission, 
and the latter is approved by the European Parliament, the preferences of this 
Institution must be taken into consideration. The process of nomination of the 
incumbent HR clarifies this issue: Catherine Ashton possibly was not the most 
likely candidate for this post, but she possessed a number of features that made her 
a suitable HR in light of the other appointments made at that time. Since the 
European Popular Party and the Member States had agreed to nominate a 
conservative man from a medium-sized Member State as the President of the 
Commission, and a conservative man from a small country as the President of the 
European Council, it seemed fit to nominate a woman issued from a left-wing party 
and coming from a big Member State to the post of HR. Provided that France and 
Germany were granted other posts, the choice of a British woman from the Labour 
Party seemed inevitable.366 This shows that C. Ashton was not chosen only because 
of her trustworthiness in the eyes of the Member States, but because of other 
factors, including her nationality, her political affiliation and even her gender. 
Not only do these factors influence the HR’s nomination, but they affect also 
his/her confirmation in the office, and the possibility that the European Council 
asks the HR to resign. These threats certainly constrains the power of the HR, but 
only if they are credible.367 Since the choice to nominate the High Representative 
depends on delicate political balances, it would seem that the European Council can 
difficultly ask him/her to resign, and it may re-nominate him/her even if it is not 
entirely pleased with his/her performance.  
Given the limited HR's accountability to the European Council, it may be argued 
that the EEAS is unlikely to be held accountable to the Member States via this 
Institution.   
7. 'International Accountability': the EEAS as a 'Servant' of the Council 
As we demonstrated in Chapter 1, the EEAS should serve the HR in the 
performance of all the functions the Treaties allocate upon the latter’s office, 
including the tasks related to the presidency of the Foreign Affairs formation of the 
Council (FAC).368 This function is particularly relevant, since the FAC is the sole 
                                                 
366 Barber, "The Appointments of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton”, 48 Journal of 
Common Market Studies (2010): 55-67.  
367 By way of analogy, see Constantinesco, La responsabilité de la Commission européenne, cit. 
supra, p. 120: “certes, l’on sait que, dans les régimes parlementaires, la menace de la motion de 
censure est un moyen pour la majorité de l’Assemblée de contraindre le gouvernement à l’entendre 
sinon à l’écouter : encore faut-il, pour que la menace soit efficace, que l’emploi de la motion de 
censure soit crédible…” 
368 Article 18(3) TEU. 
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decision-making body that is responsible for the whole of the European Union's 
external action.369  
The EEAS primarily contributes to the work of the FAC by drafting its agenda and 
by intervening in the bodies that prepare the work of the Council. As it is known, 
the preparatory bodies of the Council include the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER), which is composed of the diplomatic representatives 
of the Member States and prepares the work of the Council,370 and other 
Committees and Working parties, composed of delegates of the Member States,371 
which prepare the work of COREPER. Preparatory bodies do not adopt legal acts,372 
but they nonetheless play a crucial role, in so far as political compromises are often 
reached within them.373 Such compromises are fostered by the chairperson, who 
determines in what sequence agenda items are addressed, ensures the smooth 
conduct of discussions,374  and draws conclusions on the bodies’ sessions.375 Before 
the Lisbon reform, COREPER, Committees and Working Parties were chaired by 
representatives of the Rotating Presidency. The creation of the EEAS has modified 
these arrangements. According to the rules of procedure of the Council, while 
COREPER remains chaired by the Rotating Presidency,376  about a half of external 
relations Committees and Working Parties are chaired by the EEAS.377  
It may be argued that the EEAS plays an important role in the Council, which is 
evidently functional to foster consensus-reaching among the Member States. The 
EEAS, however, is not unrestrained in the performance of its functions within the 
FAC. The Service must be very attentive not to displease Council Members, since 
this may lead them to react via the instruments mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs; for instance, in 2011 some Member States subtly, but publicly, 
criticised the EEAS for not circulating FAC preparatory decision-making papers 
sufficiently in advance.378 What is more, if the Service failed to bring about 
consensus in preparatory bodies, the Council may even re-instate the Rotating 
Presidency in its former chairmanship position, since the EEAS' role is foreseen 
only in the rules of procedure of the Council. Hence, the EEAS performs a crucial 
                                                 
369 Decision 2009/937/EU of the Council, 1 December 2009 adopting the Council's Rules of 
Procedure, OJ 2009 L 325, Annex “Rules of Procedure of the Council”, Article 2(5). Other entities 
have responsibilities encompassing the entire external action, namely the COREPER; the latter, 
however, does not have decision-making powers, in so far as it merely prepares the decisions of the 
Council. 
370 Article 16(7) TEU and Article 240 TFEU. 
371 Currently, there are about 140 such Committees and Working Groups, see Council doc. 12223/12, 
4 July 2012, available at www.consilium.europa.eu. Certain Committees and Working Parties have a 
specific role of providing expertise in a given area, such as the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC), as seen in Paragraph 4, cf. Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and 
Security Committee, OJ 2011 L 27/1-3. 
372 C-25/94, Commission v. Council, [1996] ECR I-1469, par. 26. 
373 On the central role of COREPER in practice see Lewis, “National Interests: Coreper”, in Peterson 
and Shackleton (eds.), The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 
315-337; see also Constantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs, cit. supra, p. 343-345.  
374 Handbook of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Council doc. 3835/2/11 REV 2, 
16 November 2011, p. 43. 
375 Id., p. 32. 
376 Id., p. 40. 
377 Cf. id. “The High Representative shall ensure that the person he or she intends to appoint as 
chairperson will enjoy the confidence of Member States. If that person is not yet a member of the 
EEAS, he or she shall become one in accordance with the EEAS recruitment procedures, at least for 
the time of the appointment.” 
378 Non-paper on the European External Action Service, cit. supra, para 1. 
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role of consensus-building in the Council, and is strongly accountable to the 
Institution.  
8. ‘Communitarian' Accountability: the EEAS as a de Facto Commission Service  
The relation between the EEAS and the Commission seems to be exhaustively 
foreseen in primary law, since the Treaties indirectly provide for the integration of 
the EEAS in the Commission. Article 18(4) TEU affirms that the HR is “one of the 
Vice-Presidents of the Commission”. Since the EEAS is a service of the HR, it may 
be hypothesised that the EEAS should be accountable to the Commission itself.  
It may seem that the EEAS functions roughly as a Commission department and is 
almost completely accountable to the College of the Commissioners. This can be 
appreciated by noticing, firstly, that the EEAS acts upon the instructions of the 
Commission (when it operates in the area of Commission responsibility).379 Not 
only can the College of the Commissioner discretionally decide how Commission 
competences are to be implemented, but it is responsible for the adoption of all 
Commission acts.380 Secondly, the Commission may demand information to the 
EEAS. This serves to enable the Commission to perform its decision-making 
functions and to express its opinion externally. To this end, the Commission may 
request the EEAS to brief its members before meeting with the Parliament, 
representatives from the Member States or third States. Thirdly, the Commission 
sets the procedures the EEAS must respect. The relevance of this aspect should not 
be underestimated, since the application of internal procedures has substantive 
consequences, namely with respect to the requirement to cooperate with other 
Commission services. This issue is of such importance that it was provided for in 
primary law: Article 18(4) TEU explicitly affirms that in exercising his/her 
responsibilities within the Commission the High Representative is bound by 
Commission procedures. Commission procedures, however, are to be respected by 
the EEAS only insofar as they relate to issues falling within Commission 
responsibilities. Thus, internal documents such as the Commission Vademecum on 
working relations with the European External Action Service,381 are only binding on 
the Service when it acts in the area of responsibility of the Commission. Fourthly, 
the Commission can request the EEAS to respect its commitments towards other 
bodies. Therefore, the EEAS may be requested to defend Commission acts before 
the Member States during Comitology procedures. Similarly, the EEAS may be 
required to respond to the inquiries of the European Parliament, national 
parliaments and other bodies.  
What if the EEAS failed to live up to the requests of the Commission? In other 
words, can the Institution enforce the EEAS' accountability? In principle, the 
Commission may rely on the most radical threat, that is to say the demotion of the 
                                                 
379 On the power of instruction, see Id. 
380 Notice, however, that in ‘normal’ circumstances, the internal delegation of powers to Commission 
services may enable their officers to adopt certain administrative acts on behalf of their Institution, 
as we have seen in Chapter 2. Such possibility is precluded to EEAS officers: not being part of the 
Commission de jure, they cannot represent it in the adoption of legal acts. Cf. European Commission, 
Vademecum on working relations with the European External Action Service, SEC (2011)1636, not 
published in the OJ, p. 13: “As a Vice-President of the Commission, the HR/VP may also adopt 
decisions on behalf of the College by empowerment procedure. These cannot be sub-delegated to the 
Executive Secretary General of the EEAS (as it is not a Commission service)”. 
381 Cit. supra.  
 100 
HR/VP. Being a Commissioner, the HR/VP should carry out the duties devolved 
upon him/her by the President of the Commission under his/her authority; the 
latter should consequently be able also to request the HR to resign. As seen above, 
however, the HR is nominated by the European Council, which, according to Article 
18(1) TEU, has also the power to demote him/her by qualified majority. How can 
these two competing allegiances be squared? Article 17(6) TEU provides for an 
apparently contradictory solution: "the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall resign, in accordance with the procedure 
set out in Article 18(1), if the President so requests." This may seem to imply that 
the European Council retains the ultimate decision-making power relating to the 
HR's demotion. A systemic interpretation of Articles 17(6) and 21(3) TEU, however, 
leads to the opposite conclusion: if the HR is to promote coordination in European 
foreign policy, functionally to its coherence, he/she must cooperate with all the 
most important decision-makers, including Member States' governments, 
represented in the European Council, and the Commission. To this end, the HR 
must enjoy the trust of both institutions. The dissatisfaction of one of the two is 
sufficient to render the HR's job 'impossible', and consequently justifies his/her 
demotion. Hence, the choice of the European Council to demote the HR must be 
sufficient to override the intention of the Commission to maintain him/her in her 
position, and vice-versa. It is obvious that, in the case of inter-institutional 
conflicts, it would be prudent for the HR/EEAS not to take sides, for the sake of not 
compromising the HR's position. In particular, and differently from what a 
superficial reading of Article 17(6) TEU may seem to suggest, the EEAS should be 
wary about displeasing the Commission, in so far as the latter may demote the HR, 
as much as the European Council could. As noted above, however, the demotion of 
the HR is an unlikely event, due to the delicate balances of power that affects the 
choice of the High Representative, and all the more so in a context where the HR 
must earn the trust of both the Member States' governments and the Commission. 
There is another, and more direct, reason why the EEAS should be mindful of the 
Commission's views: the Institution may directly restrain the field of action of the 
Service. A cursory reading of the Treaties may suggest that the activities of the 
HR/EEAS in the Commission are determined directly by primarily law, since 
Article 18(4) asserts that the HR/VP is responsible for managing external relations 
and coordinating “other aspects of the Union’s external action". This may suggest 
that the HR/VP should be responsible for the management of all the external 
relations policies falling within the competence of the Commission. Such 
interpretation would render the HR/VP responsible for trade, development 
cooperation, humanitarian aid and possibly the external aspects of EU internal 
policies. This view cannot be accepted, since the content of ‘external relations’ 
policies in the Commission framework has constantly been interpreted in a 
narrower manner. The pre-Lisbon practice shows that the Commissioners 
responsible for “external relations” did not manage all external relations policies, 
but they shared the burden with other Commissioners, and namely those managing 
trade and development cooperation. The interpretation of Article 18(4) TEU given 
by European institutions confirms this finding. The HR/VP was not entrusted with 
the management of trade, humanitarian aid and the external aspects of internal 
policies. This aspect is of the uttermost importance, in so far as the Commission's 
actions relating to 'external relations' are, as it is known, primarily concerned with 
these issues. In other words, it cannot be assumed a priori that the HR/VP should 
have a pivotal role in the Commission; what is more, the precise boundaries of 
his/her role may not be easy to identify. This means that the tasks of the HR/VP, 
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and thus those of the EEAS, are largely determined pursuant to a discretionary 
choice of the Commission. In other words, the EEAS may be delegated the exercise 
of a Commission power on the basis of the Institution’s prerogatives relating to the 
organisation of its services.382 Such delegation power is ‘internal’ to the Institution, 
in so far as it enables an administration of the Commission to work on its behalf.383 
This implies that the may modify or withdraw its delegation of power at will, thus 
restraining the EEAS' discretion.  
The EEAS’ accountability to the Commission may thus appear to be absolute. In 
this sense, the relation between the Commission and the EEAS seems to emulate 
the hierarchical relation existing between the Commission and its services. This 
analogy, however, should not be overstretched. All bureaucracies, including the 
services assisting the Commission, must be granted a certain margin of manoeuvre 
in order to perform their tasks.384 The discretion of most EEAS officers vis à vis the 
Commission is even wider, considering that their career is not decided upon by the 
Institution.385 The EEAS is likely to make full use of the leeway it is granted, since 
the Service and its master have political agendas of their own. The coupling of 
‘administrative’ discretion and autonomous ‘political’ priorities renders the EEAS 
less accountable than a ‘normal’ Commission service.  
The Commission probably is well aware of the potential discrepancy between its 
own views and those of the HR/EEAS. This may explain why the College of the 
Commissioners was not particularly prone to delegate tasks to the EEAS so far. The 
external relations policies that do not fall under the responsibility of the HR, i.e. 
trade, humanitarian aid and the external aspects of internal policies, are entirely 
managed by Commission services. What is more, the Service was not entrusted with 
several responsibilities previously falling on DG RELEX, such as representing the 
Commission before other bodies managing external relations.386 Circumstantial 
evidence, however, suggests that the good working relations put into place in the 
last two years are leading the Commission to delegate some tasks to the Service, 
namely in scarcely visible areas, such as the negotiation of international 
agreements.387 
This lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Commission was hardly unexpected. This 
may explain why the legislator saw it fit to entrust some of the Commission’s 
                                                 
382 Article 248 TFEU. On the prerogatives of self organisation of public administrations, see, e.g., 
Waline, op. cit., p. 67. 
383 This delegation of power should not be confused with the ‘external’ delegation that formed the 
object of the Meroni judgement, since, in the present case the EEAS does not operate as an entity 
separate from the Commission. Therefore, the Commission can theoretically delegate any task on the 
Service, including those involving broad political discretion, but the EEAS cannot formally substitute 
the Commission in the performance of its functions. 
384 According to some authors, such margin of manoeuvre legitimises the definition of the civil service 
as “the fourth branch of government”, see Smith and Licari, Public Administration: Power and 
Politics in the Fourth Branch of Government (Oxford University Press, 2006). For a general 
appraisal of the different “fourth branches of government”, see Curtin, Accumulated Executive Power 
in Europe: the Most Dangerous Branch of Government in the European Union (Knaw Press, 2009). 
385 On the power of public administrations in the field of career management, see Waline, op. cit., p. 
67. The career of the top management of the EEAS, however, is partially controlled by the 
Commission, whose representative sits in the EEAS ‘Consultative Committee on Appointments’, cit. 
supra. 
386 This task is now performed by the biggest external relations DG, i.e. DEVCO. 
387 Interview with a Commission officer, September 2012. The agreement concerned was the 
framework agreement with Canada, that is to say an instrument falling within CFSP/non-CFSP and 
Member States’ competences. For an appraisal of the negotiation arrangements in this area, see Gatti 
and Manzini, op. cit. 
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powers on the Service through the EEAS Decision. This instrument provides for the 
allocation on the EEAS of certain Commission’s prerogatives relating to diplomacy 
and development cooperation. According to Article 5 of the Decision, a EEAS officer 
has authority on Commission fonctionnaires in Union Delegations. Article 9, 
moreover, rendered the EEAS responsible for the programming of certain external 
action instruments, previously managed by Commission services. Articles 5 and 9 
of the EEAS Decision raise several legal issues, including one relating to 
accountability: if the Commission does not delegate its power to the EEAS, how can 
it influence the conduct of the Service?388 The answer to this question is provided 
for in Article 5 and 9 themselves. These provisions explicitly affirm that the EEAS 
must act upon the instructions of the Commission, it must provide it with 
information and it must respect Commission procedures. Therefore, even if the 
Commission loses an important tool for the enforcement of the EEAS’ 
accountability, that is to say the allocation of responsibilities among its 
departments, it maintains the instruments that are necessary to oversee the EEAS’ 
activities. In other words, the EEAS remains accountable to the Commission, but 
more feebly than in the cases when the Service is delegating powers by the 
Commission itself. 
In summary, the EEAS manages Commission external relations by relying on an 
internal delegation of competence or an entrustment of power performed by the 
EEAS Decision. In both cases the Service is accountable to the Commission, but the 
former maintains political priorities separate from those of the latter. Moreover, 
when the Service acts upon a power based on the EEAS Decision, its accountability 
is difficult to enforce. Therefore, the EEAS’ functional accountability to the 
Commission in the management of its external relations should be seen as relevant, 
but incomplete.  
 
* 
 
* * 
 
This section addressed the crucial relations between the EEAS and the other 
entities that manage European foreign policies. It demonstrates that the EEAS is 
not hierarchically dependent on any other entity, but it is accountable to several 
‘masters’. The Service has limited democratic accountability; the European 
Parliament may restrain the EEAS’ power, namely by relying on its budgetary and 
decision-making powers, but it can scarcely influence its work. The EEAS is more 
closely accountable to the entities that represent the 'international' and 'integration' 
legitimacy of the Union. The Service is ‘internationally’ accountable, more because 
European countries oversee the implementation of EU policies and the EEAS 
participates in the work of the Council, than because of the authority of the 
European Council on the Service or the activity of national diplomats in the EEAS. 
The Service is accountable also to the main institution acting in the interest of 
European integration, i.e. the Commission, in which the EEAS performs the role of 
a ‘normal’ service, albeit with an unusually ample leeway. It may be hypothesised 
that when the European Parliament maintains an approach favourable to European 
integration, as it often does, the 'democratic' accountability of the EEAS may 
strengthen the effects of the 'integration' accountability. 
                                                 
388 The other issues raised by these provisions will be analysed in detail when discussing the EEAS’ 
role in international cooperation and diplomacy (chapters 3 and 4). 
 103 
The EEAS may thus be seen as having two ‘clusters’ of principals, typified by the 
intergovernmental and Community methods. The obvious shortcoming of this 
situation is that the functioning of the service is dependent on the precarious 
balance of these visions, and of the entities that support them. If the EEAS held to 
the one, to the detriment of the other, it would honour its duties towards the first, 
but fail the ones towards the second, and vice-versa. Nonetheless, the Service is 
neither meant to foster national interests, like national organs, nor to translate the 
existence of a Union interest, like the Commission.389 Therefore, it is not entirely 
accountable to either EU institutions or Member States, and it consequently must 
not choose one master over the other, but it must mediate between different, and 
potentially opposing, views.  
If the Service succeeded in this task, being a 'servant of two masters' would become 
an advantage. Thanks to its close ties to different entities, the Service may truly 
weave together the intergovernmental and integration-oriented aspects of the EU 
decision-making process,390 thus allowing for the implementation of the ‘Union 
method’.  
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 2 
This chapter sought to demonstrate that the design of the EEAS reflects its 
function, that is to say implementing the Union method. It is apparent that the 
EEAS was carefully designed to perform its function of coordination. The proximity 
to the HR grants the EEAS the capability to support him/her in the performance of 
his/her 'impossible job'. The existence of a weaker link to other Union bodies and 
the Member States provides the Service with a possibility to mediate between 
intergovernmental and integration-oriented approaches. Finally, the 
characterisation as a 'service' facilitates the performance of the EEAS' tasks, since it 
allows it to integrate de facto in the hierarchy of other bodies. The latter are 
consequently more likely to entrust the Service with the exertion of their powers, 
under their own rules, than they would be if the EEAS were another operatively 
autonomous Union body or office.  
The fundamental characteristics of the EEAS, therefore, suggest that it was 
designed for the purpose of coordinating the external action, transversally to the 
limits set by conferral. In other words, the EEAS truly embodies the 'Union 
method'. This finding, however, is insufficient to affirm that the EEAS can enhance 
external coordination in practice. It is therefore necessary to investigate the 
activities of the Service, which are addressed in the next two chapters. 
                                                 
389 On this characterisation of the Commission, see Constantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs, cit. 
supra, p. 313. 
390 J. M. Barroso, “European governance and the Community method”, speech delivered in Brussels 
on 28 February 2012, pp. 15-16. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EEAS AND POLICY 
MANAGEMENT: FOSTERING 
SYNERGY 
The creation of an entity tasked with the maintenance of external action coherence 
in theory may be of little relevance, even if its design is functional to the 
enforcement of the Union method. What is required of the EEAS, in fact, is to 
enforce coherence in practice. The deliberate choice of the legislator to position the 
Service 'across' the different areas of the external action complicates the 
identification of its activities, and the rationale for the choice thereof. This chapter 
seeks to verify whether the EEAS can enhance coordination in the conduct of 
European foreign policies, and thus foster external action coherence, and it is 
divided in two sections. The first maps the role of the EEAS in the exertion of the 
constitutional powers relating to the EU's external action. The second focuses on its 
capabilities relating to the management of cooperation with third countries, which 
is subject to a special regime.  
SECTION 1 – 'SOFT' COORDINATION: EEAS' PARTICIPATION IN THE 
EXERTION OF POLICY MANAGEMENT POWERS 
As recalled in chapter 1, Union bodies do not infer their powers from an abstract 
division contained in a general principle, such as the 'separation of powers', but 
they have only the competences that are attributed to them by the Treaties. It is in 
this sense that the ECJ speaks of an "institutional balance",391 whose protection is 
now provided for also by Article 13(2) TEU, according to which each "institution 
shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties". The powers 
of the EEAS in the management of EU policies must therefore derive from an 
attribution of competences contained in the Treaties. Considering that the Service 
has no competences of its own, as discussed in chapter 2, its tasks are likely to be 
identified on the basis of the attributions of the HR and the other entities the EEAS 
'serves'.  
This section seeks to demonstrate that the policy management powers of the EEAS 
are potentially conducive to increased coordination in practice, since they derive 
from competences spanning across the spectrum of the external action, and 
throughout the policy-making process. Paragraph 1 discusses the participation of 
the Service in the legislative function, paragraph 2 investigates its involvement in 
                                                 
391 Joined cases 188-190/80, [1982] ECR 2545, para 6.  
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the performance of executive tasks. Paragraph 3 focuses on a case study, i.e. 
security management, in order to verify the coordination capabilities of the Service. 
1. The Pragmatic Rationale for Coordination in the Legislative Phase 
In the EU, the legislative power lato sensu is shared by numerous bodies, since the 
Treaties confer on several entities the capacity to produce secondary law. In general 
terms, however, the legislative power is considered to be concentrated mostly in the 
Parliament and in the Council. In the non-CFSP areas, where the ordinary 
legislative procedure prevails, the two Institutions often act as 'co-legislators', and 
the Council votes by qualified majority. In the CFSP field, the legislative power is 
exerted only by the Council, by unanimity. The Council, and particularly its Foreign 
Affairs formation (FAC), which is responsible for both non-CFSP and CFSP external 
policies, is therefore the crucial legislator in the field of external relations. 
If the EEAS has a relatively weak link to the EP, it is strongly involved in the 
activities of the Council, since the HR is the President of the FAC. According to the 
Council Rules of Procedure, the High Representative is required to identify FAC 
priorities before each presidency period392, and before each meeting.393 In practice, 
it is the EEAS that prepares the agenda, through an extensive work of coordination. 
Such coordination is, above all, internal: the EEAS must collect the views of its 
departments and insert them in the political framework set by its political 
leadership. The coordination has also an external dimension, since the agenda must 
contain the items in respect of which a request for inclusion has been received from 
a Member State or the Commission.394 The Service needs to obtain the opinions of 
the Member States, in particular, in order to ensure the ownership of the process by 
the latter, which remain the only-decision makers in the Council. Since the HR 
holds the right of initiative in the CFSP area, whereas the Commission has a similar 
power in the rest of the EU’s external action, the EEAS should formulate the FAC 
agenda by taking into consideration also the views of the Commission and make 
sure that CFSP proposals are compatible with non-CFSP ones. It is apparent, 
therefore, that by supporting the HR in his/her capacity as President of the FAC, 
the EEAS may contribute to the coherence of policy-making process, since it can 
promote consensus between the Member States and it can foster dialogue with the 
Commission. 
The EEAS' function of coordination is magnified by the power it is conferred 
directly by the Council to preside over preparatory bodies. The preparatory bodies 
of the Council include, first and foremost, the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER),  which is composed of the diplomatic representatives 
of the Member States and prepares the work of the Council (Article 16(7) TEU and 
Article 240 TFEU). COREPER does not adopt legal acts, since it is “an auxiliary 
body of the Council, for which it carries out preparation and implementation 
work.”395 Nonetheless, it plays a crucial role, in so far as political compromises are 
often reached within this body. Such compromises are fostered by the chairperson, 
who determines in what sequence agenda items are addressed and ensures the 
                                                 
392 The agenda is required to show “the legislative work and operational decisions envisaged”, Rules 
of procedure of the Council, cit. supra, Article 2(7). 
393 Id., Article 3-1. 
394 Rules of procedure of the Council, Article 3(2) 
395 C-25/94, Commission v. Council, [1996] ECR I-1469, par. 26. 
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smooth conduct of discussions.396 The work of COREPER is further prepared by 
other Committees and Working parties, composed of delegates of the Member 
States. The views of Committees and Working Parties are not binding upon 
COREPER and, a fortiori, third subjects, but their role is important, since 
'technical' issues are generally decided at this level. As in the case of COREPER, the 
chairmen of these bodies have a crucial role in fostering the adoption of common 
positions: they can hold an informal poll of Member States’ positions, draw 
conclusions on the bodies’ sessions and either refer matters to COREPER, or else 
decide to hold further meetings of the preparatory bodies.397 
Before the Lisbon reform, COREPER, Committees and Working Parties were 
chaired by representatives of the Rotating Presidency, on the basis of the Council 
Rules of Procedure. The Lisbon Treaty did not explicitly introduce any change in 
this respect. The identification of the entity chairing preparatory bodies, therefore, 
must be performed through a systemic appraisal of primary law, which may seem to 
lead in two alternative directions. On the one hand, it may be argued that the 
determination of the chairpersons of Council preparatory bodies is an internal 
affair of the Institution.398  Therefore, the Institution should be able to freely 
determine the chairing arrangements and maintain the role of the Rotating 
Presidency. On the other, it may be submitted that institutional balance suggests 
that the EEAS should chair all preparatory bodies in the field of external relations. 
Considering that the HR presides over the foreign affairs Council, it would seem 
logical for the service that assists him/her to chair the bodies that assist the FAC. 
This interpretation may appear to be reinforced by a teleological appraisal of the 
HR's role in the FAC. It is apparent that the HR chairs this formation because of its 
coordinating potential; such objective would be difficult to attain if the preparation 
of the FAC were not conducted under the indirect guidance of the HR, since most 
decisions are taken de facto at COREPER or Committee/Working Party level.  
Significantly, neither solution was retained in practice, since the Rules of Procedure 
of the Council provide for a third, intermediate, solution. The COREPER is still 
chaired by a diplomat of the rotating presidency,399 while the EEAS only 
participates in the works of the COREPER by briefing the Rotating Presidency.400 
In the case of the bodies that prepare the work of the COREPER the situation is 
fuzzier. A “representative of the High Representative”, that is to say a EEAS officer, 
chairs “Geographic preparatory bodies”, CSDP Working Parties, the PSC and most 
“horizontal preparatory bodies” (dealing mainly with the CFSP). On the contrary, 
“preparatory bodies in the area of trade and development” and some horizontal 
preparatory bodies are chaired by delegates of the rotating presidency.401 All in all, 
EEAS officers chair about a half of external relations Committees and Working 
Parties. 
This original solution may be understood in light of the principle of coherence. The 
most limited role performed by the EEAS within the COREPER can be explained by 
                                                 
396 Handbook of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, cit. supra, p. 43. 
397 Id., p. 32. 
398 On the legal effects of and possibility to impugn such acts, see case T-345/05, Ashley Neil Mote v 
Parliament, [2008] ECR II-2849, par. 22-24 and others analysed in Chapter 2 par. 7. 
399 Article 2 of the European Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and 
Article 19(4) of the rules of procedure of the Council, cit. supra. 
400 Handbook of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, cit. supra, p. 40. 
401 Decision 2009/908/EU of the Council, 1 December 2009 and on the chairmanship of preparatory 
bodies of the Council, OJ 2009 L 322, p. 28, Annex II, Chairmanship of the preparatory bodies of the 
Foreign Affairs Council. 
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the mismatch of their mandates: whereas the EEAS coordinates EU external 
relations, the COREPER must ensure the coherence of all Union policies, including 
internal ones.402 The EEAS could only chair this Committee if the latter addressed 
external relations issues separately from other EU policies. Since this would be 
contrary to the very logic that led to the creation of COREPER, it is evident that 
such solution cannot be adopted in practice.403  
A similar line of reasoning may be applied to the other Committees and Working 
Parties. The Service’s intervention in preparatory bodies dealing with the CFSP and 
the relations with international organisations seems logical, in light of its primary 
role relating to the initiative and implementation of CFSP and the maintenance of 
multilateral relations. By cumulating the powers of initiative and implementation 
with the prerogatives of the chairperson of Council preparatory bodies, the EEAS 
may truly reinforce coordination, and thus coherence, in the legislative phase. The 
choice not to entrust the Service with the chairmanship of the bodies relating to 
trade, development and consular affairs seems to follow the same logic, since these 
policies are primarily managed by the Commission and the Member States, 
respectively, rather than by the EEAS.404  
Thus it may be argued that the EEAS’ chairmanship of Council preparatory bodies 
was not performed on the basis of abstract considerations relating to the 
Institution's autonomy or the HR's competences, but rather in light of the EEAS' 
coordination capabilities in each specific circumstance. This signals the fact that the 
division of labour is not performed in light of a dogmatic institutional balance 
carved out in the Treaties, but is fashioned in a pragmatic way, dependently on the 
added value brought by the Service. Such interpretation is problematic, since it 
blurs the distinction between the distribution of competences among Union bodies, 
which is a legal concept, and the effectiveness of decision-making procedures, 
which is a political one. It nonetheless appears acceptable once the Treaties are 
interpreted in light of the principle of external action coherence. The maintenance 
of a coherent external action does not require the EEAS to chair all Council 
preparatory bodies, but only those where the Service can bring added value in 
terms of coordination, that is to say those dealing with issues it is most closely 
associated with.   
2. EEAS' Support to Coordination in the Exertion of Executive Powers 
In the traditional separation of powers, the executive one is the least well defined. 
Its precise boundaries, in fact, vary from one State to another. The Union is even 
more complex in this respect. The Treaties do not define executive powers, and 
entrust the functions typically performed by executive bodies on a number of 
organs. Although executive functions are multiple and ill-defined, for our purposes 
                                                 
402 Article 19(2) of the rules of Procedure of the Council, cit. supra. 
403 It is true that ‘technical’ issues are addressed by COREPER I, whereas ‘political’ ones, including 
external relations, are managed by COREPER II. Nonetheless, the activities of the latter encompass, 
but are not limited to, external relations. 
404 It is perhaps less clear, however, why the Service was not granted the chairmanship of the bodies 
relating to international sanctions and the fight against terrorism, given the relevant role of CFSP in 
this area. 
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we may accept that they relate primarily to three competences regulated by EU 
Treaties: policy implementation, budget implementation405 and initiative.406  
In the formerly Communitarian (non-CFSP) area, the executive function is 
concentrated mostly in the Commission. This Institution generally has competence 
to propose the adoption of secondary law, according to Article 17 TEU. Moreover, 
the Commission is competent to implement the budget of the Union (Article 317 
TFEU) and it gives implementation to non-CFSP acts (Article 291(2) TFEU). None 
of these powers is exclusive. In rather rare cases, the Treaties allow also other 
entities to propose the adoption of non-CFSP acts. The very Article 317 TFEU 
enables other Union bodies to give implementation to the EU budget, but only for 
the parts relating to their own administrative expenditure. Finally, and most 
importantly, the implementation of EU acts can also be performed by the Member 
States, if uniform conditions for implementing Union acts are not needed, or by the 
Council "in duly justified specific cases";407 in addition, the Member States oversee 
the implementation of Union acts by the Commission, as discussed in chapter 2, via 
comitology procedures.  
In the CFSP field, the executive function is regulated in slightly more complicated 
manner. The role the Commission has in formerly Communitarian areas is largely 
devolved to the High Representative, who is competent to propose the adoption of 
legal acts and give them implementation (Article 18(2) and 26(3) and 24(1) TEU). 
The Commission is not entirely excluded from the CFSP, since it gives 
implementation to the EU budget also in this area, to the exclusion of CFSP 
operating expenditures “having military or defence implications”, which cannot be 
charged to the Union budget. The role of the Member States in the CFSP is greater 
than it is in the non-CFSP fields: not only they can implement the CFSP, but they 
normally share the initiative competence with the HR,408 and they implement the 
expenses having military or defence implications (which are not charged to the EU 
budget). The following table summarises the distribution of the executive powers: 
 
 
 CFSP non-CFSP 
Initiative HR or Member States Commission 
Policy 
implementation 
HR or Member States Commission or Member 
States 
Budget 
implementation 
Commission* 
 
* Excluding the CFSP expenses having military implication, which are implemented by the Member 
States. 
                                                 
405 It worth specifying that this paragraph deals only with budget implementation, and not the 
decision-making process on the budget. On the latter aspect, see Rossi, “La Dinamica 
Interistituzionale nella Definizione del Bilancio Comunitario”, Diritto dell'unione Europea (2006): 
179 – 200. 
406 Admittedly, initiative may be categorised also as part of the legislative function, of which it 
constitutes the beginning. Considering that the power of initiative is often exerted by executive 
bodies, at least in Europe, and especially in the EU, it is opportune to address initiative and 
implementation at once. 
407 See Article 291, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
408 An exception being Article 218 TFEU: only the High Representative can propose the conclusion of 
an international agreement in the CFSP domain. 
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It is apparent that an effective coordination of executive functions at EU level 
requires an intervention in the area falling within the remit of both the HR and the 
Commission. Since there is not doubt that the EEAS can exert the powers of the 
HR, it can be assumed that the Service participates in the initiative and 
implementation of the CFSP.  
The EEAS' role in the Commission is less straightforward. As recalled above, the 
Service assists the HR, and the latter is "responsible within the Commission for 
responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other 
aspects of the Union’s external action". Therefore, it may be hypothesised that the 
EEAS contributes to Commission activities, in order to promote external action 
coherence; for this purpose, it also manages certain policies falling within the remit 
of the Institution.  
As seen above, the Service may, or may not, be given responsibilities in the 
Commission, depending on the requirements of secondary law and the will of the 
Institution. At the moment, it would seem that the Commission is reluctant to 
delegate the exertion of its powers to the Service. To the best knowledge of the 
author, the Commission did not give the EEAS the lead in any policy area where it 
was not compelled to do so by secondary law. In other words, whereas the Council 
was eager to sacrifice its organisational autonomy for the sake of coherence, the 
Commission prefers to maintain its area of influence. The Commission's concern 
for delimitation of competences is understandable: unlike the chairpersons of 
Council working groups, Commission services are de facto entrusted with decision-
making powers, since the Institution can hardly oversee all their operations. This 
implies that by allowing the EEAS to substitute its own departments the 
Commission would actually renounce part of its discretion, something it is evidently 
not enthusiast about. 
In this context, it is necessary, firstly, to investigate the EEAS' coordinating 
capabilities in cases where the Commission does not entrust the EEAS with the 
management of any specific policy, a topic that forms the subject of the remainder 
of this paragraph, and that is further analysed in the next one. The investigation is 
concluded in the next section, which presents the effects of the entrustment of 
executive responsibilities on the EEAS via secondary law. 
Even when the Service is not given any specific responsibility in the Commission, it 
may contribute to external action coherence by 'coordinating' the activities of 
Commission departments and cooperating with them. Article 3 of the EEAS 
Decision generally calls for cooperation between the EEAS and Commission 
services, and it specifies that “the EEAS shall support, and work in cooperation with 
[…] the services of the Commission, in order to ensure consistency between the 
different areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas and its other 
policies.” The cooperation between the EEAS and Commission services normally is 
performed in an informal manner, through exchanges of views among EEAS and 
Commission officers. In certain cases, however, such cooperation is 
institutionalised. The legal instruments fostering the EEAS’ cooperation with 
Commission services in administrative matters, that is to say “inter-service 
arrangements”, have been addressed in chapter 2. Beside these instruments, soft 
law frameworks serve to foster cooperation between the EEAS and Commission 
services in operative areas.409  
                                                 
409 As seen in Chapter 2, in operative areas the duty of cooperation may be seen as binding on the 
HR; even in this case, however, cooperation must be implemented by the EEAS. Therefore, there is 
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The most evident form of institutionalised cooperation in Commission’s external 
relations is perhaps provided for by the ‘External Relations Group of 
Commissioners.' This entity, which is set up by the President of the Commission, is 
composed by the President himself, the HR and the Commissioners from the 
‘RELEX family’, and it should serve as a forum to coordinate positions and prepare 
College debates on strategic aspects of external relations.410 The EEAS contributes 
to the work of this Group, by briefing the HR and preparing the agenda of the 
Group when the HR chairs it. The EEAS may use these functions to promote 
coordination, through dialogue, since its tasks obviously entail relevant interaction 
with the other services managing external relations. Such result is partially 
hindered by the fact that, during this legislature, the Group is only chaired by the 
HR when the President of the Commission does not participate in it. This solution 
is transparently motivated by the intention to preserve the prerogatives of the 
Commission in the field of external relations, which may appear a legitimate 
concern, at first sight. Since the Commission did not entrust the HR with the 
chairing of the Group, however, it restrained his/her coordinating potential, 
precisely because it did not enable him/her to intervene, as a 'coordinator', in areas 
falling within the responsibilities of other Commissioners.  It would seem, 
therefore, that the Commission adopted an approach favourable to 'delimitation' 
rather than seeking 'coherence' in its external relations  
The EEAS’ coordinating potential is clearer in the case of administrative-level 
coordination frameworks. This issue is specifically regulated in Article 3(2) of the 
EEAS Decision, which asserts that “the EEAS and the services of the Commission 
shall consult each other on all matters relating to the external action of the Union in 
the exercise of their respective functions.” This provision is implemented mainly 
through two institutionalised forms of service-level cooperation. In the first place, 
the EEAS participates in the so-called Inter-Service Groups (ISG). The ISGs are 
formed by representative of Commission services and chaired by the service having 
the lead in a specific policy area, and they are tasked with service-level 
coordination.411 It is standard procedure for Commission services chairing ISGs 
with an external dimension to invite the EEAS to participate in such groups.412 This 
grants the Service a chance to enter into multilateral dialogue with all the services 
concerned by the implementation of Commission’s external policies managed by 
other departments. Secondly, the Service participates in Inter-Service 
Consultations (ISC). The ISC is a dialogue conducted via the Commission intranet 
on the documents and proposals prepared by Commission services. Through this 
procedure the lead Commission department seeks the formal opinion of all other 
Directorates-General and services with a legitimate specific interest in the 
substance of the proposal. This procedure has a twofold rationale. On the one hand, 
it makes sure that the College of the Commissioners does not waste time discussing 
petty details on which the services do not agree. On the other hand, it streamlines 
the decision-making procedure, by enabling the College of the Commissioners to 
adopt the acts that obtain the consensus of their services through a rapid silent 
                                                                                                                                               
little need to distinguish this situation from the case of cooperation in administrative matters, where 
the EEAS is directly bound by the duty of sincere cooperation. 
410 Vademecum on working relations with the European External Action Service, cit. supra, p. 12. 
411 An example in this sense is the Relex information committee, which coordinates communication 
strategies at services level, and is chaired by the EEAS, see Working Arrangements, p. 34. 
412 Vademecum on working relations with the European External Action Service, cit. supra, p. 13. See 
also EEAS Decision, Article 3(2). 
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assent procedure.413 Since the EEAS is responsible for external relations, it should 
be consulted through an ISC whenever an issue has external implications; this gives 
the Service a possibility to know what other departments are doing as well as a 
chance to express its views from the onset of the decision-making process.  
Through these responsibilities the EEAS may 'softly' contribute to coordination, 
through dialogue and the building of mutual trust with Commission departments. 
Nonetheless, it may reasonably be doubted whether the EEAS' coordination 
capabilities might be effective in practice, and especially whether the EEAS may 
foster coherence in the implementation of EU policies, transversally to the 
legislative and executive phase. The latter issue is investigated in the next 
paragraph, by focussing on security management. 
3. The EEAS and Security Management: Potential and Limits of External Action 
Coordination 
The management of security at EU level is notoriously fragmented. Security is at the 
heart of, at least, two policy frameworks, which are interdependent but 
procedurally separate: Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice. This fragmentation is known to lead to a "procedural 
chaos" that engenders tensions between EU institutions.414  At the same time, EU 
security strategies directly or indirectly recommend a ‘global approach’ to security, 
since the threats facing EU security are multifaceted and they must be addressed 
through a coherent mix of policies415. This paragraph intends to demonstrate that 
the EEAS, through its leading role in the CFSP, its activities in the Council and its 
coordinating duties in the Commission, may weave together the intergovernmental 
and 'Community' strands of security management, thus fostering external action 
coherence. Nonetheless, its action may hampered in practice by the defensive 
stance, and the scarce concern for coherence, of other bodies.416  
For the sake of a good understanding of the analysis, it is worthwhile identifying the 
Union’s activities that have a 'security' dimension. The activities taken into 
consideration are explicitly meant to foster security (e.g. Common Security and 
Defence Policy) or may affect ‘security’ as defined by EU security strategies.417 Such 
                                                 
413 In the absence of consensus on proposal, the Commission would indeed be able to adopt a 
Decision only through a lengthy oral procedure, whereas the agreement of all departments enables 
the use of a rapid written procedure in the College, cf. Commission rules of procedure, Articles 8, 12 
and 23(3). 
414 Flaesch-Mougin and Rapoport, "Les Instruments de Gestion Des Crises de l'Union Européenne",   
in Blumann and Picod, L'Union Européenne et Les Crises (Bruylant, 2010), p. 191, p. 191, at p. 198. 
415 The most explicit definition of the “global approach” can be found in the Internal Security 
Strategy, at p. 16: “the EU must not restrict itself just to cooperation between the law-enforcement 
agencies of Member States and other countries […] It is necessary to build relationships with other 
countries through a global approach to security, working closely with them and, when necessary, 
supporting their institutional, economic and social development” (emphasis added); see also the 
European Security Strategy, cit. supra, notably at pp. 7 and 13. 
416 A more detailed analysis of the EEAS' contribution to security management can be found in Gatti, 
"The Role of the European External Action Service in the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice", in Flaesch Mougin and Rossi (eds.), La Dimension Extérieure de L'espace de 
Liberté, de Securité et de Justice Après Le Traité de Lisbonne, pp. 171-193. 
417 The scope of this work does not allow for a comprehensive investigation of all the possible facets of 
EU security. We will not directly address, for instance, the specificities of food crises; in this respect, 
see Petit, "Les Crises Alimentaires et Sanitaires", in Blumann and Picod, L'Union Européenne et les 
Crises (Bruylant, 2010), p. 56, p. 56. It is understood, however, that, unless otherwise specified, all 
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activities tackle, inter alia, terrorism, organised crime, disasters, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and state failure.418 
The EEAS contributes primarily to the CFSP strand of EU security, namely through 
its implementation responsibilities in the CSDP area. If military CSDP missions are 
managed almost entirely by the Member States, the Service has a more crucial role 
in Civilian Crisis Management (CCM),419 since it ensures their operational 
command through one of its departments, the Civilian Planning Conduct 
Capability. Thus, the EEAS may also foster cooperation between CSDP missions 
and other actors in the field, especially when other bodies' officers are seconded to 
EU delegations420. Despite its extensive responsibilities in the CSDP area, however, 
the Service cannot give financial implementation to the EU budget. Consequently, 
the effective management of CSDP missions requires close cooperation between the 
EEAS and the Commission. 
The EEAS participates also in the management of the non-CFSP aspects of EU 
security. The EEAS' direct contribution to this field, in principle, should be limited 
to its activities in the Council, since the exertion of executive powers in the non-
CFSP sector of security management is reserved to the Commission.  The multiple 
responsibilities of the EEAS, however, sustain each other and give it a significant 
capability to coordinate the entire EU's response. The role of the EEAS in the non-
CFSP may obviously depend on the existence of procedural links between the CFSP 
and the rest of the external action. This is the case of the two-steps process that 
leads to the adoption of ‘restrictive measures’. During the first (CFSP) stage, the 
EEAS assists the High Representative, who proposes the adoption of restrictive 
measures in the CFSP framework421. During the second stage, the High 
Representative and the Commission jointly propose the implementation of such 
measures in the non-CFSP area422. The Service may thus coordinate its activities 
with those of Commission departments, through the instruments addressed in 
paragraph 2. 
The EEAS' intervention in the non-CFSP fields of security management may also be 
justified by practical factors, such as its control of crucial assets. On the one hand, 
the EEAS provides intelligence to EU agencies such as Europol423 and Eurojust.424 
On the other hand, it can use its CFSP assets to influence humanitarian aid and civil 
                                                                                                                                               
the non-CFSP security-related policies are managed in a roughly similar manner, and are 
consequently (not) coordinated by the EEAS, as described below. 
418 Cf. the European Security Strategy, cit. supra, and Internal Security Strategy, cit. supra. 
419 Hoffmeister, “Inter-Pillar Coherence in the European Union's Civilian Crisis Management”, in 
Blockmans (ed.), The European Union and Crisis Management (TMC Asser Press, 2008), pp. 157-
180. 
420 Cf. Internal Security Strategy, supra note 3, p. 17. CSDP missions and Europol regularly 
cooperate, as confirmed in an e-mail communication from Europol to the author, June 2011; the 
exchange of information between Europol and CSDP missions is regulated through doc. 13311/08 of 
the Council, 22 September 2008. 
421 Articles 18 and 27 TEU; EEAS decision, supra note 11, Article 2-1. 
422 Article 215 TFEU. 
423 Cf. doc. 14050/05 of the Council, 7 November 2005, which contains the framework for exchanging 
classified information between Europol and the Council (Sitcen); according to a Europol e-mail 
communication to the author this framework was still applicable as of June 2011. 
424 Cf. Decision 2002/187/JHA of the Council, Article 26-1, as amended by Decision 2009/426/JHA 
of the Council of 16 December 2008, OJ n° L 138 , 4 June 2009, p. 14: “Eurojust shall establish and 
maintain cooperative relations with at least: […] d) the Council, in particular its Joint Situation 
Centre”.   
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protection.425 Civil protection and humanitarian aid may also be supported by 
CSDP missions, which may provide military assets to facilitate civilian-led 
operations426.  
The EEAS' pivotal role in the management of security naturally provides it 
with potential for coordination. The HR recently tried to put that potential into 
practice, by setting up two new structures, linked to the EEAS. In the first place, the 
new Crisis Management Board, which is a permanent body composed mainly of 
high-ranking EEAS officers, including those responsible for CSDP and intelligence, 
and which should coordinate the activities of the different EEAS departments in 
cases of crisis. Secondly, and most importantly, the ‘Crisis Platform’, a non-
permanent entity composed of relevant services belonging to the EEAS, the 
Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council, which provide for political 
guidance with respect to specific crises.  The Crisis Platform may be extremely 
successful in promoting coordination, since it brings together the different visions 
about crisis response existing in the different organs of the Union. In addition, the 
Platform does not challenge institutional balance, since it is based on a 'soft law' 
mandate, and it is not aimed at adopting legal acts. Therefore, it appears as a 
creative means to bridge the intergovernmental and Community approaches to 
crisis response, and it seems to be conducive to increased coherence, despite the 
delimitation of CFSP and non-CFSP areas.  
The effects of such delimitation, however, cannot be eliminated. 
Notwithstanding its ‘inter-institutional' character, the Platform is closely tied to the 
EEAS, since it is activated by the High Representative or his/her assistants and it 
conclusions are endorsed by the High Representative, thus becoming instructions 
for his/her Service.427 This may raise the distrust of other actors, and namely of the 
Commission, which may feel that the activity of 'coordination' that is typical of the 
Platform may in fact lead to the EEAS' interference in the conduct of their activity.  
Therefore, if the EEAS' powers and assets render it a suitable coordinator of 
EU security management, coordination cannot be enforced by the EEAS, but it 
must always be promoted by entering into a dialogue with other Union bodies.428  
 
* 
 
* * 
                                                 
425 These strands of the EU’s external action are relevant in the perspective of security since they are 
instrumental to disaster response, which is interpreted by EU institutions as an integral part of 
European security. On the relevance of civil protection for EU security, cf. the Internal Security 
Strategy, supra note 19, pp. 6-14; on the relevance of humanitarian aid cf. European Security 
Strategy, supra note 18, pp. 7-11; the security dimension of consular protection during crises is quite 
evident, also due to its conceptual overlapping with civil protection, cf. also Lindstrom, “EU Consular 
Cooperation in Crisis Situation”, in Olsson, Crisis Management in the European Union (Springer, 
2009), pp. 109-126, pp. 109-126. 
426 General Secretariat of the Council, doc. 9462/3/06 REV 3, Military support to EU disaster 
response:  Identification and coordination of available assets and capabilities, 25 October 2006 and 
doc. 8976/06, General Framework for the use of Member States military or military chartered 
Transportation Assets and ESDP Coordination tools in Support of EU Disaster Response, 4 May 
2006. See also Working Arrangements, supra note 55, p. 10-14. 
427 The managing director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, A. Miozzo, was 
nominated on 2 December 2010, see EU High Representative Catherine Ashton appoints EEAS 
Managing Director for Crisis Response, www.consilium.europa.eu. 
428 The relation between the EEAS and DG ECHO is regulated, inter alia, by the Working 
Arrangements, cit. supra, pp. 10-14; see also European Commission, Towards a stronger European 
disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance, cit. supra, pp. 8-12. 
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The analysis showed that the EEAS has the potential to coordinate policy 
management, since it exercises the CFSP powers of the HR and it participates in the 
activities of the Council and of the Commission. The status of service provides the 
EEAS with an advantage in this respect, since its role within other bodies is not 
necessarily determined by abstract evaluations relating to the institutional balance, 
but it may be motivated by the added value it brings about in practice. It would 
seem that the Council privileged external action coherence over delimitation for the 
purpose of identifying the EEAS' tasks in the Institution. On the contrary, the 
Commission generally preferred to protect its prerogatives. This does not prevent 
the EEAS from promoting coordination in policy management, but certainly 
hampers its capability to enforce it, as confirmed by the example of security 
management. Probably the legislator was aware of this issue, and consequently 
provided the EEAS with the capacity to substitute Commission services, in the 
management of international cooperation, as demonstrated in the next section. 
SECTION 2 – 'HARD' COORDINATION: THE EEAS AND COOPERATION WITH 
THIRD COUNTRIES 
Of all the external policies that are implemented by the Commission, cooperation is 
probably the one most in need of coordination. In a legal perspective, this policy 
may be defined as the set of practices and acts of EU bodies that are directly or 
indirectly founded on the chapters ‘development cooperation’ and ‘economic, 
financial and technical cooperation with third countries’ (Articles 208-213 TFEU), 
located within the third title of the fifth part of the TFEU (‘the Union’s external 
action’).Cooperation with third countries encompasses also the management of the 
European Development Fund, which is not provided for in the EU Treaties, but 
which logically, institutionally and administratively belongs to the framework of 
international cooperation.  
The above definition implies that cooperation with third countries is composed of 
two policies, that is to say development cooperation and economic, financial and 
technical cooperation with third countries. Notwithstanding their similarities, these 
policies are characterised by certain differences. In the first place, they are based 
upon partially different competences. Both policies are shared in nature, but, while 
economic, financial and technical cooperation is a ‘standard’ shared competence, 
development cooperation is a sui generis shared competence,429 whose exercise 
does not result in Member States being prevented from exercising their competence 
in this field, ex Article 4(4) TFEU. The rationale for this difference is clear. The 
Member States have little interest in conducting economic, financial and technical 
cooperation with non-developing countries, an issue that attracts relatively little 
amounts of money. On the contrary, they intend to protect of their capacity to 
conduct development cooperation, that is to say a highly visible policy characterised 
by the allocation of large sums of financial resources. Secondly, these policies refer 
to the relation with different subjects: development cooperation relates to the 
                                                 
429 Indeed, according to 4(1) TFEU “the Union shall share competence with the Member States where 
the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 
6.”, and ‘economic, financial and technical cooperation’ is mentioned neither in Article 3 nor in 
Article 6 TFEU. 
 115 
cooperation with ‘developing countries’, whereas the ‘economic, financial and 
technical cooperation’ is referred to the relation with “third countries other than 
developing countries”.430 The EU generally identifies developing countries as low 
and middle income countries based on gross national income (GNI) per capita, with 
the exception of G8 members, EU members, and countries with a firm date for 
entry into the EU.431 Thirdly, these policies have different objectives: development 
cooperation has “as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the 
eradication of poverty”.432 This implies that the measures directly or indirectly 
based on Article 209 TFEU must have the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as their main objective.433 'Economic, financial and technical 
cooperation’, on the contrary, does not have autonomous objectives, and it fosters 
only the objectives of the EU’s external action.434 Finally, these policies have a 
different scope: ‘economic, financial and technical cooperation’ is, by definition, 
limited to these three sectors, whereas development cooperation relates to all 
measures which contribute to the eradication of poverty.435  
It is widely believed that the management of cooperation with third countries 
requires extensive coordination, for two main reasons. First, the EU’s development 
cooperation may conflict with the development policies of Member States, since the 
latter can conduct autonomous development policies. Hence, Article 210 TFEU 
affirms that the Union and the Member States must coordinate their policies on 
development cooperation, and that the Commission may take any useful initiative 
to promote such coordination.436 Second, development priorities may conflict with 
other policies of the Union, including the cooperation with non-developing 
countries. Since ‘cooperation with third countries’ is an integral part of the external 
action, it must be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives 
of the Union’s external action,437 provided for in Article 21 TEU. However, a 
measure adopted on the basis of Article 209 TFEU (development cooperation) may 
                                                 
430 For the partners envisaged by the ‘economic, financial and technical cooperation’, see Article 
212(1) TFEU. As for the partners of development cooperation, see Article 209(1) TFEU. 
431 Indeed, the Union conducts the cooperation based on Article 209 TFEU (that is to say the 
development cooperation legal basis) with the countries identified as recipients of ‘official 
development assistance’ (ODA) by the Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) of the OECD (or 
a subset thereof), cf. Article 1 of the Regulation 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, O.J. 
L 2006 378/41–71. For the OECD DAC list, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist. 
432 Article 208(1) TFEU. 
433 EU instruments usually make reference to the definition of ‘Official Development Assistance’ 
(ODA) provided by the OECD/DAC, that is to say “flows of official financing administered with the 
promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, 
and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 
percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government 
agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. ODA 
receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. Lending by export 
credit agencies—with the pure purpose of export promotion—is excluded”, see the OECD glossary of 
statistical terms, http://stats.oecd.org. 
434 Article 212(1) TFEU. 
435 Cf. mutatis mutandis Case C-268/94 Portugal v. Council, [1996] ECR I-6177, par. 73-76. See also 
See the ECOWAS: Case C-91/05, Commission v Council, [2008] ECR I-03651;  for a comment, see 
inter alia, Hillion and Wessel, “Competence distribution in EU external relations after Ecowas: 
clarification or continued fuzziness?”, 46 Common Market Law Review (2009) 551-586.  
436 Notice that in the Joint Communication Global Europe : A New Approach to financing EU 
external action, COM(2011) 865 final, 7 December 2011, the Commission and the HR affirmed that 
“joint programming with Member States […] should become the norm for the EU”, par. 5.2. 
437 Article 208(1) TFEU and Article 212(1) TFEU. 
 116 
offset other objectives of the Union, thus compromising the ‘coherence’ of the EU’s 
external action. Similarly, a measure based upon another basis may jeopardise 
development objectives, thus questioning  the EU’s ‘policy coherence for 
development’, that is required by Article 208(1) TFEU, which states that “the Union 
shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that 
it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”. 438  
The European External Action Service (EEAS) appears to be well placed to 
coordinate cooperation with third countries, since it has privileged relations with 
Member States and it oversees several external policies, including CFSP. However, 
the involvement of the EEAS in the management of cooperation with third 
countries raises some political and legal issues. Can the Commission be forced to 
delegate its powers to the EEAS? Would this lead to increased coherence, or would 
it simply reinforce intergovernmentalism in EU external relations? In order to 
answer these questions, this section describes, in paragraph 1, the main EU’s 
instruments in this area and it subsequently addresses the role of the EEAS in the 
coordination of cooperation with third countries. Paragraph 2 introduces the 
programming of external action instruments, paragraph 3 presents the EEAS' role 
in this area and paragraph 4 discusses the legality of the EEAS' involvement in this 
phase. Paragraphs 5 and 6 conclude the analysis by presenting the phase known as 
'implementation' of external action instruments, and discussing the EEAS' role in it. 
1. Introducing External Action Instruments 
The EU’s cooperation with third countries is implemented mainly through the so-
called ‘external action instruments’. An external action instrument may be defined 
as a framework composed by a financial facility, which may have its source either in 
the EU budget or elsewhere, and the procedures that regulate its allocation and 
disbursement. 'External action instruments’ are provided for in regulations, which 
are implemented by the Commission, through the exertion of its powers of policy 
implementation and budget implementation (Article 291(2) and 317 TFEU). 
The external action instruments devoted to the cooperation with third countries 
constitute one of the main tools of EU’s external relations, and they absorb the 
largest share of external action resources. They are presently being amended. Since 
their structure is unlikely to change,439 however, the following analysis concerns the 
existing instruments, and it makes punctual references to the pending proposals, 
whenever they introduce substantial innovations.440 
The ‘Development Cooperation Instrument’ (DCI) is the only instrument that is 
provided for in a regulation founded exclusively on a development cooperation legal 
basis (Article 179 TEC, now Article 209 TFEU). Indeed, the primary and 
overarching objective of this instrument is “the eradication of poverty in partner 
                                                 
438 Cf. Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European 
Union Development Policy: ‘The European Consensus’, OJ 2006 C 46/1, par. 36 and 37. 
439 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European 
Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions A Budget For Europe 2020, 
COM(2011)500 final, par. 5.7. 
440 On the current structure of external action instruments, see Bartelt, "The Institutional Interplay 
Regarding the New Architecture For the EC’s External Assistance", 14 European Law Journal 
(2008): 655–679. 
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countries and regions”.441 This is testified by the fact that the can be used to finance 
cooperation almost only through measures that foster the economic development 
and welfare of developing countries.442 The EU’s assistance under the DCI is 
implemented through ‘geographic’ and ‘thematic’ programmes. ‘Geographic’ 
programmes, which absorb two thirds of the DCI’s funds, are meant to foster 
cooperation with partner countries and regions determined on a geographical 
basis.443 Developing countries in sub-Saharian African and in the EU’s 
neighbourhood are not eligible for ‘geographic cooperation’ under this instrument, 
since they are targeted by other instruments. ‘Thematic’ programmes, which are 
subsidiary to ‘geographic’ programmes, “encompass a specific area of activity of 
interest to a group of partner countries not determined by geography, or 
cooperation activities addressed to various regions or groups of partner countries, 
or an international operation that is not geographically specific.”444 Such 
programmes may concern aspects as diverse as education, gender equality, 
environment protection and food security.445 DCI thematic programmes may 
finance activities in sub-Saharian Africa, but they cannot address EU’s neighbours. 
Although the DCI is the only instrument founded exclusively on a development 
cooperation legal basis, it is not the only EU’s instrument meant to foster only 
development cooperation. At the beginning of the European integration process, 
Member States set up a European Development Fund (EDF), meant to finance 
projects in countries located in sub-Saharian Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
ocean, the ‘ACP’ countries. Unlike other external action instruments, the EDF is 
foreseen by a multilateral framework agreement stipulated by the Union and its 
Members with the ACP countries, the ‘Cotonou Agreement’, that is renovated every 
five years.446 The Fund is set up through an ‘internal agreement’ of Member States, 
whereby they accept to give a voluntary contribution to the Fund.447 Hence, this 
Fund exists outside the framework of the Treaties and of the EU budget. The 
implementation of the Fund is regulated by EU law and it is modelled after the 
procedures for the implementation of other instruments; in particular, the 
Commission gives implementation to this instrument, under the supervision of a 
Committee composed of Member States’ representatives.   According to the ECJ, 
these peculiar arrangements do not pose any legal problem, since “no provision of 
the Treaty prevents Member States from using, outside its framework, procedural 
steps drawing on the rules applicable to Community expenditure and from 
                                                 
441 DCI regulation, Article 2(1). 
442 DCI regulation, Article 1 and 2(4). However, notice that, while DCI thematic programmes should 
primarily support developing countries, two beneficiary countries as well as the overseas countries 
and territories, whose characteristics do not meet the requirements to be defined as ODA recipients 
by the DAC are also eligible for thematic programmes under the conditions set out in the DCI 
Regulation 
443 On ‘geographic’ programmes, see DCI regulation, Article 5. On the distribution of DCI funding, see 
Annex IV to the DCI regulation. 
444 DCI regulation, Article 11(1).  
445 DCI regulation, Article 12(2)(b) and (c), Article 13 and Article 15. 
446 ACP-EC partnership agreement, Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, revised in Luxembourg on 
25 June 2005 and revised in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010, see O.J. 2000 L 317, O.J. 2004 L 297, 
O.J. 2005 L 209, O.J. 2005 L 287, O.J. 2006 L 247, O.J. 2010 L 287. 
447 Cf. the 10the EDF internal agreement, O.J. 2006 L 247/32. Apparently, the EDF contribution key 
is being brought closer to the key used for the EU budget, see Communication From The Commission 
To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The 
Committee Of The Regions A Budget For Europe 2020, COM(2011)500 final, par. 5.8.1. 
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associating the Community institutions with the procedure thus set up.”448 
Although the Commission and the European Parliament periodically call for its 
insertion in the EU budget (the so-called ‘budgetisation’ of the EDF), the EDF is 
constantly renovated every five years, and it is now about to enter its 11th cycle. 
Even if the Fund does not only finance development assistance stricto sensu, its 
development dimension is pre-eminent.449 Therefore, it may be considered as a 
development cooperation instrument, similarly to the DCI.  
While the DCI and the EDF foster development cooperation, other instruments 
promote the economic, financial and technical cooperation with non-developing 
countries, and are consequently founded on Article 212 TFEU (previously Article 
181a TEC). Such is the case of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), 
which supports cooperation with candidate, or potential candidates, to EU 
membership, in order to foster their progressive alignment with the standards and 
policies of the European Union. 450 Similarly, the Instrument for Cooperation with 
Industrialised Countries (ICI) is based on Article 181a TEC (now Article 212 TFEU) 
because it fosters economic, financial and technical cooperation and other forms of 
cooperation falling within its spheres of competence, with industrialised and other 
high-income countries and territories.451 
While the above instruments pursue either development cooperation or economic, 
financial and technical cooperation, most external action instruments pursue both 
objectives, and consequently have both development and non-development legal 
bases (former Article 179 and 181a TEC, current Article 209 and 212 TFEU). Some 
of these instruments have a geographic focus. This is the case of the European 
Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI),452 which is meant to provide EU 
assistance for the development of an area of prosperity involving the European 
Union and its Neighbours, mainly in the interests of the EU’s partners but also for 
the mutual interest of partner countries and Member States.453 A second 
‘geographic’ instrument having both a ‘development’ and ‘non-development’ 
connotation is the Partnership Instrument (PI), recently proposed by the European 
Commission as a successor to the ICI.454 The ‘double’ nature of the PI enables the 
EU to co-operate with new emerging economies on issues related to advancing core 
EU interests and on common challenges of global concern.455  
                                                 
448 Case C-316/91, Parliament v. Council, [1994] ECR  I-625, par. 41. 
449 See the Regulation of the Council 617/2007/EC of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the 10th 
European Development Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, O.J. 2007 L 152/1-13, and 
in particular Article 2(6). 
450 Regulation 1085/2006/EC of the Council of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA), O.J. L 2006 210/82–93, Article 1. 
451 Regulation 1934/2006/EC of the Council, establishing a financing instrument for cooperation with 
industrialised and other high-income countries and territories, O.J. 2006 L 405/41-59, Article 1. 
452 Regulation 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general 
provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument O.J. 2006 L 
310/1/14. 
453 Id., Article 1. 
454 Notice that the Commission recently proposed to enlarge the scope of the ICI’s to encompass 
developing countries, see proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries, COM(2011) 843 final, 
explanatory memorandum, par. 1. Notice also that the new Partnership Instrument proposed by the 
Commission has three legal bases, including Article 209 and 212 TFEU, but also Article 207 TFEU 
(trade). 
455 In particular, it serves to finance the cooperation with emerging countries, that are not covered by 
the geographic programmes of the new DCI, recently proposed by the Commission. See Proposal for a 
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Most external action instruments having both development and non-development 
components are ‘thematic’ in nature. Hence, ‘thematic’ instruments foster specific 
objectives worldwide (but normally not in industrialised countries), and they may, 
or may not, pursue development priorities. The clearest example in this sense is 
provided for by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR).456 This instrument is explicitly meant to provide assistance contributing 
to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and of 
respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms “within the framework of 
the [EU’s] policy on development cooperation, and economic, financial and 
technical cooperation with third countries”.457  
Another instrument that fosters both development and non-development goals is 
the Instrument for Stability (IfS).458 This instrument has two components (both of 
which may, or may not, be related to development cooperation). On the one hand, 
the ‘short-term’ component of the IfS finances assistance in response to situations 
of crisis or emerging crisis, and it is meant to “contribute to stability by providing 
an effective response to help preserve, establish or re-establish the conditions 
essential to the proper implementation of the [EU’s] development and cooperation 
policies.” On the other hand, the ‘long-term’ component of the IfS finances 
assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation, to help build capacity 
both to address specific global and transregional threats having a destabilising 
effect and to ensure preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations.459 
Given the peculiar nature of the IfS, the measures taken in its framework should be 
consistent with Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
A third instance of development/non-development cooperation is provided for by 
the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC).460 This instrument is meant 
to support the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety, radiation protection and 
the application of efficient and effective safeguards of nuclear material in third 
countries. Since the EU’s competence in this area is foreseen in the Euratom Treaty, 
the INSC is based neither on Article 209, nor on Article 212 TFEU, but it is founded 
upon Article 203 Euratom, that is to say the ‘flexibility clause’ of this Treaty.461 
Nonetheless, the INSC appears to be related to both development and non-
development cooperation, since it is likely to foster both the interests of the EU and 
the development and welfare of developing countries, similarly to other thematic 
instruments. 
                                                                                                                                               
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Partnership Instrument for 
cooperation with third countries, COM(2011) 843 final, explanatory memorandum, par. 1. 
456 Regulation 1889/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 
on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, 
O.J. 2006 L 386-11. 
457 Id., Article 1(1).  
458 Regulation 1717/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2006 
establishing an Instrument for Stability,O.J. 2006 L 327/1–11. 
459 Id., Article 1. For the ‘short-term’ component see Article 3, for the ‘long-term’ component, see 
Article 4. 
460 Council Regulation 300/2007/Euratom of 19 February 2007 establishing an Instrument for 
Nuclear Safety Cooperation, O.J. 2007 L 081/ 1-10. 
461 Consistently with the TFEU flexibility clause (Article 352), Article 203 Euratom reads: “if action by 
the Community should prove necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Community and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.” 
 120 
2. The Programming of External Action Instruments 
The funds contained in external action instruments are normally allocated during 
the phase known as 'programming'. Programming is the first phase in the cycle of 
operation. During this phase, the situation at national and sector level is analysed to 
identify problems and opportunities to be addressed through cooperation. Based on 
the country diagnosis, lessons learnt from past and present cooperation and the 
comparative advantage of donors, the EU defines the strategy whereby it supports 
the partner country's efforts to achieve its development objectives.462 Programming 
is therefore a multiannual and indicative process, which results into the allocation 
of financial resources and in the drafting of a ‘strategy paper’ and of an ‘indicative 
programme’. The strategy paper consists of a single, logical and coherent document 
comprising a series of key elements, and it identifies the main objectives and sector 
priorities for cooperation with third countries. The defined strategy is converted 
into an indicative programme, which specifies the overall objectives and lays down 
the strategic choices for EU cooperation as well as the indicative financial 
allocation, both overall and per priority area.463  
The control over the programming process evidently entails a relevant degree of 
control on the priorities of EU external action funding, as well as on the EU’s 
resources. Therefore, the identification of the entities responsible for the 
programming of external action holds a crucial value. The programming of external 
action instruments should be a Commission responsibility, since it is part of the 
'implementation' of the EU acts, within the meaning of Article 291(2) TFEU. 
Indeed, the instruments’ regulations, as well as the Cotonou Agreement, enable the 
Commission to allocate resources and to adopt and modify strategy papers and 
indicative programmes, subject to comitology procedures.464  
However, the creation of the EEAS may complicate this framework. In order to 
appreciate this, it is necessary to take a closer look at the administrative structure of 
the instruments’ programming. The remainder of this paragraph provides for a 
description of the instruments’ programming before the creation of the EEAS, while 
                                                 
462 See PCM p. 25 and GBS p. 39 
463 Partial exceptions to this rule are provided by the cases where the Union committed legally or 
politically at the international level to reach a certain financial allocation, or where the EU is required 
to allocate its resources according to a standard and rigid scheme. However, it must be stressed that, 
even in the cases when the allocation criteria are ‘standard, objective and transparent’, as required by 
the European Consensus on development, the EU maintains certain discretion as to the precise 
definition of each partner’s share of funds. 
464 After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and namely during the revision of external action 
instruments, the legislator may decide to regulate some programming aspects directly in the 
instruments’ base acts; subsequently, the legislator may delegate to the Commission the power to 
adopt non-legislative acts to supplement or amend certain such elements, ex Article 290(1) TFEU. 
This solution would enable the Council and the Parliament to determine the objectives, content, 
scope and duration of the delegation, and it would enable any of these institutions to revoke the 
delegation or to prevent any delegated act from entering into force. The European Parliament seems 
to prefer an ample reliance on Article 290 TFEU in this context. In particular, the EP intends to make 
the adoption of strategy papers, indicative programmes and financial allocations subject to a 
delegation of power, within the meaning of Article 290 TFEU. This would evidently increase the 
grasp of the EP on the management of external action instruments. The Commission does not share 
the Parliament’s view, since it considers the aforesaid documents not to fall within the ambit of 
Article 290 TFEU. Nonetheless, its recent proposals accommodate some of the Parliaments’ requests, 
since they foresee a delegation of power to the Commission in respect of three issues: the list of the 
EU’s partner countries, the areas of cooperation and the distribution of relative allocations among 
different sectors.  
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the next two paragraphs analyse the changes brought by the creation of the Service, 
and the political/legal consequences thereof. Even before the creation of the EEAS, 
the programming of external action instruments was a complex procedure, whose 
nature varied considerably depending on the instruments’ scope (geographic or 
thematic) and purpose (development cooperation or cooperation with 
industrialised countries). The most structured form of programming was provided 
for by the main geographic instruments, that is to say the ENPI and the DCI, which 
were programmed by DG RELEX, and the EDF, which was programmed by DG 
DEV. The programming of these instruments was divided in three phases: the 
drafting of the strategic paper and of the indicative programme, the quality control 
and the formal approval.  
The drafting of strategic papers and indicative programmes began with an analysis 
of the policy agenda of partner countries, as well as their political, economic and 
social situation. Such analysis was normally conducted by DG RELEX or DG DEV 
and Delegations, 465 in coordination with partner countries, in order to enhance 
their ownership of the cooperation, as well as with civil society, Member States and 
third subjects. In light of the analysis of the situation in the partner country, the 
EU’s cooperation objectives and the lessons learnt from past experience, the 
Commission elaborated an ‘indicative programme’, which identified the priorities 
across sectors, the financial ‘envelopes’ for each sector, the objectives of the 
cooperation, its expected results and the type of assistance to be provided. Once the 
first draft of the strategy paper/indicative programme was prepared, it was 
submitted by Delegations to Headquarters, and it was discussed by several 
Commission services in the so-called ‘Country-Team meeting’ (CTM). The 
membership of the CTM was variable, and it could encompass both DG DEV and 
DG RELEX departments, but also other services, such as trade or aid 
implementation (DG AIDCO).  
After the Country Team meeting reached a working version of the draft strategy 
paper, the latter was subject to a three-stages ‘quality control’, which constituted 
the second phase of the instruments’ programming. The first stage of ‘quality 
control’ was performed by the Interservice Quality Support Group (iQSG), a body 
composed by a small number of Commission officers coming from different 
external relations services, 466 selected for their skills and experience by the Group 
of external relations Commissioners. The iQSG screened programming documents 
against a common framework and ensured high quality standard of programming 
documents. The conclusions it adopted were sent back to the DG RELEX or DG 
DEV desk officer and the Delegation, which could discuss them further with the 
                                                 
465 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament concerning the 
Development of the External Service 2000, par. 3.2: “The deconcentration of responsibility for 
development aid from Headquarters to Delegations […] will mean that many Delegations will 
continue to have co-operation as one of their major tasks. […] Delegations will be called upon to lead 
the policy dialogue with beneficiary countries as well as operational co-ordination with the Member 
States' representatives on the spot within the framework of reinforced multi-annual programming”. 
466 The members of the group are senior representatives of all Directorates General involved in the 
management of the Community’s relations with developing countries: DGs Development, External 
Relations, Trade, Economic and Financial Affairs, Enlargement, ECHO, EuropeAid Cooperation 
Office and the Joint Evaluation Unit. Both the chairman and the members are selected ad personam 
by their respective Directors General for their skills and experience. Their views as expressed in the 
iQSG do not commit the Directorates-General from which they come from”, Commission Staff 
Working Document - iQSG Progress Report on second-generation Country Strategy Papers 2007/8-
2013, SEC(2009) 431, p. 16 note 29, not published; document available at http://www.uni-
mannheim.de/edz/pdf/sek/2009/sek-2009-0431-en.pdf, last visited on 21 May 2012. 
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partner State and the other entities concerned. The second stage of ‘quality control’ 
was constituted by the inter-service consultation (ISC): like most proposals for the 
adoption by the Commission, programming documents (including the conclusions 
of the iQSG) were sent by the lead department (DG RELEX or DG DEV) to all other 
Directorates-General and services with a legitimate specific interest in the 
substance of the proposal. The programming documents were subsequently 
submitted for the third stage of ‘quality control’, which was performed by the 
Member States’ committee responsible for the instrument, under ‘comitology’ 
procedures. In some instances, a negative opinion of the Committee could oblige 
the lead department to reformulate the strategy paper. 
After the quality screening, the strategy paper and the indicative programme were 
submitted to the College of the Commissioners, or to the group of external action 
Commissioners, for approval, which constituted the third and last phase of 
programming. If all Commission services having an interest in the programming 
documents had approved the proposal in inter-service consultation, the College 
could adopt them through the rapid ‘written procedure’; in the absence of 
unanimity among Commission services,467 the programming documents generally 
had to be adopted by the College through the lengthier oral procedure. After 
approval by the Commission, the strategy paper and the indicative programme 
became binding, thus constituting the formal ‘Order for Service’ covering the entire 
programming period. The strategy paper and the indicative programme could 
however be revised during the multi-annual financial framework, and particularly 
at mid-term. In principle, the revision of these documents, including the financial 
allocations, followed procedures similar to those described above. 
The programming of thematic instruments and programmes was similar to the 
programming of the main geographic instruments. The process began with the 
drafting of a strategy paper by the competent unit; thematic programmes under the 
DCI were managed by DG DEV, while thematic instruments (EIDHR, IfS, INSC) 
were programmed by DG RELEX. The thematic strategy papers were subsequently 
commented upon by other Commission departments, in the context of a ‘Thematic 
Team Meeting’. The draft programming document was subsequently evaluated by 
the iQSG, submitted for consultation among other Commission service and 
screened by the Member States’ Committee. Finally, the strategy paper was adopted 
by the Commission.468 
The programming of two geographic instruments, ICI and IPA, was organised in a 
different way. The programming of the Instrument for Cooperation with 
Industrialised Countries (ICI) was less structured than the programming of other 
instruments, and it foresaw the adoption of a single Multi-annual programme of 
cooperation encompassing all partner countries. Like other strategic documents, 
this programme was subject to interservice consultation, comitology and, finally, 
adoption by the Commission. DG RELEX was responsible for the entire 
programming cycle of the ICI. 
The programming of the IPA was centred on three-years strategic planning 
documents - the Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Documents (MIPD) – which set 
                                                 
467 Note, however, that in the event of a dispute between the lead department and a department 
consulted, the 
Secretariat-General could be asked to mediate, see the Commission’ Guide to Interservice 
Consultation (2010), par. 2.4., not published in the O.J. 
468 On the programming of thematic instruments and programmes before the Lisbon reform, see the 
Common Framework And Procedure For Strategy Papers For The Thematic Programmes 2007 – 
2013, 30 May 2006, available on www.europa.eu. 
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out the EU's priorities for assistance to candidate and eligible candidate countries. 
Such planning documents were prepared by DG Enlargement (ELARG) units, in 
cooperation with DGs Regional Affairs, Employment and Agriculture. 
Subsequently, DG ELARG consulted the partner countries’ administration on the 
draft MIPD, and it sought the opinion of Member States’ authorities in partner 
countries, civil society and other Commission DGs. Subsequently, DG ELARG 
submitted the draft document for inter-service consultation, and for the quality-
check by the ELARG Quality Support Group. Finally, the MIPD was submitted to 
the IPA management Committee and eventually approved by the Commission. It 
may be noted that the IPA was the only instrument to be programmed neither by 
DG RELEX nor DG DEV; in fact, line DGs were involved in the programming of this 
instrument more closely than other RELEX family DGs. Moreover, the role of 
Delegations in the programming of the IPA was less evident than in the case of 
development cooperation geographic instruments, since DG ELARG was in direct 
contact with the partner country’s administration. Arguably, these peculiarities 
were due to the peculiar relation between the EC/EU and candidate countries, 
which is ‘external’ in nature, but has ‘internal’ characters, since candidate countries 
are required to 'internalise' the aquis communautaire.469  
3. Involvement of the EEAS in the Programming of External Action Instruments 
In principle, the programming procedures described in the previous paragraph are 
still valid, with some modifications, mainly due to the creation of the EEAS. This 
paragraph shows that the EEAS can affect the programming of external action 
instruments, through its function as a de facto Commission service and its control 
on Delegations, but also through the management responsibilities it was recently 
attributed. 
In the first place, the EEAS participates in the programming of all external action 
instruments since it is consulted during their preparation. Although the EEAS is 
not a Commission Service, it is consulted before the submission of proposals to the 
Commission, since the Service assists a Vice-president of the Commission, i.e. the 
High Representative, in his/her capacity as Commission Vice-President. Thus, the 
EEAS may comment upon other services’ initiatives; if the EEAS’ comments are not 
accepted, the Service may theoretically render the adoption of other services’ 
initiatives more difficult, by withdrawing its approval of the envisaged actions.470 In 
all circumstances, the EEAS may also advise the HR/VP to vote against a proposal 
within the College of the Commissioners. However, the EEAS cannot make 
extensive use of these tools, which ultimately risk undermining its working 
relations with Commission services.  
                                                 
469 European Commission - DG Enlargement, ‘IPA Programming Guide, Volume 1, for Component I 
(TA-IB) and Component II (CBC), Annex 4, IPA Planning guidelines, 2008, pp. 91-93, not published 
in OJ; the document is available on the website of the government of the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, http://www.sep.gov.mk/content/Dokumenti/MK/IPAprogrammingguide-
rev%2031_03_08%20-%20Volume%201_GB.pdf, last visited on 21 May 2012. 
planning guidelines on MIPD (31/03/2008) 
470 The combination of Article 12 and Article 23 of the Commission’s rules of procedure make the 
adoption of an act through a ‘written procedure’ subject to the approval of all the services with a 
legitimate interest in the proposal. If such approval were denied, the Commission would have to 
approve the proposal in a formal meeting; see Commission Decision 2010/138/EU, Euratom, of 24 
February 2010, amending its Rules of Procedure, O.J. 2010 L 55/60-67. 
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In the second place, the EEAS participates in the programming of the main 
geographic instruments through its partial control on EU Delegations. As noted 
above, Delegations play a decisive role in the drafting of strategy papers for the 
main external action instruments, that is to say the EDF, DCI, ENPI. Delegations 
may influence also the programming of the Instrument for pre-Accession, since 
they assist DG ELARG in the performance of certain task on the spot, and notably 
for the consultation with local stakeholders, donors and EU Member states. 
However, the potential influence of Delegations, and, thus, of the EEAS, in respect 
of the IPA programming appears to be less evident than it is in the case of the EDF, 
DCI and ENPI, for the reasons mentioned above. A cursory reading of the EEAS 
Decision may suggest that the creation of the Service did not affect the Delegations’ 
role in the programming of these instruments, since cooperation with third 
countries is a non-CFSP policy, which should be executed by the Commission, and 
by its officers in Delegations, under the Commission’s instructions.471 However, the 
relation between the EEAS and Delegations necessarily affects the programming of 
the main geographical instruments. On the one hand, EEAS officers in Delegations 
may directly contribute to the programming of external action instruments: a joint 
Commission-EEAS note sent to EU Heads of Delegation in December 2011 
stipulates that the HoD can require EEAS staff to work on tasks falling within the 
remit of the Commission,472 thereby presumably including the cooperation with 
third countries. The involvement of EEAS officers in this activity may be quite 
effective, since they are likely to hold specific expertise related to the analysis of the 
partner country’s political situation, which may be useful in the drafting of strategy 
papers. On the other hand, the Head of Delegation (HoD), who is a EEAS officer, 
contributes to the programming of external action instruments by coordinating this 
activity with the rest of the EU’s action in the country of accreditation. Thus, the 
HoD, under instructions from the HR and the EEAS, can make sure that the 
strategy papers are drafted consistently with the EU’s strategy in the partner 
country.  
In the third place, the EEAS participates in the programming of certain 
instruments in a more direct way, that is to say through its officers in Brussels. The 
direct involvement of the EEAS in this area may seem to be logical, since the EEAS 
is composed also by officers formerly responsible for these duties. Before the 
creation of the Service, DG RELEX was responsible for the programming of certain 
instruments and programmes, i.e. DCI (geographic), ENPI, EIDHR, IfS, INSC.473 As 
it is know, since January 2011 DG RELEX and a small part of DG DEV were merged 
into the EEAS, while the rest of DG DEV was merged with DG AIDCO, to form DG 
DEVCO. Had programming responsibilities followed the transfer of their respective 
departments, the EEAS would have been made responsible for the programming of 
all the instruments that previously fell within the remit of DG RELEX. This would 
have weakened the position of the Commission. In this perspective, and considering 
that Article 27(3) TEU enables the Commission to veto the adoption of the Decision 
establishing the EEAS, it is perhaps not surprising that the final EEAS Decision 
considerably reshuffled programming responsibilities. 
                                                 
471 EEAS Decision Article 5. 
472 European Commission-European External Action Service, note to Heads of Delegation, 
‘Management of Staff in Delegations’, 20 December 2011, not published in the OJ. 
473 The remaining instruments were programmed by DG DEV (EDF, DCI-thematic) and DG ELARG 
(IPA). 
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Article 9(3) EEAS Decision affirms that the EEAS contributes to the programming 
and management cycle for several instruments (DCI, ENPI, EDF, ICI, EIDHR, 
INSC and IfS). The same paragraph affirms that the EEAS has responsibility for 
preparing country allocations, country and national strategic papers and national 
and regional indicative programmes, in relation to the aforesaid programmes. 
Article 9(3) further specifies that “throughout the whole cycle of programming, 
planning and implementation of the instruments referred to in paragraph 2, the 
High Representative and the EEAS shall work with the relevant members and 
services of the Commission”. Since these provisions are not completely univocal, 
the precise allocation of responsibilities in this area was subsequently determined 
through negotiations between the Commission and the EEAS. These negotiations 
led to the adoption of the ‘Working Arrangements between Commission Services 
and the EEAS in relation to external relations issues’ (Working Arrangements).474 
In a formal perspective, these arrangements are a Commission internal document, 
which is not legally binding. In practice, since they are the result of a negotiation 
between Commission services and the EEAS, they are likely to provide for a rather 
accurate description of the current distribution of tasks in this area. 
In an analytical perspective, the degree of intervention of the EEAS in the 
programming of external action instruments may be divided in five categories. 
First, the EEAS may not directly intervene in the programming of external action 
instruments. This is the case of the Instrument for Pre-Accession, which is not 
mentioned in Article 9(3) EEAS Decision. This instrument is still programmed by 
DG ELARG, under the responsibility of the Enlargement Commissioner, 
consistently with pre-Lisbon practice; the lack of innovation in this area may be 
justified by the peculiar nature of this instrument, as described above.475  
Secondly, the EEAS may be ‘consulted’ by Commission services. This is the case of 
the thematic programmes contained in the Development Cooperation Instrument, 
which, according to Article 9(4) EEAS Decision, are prepared “by the appropriate 
Commission service”, under the guidance of the Commissioner responsible for 
Development Policy. The Working Arrangements confirmed this provision, by 
affirming that the thematic programmes of the DCI are programmed by DG 
DEVCO, "in consultation with the EEAS and relevant Commission services”.476 Also 
this provision is partially consistent with previous practice, since thematic 
programmes were previously programmed by DG DEV.  
Thirdly, the EEAS and Commission services may ‘co-decide’ the programming of 
external action instruments. This is the case of the main geographical instruments, 
that is to say EDF, DCI and ENPI. The EEAS Decision provides limited guidance in 
this respect, since Article 9(4) and (5) EEAS Decision only specify that the 
proposals related to the programming of these instruments are prepared jointly by 
the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the responsibility of 
the Commissioner responsible for development (EDF, DCI) or neighbourhood 
policy (ENPI). In abstracto, it may be argued that the combination of Article 9(4) 
and (5), on the one hand, and of Article 9(3), on the other hand, implies that the 
EEAS should take the lead in the programming of these instruments. Indeed, 
Article 9(3) EEAS Decision, as noted above, explicitly affirms that the EEAS is 
                                                 
474 SEC(2012) 48, 10 January 2012, not published in the O.J. 
475 Of course, the EEAS is not completely excluded from the programming of IPA, insofar as it 
participates in the interservice consultation that precedes the adoption of programming documents 
by the Commission. 
476 See Working Arrangements, p. 20. 
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‘responsible’ for the programming of these instruments. Such interpretation is 
confirmed by the Working Arrangements, according to which it is the EEAS that 
prepares “in agreement with DEVCO” financial allocations, programming 
guidelines and draft strategy papers. Subsequently, the EEAS organises Country 
Team Meeting “meeting jointly with DEVCO”, and it invites other services, in order 
to assess the analysis and the programming proposals from Delegations. Moreover, 
the EEAS launches the inter-service consultation on the proposed documents as 
well as the Commission procedure for adoption, always “in agreement with 
DEVCO”.477 Nonetheless, interviews with EEAS and Commission officers suggest 
that DG DEVCO does not have a subordinate role in the programming of the main 
geographical instruments.478 On the contrary, it appears to lead the programming 
of development cooperation in practice: development cooperation is not the ‘core 
business’ of the EEAS, while it is the very raison d’etre of DEVCO; therefore, the 
latter is more likely to take initiative in this ambit. Moreover, the EEAS may lack 
sufficient human and ‘institutional memory’ resources, because most DG DEV 
officers were transferred to DEVCO. This may prevent the EEAS from taking the 
lead in certain areas, and namely in the programming of the EDF (which was 
previously managed by officers now working mainly for DG DEVCO). It may be 
argued that, in principle, the main geographic instruments should be the 
responsibility of the EEAS “in agreement with DEVCO”, but, in practice, the 
contrary appears to be true. This seems to contradict the argument put forward by 
some NGOs whereby the involvement of the EEAS in the management of 
development cooperation instruments may be likely to subordinate development 
cooperation to foreign policy priorities.479 
Fourthly, the EEAS may be responsible for the programming of external action 
instruments, in ‘consultation’ with Commission services. The EEAS Decision does 
not explicitly foresee any such instance. Nonetheless, the Working Arrangements 
specify that thematic instruments, i.e. the INSC, the EIDHR (with the exception of 
electoral observation), and the long-term part of the IfS, are entirely prepared by 
the EEAS in consultation with DG DEVCO and other relevant Commission services, 
under the responsibility of the HR/VP.480 Again, this confirms a partial consistency 
with previous arrangements, since these instruments were previously programmed 
by DG RELEX; this solution confirms also the coordinating role of the EEAS in 
respect of thematic programmes. 
                                                 
477 However, both the EEAS and DEVCO respond to the requests of Member States’ committees and 
to the requests of the Parliament, in the newly established procedure for democratic scrutiny; 
moreover, the EEAS does not chair Member States’ committees, which are presided by DG DEVCO. 
see Article 10, new Comitology Regulation 182/2011;  
478 Interviews with DEVCO officers March-July 2011, June 2012; interviews with EEAS officers April 
2012-June 2012. 
479 Cf. Phillips, "Development NGOs issue legal warning over new EU foreign service", EU Observer, 
25 April 2010: “Stripping away the jargon, essentially the development groups believe that the 
European Commission is less ‘political' than the member states. It has been the sole agent 
responsible for development policy and implementation until now, and they fear that the commission 
is having its powers in this area diluted or even stripped away. They view the EU executive as an 
organisation that in principle is supposed to stand above national interests and represent the interest 
of Europe as a whole and so is a better manager of development policy. They worry in particular that 
with the development area being placed in the hands of the EAS, the member states will now have 
their fingers in the pie and will subordinate poverty reduction in the third world to less altruistic 
foreign policy imperatives.” 
480 It is worthwhile noticing that, although the EEAS has primary programming responsibilities, it 
does not chair the competent Member States’ committee; the chairmanship is provided for by DG 
DEVCO, although the programming documents are defended by the EEAS. 
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Fifthly, the EEAS may be responsible for the instruments’ programming in relative 
autonomy. In this sense, Article 9(6) EEAS affirms that the Instrument for 
Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, the short-term part of the Instrument 
for Stability and election observation missions (provided for in the EIDHR) are 
under the responsibility of the High Representative/the EEAS.481 The Working 
Arrangements confirm that the programming of these instruments is performed by 
the EEAS. The only Commission department consulted throughout the 
programming cycle is the new Foreign Policy Instrument Service (FPI), whose 
nature and role are better understood in the perspective of the instruments’ 
implementation (see infra). All other Commission services are consulted only 
through ‘inter-service consultations’.482  
The table below summarises the role of the EEAS in the programming process and 
the potential for its influence in this phase. 
 
The division of labour between the EEAS and other Commission services leads to 
three conclusions. In the first place, the Service does function as a Commission 
service, mainly by substituting the DGs that preceded it (RELEX and DEV) but also 
by acquiring different responsibilities. This means that, although Article 2(1) of the 
EEAS Decision affirms that the tasks of the Service in the Institutions shall be 
performed "without prejudice to the normal tasks of the services of the 
Commission", the EEAS can be truly integrated in the structure of the Commission. 
This finding is reinforced by a second conclusion: the EEAS supports the HR/VP in 
the performance of his/her tasks in the Commission, but it supports also other 
Commissioners (Enlargement and Development). This testifies the EEAS' capacity 
to serve entities other than the HR, as suggested by the already cited Article 2(2) of 
                                                 
481 Notice that, in principle, the short-term part of the IfS is not subject to ‘programming’, since it is 
meant to tackle crises, which, by definition, cannot be ‘programmed’. Because of this reason, it is not 
referred to in Article 9(2) EEAS Decision, which deals only with the programming of external action 
instruments. However, it is for the EEAS to manage the ‘indicative pipeline of IfS interventions’, that 
embodies the political orientation of the instruments; hence, the short-term part of the IfS is treated 
here alongside the strategic dimension of other instruments, as embodied in the programming phase.  
482 Evidently, since the short-term part is not programmed, no inter-service consultation takes place 
in this context. 
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the EEAS Decision, which calls the Service to assist the President of the 
Commission, and the Commission as a whole. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the division of labour between the EEAS and 
Commission services does not follow the alleged rift between ‘development’ and 
‘politics’, since there is no clear correlation between the instruments’ legal bases 
and the degree of the EEAS’ involvement in their programming, as clarified by the 
table below. For instance, the EEAS is excluded from the management of a 
‘political’ instrument such as the IPA, which does not have a development 
cooperation legal basis, but the same Service leads the programming of thematic 
instruments, which have a strong development component.  
 
Instrument/programme Leading service Consultation Legal basis (TFEU) 
IPA ELARG  212 
DCI - thematic DEVCO  209 
EDF EEAS - DEVCO  Sui generis483 
DCI EEAS - DEVCO  209 
ENPI EEAS - DEVCO  209- 212 
INSC EEAS  DEVCO Sui generis484 
EIDHR EEAS  DEVCO 209-212 
IfS (long-term) EEAS DEVCO 209-212 
ICI/PI EEAS  212 
IfS – short-term EEAS  209-212 
 
To be sure, this case-by-case approach to division of labour entails some 
shortcomings, such as lengthy negotiations between the EEAS and Commission 
services concerning the precise delimitation of the respective duties, and the rather 
fuzzy distribution of responsibilities across EU services. However, it enables the 
EEAS to intervene in the areas where it can bring added value in practice, through 
modalities that are sensitive to the peculiarities of each specific sector. This means 
that the influence of the EEAS is strongest in the sectors that are closest to ‘high 
politics’, and, thus, to CFSP, which is managed by the HR and the EEAS. Thus the 
Service manages autonomously the short term part of the IfS, which is strictly 
linked to CSDP, and electoral observation, which is closely related to a typical CFSP 
activity such as the recognition of the democratic nature of an electoral process. In 
other words, the EEAS is closely involved in the programming of most external 
action instruments, not because of its position in the institutional balance of the 
                                                 
483 For a discussion of the legal basis of the EDF, see above. 
484 For a discussion of the legal basis of the INSC, see above. 
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Union, but rather because of its added value in specific areas. The allocation of 
programming responsibilities on the EEAS is meant to enhance the synergy 
between the different components of the EU’s external action, irrespective of the 
boundaries that separate them, and in harmony with the attention paid by the 
Lisbon reform to external action coherence.  
4. External Action Coherence as the Legal Rationale for the EEAS' Programming 
Responsibilities  
Irrespectively of the effects entailed by the entrustment of programming 
responsibilities on the EEAS, its intervention in this area may engender legal 
contradictions. In the first place, the EEAS’ intervention in the programming of 
external action instruments may violate the institutional balance set by the Treaties. 
In 2010, some NGOs argued that the HR’s proposal for a Decision establishing the 
EEAS was illegal, because “the Treaty does not provide for a split of responsibilities 
between the EEAS and the Commission, and there are no arrangements to allow a 
sharing of policy implementation under the Treaty.”485 In other words, since the 
programming of external instruments is part of the execution of the base 
regulations, and the Treaties entrust the implementation of non-CFSP policies on 
the Commission, it is for the Commission, and not for the EEAS, to program 
external action instruments.486 Hence, the EEAS Decision may be seen as 
impinging on the competences of the Commission, thereby violating Article 13(2) 
TEU, which embodies the principle of institutional balance by affirming that “each 
institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties”. 
This argument has its merits, since the programming of external action instruments 
should undoubtedly be performed by the Commission, through the exercise of its 
competence of policy implementation (Article 17 TEU and Article 291(2) TFEU).487 
These concerns are partially assuaged by the fact that the EEAS Decision never 
intended to entrust the EEAS with any such competence, simply because the EEAS 
remains a service, which assists a Union organ, that is to say the High 
Representative.488 The EEAS was merely entrusted with the task of assisting the 
HR/VP and the Commission as a whole, and it was treated as a de facto 
Commission service, to the extent that, during its activities in this area, the Service 
must follow the Commission’s procedures.489 It may be excluded, therefore, that the 
entrustment of programming responsibilities on the EEAS embodies a transfer of 
competence.  
                                                 
485  Van Reisen, Note on the legality of inclusion of aspects of EU Development Cooperation and 
Humanitarian Assistance in the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Europe External Policy 
Advisors, 2010); in this sense, see also Legal Advice Prepared by White & Case LLP to CAFOD 
(Catholic Agency For Overseas Development and CIDSE (an international alliance of Catholic 
development agencies), 16 April 2010, available at 
http://www.eepa.be/wcm/dmdocuments/CAFOD_CIDSE_memo_EEAS.pdf. 
486 Indeed, “By way of analogy with the EU’s common commercial policy, responsibility for 
development cooperation activities falls solely within the competence of the Commission”, Legal 
Advice Prepared by White & Case LLP to CAFOD, par. 3.9. 
487 The Commission may also exercise its power to adopt delegated acts, under Article 290 TFEU; 
however, the nature of the final act does not affect the allocation of responsibilities on the 
Commission. 
488 In this sense, see Van Vooren, op. cit. 
489 Art 9(3) EEAS Decision. 
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It is still possible, nevertheless, that the EEAS' activity in the Commission impinges 
on the exercise of the latter's powers, in violation of the institutional balance set by 
the Treaties. Even if the EEAS is not formally entrusted with any competence, it is 
true that its intervention in the programming of external action instruments may 
influence the priorities of the EU’s cooperation with third countries. Programming 
documents are elaborated by relying on the expertise of numerous trained officers, 
and their counterparts in other states and organisations. Therefore, it would be 
impossible for the College of the Commissioners to enter into the details of the 
instruments’ programming in order to question the judgement of the services that 
prepared them. Since the Commission should be the only entity setting the 
priorities of international cooperation during the implementation phase, it may be 
argued that the EEAS’ intervention in this area questions institutional balance in 
practice, even if the Commission’s competences remain formally intact. Even this 
argument, however, does not appear to be completely convincing, in so far as it 
does not take into consideration one of the main responsibilities of the High 
Representative: coordinating the EU’s external relations (Articles 18(4) and 21(3) 
TEU). In this sense, Duke and Blockmans argued that, if the HR could not 
participate in the setting of the priorities for international cooperation, (s)he would 
hardly be able to ensure the coherence of international cooperation with other 
policies, and namely the CFSP. 490 Therefore, a systemic interpretation of Articles 
18(4), 21 and 13(2) TEU, informed by the principle of external action coherence, is 
sufficient to exclude a violation of institutional balance by the EEAS Decision.  
Secondly, the EEAS’ intervention in the management of the instruments’ 
programming may be considered as a violation of the organisational autonomy of 
the European Commission. This autonomy is embodied in Article 248 TFEU, 
according to which the responsibilities incumbent upon the Commission are 
structured and allocated among its members by its President. Since the EEAS 
Decision, which was adopted by the Council, clearly allocates Commission 
responsibilities on the HR and his/her Service, it may theoretically be seen as 
violating Article 248 TFEU. Such interference with the Commission's 
organisational autonomy may however be justified by the fact that the Treaties 
already allocate certain responsibilities on the EEAS, albeit implicitly. The EEAS' 
responsibilities in the Commission may be partially justified on the basis of Article 
18(4) TEU, which sets the HR/VP's functions in the Commission, since the Service 
assists the High Representative/Vice-President in the programming of instruments 
such as the IfS, the EIDHR and the INSC.  
Article 18(4) TEU, however, does not explain why the Council may, through the 
Decision establishing the EEAS, determine the Service's capacity to assist also the 
Commissioners for Development and Enlargement, in respect of instruments such 
as the EDF, the DCI and the ENPI. It may be hypothesised that the entrustment of 
such programming responsibilities on the EEAS depends on a systemic reading of 
Article 248 TFEU with Articles 21(3) TEU and 7 TFEU, which provide for the 
principle of coherence, since, if Article 248 TFEU were interpreted literally, as to 
exclude the capability for the Council to mandate the EEAS to assist the 
Commission at large, the latter may exclude the Service from its activities, thus 
jeopardising coordination and, ultimately, coherence. Such reading of the Treaties 
                                                 
490 Cf. Duke and Blockmans, The Lisbon Treaty Stipulations on Development Cooperation and the 
Council Decision of 25 March 2010 (Draft) Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the 
European External Action Service (European Institute of Public Administration, 2010), p. 10. 
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appears to be in line with the spirit of the Lisbon reform, which calls for 
coordination transversally to the different policies of the Union.  
5. The 'Implementation’ of External Action Instruments 
In the phase commonly referred to as ‘implementation’ EU bodies put the 
principles contained in strategic instruments into practice. It must be stressed that 
the ‘implementation’ of external action instruments, as defined above, is comprised 
within the ‘implementation’ of Union policies, ex Article 291 TFEU. This lexical 
contradiction is unavoidable, given the widespread usage of these formulas; the 
context will however clarify the meaning of the term. 
The implementation of external action instruments is performed by the 
Commission, by exercising the power of execution (Article 291(2) TFEU) and 
budget implementation (Article 317 TFEU), and it is commonly divided in five 
stages. In the first and second stages, known as ‘identification’ and ‘formulation’, 
Commission services identify the projects to be financed, by consulting the 
intended beneficiaries of each action. The proposed interventions are normally 
screened, through the usual ‘quality control’, performed through the interservice 
Quality Support Group, interservice consultation and comitology. 491  In the third 
phase, generally referred to as ‘financing’, Commission services request the College 
of the Commissioners to adopt such proposals.492 In the fourth phase, 'financial 
implementation', the Commission decision indicates the way the project is given 
financial implementation.493 The Commission may entrust financial 
implementation tasks directly on its officers, either in Headquarters or in 
Delegations. In this case, an officer authorised by the Commission, the so-called 
‘authorising officer by delegation’ is in charge of procedures and of signing 
contracts/agreements with third parties, such as grants or procurement contracts, 
and (s)he authorises the disbursement of EU funds.494 When performing these 
functions, the authorising officer by delegation must ensure that the budgetary 
principles of the EU are complied with, namely in respect of sound financial 
management. The Commission may also decide to entrust the financial 
implementation of an action to entities such as beneficiary countries, international 
organisations or national bodies from donor countries.495 In the fifth stage, 
                                                 
491 The present description refers to the implementation of cooperation through ‘projects’, and not 
through budget support, which functions through different modalities. This choice is motivated by 
the fact that the largest part of EU cooperation is still implemented through projects and the 
EEAS/Foreign Policy Instrument Service (FPI) are scarcely involved in budget support activities: 
among the instruments implemented by the FPI, only the IfS allows for budget support. On the FPI, 
see below. 
492 The proposed project are normally adopted through an Annual Action Programme (AAP), that is 
to say a single decision for all projects financed under a country, regional or thematic programme 
during the same year. 
493 Commission documents generally refer to this phase as ‘implementation’; we prefer the use of the 
‘financial implementation’ formula since it is more univocal and it reflects the nature of the activity 
and the Commission’s power concerned, cf. Article 317 TFEU. 
494 More precisely, the Authorising Officer by delegation is generally the Director-General of a 
Commission service, who may also subdelegate his/her powers to directors, who in turn may 
subdelegate certain implementation tasks. 
495 According to the spirit of the reform of the management of external assistance of 2000, such 
‘decentralisation’ is a desirable objective, though it is not appropriate in every partner country. The 
delegation of budget-implementation tasks to third entities has an impact on the nature of work 
carried out by the services of the European Commission. The focus of the assessments of the country 
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‘evaluation’, Commission services evaluate the cooperation with third countries, 
thereby making an assessment of projects, programmes or policies, their design and 
results. In principle, the results of this evaluation should be incorporated into the 
subsequent decision-making. 
Between 2000 and 2009, the implementation of external action instruments was 
entrusted on Commission DG AIDO, which was placed under the responsibility of 
the Commissioner for external relations.496 Hence, the programming and 
implementation of development cooperation were allocated on DG RELEX/DEV 
and DG AIDCO, respectively. In order to coordinate their activities, the services 
responsible for programming and implementation consulted each other at all 
stages. At the same time, DG ELARG gave implementation to the Instrument for 
pre-Accession, and DG RELEX implemented a few programmes, including the 
short-term part of the Instrument for Stability. Therefore, these instruments and 
programmes were programmed and implemented by the same service. 
Also Commission Delegations played a pivotal role in the implementation of 
external action instruments: whereas the responsibility for programming was 
considered to be more effectively allocated upon Commission headquarters, 
implementation tasks were often entrusted on Delegations. According to the so-
called ‘devolution’ (or ‘deconcentration’) process “anything that can be better 
managed and decided on the spot, close to what is happening on the ground, should 
not be managed or decided in Brussels”.497 DG AIDCO was consequently 
extensively represented in Delegations by its officers, who worked under the 
authority of the Head of Delegation (who, in turn, belonged to DG RELEX). In most 
cases, the Head of Delegation was also responsible for financial implementation; to 
this end, (s)he was delegated budget implementation powers by the Commission. In 
other words, the Head of Delegation was also authorising officer by delegation. 
6. EEAS' Indirect Involvement in the Implementation phase  
A cursory reading of the EEAS Decision may suggest that the Service is only 
indirectly involved in the implementation of external action instruments, since the 
Decision does not entrust the Service with any responsibility in this area. As in the 
case of programming, the EEAS can use two channels to indirectly influence the 
implementation of external cooperation. First, the Service is consulted by the 
Commission services responsible for implementation, in order to ensure the 
coordination between programming and implementation. In particular, the EEAS is 
consulted through inter-service consultation before the financing phase of 
'implementation'. The Service may also instruct the High Representative to 
support, or oppose, certain implementing measures in the College of the 
Commissioners. Second, the Service can influence implementation through the 
activity of its officers in Delegations, and namely through the Head of Delegation. 
In the ‘identification’ phase, Delegations provide the substantial input for the draft 
                                                                                                                                               
systems is consequently more narrowly focused on the procedures and entities that are involved in 
the management of the specific project or programme. 
496 Before the reform of the management of external assistance performed in 2000, the services 
responsible for programming (DG RELEX and DG DEV) managed also the identification, 
formulation and financing phases, whereas the Common Service for External Relations, created in 
1998, was responsible for financial implementation and evaluation. 
497 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament concerning the 
Development of the External Service 2000. 
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project proposals; this activity falls under the responsibility of Commission 
services, but EEAS officers may support it through their expertise. The Head of 
Delegation, in particular, oversees this part of implementation, since he/she has 
authority over all Delegation officers and he/she is responsible for the dialogue with 
third subjects, which is preliminary to the ‘identification’ phase. Moreover, Heads 
of Delegation give financial implementation to EU assistance, since, like the HoD of 
Commission Delegations, new Heads of Delegation are entrusted with budget 
implementation powers by the Commission.498 Hence, they are responsible for the 
decisions involving expenditure to be charged to the EU’s budget (as well as to the 
EDF), they must comply with Commission rules and procedures and they must 
report to Commission services. This implies that the HoD may also be held 
responsible for the violation of Commission rules and procedures, and (s)he may be 
subject to disciplinary measures.  
It may be hypothesised that, in parallel with the process of programming, there 
should be also a ‘direct’ involvement of the EEAS in the implementation of external 
action instruments. Such parallelism, however, is not confirmed in practice. After 
the Lisbon reform, implementation tasks have consistently been entrusted on the 
bodies that manage the instruments’ programming, in order to foster coherence 
throughout the policy cycle and discourage internal conflicts. Thus, the new DG 
DEVCO, which programmes (either autonomously or with the EEAS) most external 
action instruments, was tasked with their implementation and DG ELARG 
maintained its implementation responsibilities in respect of the IPA. The EEAS, 
however, was not entrusted with any implementation responsibility, not in even in 
the areas where it enjoys autonomous programming responsibilities (IfS, ICI). 
The choice not to entrust the EEAS with implementation does not appear to be 
motivated by legal motives. If it is accepted that the treaties allow the EEAS to 
participate in the programming of external action instruments, it must be 
concluded that they do not hinder its exercise of implementation tasks, at least as 
long as the ensuing decisions are formally adopted by the College of the 
Commissioners. As demonstrated by the case of Heads of Delegation, certain EEAS 
officers actually give implementation to the operative lines of the EU’s budget: it 
would be sufficient to adopt an amendment to the financial regulation in order to 
enable the Commission to delegate this task to any EEAS officer.499 It is 
presumable, therefore, that the legislator did not grant any implementation 
responsibility to the EEAS for political reasons, and more precisely because of the 
opposition of the Commission.  
The entrustment of implementation duties on a department completely separate 
from the EEAS, however, would have risked jeopardising coherence in the 
management of certain external instruments, namely those entirely programmed by 
the Service. In order to balance the Commission’s priorities against the need for 
coherence in the management of external action instruments, the legislator 
elaborated a compromise: the creation of a ‘hybrid’ service. Article 9(6) EEAS 
Decision foresees the creation of a Commission department responsible for the 
                                                 
498 Council regulation 1605/2002/EU/Euratom of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, following its amendment by the 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010, as regards the European External Action Service, Article 51: “the Commission may 
delegate its powers of budget implementation concerning the operational appropriations of its own 
section to the Heads of Union Delegations”. 
499 Indeed, such an amendment already allows for the delegation of budget implementation powers to 
a specific EEAS officer, that is to say the Head of Delegation, see above. 
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“financial implementation” of instruments programmed by the EEAS, i.e. the ICI, 
election observation (under the EIDHR), and the short-term part of the IfS. At the 
same time, this new Commission department is under the authority of the High 
Representative, in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, and 
should be “co-located with the EEAS”. The Commission established such 
department in October 2010, by creating the service for Foreign Policy Instruments 
(FPI),500 through the transfer of some units, or parts thereof, formerly belonging to 
DG RELEX and DG AIDCO.501 Although the EEAS Decision affirms that this 
Commission department should have been entrusted with the ‘financial 
implementation’ of external action instruments and programmes, the FPI conducts 
all the implementation phases. This means that the FPI is to the EEAS what AIDCO 
used to be to DG DEV/RELEX. This is testified by the fact the FPI is the only 
Commission department that is consulted by the EEAS in the programming of the 
ICI, election monitoring and the short-term part of the IfS.  
The creation of the FPI raises political and legal issues. In a political perspective, it 
may be wondered whether the FPI can bring more coordination, or is rather likely 
to generate conflicts. Since both the EEAS and the FPI are under the authority of 
the HR/VP, and they are located in the same premises, it may be argued that their 
cooperation may be more effective than the cooperation between DG DEV/RELEX 
and DG AIDCO in the past. The ‘hybrid’ nature of the FPI, however, may be 
problematic. The FPI is a small service whose activities are functional to the 
performance of the task of the EEAS. The EEAS may thus tend to see the FPI as a 
mere ‘service provider’, while the FPI may desire to maintain a certain political 
autonomy. This contradiction may complicate the relation between the two 
services; in this respect, anecdotic evidence is still mixed.502 The creation of the FPI 
may also create conflicts with DG DEVCO, since the two services perform similar 
functions. The smaller FPI may be perceived as a competitor by the bigger DEVCO, 
especially because of the ‘special relation’ that exists between the FPI and the EEAS. 
It would seem that DG DEVCO was not very collaborative towards the FPI at first, 
since it instructed its officers in Delegations not to perform the tasks entrusted 
upon the FPI. Such instruction was perceived as hostile by the FPI, since the latter 
has relatively few officers in delegations, and it can hardly perform the functions it 
has been entrusted with in all third countries.503  
In a legal perspective, the creation of the FPI raises three sources of concern, 
relating to institutional balance, the Commission's organisational autonomy and 
the delimitation of the EEAS' duties. Being part of the Commission, the FPI 
evidently does not challenge the institutional balance. It may however question the 
organisational autonomy of the Commission, which did not freely decide upon its 
creation and responsibilities. As in the case of the EEAS' programming 
                                                 
500 The FPI was originally knows as FPIS. 
501 See Décision de la Commission - Organigramme pour le nouveau FPIS (Foreign Policy Instrument 
Service), SEC(2010)1307/3, 29 October 2010, not published in the O.J. 
502 While a FPI officer affirmed that the FPI tends to conflict with the EEAS “over how money should 
be managed”, a two EEAS officers denied the existence of any problem in this respect. Interviews 
conducted in March-June 2012. 
503 Case-by-case solutions are presently being found on the spot, but, even if other Commission 
services gave implementation to the instruments under the responsibility of the FPI, the situation 
would not be unproblematic: as shown above, such instruments are ‘political’ in nature, and they 
should consequently be managed by officers dealing with ‘political’ aspects within Delegations. The 
only efficient solution, therefore, would be either to increase the FPI staff in Delegations or entrust 
implementing responsibilities on the EEAS, via an amendment of the financial regulation. 
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responsibilities, however, it may be argued that the principle of coherence justifies a 
partial compression of the Commission's autonomy also in this case. Finally, it may 
be wondered whether the creation of the FPI contradicts Article 27(3) TEU, 
whereby "in fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a 
European External Action Service". Since neither Article 27(3) TEU, nor any other 
Treaty provision, ever refers to the possibility of setting up another service of the 
HR/VP, it may be argued that the creation of the FPI does run counter the letter of 
the Treaties. An appraisal of Article 27(3) TEU in light of the principle of coherence 
further reinforces this finding: the existence of a Commission service closely tied, 
but separate, from the EEAS is an expression of the desire to delimit, rather than 
coordinate, European foreign polices. Since no legal obstacle prevents the merging 
of the FPI and the EEAS in the future, but the principle of coherence actually 
requests it, it may be argued that such course of action should be pursued in the 
near future.  
 
* 
 
* * 
 
The EEAS plays a pivotal role in the management of cooperation with third 
countries, even if the Service is not part of the institution that is responsible for the 
execution of this policy, that is to say the Commission. The EEAS can indirectly 
influence the programming and implementation of external action instruments 
through the exercise of its responsibilities as a de facto Commission service, and by 
sending instructions to Heads of Delegation, who play a significant role in the 
programming and implementation of the most relevant instruments. The EEAS has 
also direct means of influence on the programming of external action instruments 
and programmes. Similarly, the EEAS can exert significant influence on the 
implementation of external action instruments through the Service Foreign Policy 
Instruments, a ‘hybrid’ Commission service closely linked to the EEAS.  
The principle of external action coherence seems to be capable of justifying the 
EEAS’ involvement in the management of the cooperation with third countries. The 
drafters of the EEAS Decision appear to have interpreted the Commission’s 
organisational autonomy and the principle of institutional balance in light of the 
principle of coherence, in order to enable the Service to bring about coordination in 
its activities in the Institution, where its contribution is most likely to be effective. 
By doing so, the legislator demonstrated its intention to weave together the 
intergovernmental and Community approaches in a pragmatic manner, and not 
according to institutional dogma, as required by the Union method.  
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 3 
This chapter sought to demonstrate that the EEAS can enhance coordination in 
policy management, and thus contribute to external action coherence. The Service 
participates in the exertion of the legislative and executive power in a significant 
manner, by fostering consensus in the Council and promoting dialogue within the 
ranks of the Commission. The effectiveness of its action is further reinforced by the 
fact that its duties often are not delimited by relying on institutional dogma, but 
they are actually determined on the basis of pragmatic considerations. Thus the 
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Service was given a particularly strong influence on the activities of the Council that 
are closest to the 'core business' of the EEAS, that is to say diplomacy and the 
conduct of the CFSP. The Service has also particularly strong responsibilities in the 
Commission with respect to non-CFSP issues that are functionally close to the CFSP 
itself. It is apparent that such pragmatic approach is rendered possible by the 
interpretation of primary law in light of external action coherence, as well as by the 
characterisation of the EEAS as a 'service', that is not part to the EU's institutional 
balance, and which can be integrated in the structure of other bodies.  
It is also apparent that, when EU institutions rigidly insist on the delimitation of 
EU's bodies competences, the EEAS' potential may be hampered. This is rendered 
evident by the case of the Commission, where the EEAS is not given a significant 
role in the coordination of external relations commissioners and, more generally, is 
not entrusted with the management of most non-CFSP activities. The Commission's 
concern for delimitation may be understandable, at present, since the uncertainties 
surrounding the EEAS' identity may raise some distrust. If the EEAS proves capable 
of increasing coordination in practice, however, its responsibilities should be 
augmented. Similarly, if delimitation proves problematic in practice, an increase in 
the EEAS' role should be granted, for the purpose of fostering coordination. 
Probably, this should be the case of external action instruments implementation, 
since the present division between the FPI and the EEAS seems hardly capable of 
promoting coordination in policy management.  
The enlargement of the EEAS' tasks may come through a revision of the EEAS 
Decision. This course of action would however be problematic, since the Council 
and the Commission would have to approve it, and they would ultimately undertake 
a further exercise of delimitation. It would be desirable, on the contrary, that EU 
institutions accept the EEAS' potential, and voluntarily permit it to expand its role 
in their own structures. It is for the EEAS, therefore, to demonstrate its added 
value, in order to obtain the instruments necessary to effectively perform its own 
duties. To the Service, from which much is required, much might be given. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EEAS AND EXTERNAL 
REPRESENTATION: PROMOTING 
UNITY 
The first chapter demonstrated that, in the practice, EU policy makers seek to 
increase coherence in European foreign policies also by enhancing unity in 
international representation, as to finally address the eternally unanswered 
question "who do I call if I want to call Europe?". This chapter seeks to show that 
the EEAS contributes also to this dimension of external action coherence, and is 
divided in three sections. The first presents the fragmentation of EU external 
representation and delineates the potential and limits of the EEAS as a coordinator 
in this field. Section 2 introduces a particular ambit of EU external representation, 
that is to say diplomacy, and it shows that the EU is showing great potential in this 
area. These findings are built upon in section 3, where the analysis intends to 
demonstrate that the peculiarities of diplomacy, as a sector of external 
representation, motivate the choice of the legislator to entrust the EEAS with a 
crucial role in this ambit.  
SECTION 1 – PARTIALLY COMPENSATING FOR FRAGMENTATION IN 
EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION 
1. The Persisting Fragmentation of External Representation  
As noted in chapter 1, European external representation suffers from severe 
fragmentation. The delimitation of competences entailed by the principle of 
conferral engenders division in representation lato sensu, thus meaning the process 
and framework in which the EU and its Members express their position(s), and 
stricto sensu, that is to say in the deliverance of the EU's message. There is no need 
to further discuss the persistence of fragmentation in the wide meaning of the 
concept, since the first chapter already clarified the potential and limits of the 
Lisbon Treaty in this respect. It is more interesting to note that the arrangements 
concerning representation stricto sensu have been significantly changed by the 
recent reform, and they may lead to an effective streamlining of representation 
arrangements.  
The Treaties provide for a general rule for EU external representation, contained in 
Article 17(1) TEU, according to which “with the exception of the common foreign 
and security policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties, [the Commission] 
shall ensure the Union’s external representation.” The first exception to this rule is 
 138 
contained in Article 27(2) TEU, whereby "the High Representative shall represent 
the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy.” A second 
exception, which complements the first, is contained in Article 15(6) TEU, which 
affirms that the President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that 
capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its 
common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
It is evident, therefore, that the EU's external representation generally follows a 
'dualistic' scheme. In the non-CFSP domain, external representation is ensured by 
the Commission. In the CFSP area, external representation is provided for by the 
High Representative, at ministerial level, and by the President of the European 
Council, at head of State level. Needless to say, such division of competences is 
likely to generate controversies: the President of the Commission and the President 
of the European Council, for instance, are entitled to participate contemporarily in 
all the summits that concern both non-CFSP issues (such as economic governance) 
and CFSP aspects (e.g. peace and war). In practice, M. Barroso and H. Van Rompuy 
participated at the same time in the last G8 and G20 summits. The same dichotomy 
may exist also at ministerial level, since the HR represents the EU in the CFSP area, 
while Commissioners perform the same role in the non-CFSP field. It is true that 
the HR might also represent the EU qua Vice-President of the Commission, thus 
cumulating his/her powers and those of the Commission, but this possibility 
remains dependent on a choice of the College of the Commissioners. 
The fragmentation of EU external representation depends also on the fact that 
other actors perform representation functions either on the basis of specific Treaty 
provisions, praeter legem, or contra legem. Certain primary law provisions provide 
for specific arrangements concerning external representation. In particular, Article 
138(2) TFEU enables the European Central Bank to represent the Union in the 
conclusion of agreements in the monetary field and Article 221(1) TFEU enables 
Union Delegations to represent the Union in third countries and at international 
organisations. Even when specific norms do not enable certain entities to function 
as representatives, they may exert such power on the basis of other competences. 
This is mainly the case of the Member States and, in particular, the Rotating 
Presidency. Before the Lisbon reform, the Rotating Presidency used to represent 
the Union with respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, as well as in the signing of 
numerous international agreements. In theory, the Treaties no longer contain any 
provision which allows the Rotating Presidency, or any other Member State, to 
perform representative functions. In practice, the Member States maintain 
representative functions in three ambits. They represent the Union in multilateral 
fora open only to States, such as the Security Council. Moreover, the presidency 
negotiates mixed agreements on behalf of the Member States. Finally, the Council 
often enables the rotating presidency to sign international agreements on behalf of 
the EU. This last practice is justified by the Council on the basis of an extensive 
reading of its competence to authorise the signing of international agreements.504 It 
may be argued, however, that it runs counter to Articles 17 and 27 TEU, since it 
questions the Commission and HR's competence to represent the Union.505 
                                                 
504 See e.g. Council Decision 2010/615/EU of 17 May 2010, O.J. 2010, L 271/1, Article 1 and Council 
Decision 2011/189/EU of 24 June 2010, O.J. 2012, L 081/1, Article 2. 
505 Arguably, the systemic interpretation of the Treaties provided for in Article 1(2) TFEU requires 
Article 218(5) TFEU to be read consistently with Article 17 and 27 TEU. These Articles clearly state 
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The existence of representation regimes challenging the distribution of 
representation competences set in the Treaties is not exceptional. This was 
rendered most evident by the awarding of the Peace Nobel Prize to the EU. As soon 
as such awarding was rendered public, all major EU political bodies and offices 
issued a communiqué (which may be seen as a form of external representation). A 
statement came from the Rotating Presidency, another from the European 
Parliament, a third from the High Representative, a fourth from the President of 
the European Council, a fifth from the President of the Commission, and a sixth 
from…the two Presidents together.506 The plurality of European representatives 
extended also the participation in the Nobel Ceremony in Oslo. According to the 
Treaties, both H. Van Rompuy and M. Barroso should have been present, since the 
'presidential couple' ensures the EU representation at the highest level. In practice, 
however, the Parliament imposed the presence of its President on the Nobel's stage, 
notwithstanding the absence of competences of representation for this 
Institution.507 In order to compensate for such partial disregard for the Treaties, the 
three Presidents reached a pragmatic solution, whereby only Presidents Van 
Rompuy and Barroso delivered a speech on behalf of the EU. 
2. The EEAS as a 'Unifier' in International Representation 
Numerous solutions have been identified in the practice to promote unity in 
international representation. The most important probably is provided for by mixed 
agreements, analysed in chapter 1, which allow for the simultaneous representation 
of the EU and its Members in the conclusion of an international instrument. The 
recent introduction of Cross-Treaty agreements, thanks to the new wording of 
Article 218 TFEU, allows for further unity, since CFSP and non-CFSP issues can be 
simultaneously contained in the same international instrument. Such result may be 
magnified in practice by the simultaneous participation of the Member States and 
the EU in the conclusion of such agreements, thus engendering the new category of 
'cross-Treaty mixed agreements'.  
Solutions for the promotion of unity are often fostered also with respect to external 
representation stricto sensu. The EU negotiator (the Commission) normally 
entrusted with the Member States' representation in the conclusion of mixed 
agreements. Even in the case of a bicephalous representation (Commission-
Rotating Presidency), the conclusion of practical arrangements between the two 
negotiators allows for increased coordination of their activity,508 either by 
                                                                                                                                               
that the Commission and the High Representative represent the Union. As recalled above, the subject 
that signs an international agreement is the representative of its sending subject. Therefore, the 
identification of the EU signer must follow the general rules concerning Union representation, 
contained in Article 17 and 27 TEU. See Gatti and Manzini, op. cit., p. 1726. 
506 See Gatti, "Who do I call if I want to give Europe a Nobel Prize?", EJIL Talk!, 14 October 2012, 
http://www.ejiltalk.org. 
507 Cf. Rossi, "Il valore del Nobel all'UE", Affari Internazionali, 22 October 2012, 
http://www.affarinternazionali.it: "La questione è però politica oltre che giuridica e merita soluzioni 
comprensibili, sia per i cittadini che agli occhi del mondo. Sebbene il Parlamento europeo non abbia 
alcun potere di rappresentare l’Ue sul piano esterno, una delegazione che comprenda i tre Presidenti 
(del Consiglio europeo, della Commissione e del Parlamento europeo) potrebbe forse meglio 
rappresentare l’unità istituzionale dell’Ue." 
508 See the judgement C-25/94, Commission v. Council, [1996] ECR I-1469, paras. 48–49 
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delimiting their sphere of intervention,509 or by allowing for the identification of a 
single speaker.510 The issue of coordination is felt also at EU-only level. For 
instance, the President of the European Council and the President of the 
Commission need to reach some kind of compromise as to the EU's representation, 
namely in the case of international summits, since bicephalous arrangements may 
not always be acceptable. Thus, in 2010 it was accepted that Barroso's aides (the so-
called 'sherpas') would have prepared the work of both presidents in view of the 
G20, while Van Rompuy's aides would have done the same for the G8. More 
generally, it has also been reported that the two Presidents decided on a case-by-
case basis who was to take the floor on behalf of the Union.511 It may seem that at 
ministerial level the potential for unity is more evident, since the HR(VP) may truly 
embody the unity of EU external representation. In practice, however, the 
Commission has been less than enthusiast about giving the HR representation 
responsibilities in the non-CFSP area, presumably because of the Institution's 
desire to protect its competences. May the EEAS contribute to solve this deadlock, 
and promote unity at administrative level? 
A cursory reading of primary and secondary law may suggest that the EEAS has no 
particular advantage over the HR. Since the former 'assists' the latter, and has not 
additional competence of its own, it may be expected not to bring about additional 
unity. There are, however, at least two benefits the EEAS may bring about. In a 
political viewpoint, the intervention of the Service is much less evident than that of 
the High Representative. For instance, the public opinion is well aware of the 
identity of the signer of international agreements, which is often a ministerial 
representative,512 but it can hardly realise which administrative-level officers 
actually negotiated an agreement.513 Thus the delegation of representation powers 
from the Commission to the EEAS may be politically more acceptable than the 
same delegation to the High Representative. The practice already provides for 
limited evidence in this sense: while the Commission has not wilfully delegated 
much of its powers to the HR, it seems to have allowed the EEAS to perform 
negotiating activities in its own area of competence. In at least one case of Cross-
Treaty mixed negotiation, the Commission and the EEAS reached a compromise 
whereby they distributed the negotiating tasks on the basis of the 'political' salience 
of each issue: the Commission intervened in 'technical' areas, leaving politically-
                                                 
509 Cf. Code of conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission on the UNESCO 
negotiations on the draft Convention on the protection of the diversity of cultural contents and 
artistic expressions, Council doc. 5768/05, of 31 Jan. 2005.  
510 For instance, the PROBA 20 arrangement, concluded by the Commission and Member States, 
provided for the creation of a single delegation representing both the EC and its Members. In other 
words, the EC and its Members participated in the negotiation through a common organ ad hoc. The 
PROBA 20 arrangement concerns negotiation in a multilateral forum, but it may apply to our subject 
by analogy. The arrangement is cited in Völker and Steenbergen, Leading Cases and Materials on the 
External Relations Law of the e.C., With Emphasis on the Common Commercial Policy (Kluwer Law 
and Taxation, 1985), pp. 48–51. 
511 De Baere and Orbic, "The European Union in the Gx System", in Jorgensen and Laatikainen (eds), 
Routledge Handbook On the European Union and International Institutions – Performance, Policy, 
Power (Routledge, 2012), pp. 311-323, at p. 314. 
512 On the distinction between the representation of international subjects in the negotiation and 
signature of international agreements, see, inter alia, Tanzi, Introduzione al diritto internazionale 
contemporaneo (CEDAM, 2010), pp. 127–128. 
513 The high visibility of the EU's signer may also contribute to explain why the Member States insist 
on maintaing the Rotating Presidency's role in this area, after the Lisbon reform, once it should 
probably be abandoned, see Gatti and Manzini, op. cit., p. 1728. 
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sensitive topics, in CFSP and non-CFSP fields alike, to the EEAS.514 However, this 
sort of practice does not appear to be generalised for the time being, presumably 
because of lack of mutual trust between the Commission and the EEAS. Probably 
the legislator foresaw this issue, and it enforced unity where it is most necessary, 
that is to say in diplomatic representation.  
SECTION 2 – A SINGULAR FORM OF EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION: 
INTRODUCING EU DIPLOMACY 
The capacity of the Union to conduct diplomatic relations requires careful 
qualification. The very term “diplomacy” is not unequivocal. It may generally be 
defined as the political process whereby political entities establish and maintain 
official relations with one another, in pursuing their respective objectives in the 
international environment.515 In legal terms, it is more precisely conceived as the 
organs (the diplomatic missions) and the physical persons (the diplomatic agents) 
which conduct such activities on behalf of States.516 The use of the word “State” in 
this context is significant, in so far as diplomacy, as it is usually referred to in 
international law, is a States’ prerogative. The progressive affirmation of non-State 
actors on the international scene questioned the States’ monopoly of diplomacy. In 
particular, the twentieth century saw the progressive establishment of a sui generis 
diplomacy conducted by international organisations. The European Communities 
have always been at the forefront of this evolution. The post-Lisbon Union 
“diplomacy” is, many respects, a development of the EC’s advanced para-
diplomacy, although it also displays significant differences. 
This section investigates the nature of the EU’s diplomatic relations by analysing its 
capacity to send and receive diplomatic missions. This analysis will begin with a 
general description of the so-called right of legation of States, while paragraph 2 
turns to the right of legation of international organisations and paragraph 3 
provides for an analysis of the EU right of legation. Paragraph 4 concludes the 
investigation, by providing for an account of the practice of EU diplomatic 
relations. 
                                                 
514 This is the case of the framework agreement with Canada, presently being negotiated (see Council 
doc. 16964/11 and 
17037/11, not published, 30 Nov. 2011), as reported by a Commission officer in September 2012. 
515 See Plischke, Instruction in Diplomacy: the Liberal Arts Approach (American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 1972)., p. 20. See, in this sense, also Calvo, Dictionnaire manuel de 
diplomatie et de droit international public et privé (ed. Lawbook Exchange, 2009 – original edition 
Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1885), p. 137: "la diplomatie est la science des relations qui existent entre 
les divers Etats, telles qu'elles résultent de leurs intérets réciproques, des principes du droit 
international et des stipulations des traits ou des conventions." See also the generic definition of 
diplomacy provided for by Nahlik, Development of Diplomatic Law – Selected Problems (Hague 
Academy of International Law, 1990), p. 202: "diplomacy means the activities of States, in some 
cases also of other subjects of international law, in their mutual official relations. In this meaning, it 
can be said to constitute the main tool of the foreign policy of a State." For an historical overview of 
the development of diplomacy and diplomatic law, see Stuart, Le Droit et La Pratique Diplomatiques 
et Consulaires (Hague Academy of International Law, 1934), pp. 5 ff.  
516 In this sense, see Nahlik, op. cit., p. 202.  
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1. The 'Right of Legation' of States 
The ability to exchange representatives is one of the traditional prerogatives of 
sovereign subjects, which derives from the right of monarchs to exchange 
representatives.517 This ability is traditionally referred to as “right of legation” or ius 
legationis.  
It is preliminarily necessary to verify whether the 'right of legation' is a right stricto 
sensu. Ancient texts support this view: Vattel, for instance, affirmed that every 
sovereign State has a right to send and to receive public ministers.518 The ius 
legationis was thus considered as a right stricto sensu, which derived from the 
principle of the ius gentium whereby there must be a minimum degree of relations 
between States (ius communicandi).519 Such interpretation has a merit, in so far as 
it stresses the objective of the diplomatic intercourse: fostering the communication 
between States and, ultimately, promoting their peaceful coexistence. 
Notwithstanding its advantages, such interpretation of the right of legation is 
rejected by contemporary authors, who argue that legation is not a 'right' stricto 
sensu, since it does not imply any correlative obligation on the part of other States 
to receive (or send) diplomatic envoys.520 In fact, the establishment of a diplomatic 
mission impinges on the sovereignty of the receiving State, which must 
consequently be able to oppose the establishment of the mission. The discretion in 
this ambit is testified by the 1961 Vienna Convention, which unequivocally affirms 
that “the establishment of […] permanent diplomatic missions takes place by 
mutual consent”.521 Therefore, it has been affirmed that it would be more logical to 
replace the word 'right' by 'faculty'.522 Since a discussion on the exact limits of the 
'right' of legation exceeds the scope of the present analysis, and the traditional 
formulation 'right of legation' is generally used also today (even by those who reject 
its literal interpretation), we maintain the traditional definition here.  
Who can exercise the right of legation? There is no doubt that States, being the 
main (and original) international actors, can certainly send and receive permanent 
diplomatic missions. In fact, the 1961 Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations 
applies to inter-State relations. This implies that the exercise of the right of legation 
has two prerequisites: statehood, that is to say internal and external sovereignty, 
and mutual recognition. The exercise of the right of legation in practice, therefore, 
testifies the mutual recognition of the parties that enter into the diplomatic 
intercourse,523 thus potentially contributing to the ultimate success of an entity in 
                                                 
517 Dembinski, Modern Law of Diplomacy: External Missions of States and International 
Organizations (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 29. 
518 Vattel, Le droit des gens, (edition Joseph Chitty and Edward D. Ingraham, 1883),  Book IV, 
Chapter 5, §57.  
519 For a discussion of this theory, see Reichling, Le Droit de Legation Des Communautés 
Européennes (UGA, 1964), p. 12. 
520 In this sense, see inter alia Reichling, op. cit.; Nahlik, op. cit., p. 202, note 5; Salmon, Manuel de 
Droit Diplomatique (Bruylant, 1994), pp. 27-28. 
521 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, UNTS vol. 500, p. 95. 
522 Erice and O'Shea, Derecho Diplomático (Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1954), p. 101. 
523 Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary On the Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations 
(Oxford University Press, 2008). It is worth specifying that recognition, the establishment of 
diplomatic relations and the establishment of permanent representations (i.e. the exercise of the jus 
legationis) are different legal phenomena, even if they can be contemporary: States can recognise 
each other without entering into diplomatic relations, and, if even when they do, they can conduct 
them through channels different from permanent diplomatic representations. 
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being accepted as a State by the international community.524 In other words, the 
States whose legal status is disputed can exercise the right of legation in so far as 
other States are willing to recognise them and support their claim for statehood in 
practice.  
It remains to be seen whether the right of legation has a precise content. The notion 
of 'right of legation' stricto sensu does not relate to the sending of any 
representative ('legate') abroad, but it consists of the capacity to establish 
permanent diplomatic missions. The 'permanent' character of diplomatic missions 
differentiates diplomatic missions from temporary forms of representation, such as 
ad hoc envoys.525 The requisite of permanence, however, must be understood as 
relative, because diplomatic missions can cease to function, either because the 
sending State closes them or because the sending State disappears. The 'diplomatic' 
character of missions implies that they should contribute to the maintenance of 
official relations between the sending and the receiving subjects, by performing 
'diplomatic' functions. Such functions are manifold. A legal analysis may safely rely 
on the categorisation made by the 1961 Vienna Convention,526 which lists five 
functions: representation, promotion of peaceful relations, protection of the 
sender's interests, information and negotiation.527 Notwithstanding its limits528 this 
list has the advantage of being sufficiently accurate;529 consequently, it is relied on 
for the purpose of the present analysis.  
The function of “representing the sending State in the receiving State” is at the core 
of the very idea of the diplomatic intercourse and it is the primary task of 
diplomatic missions.530 Diplomatic representation serves the purpose of providing a 
                                                 
524 Cf., mutatis mutandis, the judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Secession 
of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; 1998, para. 155: "although there is no right, under the Constitution or 
at international law, to unilateral secession, the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of 
secession leading to a de facto secession is not ruled out.  The ultimate success of such a secession 
would be dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider the 
legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and 
Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold recognition." 
525 On the evolution of the permanent character of diplomacy, see Weckmann, "Origen de La 
Misiones Diplomaticas Permanentes",  1 Foro Internacional (1960): 268-298, and Outrey, "Histoire 
et Principes de L'administration Française Des Affaires Etrangères, 2 Revue Française de Science 
Politique (1953): 298-318, particularly at p. 301: "pour nous l'existence d'une diplomatie au sens 
propre du terme implique nécessairement celle de missions diplomatiques permanentes". 
526 Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations, 18 April 1961, UNTS vol. 500, p. 95. 
527 Article 3 Vienna Convention 1961. 
528 The list of diplomatic functions contained in Article 3 Vienna Convention 1961 has been criticised 
by J. Salmon, op. cit., p. 103, because: “Cet article [...] mélange des fins [...] et des moyens [...], tout 
en negligéant de mentionner certains moyens”.  
529 In this sense, see Tanzi, “Relazioni diplomatiche”, in Digesto delle discipline pubblicistiche, p. 122-
147, at p. 130, and bibliography cited therein, note 42. 
530 Maresca, La Missione Diplomatica (Giuffré, 1967), p. 150; Blum, “Diplomatic Agents and 
Missions”, in Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (North-Holland), pp. 
1034-1040, p. 1038; Tanzi, op. cit. at p. 130. Of course, the term “representation”, in this context, 
cannot be interpreted as a synonym of “agency”: since diplomatic missions do not enjoy international 
personality, they cannot be agents for their State. Diplomatic missions are simply organs of an 
international subject that “represent” it before another international subject; in this sense, see Sereni, 
La représentation en droit International, cit. supra, p. 85, who affirms that “les organes des sujets de 
droit international ne sont pas leurs représentants”. According to Sereni, in fact, the very use of the 
term “représentation” in this context is not correct, since the diplomatic “representatives” of 
international subjects do not exert the function of representation stricto sensu. (Id., p. 87); Cf. also 
Anzilotti, Corso di diritto internazionale, I, 1912, p. 126: “We cannot conceive the relationship 
between state and organ as an agency relationship: agency implies two distinct subjects, one of which 
declares the intention and acts for the other. But a state without its organs is nothing: it is an abstract 
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permanent link between the sending and the receiving States, thus ensuring the 
participation of the former in the internal and international political life of the 
latter, within the limits imposed by international law.531  Diplomatic representation 
is not limited to international relations, but it concerns also the internal legal order: 
the Head of Mission represents the sending subject in internal proceedings, both as 
a claimant and as a defendant.532 The representation performed by Diplomatic 
missions is complete since they have the capacity to represent their entire State in 
all its functional and geographical dimensions (ius representationis omnimodo).533 
The ius representationis omnimodo is crucial, since it expresses the need for unity 
in the conduct of diplomatic relations: diplomatic representations are functional to 
convey the message of the entire sending state, and not only of a part thereof. The 
ius representationis omnimodo must nonetheless be understood as relative, since 
diplomatic missions may coexist with temporary representatives, ranging from 
ministers to ad hoc envoys.534 
The protection of interests is framed by the Vienna Convention as the function of 
“protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its 
nationals, within the limits permitted by international law.”535 As for the content of 
the interests protected, the wording of the Convention and the nature of 
international relations militate in favour of a very broad interpretation of the 
provision.536 Consequently, diplomatic missions can protect any “interest” which is 
deemed as such by the sending subject, as long as the protection does not trespass 
the limits imposed by international law. 
The function of information is framed as “ascertaining by all lawful means 
conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the 
Government of the sending State.” The mission can collect information through 
multiple sources, covering “the political, cultural, social and economic activities of 
the country, and in general all aspects of life which may be of interest to the sending 
State.”537 The diplomatic function of information is characterised by its confidential 
nature: the communications from diplomatic missions to their capitals can be 
encoded and they must not be intercepted by the State of accreditation.538 The 
secrecy of diplomatic communications is not limited to the relations with third 
countries: generally, they are not disclosed in the home country either.539  
Finally, the function of negotiation is defined by the 1961 Vienna Convention as 
“negotiating with the government of the receiving State”. This provision can be 
                                                                                                                                               
conception; there cannot be a distinction between the state and its organs”, translation by Sereni, 
“Agency in International Law”, 34 American Journal of International Law (1940): 638-660. 
531 Maresca, op. cit., p. 150. 
532 Salmon, op. cit. p. 112-113. 
533 For instance, a commercial mission or a development cooperation agency do not, in principle, 
represent the State as a whole, but only a ministry, in its field of activity, therefore they are not the 
product of the exercise of the right of legation and, thus, they are not diplomatic missions stricto 
sensu. 
534 For instance, the sending State might desire to conduct its relations with a third State through a 
special mission, or summitry, thus “bypassing” its own permanent diplomatic mission; this would not 
amount, however, to a “downgrading” of the mission itself.  
535 Article 3(b), see supra note 1. 
536 Cf. Salmon, op. cit., p. 104. 
537 Commentary to the 1961 Vienna Convention, p. 90. In particular, the information the mission 
transmits to the sending government can concern bilateral relations, local political, social or cultural 
events, the relations of the State of accreditation with other States and local repercussions of facts 
happened in the sending State, see Maresca, op. cit., p. 151. 
538 Vienna Convention 1961, see supra note, Article 27(1) 
539 Salmon, op. cit., p. 116 
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interpreted in two ways. According to a restrictive interpretation, such function 
may be construed in accordance to Article 7(2)(b) of the Vienna Conventions 
1969,540 which affirms that the Heads of diplomatic missions can represent the 
sending State “for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the 
accrediting State and the State to which they are accredited”, even in the absence of 
full powers.  According to an alternative interpretation, the diplomatic function of 
negotiation should be interpreted more extensively : “il s'agit de concilier, de 
rechercher des transactions, de préparer des traités, de conclure des engagements 
politiques.”541  
2. The Functional Right of Legation of International Organisations 
The development of international organisations542 during the 20th century led to the 
creation of new forms of international relations, which had to be conducted through 
innovative instruments. In principle, international organisations may conduct their 
international relations through Member States diplomatic missions. Such 
'triangular' diplomacy may however lead to a conflict of interests for national 
diplomats, since the priorities of a Member State may differ from the political line 
of the international organisation.543 Therefore, international organisations often 
establish missions of their own, in order to implement their policies and to foster 
their objectives.544 This can be appreciated by addressing firstly the right of 'passive' 
legation, that is to say the ability to receive diplomatic missions, and subsequently 
turn to the right of 'active' legation, i.e. the capacity to send diplomatic 
representatives abroad. 
International organisations do not have any right of passive legation with respect to 
their Member States. Although international organisations enjoy separate 
international personality, their Member States must participate in their life. Such 
participation may require the establishment of missions to the organisations. 
Consequently, an international organisation does not have any discretion as to the 
acceptance of its Members' missions. This is testified by the fact that Member States 
normally provide for the establishment of their missions to international 
organisations in the latter’s founding instruments. International organisations do 
have a functional right of passive legation with respect to third States. As noted 
above, the right of legation is traditionally a prerogative of States. However, 
international organisations share with States a crucial feature: international 
                                                 
540 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1969, UNTS vol. 1155, p. 351. 
541 Salmon, op. cit., p. 115. 
542 To be sure, there is no customary definition of international organisation, see, for instance, the 
1986 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties between States and international Organizations   (21 
March 1986, not yet in force) elliptically defines international organisations as…"intergovernmental 
organizations", Article 2(1)(i).  However, for the purposes of this research, an international 
organisation can be described as an autonomous entity, set up by a constituent instrument, which 
expresses its independent will through common organs and has a capacity to act on an international 
plane, see Gautier, op. cit., at p. 33. 
543 Magi, Le Organizzazioni Internazionali e Il Diritto di Legazione (Dissertation – University of 
Siena, 1967), p. 50. 
544 “Compte tenu du fait que les activités exercées par les organisations internationales produisent, 
quel que soit leur degré de spécialisation, des effets directs ou indirects à l'égard de pays tiers et 
d'autres organisations internationales, il est inconcevable qu'elles puissent se trouver dans un état 
d'isolement total […] la plupart des organisations de date récente ont des objectifs spécifiquement 
internationaux dont la poursuite rend indispensables les relations avec des pays tiers.”, Reichling p. 
26; cf. also Magi, p. 26. 
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personality, that is to say the capacity to act in the international legal system and to 
be subject to rights and obligations.545 Since (certain) international organisations 
have to act internationally, they must also be endowed with the means to conduct 
their external action. These means may encompass the acceptance of a third State’s 
mission. For instance, Article 16 of the protocol on the privileges and immunities of 
the Communities affirmed that “the Member State in whose territory the 
Communities have their seat shall accord the customary diplomatic immunities and 
privileges to missions of third countries accredited to the Communities”,546 thus 
implying that the Communities enjoyed the right of passive legation.  
The right of passive legation of international organisations encounters a limit: 
whereas the right of legation of States is a consequence of their personality, and 
ultimately of their sovereign character, the right of legation of an international 
organisation depends on the tasks and competences it is attributed.547 In other 
terms, both the international personality and the right of legation of an 
international organisation are a consequence of the functions the organisation is 
entrusted with.548 Thus, an international organisation can receive the 
representatives of third States only if the right of passive legation is necessary in 
order to foster the organisation’s goals and exercise its competences. In other 
words, international organisations hold only a functional right of passive legation. 
The functional limit of the right of legation of international organisations affects 
also the nature of the States’ missions that are accredited to international 
organisations. Although States can certainly establish permanent missions that 
represent the entirety of their sender, they cannot establish a mission capable of 
performing all diplomatic functions. For instance, a State’s mission accredited to an 
international organisation is generally not able to protect the interests of the States’ 
citizens, in so far as the organisation can scarcely exert coercive powers.  
Like the passive dimension of the right of legation, the right of active legation is not 
an intrinsic feature of international organisations. Nonetheless, it is submitted that 
international organisations hold a functional right of active legation, and can set up 
organs roughly similar to States’ diplomatic missions, in order to conduct their 
'diplomatic' relations in practice. Of course, international organisations do not hold 
the right of active legation by default, in force of their international personality or 
because they exercise the right of passive legation.549 In their relations with 
Member and third States alike, international organisations are entitled to send their 
representatives in so far as this is necessary in order to foster the objectives of the 
organisation. In other terms, international organisations hold a functionally limited 
right of active legation, as well as a functionally limited right of passive legation. It 
                                                 
545 International organisations enjoy international personality if this is explicitly envisaged in their 
founding instruments; moreover, they can also enjoy international personality, as an “implied 
power”, if this is necessary in order to accomplish the tasks they are attributed by States, cf.  ICJ 
judgement, Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 174. 
546 Translation of Protocole sur les privilèges et immunités des Communautés européenne, O.J. 1967 
152/13. 
547 Thus Magi supra note 5, p. 17. 
548 "La personalità giuridica delle organizzazioni internazionali è in particolare non il presupposto, 
ma piuttosto la conseguenza dell'attribuzione di obiettivi e competenze sul piano esterno, fatta 
esplicitamente o implicitamente dagli Stati fondatori nei Trattati istitutivi", Rucireta, "Aspetti del 
C.D. 'Diritto di Legazione' Attivo e Passivo Delle Comunità Europee", Annali Istituto di Studi Europei 
Alcide de Gasperi (1987): 117-156, at p. 119. 
549 This contradicts what was affirmed by Van der Goes van Naters, European Parliament, doc. 
87/1959, January 1960. 
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may be wondered whether the right of legation of international organisations meets 
other limits: can organisations set up missions similar to the diplomatic missions of 
States, i.e. endowed with the character of permanence and the capacity to perform 
diplomatic functions?  
First, international organisations can create permanent missions, if the exertion of 
the organisations’ powers requires such organs. Such was the case of the European 
Communities: after having been endowed with relevant external responsibilities, 
the Communities felt the urge to open delegations in third countries. The ECSC 
opened a liaison office in the UK in 1954 and the EEC Council evaluated the 
opening of other EEC delegations in the sixties. For political reasons, the 
Communities never opened any other delegation.550 However, the urge for 
permanent representation in third countries was such that neither the Council nor 
Member States ever opposed the creation of Commission Delegations, which 
existed until their were substituted by Union Delegations in 2009.551  
Second, the missions of international organisations normally cannot perform all 
diplomatic functions. As shown above, the establishment of international 
organisations’ missions is functional to the exertion of the powers of the sending 
subject. Consequently, the functions of the former can be performed only by relying 
on the limited powers of the latter. Such powers enable the performance of a 
restricted set of diplomatic functions. The missions of international organisations 
may well represent their sending subject, in its entirety (ius representationis 
omnimodo)552 and in the internal and international legal order. For instance, it is 
widely accepted that the pre-Lisbon delegations of the European Commission 
represented the entire Community, despite their nomen juris.553 Such missions may 
also gather information and negotiate on behalf of their organisation. 554 However, 
the capability to promote peaceful relations and defend the sender's interests, not 
to mention the protection of its citizens, is beyond the reach of most international 
organisations. 
Our analysis therefore shows that the right of active and passive legation of 
international organisations differs from the right of legation of States in two main 
                                                 
550 It would seem that France opposed the creation of any further mission on the part of the EEC, for 
reasons related to politics and prestige. Indeed, this period coincided with the “empty chair” crisis.  
cf. Magi, op. cit. 
551 It is to be noted that, unlike States, international organisations are not intrinsically “permanent”, 
insofar as their dissolution can be determined by a volition of their member States. Nevertheless, this 
lack of permanence of the sender does not necessarily determine a lack of permanence of its 
missions. To be sure, a mission endowed with a representative function ceases to exist when its 
sender disappears. However, even the missions of States cease to function when theirs senders 
disappear: this limit does not question the character of permanence of the mission, since, as noted 
before, when a State ceases to exist, its diplomatic missions normally terminate their functions. 
552 Of course, such representation is functionally limited, in so far as the very personality of the 
sending subject is not complete. As noted above, however, the requirement of general representation 
is to be understood as relative: international organisations may well be capable of creating missions 
that represent the organisations in their entirety. 
553 Such function was however shared, in a few cases, with the representatives of the Council, see 
Rucireta, op. cit., p. 137. 
554 Another example is provided by the Council of Europe liaison office to European Union, which 
routinely performs functions such as representation and information, cf. Council of Europe, 
Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the 
European Union: Overview of activities, DPA/Inf (2011) 18, 5 May 2011: “[the liaison office] 
organised and/or facilitated in 2010 a large number of meetings and contacts between senior officials 
of both organisations, as well as meetings with media representatives. In addition, through bilateral 
contacts with senior officials of the European Union, the Brussels Office regularly reported on 
important developments related to the European Union and advised on initiatives related to these.” 
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aspects. First, the right of legation of international organisations is a consequence 
of attribution and it is consequently functionally limited, while the right of legation 
of States derives from their international personality and is not limited. Second, the 
missions that international organisations send and receive can perform only certain 
diplomatic functions, because of the functionally limited personality of the sending 
organisation, while the missions of States can perform any function which is 
allowed for by international law. This theoretical distinction has a practical 
consequence: inter-state relations are diplomatic stricto sensu, and their status is 
consequently disciplined also by customary diplomatic law. The relations of 
international organisations, on the contrary, are not 'diplomatic' stricto sensu, 
therefore they are disciplined only conventionally. In light of this significant 
difference, it is therefore necessary to wonder whether the EU, being a sui generis 
international organisation, has the same right of legation as other international 
organisations, or it is more similar to a State in this respect.  
3. The 'Mixed' Right of Legation of the European Union 
Since the EU is an international organisation, founded on the principle of conferral, 
it may be expected to enjoy a functional right of legation, which allows it to 
establish only sui generis diplomatic missions. This paragraph seeks to 
demonstrate that this is not the case, by testing the EU's capabilities to overcome 
the two limits characterising the right of legation of international organisations.  
The first limit to the right of legation of international organisations consists of the 
incompleteness of their competences. As noted in chapter 1, the EU can exert its 
power in the external relations domain almost in any area, on the basis of the 
competences it has been explicitly attributed, its CFSP 'competence'555 and through 
the flexibility clause. Since EU external competences are potentially unrestrained 
its functional right of legation is similar to the full right of legation of a State.556 
The second limit to the right of legation of international organisations consists of 
the functional deficiencies of the missions that are accredited to them, and which 
they send abroad. There is no doubt that the missions of third States accredited to 
the EU can perform the function of representation, and it is apparent that they also 
negotiate on behalf of their sending subjects. This is clearly shown by the fact that 
the international instruments stipulated by the Union are frequently signed by the 
Heads of Mission of third countries. Third States’ missions collect also information, 
by interacting with Union bodies and with the representatives of the Member 
States. At the same time, they promote friendly relations with the Union, in 
                                                 
555 As noted in the first chapter, although Article 24(1) TEU asserts that the CFSP is a competence of 
the Union, it appears to be more a framework for coordination than a competence stricto sensu. 
556 Cf., a contrario, Pescatore, Les Relations Extérieures Des Communautés Européennes: 
Contribution a la Doctrine de la Personnalité des Organisations Internationales (Hague Academy of 
International Law, 1961), p. 192, according to whom "l'usage du qualificatif diplomatique pour 
désigner les missions des Communautés dans les pays tiers doit provoquer une équivoque et un 
conflit avec les Etats membres. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue, en effet, que les Communautés 
européennes poursuivent des objectifs à caractère économique, que leur compétence externe se situe 
dans le domaine commercial et dans le domaine de la coopération nucléaire, respectivement; les 
missions qu'elles peuvent être dans le cas de détacher dans les pays tiers ne sont donc pas 
représentatives de la communauté européenne tout court, mais il s'agit de missions spécialisées, 
chargées de sauvegarder les intérêts extérieurs du marché commun ou de l'industrie nucléaire 
européenne." 
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particular by promoting cultural, economic and scientific cooperation,557 given the 
EU's extensive competences in the field of international cooperation. Finally, the 
missions of third States accredited to the EU may protect the interests of their 
sending countries and, to a certain extent, of their citizens, by advocating the 
adoption of policies favourable to their interests. Third countries’ missions, 
however, cannot completely ensure the protection of their citizens, since some 
issues, such as the visa policy, are largely administered by Member States, even if 
they are disciplined also at EU level.  
The performance of diplomatic functions by EU Delegations is more controversial. 
Union Delegations can perform the function of representation on the basis of 
Article 221(1) TFEU, which affirms that “Union delegations in third countries and 
at international organisations shall represent the Union.” This implies that EU 
Delegations exercise the ius representationis omnimodo. Delegations represent the 
Union within the legal system of the receiving States; in particular, the Heads of 
Delegation represent the Union “for the conclusion of contracts, and as a party to 
legal proceedings”.558 Moreover, they represent the Union also in the sphere of 
international relations, by delivering Union messages to the Ministries for Foreign 
Affairs of third countries, as well as to entities that are not tasked with the 
management of foreign policy, such as ministries dealing with internal affairs,559 
local authorities560 and the local population at large.561 Delegations represent the 
Union also at international organisations, by intervening on behalf of the Union in 
the organs of international organisations.562 First, the Union may be a Member of 
                                                 
557 For instance, the US mission to the EU has even opened a Commercial Service, meant to foster the 
insertion of American business into the EU market, cf. http://export.gov/europeanunion. 
558 EEAS Decision, Article 5(8). On the representation of sending States in the legal system of 
receiving countries, see Salmon, op. cit. p. 112-113; Tanzi, op. cit, p. 131. 
559 For instance, constant interaction is required between the EU (formerly “Commission) Delegation 
and the “National Authorising Officer” (NAO) for the implementation of the European Development 
Fund, cf. Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, 
signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, O.J. L 317, 15 December 2000, Annex IV, and particularly 
Article 35. Noticeably, the NAO is usually a minister with an economic portfolio. For instance, the 
NAO of Cameroon currently is the Minister of Economy, Planning and Regional Development (cf. the 
website of the Cameroon NAO, www.caonfed.org, last visited on 16 August 2011), in the case of 
Liberia the NAO is the Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs (cf. the website of the 
corresponding ministry, www.mopea.gov.lr, last visited on 17 August 2011).  
560 Letter from the EU Ambassador to the governor of Texas on the Mathis case, 31 May 2011; the 
Head of delegation to the US sent a letter to the same governor on 13 June 2011, in the Leal case; 
both letters are available on the website of the EU delegation to the US: http://www.eurunion.org, 
last visited on 28 August 2011. 
561 On EU public diplomacy see Rasmussen, "The Messages and Practices of the European Union’s 
Public Diplomacy”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy (2010): 263-287, pp. 273-276, and De Gouveia 
and Plumridge, European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy (the Foreign Policy 
Centre, 2005), p. 14. Notice that public diplomacy is not necessarily conducted through diplomatic 
means, since it can be managed by headquarters and governments as well. There is no universally 
accepted definition of “public diplomacy”, but it can be described as “a government’s process of 
communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas 
and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies,” definition by 
Tuch, Communicating with the world: U.S. public diplomacy overseas, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 
p.3. 
562 The EU's representation in multilateral contexts proved contentious in 2011, when the United 
Kingdom blocked the issuing of statements on behalf of the 'European Union' claiming they actually 
were adopted on behalf of the 'Union and its Members', see Van Vooren and Wessel, "External 
representation and the European External Action Service: selected legal challenges", in Blockmans 
and Wessel (Eds), Principles and practices of EU external representation (CLEER, 2012), pp. 59-83, 
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an international organisation, originally or subsequently to its accession. In this 
case, Union Delegation officers can participate in the works of the organisation, 
thus presenting the Union position and, eventually, voting on its behalf.. Second, 
the Union may be an observer to an international organisation. In this case, the 
Union cannot express any vote and it is for Member States' representatives to cast 
the votes also with respect to matters falling within Union competences. 
Nevertheless, Delegation officers represent the Union positions during the 
discussions. Third, the Union may not be represented within international 
organisations; consequently, Delegations cannot represent the Union at the 
organisation.563 In this case, Member States must also represent the Union position 
(with respect to matters falling within Union competences). The Union may not be 
represented at diplomatic level within international organisations for another 
reason: it may not have accredited a Delegation, even if this were not legally 
impossible.564 These last considerations do not run counter the fact that, whenever 
a Delegation is accredited to an international organisation, it does represent the 
Union. 
It may seem that Union Delegations should neither negotiate nor sign any 
instrument on behalf of the Union. The negotiation of international agreements is 
disciplined by Article 218(3) TFEU, whereby the Council nominates the Union 
negotiator depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged. This provision, 
read in combination with Article 17 and 27 TEU can but signify that international 
agreements are to be negotiated by the bodies that represent the Union in the non-
CFSP area, that is to say the Commission, and in the CFSP area, that is to say the 
High Representative.565 This does not prevent Delegations, however, from 
negotiating agreements with third countries (or international organisations) on 
behalf of either the Commission or the High Representative.566 More generally, 
there is no doubt that Delegations perform a function of negotiation lato sensu, by 
interacting with the authorities of the host subject. 
Union Delegations are capable of performing also the diplomatic function of 
information. One of the original purposes of Commission delegations was precisely 
                                                                                                                                               
at p. 66. The problem was partially solved through the subsequent Council of the European Union, 
‘General Arrangements for EU Statements in Multilateral Organisations’, 16901/11, Brussels, 24 
October 2011.  
563 See Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU's Role As Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the 
Restructuring of European Diplomacy (CEPS, 2011), p. 8, 9. On the participation of the Union to 
international organisations, see also, inter alia, Sack, "The European Community's Membership of 
International Organizations”, 32 Common Market Law Review (1996): 1227-1256. 
564 As an alternative, the Union may accredit an “office” to an international organisation, being the 
“office” part of a Delegation accredited to a third Country. Such is the case of the EU office at the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation, which is administratively part of the EU Delegation to 
Canada (cf. the website of the EU Delegation to Canada http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/canada). 
The Commission requested the Council the authorisation to open negotiations with ICAO in order to 
upgrade the status of the EC/EU within the organisation, which is presently open to States only, see 
SEC(2002)381 final, 9 April 2002, not published in the OJ. The proposal was never approved by the 
Council. Notice that the existence of an autonomous Delegation or of an “office” that is part of 
another Delegation does not question the function of representation performed by the organ, 
therefore the issue is not addressed more in detail here. 
565 see Gatti and Manzini, op. cit. 
566 Such is the case of , the Country Strategy Paper stipulated by the Union in the framework of the 
implementation of the European Development Fund, and available at the Europeaid. 
website http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/csp/csp_10th_edf_en.htm. Although 
these documents are generally finalized by Headquarters’ officers, they are prepared, in the first 
stages, by Delegation officers, as noted in chapter 3. 
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the gathering of information.567 Nowadays, Delegations collect information related 
to diverse aspects, related to CFSP and non-CFSP areas alike. For instance, they 
retrieve information about the protection of fundamental rights in third 
countries,568 or their economic and financial situation.569 The Delegations' ability to 
retrieve (significant) information is testified also by their capability to transmit it 
via confidential channels,570 and by their participation in the “Correspondance 
Européenne” (COREU). This is a system for the exchange of CFSP-related classified 
information between authorities within Member States (including diplomatic 
missions), the Commission and the Council General Secretariat.571   The 
confidentiality of COREU messages relates both to international relations and 
internal politics: by default, the content of these messages is disclosed neither to the 
governments of third countries nor to other EU bodies or European citizens.572  The 
                                                 
567 “The first delegation in the history of the European communities was opened in 1954 in London by 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It was originally designed to serve merely as an 
information and communications office”, Bruter, "Diplomacy Without A State: the External 
Delegations of the European Commission", 6 Journal of European Public Policy (1999): 183-205, at 
p. 183 
568 Cf., e.g., the Local EU Statement on demolitions and forced evictions, by the EU Delegation to 
Azerbaijan, 12 August 2011, available on the website of the EU Delegation to Azerbaijan, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/azerbaijan, last visited on 18 August 2011: “The European 
Union Delegation [...] Will continue to closely monitor and report on domestic developments in 
Azerbaijan, notably in the domain of evictions, expropriations and general respect for property 
rights”. See also the Binayak Sen case: an observer from the EU delegation to new Dehli monitored 
the hearing of a alleged member of the Indian Maoist Party in 2010, along with observers from the 
diplomatic missions of some Member States, see Court hearing in the case of Dr Binayak Sen, 
21/01/2011, www.eeas.europa.eu (last visited on 12/04/2011) and “EU observers want to watch 
Binayak's trial”, The Times of India, 23 January 2011. For a critical reception of the episode, see K. 
Gupta, “Left-lib sheds glycerine tears for Binayak Sen”, The Pioneer, New Dehli, 13 February 2011: 
“the High Court's proceedings were monitored by a group of observers delegated by the European 
Union which had accused the lower court of conducting an 'unfair trial'. I personally found the 
presence of the all-White EU delegation in the courtroom offensive, not the least because allowing 
these observers to monitor the functioning of Indian judiciary is tantamount to accepting that our 
justice system is neither transparent nor fair.” 
569 Such information is required, inter alia, for the preparation of strategy documents in the 
programming of international cooperation, see supra, chapter 3. 
570 In this regard, it may be noted that both the Commission and the Council have put into place 
security arrangements, which cover also the internal dissemination of information. These 
arrangements provide for the creation of four security levels for EU documents: RESTREINT UE, 
CONFIDENTIEL UE, SECRET UE, TRES SECRET UE. This increasing level of confidentiality reflects 
the degree of harm the dissemination of the document could produce to EU or Member States’ 
interests, ranging from “disadvantageous” to “exceptionally grave”.; see  Commission Decision 
2001/844/EC, Euratom, of 29 November 2001, OJ L 317, 3.12.2001, p. 1, amended by Commission 
Decision 2005/94/EC, Euratom, of 3 February 2005 L 31, p. 66, 4 February 2005, Commission 
Decision 2006/70/EC, Euratom, of 31 January 2006 L 34 p. 32, 7 February 2006, Commission 
Decision 2006/548/EC, Euratom, 2 August 2006, L 215 p. 38, 5 August 2006; Decision of the 
Council 2001/264/EC, of 19 March 2001, O.J. L 101, 12 April 2001 p. 1 and Decision of the High 
Representative for CFSP, 27 July 2000, OJ C 239 23 august 2000. The security arrangements of the 
Commission, in particular, concern the communication with delegations, cf. Article 2, of the annex to 
Commission Decision 2001/844. 
571 Notably, the biggest single provider of inputs to the system used to be Council General Secretariat 
(GSC), therefore it may be inferred that this role will pass on to the EEAS (which absorbed GSC’s 
external relations’ DG). Thus, the presence of EEAS officers will further enhance the role of EU 
delegations in this system. Notice also that EU delegations are inserted also in another information-
sharing circuit, CSDP-net, dealing with security information, which is usually highly classified, see 
Bicchi and Carta, op. cit, particularly at pp. 10-11. 
572 Although COREU documents are classified, their content may be disclosed, whenever such 
disclosure is not likely to harm the interests of the Union or of its Members. On the access to COREU 
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participation in the COREU system ultimately certifies the capacity of Delegations 
to perform the diplomatic function of information: as affirmed by the Council, 
“COREU messages are the equivalent of diplomatic telegrams.”573  
The capacity of EU Delegations to promote friendly relations with third Countries is 
not questionable either. The very agreements between the Union and third 
countries, which allow for the establishing Union Delegations, explicitly affirm that 
the parties are desiderous of further strenghtening and developing friendly 
relations and cooperation.574 The Commission created several delegations in the 
60’s and in the 70’s575 precisely to implement development cooperation; this 
activity remains the main function of Delegations in many developing countries. 
International cooperation is principally meant to promote economic priorities; 
development cooperation, in particular, intends to foster the sustainable economic 
development of developing countries, in order to eradicate poverty.576 However, 
international cooperation may foster other forms of cooperation, also in the cultural 
and scientific domain, with developing577 and industrialised countries alike.578 
Finally, Union Delegations can give protection to EU interests. Although some of 
the objectives of the external action seem functional to the promotion of 'altruistic' 
interests (such as the eradication of poverty),579 the very Treaties require the Union 
                                                                                                                                               
documents, see inter alia Order of the Court, Case C-120/94 Commission v Greece, [1994] ECR I-
03037 ; Case C-353/99, Council v Heidi Hautala, [2001] ECR I-09565; Case C-353/01 P., Olli 
Mattila v Council, [2004] ECR I-01073. 
573 Case T-204/99, Olli Mattila v Council, [2001] ECR II-02265, par. 49, emphasis added. 
574 Cf., e.g., second paragraph of the preamble of the establishment agreement with Uzbekistan: 
“desiderous of further strenghtening and developing the friendly relations and cooperation between 
the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and the republic of Uzbekistan [...]”, 
Agreement between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and the 
government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on establishment and the privileges and immunities of the 
Delegation of the European Union in the republic of Uzbekistan, signed on 24 January 2011, not 
published in OJ; in this sense, see also the Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and 
the Commission of the European Communities on the establishment and the privileges and 
immunities of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in New Zealand, 
signed on 10 March 2004, UNTS vol. 2524. A similar wording (in French) is used in the Accord entre 
le gouvernement du Japon et la Commission des Communautés Européennes sur l'établissement 
ainsi que les privilèges et immunités de la délégation de la Commission des Communautés 
Européennes, signed on 11 March 1974, UNTS vol. 1002, p. 220. 
575 See Sobrino Heredia, "La Actividad Diplomàtica de Las Delegaciones de La Comisiòn en El 
Exterior de La Comunidad Europea", 20 Revista de Instituciones Europeas (1993): 485-53; see also 
Dimier and Mcgeever, "Diplomats Without A Flag: the Institutionalization of the Delegations of the 
Commission in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries", 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 
(2006): 483–505. 
576 Cf. Article 21(2)(d) TEU and Article 208(1) TFEU. 
577 See, e.g., the Cotonou agreement, supra note, Article 23: “Cooperation shall support sustainable 
policy and institutional reforms and the investments necessary for equitable access to economic 
activities and productive resources, particularly: [...] i) trade development, including the promotion 
of fair trade; [...] l) development of scientific, technological and research infrastructure and services; 
including the enhancement, transfer and absorption of new technologies; [...] n) the promotion of 
traditional knowledge; see also Article 22(1): “Cooperation shall support ACP efforts to implement: 
[...] structural policies designed to [...] liberalise trade and foreign exchange regimes and current 
account convertibility, having regard to the particular circumstances of each country”, and Article 27, 
titled “culture and development”.  
578 Cf. Article 212(1) TFEU: “the Union shall carry out economic, financial and technical cooperation 
measures, including assistance, in particular financial assistance, with third countries other than 
developing countries.” 
579 Cf. Article 208(1) TFEU. Cf. the European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2011 on Regulation 
(EC) 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation: lessons learned 
and perspectives for the future (2009/2149(INI), par. 16: “development cooperation is the only 
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to safeguard its fundamental interests (Article 21(2)(a) TEU). Thus, at least some 
Union policies must pursue Union interests.580 Not only do Delegations promote 
the interests of the Union, but they also defend the interests of European citizens, at 
least to a certain extent. It is well known that the diplomatic and consular 
protection of EU citizens abroad is performed by the authorities of their own State 
of nationality or, in the absence thereof, by the missions of other Member States. 
However, EU Delegations coordinate the work of the Member States, ex Article 35 
TEU.581 What is more, some Member States recently requested to step-up the role 
of Delegations in this area.582 Such solution would have the advantage of enlarging 
the consular network of most Member States.583 
The right of legation of the EU therefore appears similar to the one of a State, since 
the EU may theoretically conduct an external action virtually unrestrained by 
attribution, and because it is equipped with organs capable of performing most of 
the functions typical of diplomatic missions. Is this similitude with the diplomacy of 
States reflected in the practice of diplomatic law? 
                                                                                                                                               
external action policy (besides humanitarian aid) which has not been designed to serve EU interests 
but rather to defend the interests of the most marginalised and vulnerable populations on this 
planet.” 
580 In fact, even development cooperation instruments have a ‘EU interest’ component”. Cf., e.g., the 
programmes on the fight against illegal immigration, which is evidently not a priority for developing 
countries: Article 13 (Migration) of the Cotonou Agreement, supra note, and DCI regulation, supra 
note, Article 6 (migration and asylum), and in particular par. 2(c) (illegal migration and 
readmission). 
581 See Articles 20(2)(c), 23 TFEU and Article 46 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
582 Jean Asselborn, Speech on the occasion of the diplomatic conference of Latvia, Latvia, 20 
December 2011: “alongside its Benelux partners, Luxembourg is convinced that the EEAS should take 
on consular functions.[...] I am pleased that we have started concrete thinking on this matter. The 
Benelux have joined forces with the Baltic states, Finland and Sweden to identify specific consular 
tasks that lend themselves to closer cooperation between member states and could, we believe, be 
taken on by the EEAS. I intend to push this endeavour with all possible means, because it’s not only 
good for the smaller countries that are not present everywhere in the world, but because it’s good for 
the EU and the perception the public have of the EU.” The Speech is available at the website of the  
government of Luxembourg,  http://www.gouvernement.lu. It may also be noted that also other, 
bigger, Member States affirmed that “the role of the EEAS in the area of consular protection should 
be further explored, in line with the Treaty”, in the Non-paper on the European External Action 
Service from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, 8 December 2011, par. 4; the non-
paper is available at the address www.bruxelles2.eu. 
583 The entrustment of consular functions on Delegations would not be unproblematic in the 
perspective of international law, since third countries are not obliged to accept the performance of 
diplomatic or consular protection by entities other than the State of nationality. In this sense, see 
Salmon, op. cit., p. 106. What is more, third and Member States may not be willing to accept the 
performance of a typical States’ prerogative by the mission of an international organisation. Be it as it 
may, the role of Delegations in this area is probably destined not to change in the next future. The 
Commission recently proposed the adoption of a directive on the protection of  European citizens, on 
the basis of Article 23 TFEU, but this proposal does not foresee any role for Union Delegations, apart 
from consultation and coordination on the spot. Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of 
play and way forward, COM/2011/0149 final, 14 January 2012; cf., in particular, Article 14. 
 154 
4. The Practice of EU Diplomatic Relations: 'Mixed' Evidence 
There are elements of the practice relating to EU diplomatic relations that suggest 
significant analogies between the Union and sovereign States in this area, as well as  
a few elements that point in the opposite direction. 
The practice relating to the passive side of the EU's right of legation displays 
significant analogies with the one of States. The first analogy concerns the very core 
of diplomatic law, that is to say the conferral of immunities and privileges, and is 
contained directly in primary law, since the Treaties of Rome. Indeed, what is now 
Protocol (No 7) on the privileges and immunities of the EU holds that "the Member 
State in whose territory the Union has its seat shall accord the customary 
diplomatic immunities and privileges to missions of third countries accredited to 
the Union."584 In the course of the years, the Commission tended to extend the 
analogies with States' diplomacy beyond the mere conferral of immunities. In 
particular, the Commission soon established the practice whereby letters of 
credence were presented to the President of the Commission, who had instituted for 
these occasions a ceremony modelled on the one used between States. This practice 
irritated some Member States, which, through the Luxembourg Compromise, 
imposed the sharing with the Council of the power to receive the letters of 
credence.585  
The Commission complied with the Council's request, but did not renounce its 
penchant for mimicking States in diplomatic relations. In transparent analogy with 
States, the Commission still publishes a list of the diplomatic missions accredited to 
the EU, including the names of the officers thereof and, in particular, those of the 
heads of missions, who are referred to, not only as "ambassadors" but also as 
"extraordinary and plenipotentiary". The latter titles do not have any practical 
consequence in legal terms, but they are important in a symbolic perspective, since 
they are typical of inter-state diplomacy.586 Another curious analogy between the 
EU and States in this ambit is provided for by the figure of the 'doyen' of the 
diplomatic corps, that is to say the senior diplomatic representative tasked 
principally with instructing other heads of missions upon their arrival. Not only 
does the Commission's protocol service contemplate this figure, but it also entrusts 
its function on the Papal Nuncio,587 consistently with the long-standing tradition of 
several Catholic States. 
                                                 
584 Protocol (no. 7) on the privileges and immunities of the European Union, O.J. C 2010 83/266, 
Article 16 (emphasis added). 
585 Extraordinary session of the Council, Luxembourg, 17 to 18 and 28 to 29 January 1966,  
Final Communiqué of the extraordinary session of the Council, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, March 1966, 3-66, pp 5 – 11: "5. In 1959 the Council laid down the rules which, 
provisionally, were to govern the recognition of diplomatic missions accredited to the Community 
(letter of 25 July 1959 from M. G. Pella, President of the Council, to the President of the 
Commission). These rules amount to a sharing of prerogatives between the Council and the 
Commission. In particular, letters of credence are presented to the President of the Commission, who 
has instituted for these occasions a ceremony modelled on that used between states, whereas the 
Treaty of Rome lays down that the Council alone may commit the Community vis-à-vis non-member 
countries. A stop must therefore be put to the present practices and all the prerogatives of the Council 
restored. 
6. Consequently, any approaches by foreign representatives to the Commission must be reported with 
all despatch to the Council or to the representative of the State in the chair." 
586 The 'Permanent observers' to the Organisation of American States, for instance, are simply 
referred to as "ambassadors", see http://www.oas.org/en/ser/dia/perm_observers/countries.asp.  
587 European Commission, Vade-mecum for the use of the diplomatic corps accredited to the 
European Union and to the European Atomic Energy Community, para VI.1.  
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The passive dimension of the EU's right of legation has also two major differences 
from the similar function of sovereign states. First, the EU interacts with foreign 
missions via a plurality of bodies. Not only are accreditations approved by both the 
Commission and the Council, as foreseen in the Luxembourg Compromise, but 
letters of credence are presented to the President of the Commission and the 
President of the European Council. At first sight, this practice appears bizarre. A 
closer investigation, however, reveals its tendential consistency with the States' 
practice: since the accreditation of foreign representatives is a traditional 
prerogative of the monarch, this function is currently performed by heads of State. 
This practice was 'imported' in the EU system by entrusting the accreditation 
function to the figures that may be most closely assimilated to a head of State, that 
is to say the two Presidents.  
A second difference between the EU and sovereign States is slightly more 
significant: whereas States can ensure reciprocity in the conduct of diplomatic 
exchanges, since they can protect foreign missions, the EU may seem to be 
incapable of doing the same, because it lacks a territory and a police force. Thus the 
relations between the EU and third States are not truly bilateral, but 'triangular', 
since the former can only grant privileges and immunities to the missions of the 
latter by requesting the intervention of Belgian authorities. Despite its merits, such 
argument does not appear entirely satisfactory: Belgium is required by Protocol 7, 
and its duty of loyalty, to grant protection to third countries' missions. What is 
more, the EU legal order contains the instruments that are necessary for the 
enforcement of such obligations; the Commission may, for instance, initiate an 
infringement procedure against Belgium. Against this argument, it cannot be held 
that the EU is unable to force Belgium to comply with its duties through the 
recourse to force, since even in federal systems the 'central' government may 
encounter difficulties in promoting compliance with international law, as 
demonstrated, for instance, by the Medellìn case in the US.588  
The active side of the EU's right of legation has also striking similarities with the 
conduct of diplomacy by States. The first such analogy consists, again, in the status 
of the missions: EU Delegations, like States' embassies, normally enjoy full 
diplomatic privileges and immunities, as provided for in the Vienna Convention of 
1961.589 Another analogy between the status of EU Delegation and that of embassies 
is provided for by the application of the Vienna Convention of 1961 to the 
diplomatic exchange, also beyond the provisions relating to immunities and 
privileges; in other words, most States accept that the status of EU Delegations is, 
                                                 
588 Supreme Court of the United States, José Ernesto Medellìn v. Texas, opinion of the Court, 552 
U.S._(2008), 25 March 2008: "The United States contends that while the Avena judgment does not 
of its own force require domestic courts to set aside ordinary rules of procedural default, that 
judgment became the law of the land with precisely that effect pursuant to the President’s 
Memorandum and his power “to establish binding rules of decision that preempt contrary state law.” 
[…] The United States maintains that the President’s constitutional role “uniquely qualifies” him to 
resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear on compliancewith an ICJ decision and “to do 
so expeditiously.” In this case, the President seeks to vindicate United States interests in ensuring the 
reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and 
demonstrating commitment to the role of international law. These interests are plainly compelling. 
Such considerations, however, do not allow us to set aside first principles. The President’s authority 
to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, “must stem either from an act of Congress or 
from the Constitution itself" (emphasis added). 
589 As discussed below, there are however (partial) exceptions, see also Baroncini, Il Treaty Making 
Power della Commissione Europea (Editoriale Scientifica, 2008), p. 191. 
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in a substantive perspective, almost identical to the one of States' embassies.590 The 
similarity between EU Delegations and States' missions is further confirmed by its 
symbolic characterisation. The Head of Delegation, for instance, is generally 
accredited to the Head of State of the receiving country, whereas the Heads of the 
missions of international organisations are normally accredited to the Ministries for 
Foreign Affairs. In addition, the Head of Delegation is universally termed 
"Ambassador". This usage, which is generally requested by the EU,591 was 
widespread also before the Lisbon reform. Nonetheless, EU officers were 
sometimes reluctant to use it, presumably in order not to irritate the Member 
States.592 The creation of the EEAS, and the secondment of national diplomats to 
the post of Head of Delegation, rendered this practice obsolete, and it is now 
standard usage to refer to the HoD also as 'ambassador'. 
The quasi State-like status of the Union is testified also by its position in the list of 
diplomatic missions accredited to third countries and by the place of its Head in the 
order of precedence in the diplomatic corps. The Commission has always been keen 
on preventing the host States from placing the EU's delegation and ambassador 
among the organs and representatives of other international organisations. Thus it 
is frequent to find the EU Delegation in the list of the missions of States.593 The 
placement of the Head of Delegation is more delicate, since the position of 
ambassadors is normally determined by the date in which they presented their 
letters of credence. Considering that the HoD may arrive before the ambassadors of 
the Member States, the latter may theoretically be preceded by the European 
representative. Since this result is considered unacceptable by (some?) Member 
States, the HoD is often placed after the ambassadors of sovereign States, but 
before the representatives of international organisations. In at least one case, that is 
to say Canada, the EU ambassador is however listed among the States' 
representatives; as a result, he comes before the US envoy, and those of several 
Member States.594 
Beside the analogies between the EU's diplomacy and that of States, there remains 
a most significant difference in the source of the Delegations' immunities. Whereas 
States' missions (and their staff) enjoy privileges and immunities on the basis of 
customary law, EU representatives obtain immunities on the basis of a specific act. 
                                                 
590 In this sense, see inter alia, Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the 
Commission of the European Communities on the establishment and the privileges and immunities 
of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in New Zealand, signed on 10 
March 2004, UNTS vol. 2524. 
591 Boselli, Guide diplomatique pratique à l'usage des fonctionnaires en poste dans les délégations de 
la Commission de la C.E. (European Commission, External Relations DG, 1992): "A partir de 1983, le 
rang d'ambassadeur est explicitement mentionné dans les lettres de créances, ce qui implique, dans 
la plupart des cas, leur présentation au niveau de Chef d'Etat." 
592 Third countries were not always as reluctant as European actors. For instance, Winand, "The US 
Mission to the EU in Brussels D.C., The European Commission Delegation in Washington D.C. and 
the New Transatlantic Agenda", in Philippart and Winand (eds), Ever Closer Partnership: Policy 
Making in US-EU Relations (Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 107-154, at p. 144, noted that, already at that 
time, "there [was] a clear tendency on the part of Americans to call the Delegation's ambassador, “EU 
ambassador”, which he [was] not". 
593 Examples in this sense are provided for by the United States (where the EU shares this status with 
the African Union, see http://www.state.gov/s/cpr/rls/dpl/2012/182778.htm), Canada 
(http://w03.international.gc.ca/Protocol-Protocole/Heads-Chefs.aspx?lang=eng), Australia 
(http://www.dfat.gov.au/protocol/diplomaticlist.pdf) and Japan 
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/emb_cons/protocol/a-h.html#E); last visited on 4 August 2012. 
594 See the website of the Canadian government, http://w03.international.gc.ca/Protocol-
Protocole/Ambassador-Ambassadeur.aspx?lang=eng; last visited on 4 August 2012. 
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In most circumstances, the Union concludes an agreement with the host country, 
the so-called 'establishment agreement', whereby the State accepts the 
establishment of the Delegation and provides for the application mutatis mutandis 
of the Vienna Convention of 1961, including the parts relating to privileges and 
immunities. In other cases, the host country provides for the privileges and 
immunities of the EU's mission through a unilateral act.595 To the best knowledge of 
the author, there is no EU Delegation whose status is not regulated either through a 
bilateral or a unilateral act. This implies that it is generally believed that the EU 
does not conduct a fully fledged diplomacy, and its missions should consequently 
not benefit from the protection offered by customary law. The non-application of 
customary law to EU Delegations has a corollary: third States may decide not to 
grant full diplomatic protection to EU Delegations. Canada, for instance, grants 
immunities to most EU officers only for acts performed in their official capacity.596  
 
* 
 
* * 
 
It may be concluded that the diplomatic relations of the Union are different from 
the relations conducted by international organisations, since the EU’s external 
action is equivalent to a virtually full foreign policy (at least in principle) and the 
missions of the Union are capable of performing most diplomatic functions. This 
finding is partially confirmed by the practice, which shows that the diplomatic 
relations of the EU are very similar to those of States. Given the isomorphism of 
Union and States' diplomacy in the 'external' perspective, it may be hypothesised 
that the EU's diplomatic relations should be 'statomorphic' also in an 'internal' 
viewpoint. In other words, they should be conducted according to the principle of 
unity in external representation that informs the foreign policy of States.  
SECTION 3 – PROMOTING UNITY IN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION  
Although the Union can conduct virtually full diplomatic relations, the 
fragmentation of its external representation may theoretically hamper the EU's 
unity in diplomatic representation, as shown in paragraph 1. The remainder of this 
section seeks to demonstrate that the EEAS can ensure unity in European 
diplomacy, since its officers have authority on EU Delegations (paragraph 2), 
substitute Commission officers in the performance of certain diplomatic activities 
(paragraph 3) and coordinate the missions of the Member States. 
                                                 
595 This is the case of Switzerland, US and Canada, see Baroncini, op. cit., pp. 195-200. 
596 See European Communities Privileges and Immunities Order, C.R.C., c. 1308, para 4(b): "officials 
of the [EU], other than senior officials, shall have in Canada, to such extent as may be necessary for 
the performance of their functions, the privileges and immunities specified in section 18 of the 
Convention [on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations]". Section 18 of the aforesaid 
Convention reads: "Officials of the United Nations shall: (a) be immune from legal process in respect 
of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity", see Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted by the Assembly General on 21 
February 1946. Notice that the applicability of this law was confirmed by Chantal Schryburt, Office of 
protocol, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, in an email to the author of 14 October 
2011.  
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1. Fragmentation in EU's Diplomatic Relations 
The CFSP/non-CFSP duality of the EU’s external action affects also the 
performance of the diplomatic relations of the EU. This can be demonstrated by 
taking into consideration the relations between the Union and the missions of third 
subjects and the relations between Union Delegations and the third subjects they 
are accredited to. 
The previous section showed that the third subjects’ missions accredited to the EU 
perform most diplomatic functions. In order to do so, they interact with the Union 
bodies capable of representing the EU’s opinion externally, and namely with the 
Commission and the High Representative, with respect to non-CFSP and CFSP 
issues, respectively.597 Such a duality has a major consequence. Whereas the 
missions accredited to States mainly address officials responding to the local 
government’s chain of command, third subjects’ missions accredited to the EU 
routinely interact with entities that respond to different chains of command. For 
instance, if the mission of a third subject wished to discuss an aspect related to 
agriculture, it would have to address the competent Commissioner, or his/her 
Service; therefore, the Commission’s College would be ultimately responsible for 
the position expressed by the Union in this area. If the mission of a third subject 
intended to discuss a purely diplomatic (CFSP) aspect, it would have to address the 
High Representative, or the EEAS. In principle, the High Representative would be 
responsible for the opinion (s)he and his/her Service would express.  
To be sure, the Union position is decided upon by the Council, and in certain cases 
by the Council and the Parliament, and not by the EU’s representative(s); therefore, 
it may seem that the presence of two Union speakers does not necessarily entail 
negative consequences, in so far as the representatives deliver the same message. 
However, the contrary conclusion appears to be more realistic, for three reasons. 
First, the presence of two speakers engenders per se the image of a non-cohesive 
Union. Second, the difficult distinction between CFSP and non-CFSP areas may 
give rise to 'turf battles' between the Union representatives as to the respective 
capacity to enter into a dialogue with respect to a specific subject, thus further 
reducing the image of European unity. Third, Union representatives may transmit 
non-coordinated messages, since they do enjoy some leeway: the power of 
representation, as referred to in Article 17 and 27 TEU, does not simply imply the 
capacity to speak, but it actually entails some degree of discretion. In particular, the 
representative is free to choose the timing, the medium and the wording for the 
communication, as long as the content of the position is respected. 
It may seem that the fragmentation of the external action should affect also the 
active side of the EU’s legation, As shown in previous section, Union Delegations 
represent the Union in third countries and at international organisations, they 
negotiate on its behalf, contribute to the protection of European interests, foster 
cooperation with third subjects and collect information for the EU. It is evident that 
                                                 
597 As noted above, the Treaties confer the external representation power mainly on four entities, that 
is to say Union Delegations, the President of the European Council, the Commission and the High 
Representative. However Union Delegations and the President of the European Council do not 
interact with third subjects’ missions accredited to the EU. On the one hand, EU’s Delegations cannot 
be tasked with maintaining the contacts with third subjects’ missions because they are in different 
places: the former are located in third subjects, while the latter are located in the Union. On the other 
hand, the President of the European Council represents the Union at his/her own level, that is to say 
at the level of Head of State, therefore (s)he usually does not interact with third Subjects’ missions. It 
may be argued that. 
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the performance of these functions requires the exertion of several powers, 
including policy and budget implementation and, of course, external 
representation. As noted above, the distribution of these powers is affected by the 
CFSP/non-CFSP duality of the external action. Delegations should therefore exert 
powers that descend from the competences of both the HR and the Commission, 
and may be conceived as organs "characterised by a two-fold organic and functional 
dependence with respect to the EEAS and the Commission", as noted by the 
General Court in the Elti case.598 The duality of EU Delegations is expressed 
graphically in the following table: 
 
 
 CFSP non-CFSP 
Political level High Representative College of the Commissioners 
Administration EEAS COM Services 
Diplomatic mission Delegation 
Management of the 
external action at 
diplomatic level 
EEAS COM Services 
 
 
The dichotomous structure of Delegations is testified, in the first place, by the 
double source of their staff. The presence of EEAS officers in Delegations is not 
surprising, since Delegations are part of the Service itself, whilst the presence of 
Commission officers requires further attention. Article 5(2) of the EEAS Decision 
affirms that staff in delegations shall comprise Commission staff “where 
appropriate for the implementation of the Union budget and Union policies other 
than those under the remit of the EEAS.”599 This confirms that the reason why 
Commission officers are present in Delegations is the link between the latter and 
the Commission’s powers.600 It must be stressed that Commission officers in 
Delegations are not seconded to the EEAS: they retain their status as Commission 
servants, they remain part of a Commission service, they are subject to Commission 
rules, and their career progression remains in the hand of the Commission. 
Moreover, it may be noted that, since the College can autonomously organise its 
own services (Article 248 and 249 TFEU), the Commission can autonomously 
                                                 
598 See case Elti, cit. supra, para 46: "the legal status of the Union Delegations is characterised by a 
two-fold organic and functional dependence with respect to the EEAS and the Commission." 
599 Article 5 EEAS Decision, emphasis added. Ad abundantiam, it may be noted that the persisting 
presence of Commission staff in Delegations is testified also by the transitional arrangements 
concerning the transferral of Commission department to the EEAS in 2010. In fact, former 
Commission Delegations were transferred to the Service, along with their Heads and their political 
sections. However, the EEAS Decision did not affirm that all Delegation officers would have been 
transferred to the Service. On the contrary, it explicitly excluded the “staff responsible for the 
implementation of financial instruments” from the transferral, EEAS Decision, Annex, section 2. 
600 According to the letter of the EEAS Decision, the presence of Commission officers in Delegation is 
eventual: Commission officers can staff a Delegation only when the latter performs tasks functional 
to the exertion of powers conferred on the Commission. In practice, all Delegations perform such 
tasks. In fact, Commission officers are always present in Delegations, and, in some cases, they staff 
the Delegation almost completely, cf. Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011, par. 16. 
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decide whether to post its officers to Delegations. Therefore, the EEAS Decision 
does not make the posting of Commission officers to Delegations subject to the 
approval of the High Representative or of the EEAS.601 In light of this last 
consideration, it is evident that there is a stringent need for cooperation between 
the EEAS and the Commission, since the first must enable the latter to effectively 
exert its powers through Delegations.  
In the second place, the dichotomous identity and structure of Delegations is 
testified by the fact that they receive input from both the Commission and the HR. 
According to the first paragraph of Article 5(3) of the EEAS Decisions, Delegations 
receive instructions from the HR and the EEAS. This is understandable, because 
Article 221(2) TFEU affirms that Delegations are “placed under the authority of the 
High Representative” and because Delegations are staffed by EEAS officers, who 
are meant to assist the HR, in line with Article 27(3) TEU. According to the second 
paragraph of Article 5(3) of the EEAS Decisions, the Commission may also issue 
instructions to Delegations, “in areas where the Commission exercises the powers 
conferred upon it by the Treaties”. This confirms that the link between the 
Commission and Delegations is determined by the exercise of Commission 
competences by Delegations.hnn                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
identity of Union Delegations is testified by the distribution of the budget 
implementation powers in respect of administrative expenditure. The EEAS is 
responsible for the implementation of its own administrative budget (Article 8(1) 
EEAS Decision); consequently, the EEAS part of the Delegations’ administrative 
budget is implemented by an EEAS officer identified accorded to the rules 
established by the High Representative. At the same time, the Commission is 
responsible for the implementation of its own administrative expenditure in 
Delegations, that is generated by the presence of Commission officers and by the 
performance of activities falling within the remit of Commission’s powers; 
consequently, the Commission part of the Delegations’ administrative budget is 
implemented by a Commission officer, identified by the Commission according to 
Commission rules.  
It is clear, therefore, that the distribution of external action management powers 
between the Commission and the High Representative affects also the conduct of 
EU diplomatic relations. The dis-unity that ensues is certainly negative with respect 
to the passive side of the EU's right of legation, since the missions of third States in 
Brussels may be disoriented by the complexity of the EU's machinery. All political 
systems, however, have their peculiarities, and diplomats are well equipped to 
adjust to them, in the course of time. What is particularly pernicious is the potential 
division of the active side of the EU's legation. The 'projection' of the EU's external 
action dichotomy may seriously hamper the unity in international representation of 
the Union, not least because diplomatic missions are tasked precisely with the 
conveyance of a single position to third countries, and for this purpose they are 
placed under the authority of a single officer, i.e. the ambassador. Needless to say, 
third States would be extremely confused if the EU Delegation spoke with two 
voices, one for the Commission and the other for the HR. If this were the case, 
Union Delegations probably would be sidelined, and possibly bypassed through a 
direct dialogue with the EU Head Quarters, or even with the Member States. The 
dis-unity of EU Delegations, therefore, would not only jeopardise unity in 
                                                 
601 It may be noted, however, that the dimension of the Delegation may be subject to restrictions by 
the accrediting country or international organisation, cf. Article 11 Vienna Convention 1961 and 
Article 14 of the Vienna Convention 1975; see also Salmon, op. cit., p. 561.  
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international representation, but it would ultimately disrupt the entire project of a 
EU diplomacy that was carefully nurtured by the Commission during the last fifty 
years. 
2. Fostering Unity in EU Diplomacy via the 'Authority' of the Head of Delegation… 
A systemic appraisal of Article 221(2) TFEU and Article 27(3) TEU may suggest that 
Delegations should be placed under the authority of the EEAS. How is this possible 
in a context where Delegations must exert powers belonging to different EU bodies 
and offices? The solution put forward by the legislator was to create a novel figure, 
the Head of Delegation, who, despite his/her status as EEAS officer, should ensure 
coordination transversally to the CFSP/non-CFSP divide.  
The HoD is not entirely new. The very definition ‘Head of Delegation’ is a legacy of 
Commission ‘diplomacy’. The Heads of Commission’s Delegations were tasked, 
inter alia, with the maintenance of the unity of Delegations,602 since these organs 
were staffed by officials originally affiliated with different (Commission) services: 
Heads of Delegation had authority over all staff and activities of the Delegation, and 
they represented the entire Commission.603 Nonetheless, the new HoD is an 
original figure, because he/she is entrusted with the same responsibilities as the 
HoD of pre-Lisbon Commission Delegations, but he/she has also a more ‘political’ 
(CFSP) role. This determines an original interplay between the HoD’s affiliation 
and his/her tasks. 
It must be noted that the HoD is an officer of the EEAS. The affiliation of the Head 
of Delegation is explicitly defined neither by primary nor by secondary law. 
However, the EEAS Decision implicitly identifies him/her as a EEAS officer, since it 
affirms that the HoD exerts a powers of the HR: the first paragraph of Article 5(2) 
of the EEAS Decision asserts that the HoD has authority on the Delegation, in line 
with Article 221(2) TFEU, which gives the HR authority on the same organ. The 
direct relationship between the HoD and the HR is further testified by the second 
paragraph of Article 5(2) of the EEAS Decision, which states that the HoD is 
“accountable to the High Representative for the overall management of the work of 
the delegation and for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the Union”. This 
last responsibility of the HoD is particularly significant: the HoD is an officer of the 
EEAS, but he/she must ensure the coordination of all actions of the Union, thereby 
presumably including CFSP and non-CFSP actions.  
The HoD seems able to perform this task, since Article 5(2) of the EEAS Decision 
confers the HoD authority on the entire Delegation, for all its activities and on all its 
staff, whatever their status (thereby including also national officers seconded to the 
EU). This renders the HoD capable of overseeing the implementation of all Union 
policies,604 namely by exerting authority on all Delegation officers. Not only does 
                                                 
602 Commission Delegations evolved significantly over time; for the purpose of the present analysis it 
is sufficient to consider the organisation of the last pre-Lisbon structure of Commission’s para-
diplomacy, as set by Commission decision on the administrative reform of the External Service, 
December 2002, C(2002)5370, not published in the OJ. For a detailed account of the evoution of the 
Commission External Service, see Carta, The European Union Diplomatic Service (Routledge, 2011). 
603 Commission Decision C(2002)5370,  Article 7(1), (3) and (4). 
604 Arguably, the HoD is responsible also for the retrieval of information necessary to the 
performance of the initiative function; however, it is difficult to distinguish this function from policy 
implementation in practice, therefore it will be assumed that it is comprised within policy 
implementation. 
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the HoD oversee the execution of CFSP initiatives, but he/she also supervises the 
execution of non-CFSP actions. As recalled above, the latter receive execution by 
the Commission, ex Article 291(2) TFEU, therefore they are implemented by 
Commission officers in Delegations. Consequently, through his/her “authority” on 
Commission officers, the HoD functions as a de facto Commission officer.   
The 'dual' nature of the HoD has two problematic consequences. First, the HoD 
must respect both EEAS and Commission rules and procedures. If the HR or the 
Commission have reason to consider the HoD non-compliant with his/her 
obligations, they may “initiate administrative inquiries and disciplinary 
proceedings” against him/her. 605 Subsequently, it is for either the HR or the 
Commission to decide whether “a failure to comply with obligations” has taken 
place, and whether to address a warning to the HoD or initiate disciplinary 
proceedings.606 If the HR, or the Commission, considers the behaviour of the HoD 
to constitute a “serious misconduct”, the latter may even be required “to make 
good, in whole or in part” any damage (s)he may have caused to the Union.607 
Therefore, the Heads of Delegation that are less versed into EU procedures, namely 
national diplomats, may encounter relevant difficulties in practice, and they may 
have to devote a significant part of their attention to 'bureaucratic' issues, for the 
sole purpose of not incurring in administrative sanctions. It may well be that 
prospective candidates, especially from the Member States, may even be 
discouraged from applying to posts as HoD.608 This problem may nonetheless be 
temporary, since the progressive socialisation of national diplomats to the EU 
mindset may render them more sensitive to procedural issues. 
A second problem is more structural, and difficult to tackle. Delegations, like all 
diplomatic missions, have 'representative' character, therefore they must act upon 
instructions.609 This implies that they do not autonomously decide upon the 
exertion of policy implementation, budget implementation and external 
representation powers in an autonomous manner, but they must act upon the 
instructions of the entities that are attributed competences in these areas, that is to 
say the HR and the Commission. To this end, both the Commission and the HR 
need to directly or indirectly issue instructions to Delegations. The HR's 
instructions can be transmitted and executed by the HoD, or by other officers under 
his/her authority, in a rather unproblematic manner, since the HoD is part of the 
chain of command of the EEAS. The execution of Commission's instructions is 
more complicated, since the HoD should receive instructions from, and transfer 
them to, the officers belonging to a body different from its own. Such arrangement 
evidently violates the long standing principle enshrined in the EU's staff regulations 
whereby officials "shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government, 
authority, organisation or person outside his institution”.610 Therefore the staff 
regulation was amended in 2010, also to allow for the insertion of the HoD in the 
                                                 
605 Staff regulations, Article 95(3) and 86.  
606 Staff regulations, Annex IX, Article 3. 
607 Staff regulations, Article 22. 
608 A diplomat of a Member State reported these difficulties to the author in January 2013. 
609 “Le corollaire du caractère représentatif du chef de mission est qu’il censé agir sur instructions.” 
Salmon, op. cit., p. 113. 
610 Regulation 259/68/EEC/Euratom/ECSC of the Council of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff 
Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European 
Communities and instituting special measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission, 
 OJ L 56, 4 March 1968, p. 1 (hereinafter, “Staff Regulation”), Article 11. 
 163 
chain of command of the Commission.611 The capacity of the Commission to issue 
instructions to the HoD had his/her Delegation may theoretically take three 
alternative forms. First Commission's instructions may have to be routed via the 
HR or his/her Service. Article 221(2) TFEU, in fact, does not mention the 
Commission's authority, that is to say hierarchical superordination, over 
Delegations. This may well imply the HR's exclusive ability to interact with and 
issue instructions to EU missions abroad. Such reading of primary law appears 
most consistent with the principle of external action coherence, since it makes sure 
that EU missions abroad receive coherent input. It has the shortcoming, however, 
of inserting other non-Commission officers in the chain of command of the 
Institution, an issue that should be addressed via a further amendment to the staff 
regulations. Second, Commission's instructions may be issued directly to Heads of 
Delegation. This solution places the HoD in the uncomfortable position of having to 
arbitrate between the instructions of the HR and those of the Commission, but it 
may be effective, in so far as Delegation officers would anyway receive one single 
input. The legislator, however, seems to have preferred a third approach to Article 
221(2) TFEU. The preamble of the EEAS Decision affirms that, when the 
Commission issues instructions to Delegations, the Commission simultaneously 
"provide a copy thereof to the Head of Delegation and to the EEAS central 
administration”. In other words, the Commission may directly address its own 
officers in Delegations, thus by-passing the HR, the EEAS and the very HoD, and 
potentially questioning the unity and effectiveness of EU external representation. 
The Commissions' instructions may indeed contrast with previous or subsequent 
instructions of the HoD and, ultimately, of the HR, thus challenging his/her 
authority under Article 221(2) TFEU.612 
3. …and the Exercise of Commission Powers  
The previous paragraph shows that the HoD, despite being an EEAS officer, fosters 
unity in EU diplomacy through his/her contextual insertion in the hierarchies of 
both the EEAS and the Commission, and his/her consequent authority on both 
EEAS and Commission officers. This paragraph completes the analysis by 
demonstrating that he/she may also substitute Commission officers in the exertion 
of two crucial powers, that is to say budget implementation and external 
representation. 
The budget implementation tasks of the HoD are twofold. In the first place, he/she 
gives implementation to the administrative budget of the EEAS. Article 8 of the 
EEAS Decision enables the HR to give implementation to the EEAS’ administrative 
budget,613 and to delegate this power within the EEAS, and presumably to the HoD. 
                                                 
611 Regulation 1080/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 , 
OJ L 311, 26 November 2010, p. 1. See, in particular, new Article 96 of the staff regulations. 
612 It is perhaps not surprising that these arrangements have already led to some controversies. For 
instance, Vogel reports that “the Commission routinely issues direct instructions to Commission staff 
working in EU delegations instead of routing them through the head of delegation”, in “Ashton on 
defensive on EU's diplomatic service”, in European Voice, 5 January 2012. Nonetheless, the HR’s 
report on the EEAS of 2011 affirms that “these arrangements have not given rise to any systemic 
problems”. 
613 On the implementation of the administrative budget see Article 1(2) and 50 of the Council 
Regulation 1605/2002/EC/Euratom of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 
general budget of the European Communities OJ L 248, 16 September 2002, p. 1, as amended by 
Regulation 1081/2010/EU/Euratom of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
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This power is mainly ‘technical’ in nature, but its exercise may be time-consuming, 
since the Delegation may be endowed with a relevant budget, which relates to its 
buildings, staff and security. This issue is complicated by the fact that the HoD may 
be prevented from delegating this power. The EEAS Decision enables only EEAS 
officers to give implementation to the EEAS’ administrative budget. Since several 
Delegations have few or no EEAS officer apart from the HoD, the latter may be 
obliged to personally give implementation to the EEAS’ administrative budget. 
In the second place, the HoD may implement the operative lines of the EU budget, 
relating to the policies managed by his/her Delegation. As recalled above, the 
Treaties entrust the power of financial implementation on the Commission (Article 
317 TFEU), with respect to both CFSP and non-CFSP activities. Before the Lisbon 
reform, the Commission HoD gave implementation to the EU budget in third 
countries. This arrangement can no longer be applied, since the officers of EU 
bodies different from the Commission should not be able to exert this power.614 The 
legislator introduced a provision meant to maintain the role of Heads of 
Delegations. Article 5(4) of the EEAS Decision asserts that the Head of Delegation 
implements operational credits in relation to the Union’s projects in the 
corresponding third country, where delegated by the Commission.615 This means 
that the HoD gives implementation to the operative lines of the EU budget as if 
he/she were a Commission officer, thus confirming the findings reached above, 
according to which the HoD has been de facto inserted within the chain of 
command of the Commission. The rationale for the maintenance of the HoD's role 
in budget implementation, via a delegation from the Commission, is clear. On the 
one hand, this solution makes sure that all the expenses of EU Delegations are 
supervised by a single entity, in accordance with the principle of unity that inspires 
the Union's budget. On the other hand, as noted by the Court of Auditors, this 
solution preserves the authority of the Commission with respect to budget 
implementation and it may be seen as an attempt to safeguard, as much as possible, 
the internal Commission procedures for the implementation of the EU’s operative 
budget.616 
It may be wondered whether the participation of the HoD in the implementation of 
operative lines of the Union budget is legal. Since the HoD is not a Commission 
official, the delegation of budget implementation powers to the HoD is subject to 
the general conditions applicable to the delegation of powers to third parties: 
                                                                                                                                               
2010 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, as 
regards the European External Action Service, OJ L 311, 26 November 2010, p. 9 (hereinafter, 
“Financial Regulation”). Notice that the European Development Fund is subject to different budget 
implementation rules, since it does not belong to the EU budget; therefore the creation of the EEAS 
engendered the modification of the EDF financial implementation Regulation too, cf. Council 
Regulation 370/2011/EU of 11 April 2011 amending Regulation 215/2008/EC on the Financial 
Regulation applicable to the 10th European Development Fund, as regards the European External 
Action Service OJ L 102, 16 April 2011, p. 1. Since the provisions of the EDF Financial Regulation, 
and their recent amendments, are similar to the arrangements of the general Financial Regulation, 
only the latter will be addressed hereinafter. 
614 Financial Regulation, cit. supra, Article 51.  
615 Notice that the EEAS Decision affirms that the budget implementation power is sub-delegated by 
the Commission. The use of the prefix “sub” is due to the fact that the College directly delegates 
budget implementation powers to the directors general of its Services, and these subsequently sub-
delegate the budget implementation to Commission officers, or to the HoD. 
616 Court of Auditors, Opinion No 4/2010 on a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Council Regulation 1605/2002/EU/Euratom on the Financial 
Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, as regards the European 
External Action Service, OJ C 145, 3 June 2010, p. 4, par. 8. 
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according to the Meroni jurisprudence, EU institutions can delegate their powers to 
third parties only when this “does not imply any delegation of powers involving a 
real margin of discretion.”617 Although the strategic relevance of external actions 
funds, and the pivotal role of Delegations with respect to their implementation,618 
characterise budget implementation as a highly “political” function, the budget 
implementation powers delegated to the HoD do not involve a substantial margin 
of discretion. Indeed, the Financial Regulation stipulates that Heads of Delegation 
are subject to the Commission “as the institution responsible for the definition, 
exercise, control and appraisal of their duties and responsibilities.”619 Moreover, 
Heads of Delegation “apply the Commission rules for the implementation of the 
budget” and are submitted to the same duties “as any other sub delegated 
authorising official of the Commission”.620  Finally, the HoD may even have his/her 
delegation or subdelegation withdrawn temporarily or definitively by the 
Commission.621  
Despite its advantages and its legality, the technique used to vest the HoD with the 
budget implementation power entails some shortcoming. First, the choice to give 
only the HoD the capability to implement the operative lines of the budget renders 
the implementation of operative expenditure more complex and subject to conflict 
of priorities between the Commission, that holds the budget implementation power 
ex Article 317 TFEU, and the HR, that has authority on the Delegation and its 
Head.622 This reinforces the negative effects of potentially conflicting instructions, 
as seen above. Secondly, the attribution of an exclusive budget implementation 
function on the HoD, coupled with his/her other multiform responsibilities and 
his/her potential personal responsibility for violation of Commission procedures, 
contributes to complicate the HoD's job in practice. An EU ambassador that is not 
entirely familiar with EEAS and Commission procedures may in fact be incentivised 
to spend a significant portion of his/her time dealing with administrative issues, 
rather than conducting EU diplomacy proper. 
Beside his/her role in the implementation of the budget, the HoD has a crucial, and 
exclusive, function in what is probably the most fundamental activity of Union 
Delegations, that is to say external representation stricto sensu. Article 5(8) of the 
EEAS Decision affirms that the HoD represents the Union "in the country where 
the delegation is accredited, in particular for the conclusion of contracts, and as a 
party to legal proceedings”. This provision demonstrates that the HoD has the 
capacity to represent the Union within the legal order of the host State. More 
generally, it suggests that the HoD's has the ability to speak on behalf of the Union 
                                                 
617 Chiti, op. cit., at p. 1421. Cf. Cases C-9/56 and C-10/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1958, ECR 
English special edition, p. 133, par. 10: “to delegate a discretionary power to bodies other than those 
which the treaty has established to effect and supervise the exercise of such power each within the 
limits of its own authority, would render less effective the guarantee resulting from the balance of 
powers established by article 3.” Notice that the Meroni judgement referred to Article 3 of the 
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, which contained the principle of institutional balance: 
“Within the framework of their respective powers and responsibilities and in the common interest, 
the institutions of the Community […]”; this principle is now enshrined in Article 13(2) TEU, 
described above. 
618 As for the pivotal role of EU Delegations with respect to budget implementation, see Court of 
Auditors, Special Report No 10/2004 concerning the devolution of EC external aid management to 
the Commission Delegations OJ C 72, 22 March 2005, p. 1 
619 Financial Regulation, cit. supra, Article 59. 
620 Financial Regulation, cit. supra, Article 51.  
621 Financial Regulation, cit. supra, Article 64(1). 
622 See the Court of Auditors’ Opinion 4/2010, cited above, par. 9 and 14. 
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qua international subject, that is to say by delivering its political messages, 
including diplomatic démarches.623 This interpretation is supported by the very 
letter of Article 5(8), which asserts that the HoD represents the Union in the 
country where the Delegation is accredited "in particular", but not exclusively, for 
the purpose of concluding contracts. Such interpretation is corroborated also by an 
appraisal of the Treaties in light of the principle of external action coherence: the 
choice to entrust Delegations with the representation of the entire Union (Article 
221(1) TFEU) and to place them under the authority of a single office (Article 221(2) 
TFEU) is evidently meant to foster unity in international representation, and thus 
coherence. Such unity can only be expressed in the field by the Head of Delegation, 
who is the apical officer of the organ.  
The representative role of the Head of Delegation is testified by the practice. Heads 
of Delegation are accredited to third subjects through letters of credence, which 
certify their representative function.624 These letters are signed by the president of 
the European Council and the president of the Commission.625 This choice is 
justified by the fact that the President of the European Council represents the 
Union at Head of State level with respect to CFSP matters, whereas the Commission 
represents the Union in non-CFSP areas. Since the letter of credence is signed by 
EU representatives in CFSP and non-CFSP areas, it is evident that the HoD 
represents the entire Union.626  
The holistic nature of the representation task of the HoD has two corollaries. On the 
one hand, the HoD exerts the power of representation of both the HR and the 
Commission. As demonstrated in the previous paragraph, the HoD must act upon 
instructions, therefore he/she must represent the position(s) he/she receives from 
Brussels. Although the HoD does not eliminate the fragmentation of EU decision-
making, he/she may at least make sure that third subjects receive one single 
message.627 On the other hand, the HoD may perform its representative function 
via both Commission and EEAS officers, if he/she so desires, but they are prevented 
from issuing messages to third parties without the approval of the HoD. 
                                                 
623 On the use of EU's diplomatic démarches (before the Lisbon reform), see Khaliq, Ethical 
Dimension of the Foreign Policy of the European Union: A Legal Appraisal (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), pp. 89-90. 
624 Indeed, the crucial element of all letters of credence lies in their request “that credit may be given 
to all that the agent may say in the name of his sovereign or government”, Roberts (ed.), Satow’s 
Diplomatic Practice (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 62. Notice that the so-called “accreditation” 
to international organisations is, in fact, an information that the Union transmits to the organisation 
concerned, cf. Salmon, op. cit., p. 558-559. 
625 Cf. Wouters and Duquet, The EU, EEAS and Union Delegations and International Diplomatic 
Law: New Horizons (Leuven Centre For Global Governance Studies, 2011), at p. 10-11.  
626 In this sense, see also J. Vantomme (Head of Section ‘Protocol and Diplomatic Questions’ at the 
European External Action Service), intervention ‘The European Union and the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations: a Practitioner’s view’ at the conference The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations at the age of fifty: State of affairs and challenges ahead, Leuven, 9 May 2011; Vantomme 
held that this practice is justified precisely because the two presidents represent the entire EU, in the 
two strands of its external action, and Delegations must represent the entire Union. 
627 It must be stressed, however, that the exclusivity of the representation function entrusted on the 
HoD relates only to the diplomatic level. The HR, Commissioners, the President of the European 
Council, and special representatives may perform their functions alongside the Delegation. By 
definition, however, their role is temporary, whereas the Head of Delegation represents the EU in 
permanence. At the same time, the Delegation represents the EU only with respect to the relation 
with the subject it is accredited to. Thus the Head of Delegation to a country cannot issue 
communiqués relating to the EU's policy towards another country.  
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Commission officers, in particular, cannot undertake any initiative towards third 
subjects against the will of the HoD, even if the Commission itself requests it. In 
such circumstance, it is for the HoD to raise the issue with the EEAS, the HR and 
Commission management. 
The increased 'unifying' capabilities of the HoD are justified by the peculiarities of 
his/her activities. The EU budget must be implemented by a single officer in order 
to preserve its unity and avert accounting errors. Most importantly, the EU position 
must be presented through a single voice, in order not to disorient EU's partners. 
The cumulation of the authority on the Delegation and the exertion of both EEAS 
and Commission powers renders the HoD potentially very effective in ensuring the 
unity of EU diplomacy. As a former UK ambassador recently put it: "I wish, as a 
British head of mission, I had had the same powers that a European head of 
delegation does, because it would have enabled me to bring together all the 
different [assets of the mission]".628 
4. Coordinating European Diplomatic Missions 
Not only does the EEAS ensure the unity of EU diplomacy, but it also promotes 
cooperation between EU and Member States' diplomatic representations, thus 
fostering external action coherence. Cooperation between diplomatic missions is a 
corollary of cooperation in European foreign policy. The missions of the Member 
States started to maintain close links early in the integration process, namely 
through regular meetings chaired by the Rotating Presidency. The London Report 
of foreign Ministers of EEC Members on the EPC629 (1981) acknowledged the 
relevance of this practice, asserting that it was "important that the Heads of Mission 
of the Ten maintain the practice of meeting regularly in order to exchange 
information and co-ordinate views." EEC foreign ministers went as far as to affirm 
that the first instinct of European diplomats should have been "to co-ordinate with 
their colleagues of the Ten".  
The Commission was originally excluded from these meetings, which were part of 
the intergovernmental EPC framework. Since the Institution was to be "fully 
associated with the proceedings of Political Co-operation"630 among the EEC 
Members, it gradually managed to introduce its representatives in almost all the 
meetings of Member States' diplomats.631 As a matter of fact, cooperation meetings 
went far beyond the policy boundaries of the EPC, and soon included also issues 
falling within EEC competences. In certain occasions, therefore, the presence of 
Commission representatives was not only tolerated, but appreciated because of 
their expertise.632 
                                                 
628 N. Westcott, Managing Director for Africa, EEAS, in UK House of Lords, The Select Committee on 
the European Union, Inquiry on European External Action Service, 22 January 2013,  p. 4, available 
at http://www.parliament.uk. 
629 Report on European Political Cooperation issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on 13 
October 1981. 
630 Article 30(3)(b) of the Single European Act. 
631 Bot, "Cooperation Between the Diplomatic Missions of the Ten in Third Countries and 
International Organisations", 10 Legal Issues in European Integration (1994): 149-169.  
632 On the activities of Commission Delegations see inter alia Bruter, "Diplomacy without a state: the 
external delegations of the European Commission", 6 Journal of European Public Policy (1999): 183-
205, at p. 193. 
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The Single European Act codified the practice of diplomatic cooperation in Article 
30(9), by requesting the Member States and the Commission to "intensify co-
operation between their representations accredited to third countries and to 
international organizations". The Maastricht reform further specified that the 
diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and Commission 
Delegations were to cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint 
actions adopted by the Council were complied with and implemented. It also 
affirmed that they should have exchanged information, carried out joint 
assessments and contributed to the implementation of the right to diplomatic and 
consular protection of European citizens.633 
In the daily activity of European diplomatic missions, cooperation was organised in 
a pragmatic manner. The frequency of the meetings varied according to the 
requirements of each specific situation, and on the strategies of EEC Members. 
Generally, European diplomats met at least once a month, but they could gather 
more frequently. The level of representation varied too, depending on the 
circumstances: beside the meetings of the ambassadors, there could be meetings of 
deputy heads of mission as well as heads of sections. Finally, the flexibility of this 
form of cooperation was testified by their outcome. Cooperation could have two 
main purposes. On the one hand, it could be used to foster cooperation on 
'practical' issues, such as the compliance with the administrative requirements of 
the host State or the management of communication devices (e.g. the 'diplomatic 
bag'). On the other hand, it could be functional to 'political' purposes, namely the 
exchange of information, the preparation of joint reports for the Council and its 
preparatory bodies, the adoption of joint positions within international 
organisations,634 the introduction of joint demarches towards the host States or the 
issuing of common statements for the general public (the so-called 'local 
statements'). It is worth stressing that, being diplomatic cooperation part of the 
intergovernmental EPC, the adoption of joint positions could only be taken by 
consensus of the Member States' representatives, and without the association of the 
Commission representatives. The external representation in the deliverance of such 
joints positions and demarches was generally performed by the representative of 
the Rotating Presidency.635  
The advantages of diplomatic cooperation were manifold. Cooperation in practical 
areas enabled the Member States to allocate their administrative resources more 
effectively, and possibly reinforced their sense of solidarity. Political cooperation, 
on the other hand, granted even more significant benefits. The exchange of 
information allowed the Members, and especially the smallest ones, to keep abreast 
of recent developments. The drafting of joint reports could prevent the duplication 
of the reporting tasks of European missions. What is more, the formulation of joint 
positions enabled the EC/EU to truly speak with one voice in multilateral fora and 
vis à vis third countries. The unity of international representation also granted the 
Member States increased scope for manoeuvre, since positions that could have been 
difficult to uphold by single countries became easier to adopt as a European group: 
                                                 
633 Article 20 TEU, in the last pre-Lisbon consolidated version. 
634 On the cooperation of the missions accredited to international organisations see in particular 
Carotenuto, La Participation de La Communauté Européenne et de Ses Etats Membres Aux 
Organisations Internationales (PhD Dissertation, University of Strasbourg, 1999), pp. 353 ff. and 
Rasch, The European Union At the United Nations: the Functioning and Coherence of EU External 
Representation in a State-Centric Environment (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 59 ff. 
635 Bot, op. cit., pp. 154-158. 
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the EPC thus served as a 'shield' behind which the Member States could voice their 
opinions.  
Diplomatic cooperation, however, had also evident limits. It is obvious that it could 
not be used as an alternative to genuine cooperation at political level. Diplomatic 
missions could coordinate their activities in the implementation of each States' 
policy, but they could not modify the policies as such. To be sure, this limit is 
inevitable: by definition, diplomatic missions act upon the instructions they receive 
from their capitals, and are not independent decision-making bodies. Diplomatic 
cooperation had also other, less inevitable, limits. To begin with, the involvement of 
the Commission was rather troublesome, in so far as the Member States' sometimes 
distrusted the scarce secrecy of the Institution and the lack of diplomatic 
background of its officers.636 Especially at the earliest stages, this rendered more 
difficult the circulation of information among European representatives. Moreover, 
the Member States were not always eager to cooperate with each other, especially 
when their core interests relating, in particular, to trade and defence, came into 
play. It has also been reported that some Member States routinely withheld 
information in order to promote their own positions.637 Finally, if it is generally 
accepted that the mission of the Rotating Presidency played a pivotal role in the 
promotion of cohesion between its peers, both in respect of agenda-setting and in 
the promotion of consensus, it is also widely believed that the Rotating Presidency 
possibly did not ensure an optimal coordination of European missions. Since the 
Presidency had political priorities of its own, its diplomats were sometimes 
perceived as non-neutral in the performance of their coordinating activities, and 
they could consequently be distrusted by their colleagues. Even more 
problematically, the Presidency often lacked the capacity to perform the 
coordination, in so far as most Member States have few diplomatic missions. In 
several third countries the coordination had to be performed by other Member 
States, thus jeopardising the coherence of the coordination process throughout the 
world. Finally, the Presidency did not ensure continuity, since the Rotating 
Presidency, by definition, varies every six months. This issue was internally 
problematic, since the missions of the Member States did not have a permanent 
point of reference. As it is obvious, the shortcomings entailed by the lack of 
continuity were particularly severe in an external perspective, since the 'phone 
number' of the EU changed every six months.638  
The Lisbon reform, and the creation of the EEAS, may have solved some of these 
problems. The Treaties make numerous direct and indirect references to the 
cooperation between European diplomatic missions. Articles 32 and 35 TEU, as 
well as Article 221(2) TFEU explicitly call for cooperation between EU Delegations 
and Member States' diplomatic missions.639 It is worth stressing that this 
cooperation should cover CFSP as well as non-CFSP areas. Additionally, such 
cooperation should be reciprocal: although Article 221(2) TFEU only refers to the 
Delegations' duty to "act in close cooperation with Member States’ diplomatic and 
consular missions" it cannot be argued that such cooperation should be unilateral, 
                                                 
636 Id., p. 154. 
637 Tomkys, "European Political Cooperation and the Middle East: a Personal Perspective", 63 
International Affairs (1987): 425-437, at p. 435. 
638 On the shortcomings entailed by the Rotating Presidency's role in diplomatic coordination see 
Rijks, EU Diplomatic Representation in Third Countries, Paper Prepared For the GARNET 
Conference ‘the EU in International Affairs’ (2008). 
639 Notice that the very Article 27(3) TEU asserts that the EEAS must cooperate with the diplomatic 
services of the Member States, including therefore their diplomatic missions.  
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since it would be logically difficult for a Delegation to 'work with' (co-operate) with 
embassies that do not reciprocally 'work with' the Delegation.640 The need for 
diplomatic cooperation is implied also by other provisions. Article 20 and 23 TFEU, 
which foresee the diplomatic and consular protection of European citizens, 
implicitly request the Member States to cooperate in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of such protection. Even more significantly, Article 34 TEU, 
concerning the EU representation in multilateral fora, requests the Member States 
to coordinate their actions, and it demands the High Representative to organise 
such coordination; consequently, the EU Delegations to international organisations 
should coordinate the activities of national representations in those frameworks. 
The modalities of diplomatic cooperation in practice do not seem to have 
significantly changed since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty: the frequency 
and outcome of the meetings are still determined by the needs that prevail in the 
field.641 This is not particularly surprising, considering that the modalities of 
European diplomatic cooperation have always been determined in a pragmatic 
manner. What the Lisbon reform changed was the identity of the actor that is 
pivotal to the process of coordination, that is to say the chair of the diplomats' 
meetings. Since the Rotating Presidency no longer has any competence in the field 
of external representation, it is for a Union office to ensure the chairing of 
European missions abroad. This office is the EU Delegation, which, according to 
Article 221(1) TFEU, represents the Union in respect of both CFSP and non-CFSP 
issues. This last aspect is of particular importance, since it is the ius 
representationis omnimodo that grants the Delegation the ability to chair these 
meetings, which concern 'political' as well as 'technical' issues. In practice, the 
meetings at ambassadorial level are chaired by the Head of Delegation (at the level 
of ambassadors), his/her deputy, or the heads of the Delegations' sections.  
The presence of the Delegation solves most of the problems generated by the role of 
the Commission. Unlike its predecessor, the new EU Delegation headed by the 
EEAS can easily be characterised as 'diplomatic' in nature, also in the eyes of other 
European diplomats. This is due not only to the fact that diplomats from the 
Member States are seconded to the EEAS, but also to the Delegation's capability to 
manage 'high politics'. The characterisation of the Delegation as a 'diplomatic' 
mission is likely to have at least one beneficial effect: national diplomats may accept 
to provide it with access to restricted information on a regular basis, something 
they were not always willing to do with Commission Delegations because of their 
perceived lack of secrecy. 
What is more, the Delegation has relevant advantages over the Rotating Presidency, 
as a chair of European meetings. As it is evident, the Delegation should not suffer 
from a conflict of priorities. Since the work of the Delegation is directed by the 
EEAS, it is presumable that the coordination should be oriented to the pursuit of 
the Service's overarching priority, that is to say coherence. This should motivate the 
Member States to rely on the coordination provided by the Delegation in the field, 
and accept its function as an 'honest broker'. The possible presence of Commission 
officers qua Delegation representatives in meetings at head of section level does not 
                                                 
640 Similarly, Article 5(9) of the EEAS Decision affirms that "the Union delegations shall work in close 
cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States". This 
provision cannot be intended as a unilateral obligation of cooperation for the Delegation, since such 
reading would imply that a EU organ 'works together' with Member States' bodies…that do not work 
with the EU organ itself. In this sense, see Blockmans and Hillion, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
641 Wouters et al., The Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service: 
Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities (European Parliament, 2013), p. 70. 
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challenge this finding, since they must respond to the Head of Delegation. The fact 
that national diplomats may often chair coordination meetings, qua temporary 
EEAS officers, may raise some conflicts of allegiance, but, as seen in chapter 2, such 
problems are not likely to be frequent.  
EU Delegations have also an advantage in terms of capacity: unlike the embassies 
of most EU Members, they can chair the meetings in almost all third countries. The 
Delegations may ensure coordination also within the international organisations to 
which they are accredited, even when the EU is not a Member of the organisation; 
this is the case, for instance, of the United Nations. Thus the EEAS may make sure 
that the arrangements concerning diplomatic cooperation respond to similar 
standards; it may also be expected that the Service will be able to easily promote the 
transfer of the 'best practices' from one context to the other.  
Finally, and most evidently, the Delegations ensure the continuity of the 
coordination. This is important in an internal perspective, because the 
representatives of the Member States have a permanent interlocutor, with which 
they can develop a relationship of mutual trust. The permanence of the Delegation 
has also a most important external consequence: the host State, or the other 
Members of international organisations, have a single interlocutor. Thus the unity 
of Europe may become complete: not only does the Union speak with a single 
representative (i.e. the Head of Delegation), but its Members may identify with the 
'one voice' of the EU. It is already possible to notice that EU Heads of Delegation 
routinely deliver messages on behalf of the Union and its Members, thus 
reinforcing the Union identity (and visibility) on the international scene. For 
instance, EU representatives have been delivering 'local statements' on behalf of the 
Union and its Members concerning issues like peace-building in Ivory Coast,642 
freedom of expression in Mali643 and the use of force on the part of Israel.644  
The diplomatic unity brought by the EEAS may, in the long term, lead to the 
prevalence of a diplomatic 'norm' of consultation among European 
                                                 
642 EU Delegation to Ivory Coast, La Délégation de l'Union européenne émet la déclaration locale 
suivante en accord avec les Chefs de Mission des Etats membres en République de Côte d'Ivoire, 25 
June 2012: "La Délégation de l'Union européenne s'inquiète de la montée en puissance d'un discours 
virulent parmi la classe politique et les médias ivoiriens. Ce genre de propos a par le passé attisé la 
haine et les conflits. Ils nuisent aujourd'hui au processus de dialogue et de réconciliation nationale 
souhaité par le Président de la République et les citoyens, qui aspirent à vivre en paix", see 
www.eeas.europa.eu. 
643 EU Delegation to Mali, Communiqué de l’Union européenne sur les atteintes contre la liberté de la 
presse au Mali, 19 July 2012: "La Délégation de l'Union européenne en accord avec les Chefs de 
Mission des Etats Membres de l'Union Européenne accrédités au Mali a publié le communiqué 
suivant: La Délégation de l'Union européenne à Bamako dénonce avec force les agressions dont sont 
victimes des journalistes au Mali. Elle condamne ces tentatives d'intimidation et se prononce en 
faveur d'une presse libre, pluraliste et responsable, qu'elle soit écrite ou audiovisuelle, publique ou 
privée", see www.eeas.europa.eu. 
644 EU Delegation to Israel and EU Technical Assistance Office (West Bank), Local EU statement on 
NGO offices raided by Israeli security forces: "The EU missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah are 
deeply concerned by the incursion by Israeli  
Security Forces into Ramallah on 11 December, to raid the offices of 3 NGO's with which the EU and 
some of its Member States have implemented cooperation projects: […] The EU missions in 
Jerusalem and Ramallah see Palestinian civil society as an essential partner in the shared project of 
democratic state building." See also the Local EU statement on recent arrests of Palestinian 
lawmakers, 28 January 2012: "The EU Missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah are concerned about the 
arrest at the ICRC office in East-Jerusalem of Palestinian Legislative Council member Mohammed 
Totah and former Minister for Jerusalem Affairs Khaled Abu Arafeh. The EU missions in Jerusalem 
and Ramallah are also concerned about the recent arrests of PLC Speaker Aziz Dweik and PLC 
members Khaled Tafesh and Abduljabbar Foqaha", see www.eeas.europa.eu. 
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representatives,645  which has aptly been described as 'Community reflex' or 
'coordination reflex'.646  
If the cooperation proves to be particularly effective, the Member Stats may decide 
to pragmatically renounce the exercise of (part of) their right of legation, in favour 
of the EU Delegation. The Member States may do so by adopting the Delegation as 
their organ, in particular when diplomatic relations are broken off between a EU 
Member States and the State hosting the Delegation, or if the mission of the EU 
Member is recalled. The EU Member State may entrust the protection of its 
interests to the EU,647 which may perform this function via the Delegation. Such 
solution might be useful in case the EU Member wanted to express its 
dissatisfaction with the behaviour of the host State, but intended to maintain the 
diplomatic 'channel' open. The choice of the Union, rather than another State, as 
the 'protecting power' for these purposes may be logical, in so far as the latter is 
more likely to have a political agenda differing from that of the EU Member 
breaking diplomatic relations. The entrustment of diplomatic functions on the EU 
Delegation may also become permanent, at least in respect of bilateral diplomacy, 
for instance because a Member State seeks to be 'present' in a third country, but it 
does not intend (or cannot) establish a mission of its own, also because of financial 
reasons.648 The temporary and permanent entrustments of functions to the 
Delegation may be accompanied by the secondment of national officers to the 
Delegation. In this case, the EU and its Member(s) may be able to ensure external 
unity and internal division of labour, through the creation of a national section 
within the Delegation. In a formal perspective, national diplomats may be 
presented to the receiving State as officers of the Union. In a substantive viewpoint, 
they would maintain a certain margin of manoeuvre in the conduct of national 
policies within the Delegation. Although some (small) Member States expressed 
interest for some form of adoption of the Delegation as a national organ, this 
solution seems not to be exceedingly realistic at present, since renouncing the 
control on embassies would dramatically decrease the visibility of a EU Member 
abroad. In order to decrease costs and maintain the visibility of national diplomacy 
at once, the Member States may simply seek to co-locate their missions with the EU 
Delegation, as some of them have done in Ethiopia, Yemen,649 South Sudan, Nigeria 
                                                 
645 For a discussion of the diplomatic 'norm' of consultation see Holland, "European Political 
Cooperation and Member State Diplomatic Missions in Third Countries - Findings from A Case Study 
of South Africa", 2 Diplomacy and Statecraft (1991): 236-253. Notice that the interviews recently 
conducted by Wouters et al., op. cit., p. 70, suggest that the novel arrangements have generally 
improved coherence. 
646 According to Bale, "Field-Level CFSP: EU Diplomatic Cooperation in Third Countries", 10 Current 
Politics and Economics of Europe (2000): 187 – 212, p. 38,  there was not, at the time, anything that 
"could accurately be described as a coordination reflex. The automaticity implied by such a term is 
impossible when those who might demonstrate - the diplomats themselves - rely in important 
matters on instructions from home first before acting in concert".  
647 See Article 45 of the 1961 Vienna Convention, cit. supra. 
648 The figures presented by Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU's role as global actor: institutions, 
law and the restructuring of European diplomacy (CEPS, 2011), p. 10, in fact, "suggest huge scope 
for economies of scale if the EEAS is able to take on functions that in some cases are currently 
duplicated 27 times. There are possibilities for this in arranging common political and economic 
reporting, in establishing common consular services for issuing at least short-term Schengen visas, 
and in arranging for mini-diplomatic missions to be co-located with the EU Delegations to save in 
infrastructural costs. In addition there are many international meetings where the EU does not have 
to be represented by 27+1 delegations"; see also Id., p. 63. 
649 Wouters et al., op. cit., p. 71. 
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and Tanzania.650 Even this solution, however, is far from being sought by all the 
Member States. 
Not only are EU States unwilling to renounce the control on their embassies, but 
they sometimes challenge the very foundations of EU diplomatic cooperation, by 
contravening their duty of loyalty. Recently, some EU countries intermittently 
questioned the representative capacity of the EU Delegations, for political rather 
than legal reasons.651 Even when the Member States accepted the role of the 
Delegation, the effectiveness of the latter's action was sometimes impaired by the 
maintenance of national positions conflicting with the single stance adopted at EU 
level.652  
What is more, the Members' loyalty to the Union is not sufficient to ensure unity in 
practice, since the absence of unanimity renders coherence impossible. For the time 
being, the Member States remain less than eager to cooperate in areas affecting 
their core interests and visibility in specific third countries.653 This is, in fact, a limit 
of European diplomatic coordination that cannot be addressed by the EEAS. As in 
other fields, the Service may foster unity, but it cannot enforce it.  
 
* 
 
* * 
 
This section sought to investigate the peculiarities of the EU's representation at 
diplomatic level. It demonstrated that the EU's diplomatic representation is not 
unaffected by fragmentation, but that the creation of the new post of Head of 
Delegation, who is an EEAS officer, has the potential to limit the shortcomings 
entailed by such fragmentation. It is manifest that the legislator sought to promote 
unity, and thus coherence in this area, since the Head of Delegation is meant to 
facilitate coordination between the activities of the EEAS and those of the 
Commission, through his/her insertion in the hierarchy of both entities. 
Importantly, the coordinating functions of the HoD are not inspired by a 'static' 
                                                 
650 N. Westcott, Managing Director for Africa, EEAS, in UK House of Lords, The Select Committee on 
the European Union, Inquiry on European External Action Service, 22 January 2013,  p. 4, available 
at http://www.parliament.uk. 
651 Id. See also Van Vooren and Wessel, "External Representation and the European External Action 
Service: Selected Legal Challenges", in Blockmans and Wessel (eds), Principles and Practices of EU 
External Representation (CLEER, 2012), pp. 59-83, p. 66, who notice that "the fact that now Article 
47 TEU explicitly gives legal personality to the EU, has prompted the UK to deploy the rather legal-
formalistic argument that the terminology ‘EU’ can no longer be utilized to designate ‘EC and its 
Member States’ when delivering statements on behalf of the EU in multilateral fora. […] The 
Commission and several Member States strongly opposed this reasoning, which led to ‘EU’ 
representation in multilateral fora such as at the OSCE and UN to ground to a halt during the second 
half of 2011." The issue was partially solved with the "General Arrangements for EU Statements in 
Multilateral Organisations’, Council doc. 16901/11, 24 October 2011, which regulates how messages 
are to be delivered 'on behalf of the EU' or on behalf of "the EU and its members".  
652 According to a diplomat from a non-EU State, interviewed by the author in April 2012, it is well 
known that the positions upheld by EU and Member States' diplomatic missions, especially in the 
fields of human rights, are often contradicted by the behaviour of national embassies in the context of 
bilateral relations. Several EEAS officers interviewed at a latter stage denied the existence of such a 
widespread practice. Anyway, also Wouters et al., op. cit., p. 71, notice that "in case of delicate issues, 
such as human rights, the Member States prefer an EU demarche. While this may impair the Union’s 
relationship with the third country in question, it allows Member States to continue to maintain good 
relations with it." 
653 Wouters et al., op. cit., p. 70. 
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understanding of division of labour, but they are modelled to increase coherence 
where unity is most necessary,  
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER 4 
This chapter intended to demonstrate that the EEAS can enhance unity in EU 
external representation, and thus lead to increased coherence in the conduct of 
European foreign policies. It is submitted that, although the external representation 
of the Union is fragmented because of conferral, the EEAS may contribute to 
increase the EU's unity on the international scene. In general, the EEAS renders 
such unity more feasible, since the Commission may be relatively more trustful of 
the Service than it is of other entities, including the HR. It is in the field of 
diplomacy, however, that the Service brings about the most evident added value.  
The EU has the potential to conduct an almost full (and state-like) diplomacy, and 
this potential is largely confirmed by the practice. Such potential would however be 
nullified by the fragmentation of competences in the field of external 
representation, by projecting the divisions between EU actors in third countries and 
at international organisations. Given the need to foster unity in this area, the 
legislator directly provided an EEAS officer, the Head of Delegation, with the 
capability to oversee the entire work of EU delegations, also in the areas falling 
within the competences of the Commission, thus privileging unity in international 
representation over delimitation. The HoD was also allowed to substitute 
Commission officers in areas where unity is essential, that is to say budget 
implementation and, above all, external representation stricto sensu.  
The EEAS' contribution to diplomatic unity is not limited to the EU level. In fact, 
unity can be promoted also transversally to the divide between EU and Member 
States' competences, since the new EU Delegations are likely to render diplomatic 
coordination more effective. In sum, third States may have finally found, in their 
own territory, the telephone number they need to talk to Europe. 
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CONCLUSION 
The analysis sought to demonstrate that the European External Action Service is a 
new sort of Union body, which is meant to reconcile the two Europes that interact 
with the world – the 'technocratic Europe', dealing with 'Communitarian' issues 
such as trade and aid, and the 'power Europe', dealing with 'high politics'.654 
The motivation for this 'mixed' identity is found in the contradiction that affects 
current European foreign policy. Monnet's prophecy on Europe's role in 
international relations has become commonplace: "nos pays sont devenus trop 
petits pour le monde actuel à l’échelle des moyens techniques modernes, à la 
mesure de l’Amérique et de la Russie d’aujourd’hui, de la Chine et de l’Inde de 
demain".655 Therefore, the pure 'intergovernmental' vision can no longer be 
accepted. The Member States do not ignore this fact, but they are not willing to 
preside over the dismemberment of their foreign policies, because of ideology, the 
lack of mutual trust or the existence of diverging interests. In this context, an 
inflexible support for the Community method throughout European foreign policies 
probably would be counterproductive, since the Member States may prefer not to 
cooperate rather than accepting the EU's 'competence creep'. This conundrum is 
solved by accepting plurality in European foreign policy, while requesting the 
Union and its Members to ensure the coherence of their external actions.  
Coherence can be implemented only through the coordination of the different, and 
separate, initiatives of European policy-makers, that is to say by bridging the gap 
between the 'Community' and intergovernmental approaches. This is the 'Union 
method' envisaged by A. Merkel: "coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity - each 
of us in the area for which we are responsible but all working towards the same 
goal".656 The EEAS embodies the 'Union method', since it is clearly meant to 
coordinate the different strands of European foreign policy. In fact, the Service is 
not a simple extension of the acquis communautaire in the sphere of the Union's 
external relations657, because it is tasked with promoting consensus among the 
Member States, and it must consequently consider their interests and priorities. 
The EEAS is not a proxy of the Member States either, since it operates under the 
control of a EU organ (the High Representative) in close cooperation with the 
Commission; moreover, its officers are likely to work with the interests of the Union 
in mind.  
The characterisation of the EEAS as a 'coordinator' explains its apparently 
anomalous features. Some aspects of the Service overtly defy conferral and its 
corollaries precisely because the EEAS was designed from the onset to 
pragmatically combine the Community and intergovernmental methods. The 
                                                 
654 Vaïsse et al., op. cit., p. 20. 
655 Jean Monnet (1954), quoted in Barroso, Europe: quel héritage? Quelles responsabilités? – Etats 
généraux de l'Europe, Strasbourg, 17 April 2010, SPEECH/10/166. 
656 Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of 
the College of Europe in Bruges on 2 November 2010. 
657 See European Parliament legislative resolution of 8 July 2010 on the proposal for a Council 
decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, O.J. 
2011 C 351, preamble. 
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challenge is now to make sure that this pragmatic approach is applied in respect of 
all the activities of the Service, thereby including also the areas where the concern 
for delimitation constantly hinders an effective coordination. For instance, EEAS 
officers may be enabled to give financial implementation to the operative lines of 
the EU budget; additionally, the EEAS should be allowed to verify all the 
instructions sent to EU officers in Delegations, possibly via the Heads of 
Delegation.658 More generally, it is necessary to redefine the EEAS' tasks on the 
basis of what best achieves the desired outcome, rather than institutional theory or 
dogma. It would thus seem logical to give the Service responsibilities in the most 
politically sensitive areas, even when they pertain to fields other than the CFSP, 
such as in the case of security management659 or climate change.660 This can be 
done through the revision of the EEAS Decision due to take place in 2013/2014. In 
principle, it would seem logical to 'de-regulate' the division of labour between the 
Service and other bodies, since the recent practice suggests that EU services require 
ample scope for manoeuvre in the determination of their respective roles. However, 
such course of action is possible only if Union institutions, and namely the 
Commission, voluntarily accept the 'interference' of the EEAS with their activities. 
Further research may indicate which 'hard' or 'soft' legal instruments are most apt 
at ensuring increased coherence in practice.  
The nature of the EEAS as a coordinator provides indications also as to its probable 
influence on European foreign policy. The Service is bound neither to reinforce the 
'exceptionalism' of the Union as an international player, nor to transform the EU's 
external action into a state's realist foreign policy. The EEAS is more likely to 
mediate between the positions of European foreign policy actors, in order to foster 
its overarching objective, that is to say coherence. In other words, the EEAS is more 
concerned with the existence of a European foreign policy than with its content. 
Future researches may shed light on the exact consequences of the EEAS' creation. 
For instance, it would be useful to understand to what extent the allocation of the 
EU's development cooperation funds will be re-routed to non-development 
purposes in the next few years. Given the findings of chapter 3, it may be 
hypothesised that there may be shifts in certain marginal areas, and namely those 
closely linked to the CFSP, but that the bulk of EU aid will remain as development-
oriented as it was in the recent past.  
The EEAS' concern for effectiveness does not automatically imply its capability to 
ensure increased coherence in practice. It is possible that even a successful activity 
of coordination fails to increase coherence because of the opposition of some policy-
makers. This apparent paradox can be elucidated through the example of the EU's 
stance towards Israel-Palestine relations. As it is known, the Union has a well-
established position in this area, whereby it seeks to foster a comprehensive 
negotiated peace on the basis of a two-state solution.661 This position is supported, 
at least in principle, via CFSP and non-CFSP initiatives alike.662 However, it is easy 
                                                 
658 See supra, chapters 3 and 4. 
659 See supra, chapter 3. 
660 Cf. De Jong and Schuntz, op. cit. 
661 See Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the Middle East 
Peace Process, Brussels, 29 November 2012 
662 In the context of its trade policy, the Union does not extend the preferential treatment accorded to 
Israeli products to the goods originating from occupied territories. Indeed, whereas the EC-Israel 
Association Agreement provides for preferential treatment for Israeli products imported in the EU, 
“the European Union takes the view that products obtained in locations which have been placed 
under Israeli administration since 1967 do not qualify for the preferential treatment provided for 
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to note that EU diplomatic missions never publicly condemned the building of new 
Israeli settlements via a 'local statement'. This absence of unity may well depend on 
a weak coordination on the part of the EU Delegation (and thus of the EEAS) but it 
may also be caused by the rigidity of some Member States: as noted in chapter 4, 
the Service can promote, but not enforce, unity in external representation.663  
The example of Israel-Palestine relations shows also that coherence may be ensured 
even in the absence of a successful coordination. In 2011, some EU Members voted 
in favour of Palestine accession to UNESCO, whereas others opposed it, and a third 
group abstained. The following year, when the UN General Assembly granted 
observer status to Palestine, cohesion was greater, and only one Member opposed 
the demand of Palestine.664 Evidently, it is not possible to assert a priori whether 
this improvement is a consequence of the EEAS' coordination or depends on 
exogenous factors, such as the international outrage for the boosting of the Israeli 
colonisation policy.665  
Thus assessing the added value of the Service is a complex task. A balanced 
evaluation of the EEAS' contribution to European foreign policy can only be 
performed through an accurate analysis of the specific circumstances of each case 
and the mobilisation of new theoretical tools, capable of distinguishing the outcome 
of the coordination process from that of the EU action as a whole. Future research 
may consequently demonstrate empirically whether the Service is a mere 
instrument for the projection of national interests or it has the capability to create a 
coherent foreign policy where incompatible views previously existed.666 This kind of 
research would not serve only academic purposes, but it would also help 
parliamentary bodies and European citizens to identify the subjects responsible for 
the creation, or the absence, of EU-wide policies.  
These conclusions, as well as the additional researches they suggest, are particularly 
significant, since the 'Union method' is likely to be the sole means through which a 
European foreign policy can come into being during the next years. The creation of 
a monolithic, 'Community-like', foreign policy would need the relativisation of 
national interests, which, in turn, necessitates the weakening of national identities. 
Since this outcome is far from being achieved, the sustainability of a European 
foreign policy can only be ensured via the affirmation of a new approach to external 
                                                                                                                                               
under that agreement, Case C-386/08, Firma Brita Gmbh v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, [2010] 
ECR I-1289, para 64 
663 A third explanation may be that the HR issued such condemnation herself in numerous occasions. 
It is worth noticing, however, that in this case it is the Union and not its Members that condemns 
Israeli actions. If the settlement policy were condemned via a joint statement of EU missions, the 
participation of all Union members would be more evident. The European countries that are closest 
to Israel may therefore prefer the former solution, which is less problematic for their bilateral 
relations. 
664 From the 2011 to the 2012, three Member States switched from abstention to approval (Italy, 
Denmark, Portugal), three countries switched from “no” to abstention (Germany, Netherlands, 
Lithuania), one country switched from “no” to approval (Sweden), see Fisher, "Map: How Europe 
voted on Palestine at the U.N., in 2011 and now", Worldviews-Washington Post, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews, 29 November 2012. 
665 Cf. McGreal, “Israel to build new Jewish settlement homes after UN Palestine vote”, The 
Guardian, 30 November 2012, according to whom “the Israelis were particularly stung by the 
German decision to shift from opposition to abstention. Haaretz reported that Germany moved 
because of Israeli intransigence on Jewish settlement construction and because Israel had not met 
previous commitments to the German government.” 
666 A theoretical framework to address at least part of this issue is provided for in Furness, "Who 
Controls the European External Action Service? Agent Autonomy in EU External Policy", 18 
European Foreign Affairs Review (2013): 103-122. 
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relations, which acknowledges that "often the choice is not between the Community 
method and the intergovernmental method, but between a coordinated position 
and nothing at all".667 The development of this coordination is the main 
contribution of the EEAS to European integration and the principal challenge it has 
to face. Besides, "coordination is often a first stage which leads on to more 
integrated measures."668 
                                                 
667 Van Rompuy, Not Renationalisation of European Politics, cit. supra. 
668 Id.. 
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